A recent study in Climatic Change led by MIT professors Evan Lieberman and Volha Charnysh, co-authored with MIT PhD student Jared Kalow and UPenn postdoc Erin Walk PhD ‘24, explores US public opinion on global climate policies considering our nation’s historic role as a leading contributor of carbon emissions.

The randomized, experimental survey specifically investigates American attitudes toward a “moral responsibility” for providing aid to poor nations--which have a significantly smaller carbon footprint and face catastrophic climate events at a much higher rate than wealthy countries.

The authors recently sat down with the Center of International Studies to discuss their research, provide insights, and offer recommendations that could result in more effective climate advocacy.

1) What are the key findings (and any surprises!) of your recent paper on climate attitudes among the US population?

A big question at the COP29 Climate talks in Baku, Azerbaijan, was, who will pay the trillions of dollars needed to help lower-income countries adapt to climate change? During past meetings, global leaders have come to an increasing consensus that the wealthiest countries should pay, but there has been little follow through on commitments. In countries like the United States, popular opinion about such policies can weigh heavily on politicians' minds, as citizens focus on their own challenges at home.

Prime Minister Gaston Browne of Antigua and Barbuda is one of many who views such transfers as a matter of moral responsibility, explaining that many rich countries see climate finance as “a random act of charity ...not recognizing that they have a moral obligation to provide funding, especially the historical emitters and even those who currently have large emissions.”

In our study, we set out to measure American attitudes towards climate-related foreign aid, and explicitly to test the impact of this particular moral responsibility narrative. We did this on an experimental basis, so subjects were randomly assigned to receive different messages.

One message emphasized what we call a “climate justice” frame, and it argued that Americans should contribute to helping poor countries because of the United States’ disproportionate role in the emissions of greenhouse gasses that have led to global warming. That message had a positive impact on the extent to which citizens supported the use of foreign aid for climate adaptation in poor countries. However, when we looked at who was actually moved by the message, we found that the effect was larger and statistically significant only among Democrats, but not among Republicans.

We were surprised that a message emphasizing solidarity, the idea that “we are all in this together,” had no overall effect on citizen attitudes, Democrats or Republicans. 

2) What are your recommendations toward addressing the attitudes on global climate policies within the US?

First, given limited budgets and attention for communications campaigns, our research certainly suggests that emphasizing a bit of blaming and shaming are more powerful than more diffuse messages of shared responsibility.

But our research also emphasized how critically important it is to find new ways to communicate with Republicans about climate change and about foreign aid. Republicans were overwhelmingly less supportive of climate aid and yet even from that low baseline, a message that moved Democrats had a much more mixed reception among Republicans. Researchers and those working on the front lines of climate communications need to do more to better understand Republican perspectives. Younger Republicans, for example, might be more movable on key climate policies.

3) With an incoming Trump administration, what are some of the specific hurdles and/or opportunities we face in garnering US public support for international climate negotiations?

Not only did Trump demonstrate his disdain for international action on climate change by withdrawing from the Paris agreement during his first term in office, but he has indicated his intention to double down on such strategies in his second term. And the idea that he would support assistance for the world’s poorest countries harmed by climate change? This seems unlikely. Because we find Republican public opinion so firmly in line with these perspectives, frankly, it is hard to be optimistic.

Those Americans concerned with the effects of climate change may need to look to state-level, non-government, corporate and more global organizations to support climate justice efforts. 

4) Are there any other takeaways you’d like to share?

Those working in the climate change area may need to rethink how we talk and message about the challenges the world faces. Right now, almost anything that sounds like “climate change” is likely to be rejected by Republican leaders and large segments of American society. Our approach of experimenting with different types of messages is a relatively low-cost strategy for identifying more promising strategies, targeted at Americans and at citizens in other wealthy countries.

But our study, in line with other work, also demonstrates that partisanship – identifying as a Republican or Democrat – is by far the strongest predictor of attitudes toward climate aid. While climate justice messaging can move attitudes slightly, the effects are still modest relative to the contributions of party identification itself. Just as Republican party elites were once persuaded to take leadership in the global fight against HIV and AIDS, a similar challenge lies ahead for climate aid.

Read the study here.