Russia’s partnership with Iran: Short-term gains, long-term losses

It may seem that Russia and Iran are destined for a long alliance because of their tight cooperation in current war-fighting. Yet history suggests that a deep vein of distrust runs through their relationship, and their core interests do not always align. It is probably a mistake to assume that their current security cooperation will be permanent, especially because Russia is fundamentally so much stronger than Iran and over the long term will likely need the relationship less.

The simultaneity of their two wars has propelled Moscow and Teheran into a bilateral partnership of convenience, one that is opportunistic and not based on any long-term trust or military integration. Indeed, the relationship has been costly for Moscow’s other security goals in the Middle East and is unlikely to remain at its present strength after either of these states’ current wars end.

Although Russia and Iran have a long history of conflict, they began engaging in significant military cooperation in 2015, when they engaged in joint military planning and operations alongside Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah, in support of dictator Bashar al-Assad’s regime in the civil war in Syria (which Assad nevertheless lost in 2024). Their involvement in the Syria war allowed both to showcase their military projection capabilities abroad and to support a fellow authoritarian leader against what began as a popular uprising. Since 2016, Russia has been Iran’s sole foreign source of weaponry, though Russia has refused some Iranian requests for more advanced armaments. But these forms of cooperation did not place them directly at odds with the United States, and even as Russia and Iran cooperated in Syria they found themselves competing for influence on the ground there.