No Good Options: The Extended Nuclear Deterrence Trilemma

Professor Mark Bell from the University of Minnesota will give a presentation at the MIT Security Studies Program's Wednesday Seminar.

Summary: Extended nuclear deterrence has been a core feature of U.S. grand strategy throughout the nuclear age. However, shifting U.S. commitments, a changing balance of power, and potential new patrons of extended nuclear deterrence are raising the question of how extended nuclear deterrence operates in more general terms, beyond the U.S. case. We identify a trilemma that exists when states offer extended nuclear deterrence. States cannot simultaneously prioritize three policy goals: credible deterrence; a nuclear arsenal oriented toward crisis stability; and nonproliferation. The choice to prioritize any two of these goals requires deprioritizing the third. We show that the constraints of the trilemma drove U.S. policy choices during the Cold War and sheds light on the China-North Korea relationship and ongoing policy debates regarding potential “post-American” options for European extended nuclear deterrence.