The shadow architects of power

In Washington, D.C., where conversations about Russia often center on a single name, political science doctoral candidate Suzanne Freeman is busy redrawing the map of power in autocratic states. Her research upends prevailing narratives about Vladimir Putin's Russia, asking us to look beyond the individual to understand the system that produced him.

"The standard view is that Putin originated Russia’s system of governance and the way it engages with the world," Freeman explains. "My contention is that Putin is a product of a system rather than its author, and that his actions are very consistent with the foreign policy beliefs of the organization in which he was educated.”

That organization — the KGB and its successor agencies — stands at the center of Freeman's dissertation, which examines how authoritarian intelligence agencies intervene in their own state's foreign policy decision-making processes, particularly decisions about using military force.

Dismantling the "Yes Men" Myth

Past scholarship has relied on an oversimplified characterization of intelligence agencies in authoritarian states. "The established belief that I'm challenging is essentially that autocrats surround themselves with ‘yes’ men," Freeman says. She notes that this narrative stems in great part from a famous Soviet failure, when intelligence officers were too afraid to contradict Stalin's belief that Nazi Germany wouldn't invade in 1941.

Freeman's research reveals a far more complex reality. Through extensive archival work, including newly declassified documents from Lithuania, Moldova, and Poland, she shows that intelligence agencies in authoritarian regimes actually have distinct foreign policy preferences and actively work to advance them.

"These intelligence agencies are motivated by their organizational interests, seeking to survive and hold power inside and beyond their own borders,” Freeman says.

When an international situation threatens those interests, authoritarian intelligence agencies may intervene in the policy process using strategies Freeman has categorized in an innovative typology: indirect manipulation (altering collected intelligence), direct manipulation (misrepresenting analyzed intelligence), preemption in the field (unauthorized actions that alter a foreign crisis), and coercion (threats against political leadership).

"By intervene, I mean behaving in some way that's inappropriate in accordance with what their mandate is," Freeman explains. That mandate includes providing policy advice. “But sometimes intelligence agencies want to make their policy advice look more attractive by manipulating information,” she notes. “They may change the facts out on the ground, or in very rare circumstances, coerce policymakers."

From Soviet Archives to Modern Russia

Rather than studying contemporary Russia alone, Freeman uses historical case studies of the Soviet Union's KGB. Her research into this agency’s policy intervention covers eight foreign policy crises between 1950 and 1981, including uprisings in Eastern Europe, the Sino-Soviet border dispute, and the Soviet-Afghan War.

What she discovered contradicts prior assumptions that the agency was primarily a passive information provider. "The KGB had always been important for Soviet foreign policy and gave policy advice about what they thought should be done," she says. Intelligence agencies were especially likely to pursue policy intervention when facing a "dual threat": domestic unrest sparked by foreign crises combined with the loss of intelligence networks abroad.

This organizational motivation, rather than simply following a leader's preferences, drove policy recommendations in predictable ways.

Freeman sees striking parallels to Russia's recent actions in Ukraine. "This dual organizational threat closely mirrors the threat that the KGB faced in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland from 1980 to 1981," she explains. After 2014, Ukrainian intelligence reform weakened Russian intelligence networks in the country — a serious organizational threat to Russia's security apparatus.

"Between 2014 and 2022, this network weakened," Freeman notes. "We know that Russian intelligence had ties with a polling firm in Ukraine where they had data saying that 84% of the population would view them as occupiers, that almost half of the Ukrainian population was willing to fight for Ukraine.”  In spite of these polls, officers recommended going into Ukraine anyway."

This pattern resembles the KGB's advocacy for invading Afghanistan using the manipulation of intelligence — a parallel that helps explain Russia's foreign policy decisions beyond just Putin's personal preferences.