M. Taylor Fravel, director of the Security Studies Program (SSP), examines the purge of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers by Xi Jinping and the challenges PLA leadership could face in the aftermath.
Xi Jinping.
The second wave of purges of senior PLA officers by Xi Jinping is unprecedented in the history of the PLA. The Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission, which oversees China’s armed forces, has been organizationally decapitated. Of the six generals named to the CMC in 2022, only one remains. Additionally, he is a political commissar whose career has focused on discipline and personnel issues, not military operations and training.
Yet, as the new data gathered by the CSIS China Power team shows, the significance of this round of purges extends far beyond the CMC to impact the entire PLA leadership. In the PLA’s organizational structure, an officer’s grade is more important than their rank and usually corresponds to the grade or level of the unit they command, oversee, or direct. Below the CMC, the highest grade an officer can hold is theater command leader, which includes the commanders and political commissars of the four services and five regional theater commands, as well as the directors of key departments within the CMC. The next most important grade is theater command deputy leader, which includes the multiple deputies to the positions above, the associated chiefs of staff, the directors of other departments within the CMC, and other positions.
A focus on grades indicates that the PLA leadership comprises roughly 176 billets or positions. In addition to the six CMC positions (two vice chairs and four members), these include 25 theater command leader positions and another 145 theater command deputy leader positions, according to TextOre’s Directory of PLA Military Leadership 2025. The CSIS Database on Chinese Military Purges shows that 101 senior officers who served in CMC, theater command, or theater deputy command grade positions have been dismissed or gone missing. After accounting for positions in which more than one purge has occurred, such as the commander of the PLA Rocket Force, approximately 52 percent of positions in the PLA leadership have been impacted.
This figure is striking and extraordinary, demonstrating the depth of Xi’s campaign and the unprecedented churn in the PLA leadership. It has affected the commanders and political commissars of each service (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force) and each theater command, as well as the directors of six CMC departments, among many other senior leadership positions and deputy leadership positions. Put differently, all CMC positions and theater command level positions have experienced a purge as measured in the CSIS data. And purges have occurred in approximately 38 percent of all theater command deputy leader positions.
Several implications follow from this analysis. First, the depth of the purge suggests that dissatisfaction with the PLA leadership’s performance is a major factor in Xi’s calculus (in addition to concerns about corruption, political loyalty, military autonomy, military obedience, or policy differences).
Second, rebuilding the PLA leadership will take time. A large gap exists at the theater command leader grade, with 38 officers in such positions having been dismissed or disappeared. They can only be replaced by officers serving in theater deputy leader command positions, yet with 56 officers in this grade having been dismissed, the pool of potential officers who can be promoted to theater command level positions has been cut by more than one-third. Moreover, to be promoted to a higher grade, an officer typically must serve three to five years in their current grade, further complicating efforts to replenish the leadership positions.
Third, the purge underscores the challenges that PLA leadership would face, either with empty billets or newly promoted officers inexperienced in their new roles, in undertaking large-scale military operations such as a blockade or amphibious assault of Taiwan. Although roughly half (53 percent) of theater command–level officers who were purged came from the command track, this proportion grows to around two-thirds (68 percent) at the deputy theater command level, highlighting the difficulty that the PLA will face to meet its ambitious modernization goals.
