Caitlin Talmadge, member of the Security Studies Program (SSP) and faculty affiliate at the Center for Nuclear Security Policy (CNSP), argues that the Iran war undermined the notion that US forward bases and surface ships enjoy sanctuary from adversary attack, with major implications for US defense planning against Russia and China.
The Iran war has called into question the feasibility of the American way of war. For decades, the United States has premised its national strategy on the ability to fight using forces forward deployed close to enemy territory. But this war has profoundly undermined the notion that the bases and surface ships needed to project such power will continue to enjoy sanctuary from adversary attack. This reality has major implications for U.S. policy toward and campaign planning against more powerful adversaries such as Russia and China, who will also surely seek to deny the United States the ability to fight in the manner it prefers.
How did we get here?
America has largely embraced a forward defense approach since World War II. Insulated by its fortunate geography, the United States has honed a model of warfare that emphasizes projecting power to counter and defeat threats at a distance rather than on its shores. This approach is predicated on U.S. naval power at sea combined with an unparalleled network of allies and partners on land that grants a combination of access, basing, and overflight permissions.
The United States’ forward military posture varies by region and is ideally tied to the capabilities required to deter and, if necessary, defeat threats in line with U.S. national security interests. For that reason, the United States did not always keep large standing forces in the Middle East or have the ability to rapidly deploy such forces in the event of conflict. Those capabilities emerged only in the early 1980s in response to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, eventually leading to the formation of U.S. Central Command.
These investments largely delivered on their promise in the 1991 Gulf War. The United States was able to amass over half a million troops in the region within a few months of Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. It then pummeled Iraq in a six-week campaign of land- and sea-based air strikes followed by a victorious 100-hour ground war, all with very low casualties or equipment losses. In 2003, the United States again relied on these assets plus its foothold in Afghanistan to easily overthrow the regime in Baghdad (notwithstanding the insurgency and civil war that followed).
Throughout this period, U.S. bases and carriers had virtual sanctuary from Iraqi attacks despite being located relatively close to Iraqi territory. Carriers regularly operated in and near the Persian Gulf, while the United States maintained large bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. In 1991, Iraq did launch one devastating ballistic missile attack against a U.S. base in Saudi Arabia, killing 28 service members. But despite that harrowing episode, most Iraqi Scuds were intercepted or inaccurate, doing little damage to U.S. bases.
After 1991, Iraq’s ability to attack U.S. bases or ships was minimal, given the military damage it had suffered, in addition to general Iraqi tactical incompetence and economic ruin. During the insurgency and civil war in Iraq, U.S. bases located within the country did come under repeated attack, but bases outside the country and carriers in the Gulf remained largely safe. Overall, the United States was effectively able to deploy and employ forces in the region at will.
The end of an era
Fast forward to 2026, and it is clear that Iran went to school on the U.S. way of war and understands how to leverage its limited assets to strike at the heart of U.S. power projection capabilities both on land and at sea. Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, has said as much, explicitly threatening that the United States will no longer have “a safe haven for its mischief and for establishing military bases” and that the region will “no longer serve as shields for American bases.” He has also openly warned that “history will record that the Iranian nation sank the superpower of America in the Persian Gulf.”
It is true that the United States has enjoyed tactical and operational successes in the war. It has degraded Iran’s conventional military and damaged its nuclear program. The United States’ integrated air and missile defense regional architecture, developed over nearly 20 years, has also performed well, albeit at a high cost. No one can say that Iran has outright prevented the United States from projecting power into the region—the U.S. military has done so, though how long it can sustain the high tempo of current operations remains to be seen.
