Caitlin Talmadge, faculty affiliate of the Security Studies Program (SSP) and the Raphael Dorman-Helen Starbuck Associate Professor of Political Science, analyzes Israel's campaign against Iran, specifically its targeting of Iran's military capabilities.
An Iranian firefighter works at the scene of a destroyed residential building caused by Israeli attacks in Tehran, Iran.
Israel has publicly described its attacks on Iran as aimed at preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, but nearly a week into the war, it is less than clear that this stated purpose is Israel’s actual or only purpose. Based on the pattern of Israeli strikes so far, the campaign looks at least as focused on destroying Iranian conventional military capabilities, especially its air defense and missile forces (though these missiles could someday help Iran deliver nuclear weapons); degrading Iran’s economic ability to reconstitute these forces; restoring deterrence after the horrific Iran-supported Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023; and destabilizing and possibly displacing the Iranian regime.
The campaign is still ongoing, of course. Some targets could serve multiple different war aims, and the Israelis surely do want to damage Iran’s nuclear program. But so far, the war looks more like an effort to pummel Israel’s archrival at a time when Iran’s ability to fight back is more limited than it has been in decades. The Iranian regional position is in tatters due to the disintegration of Hezbollah and Hamas, the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria, Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine, and the damage already suffered in military exchanges with Israel last year. That much is clear. What is unclear, however, is that there was actually any big impending change in Iran’s nuclear program that pushed Israel to attack now. Prior to the war, U.S. officials apparently dismissed Israel’s efforts to persuade them otherwise.
Israeli damage to Iran’s nuclear program seems limited so far, in part because permanently destroying it is a tall order. The assassinations of top scientists are clearly a blow, and Israel is said to have scored direct hits on the important enrichment facility at Natanz, including underground. But nuclear knowledge is widespread in Iran, and since President Donald Trump reneged on the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, the International Atomic Energy Agency lost the ability to monitor where Iran may have hidden other components of its program.
Most importantly, Israel seems barely to have touched Fordow, the crucial and deeply buried enrichment site southwest of Tehran. Israel lacks the ideal air-delivered munitions needed to destroy facilities so far underground. It is entirely possible that Israel still has plans for a ground operation there, an approach that would be in keeping with the Israeli tradition of bold commando raids. It is also possible Israel expects Trump will eventually cave to pressure to attack the site with the U.S. Air Force’s 30,000-lb. bunker-busting bombs that can be dropped effectively only from a U.S. B-2 bomber. That gamble may prove correct, but it is not assured that even this so-called Massive Ordnance Penetrator will achieve the military results the Israelis want at Fordow.
In short, the war may damage but not end Iran’s nuclear program—and the Israelis likely know this, despite rhetoric to the contrary. But they may be hoping for other kinds of results from their campaign. Watching the pattern of attacks over the coming days will be key.
