précis interview
John Tirman

précis: What is the Human Rights Revolution?

JT: The Human Rights Revolution is a loose concept but it’s a phenomenon among governments particularly as well as NGOs and activists that emerged after the Second World War. At the time, there was a gradual but discernible expansion of rights, especially in the Global South with post-colonial movements and state-building.
It was not a perfectly smooth phenomenon because the Cold War served as a counter to it. However, by the 1960s and mid 1970s, governments were being held accountable in ways that they weren’t held accountable before. This was also the era of the rise of groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

**précis:** Do you see the decline of the Human Rights Revolution as something that is happening within states or across states? Which decline is more concerning?

**JT:** In the last 10-15 years, many states have been backsliding and have been simply ignoring human rights norms demands from NGOs and from other states and politicians. They can simply ignore it and get away with it. There are some particularly egregious examples like Turkey and Russia and Poland and Hungary with their rising anti-Semitism. Unfortunately, the US, even under the best of circumstances—under Clinton and Obama—did not do very much to advance this agenda. We are left in a situation where one cannot be very optimistic about the protection of free speech, assembly, and the traditional rights we focus on.

At the same time, we are seeing human security issues emerge, like immigration and refugee status. International Law for refugees is being ignored around the world—not just the Syrian crisis. I feel rather pessimistic about it in the US with Trump. In the past, people used to at least talk the talk if they didn’t walk the walk, they’d at least pay lip service to democracy and human rights—even under the Soviet Union—they don’t do that anymore. This trend towards authoritarianism is global for reasons I don’t completely understand. Human rights and human security are suffering for it.

**précis:** In your latest book, Dream Chasers: Immigration and the American Backlash, you describe the rise of right-wing exclusionary politics and populism as the other side of the coin of the decline of the human rights revolution. How would you describe right wing populism in the US?
JT: If you look at the United States, right-wing populism has always been there. It’s not new; it’s just new in how it’s gotten traction currently. It’s striking to me the issues that people focus on—and I do read right-wing blogs and social media—it’s mainly about immigration. One could say it’s a proxy for racism or for other kinds of noxious political ideologies, but what it focuses on is the notion that these people—whether Mexicans or Muslims—are coming in and taking jobs and changing the culture and cutting in line for federal support and benefits. I think this is a constant in almost all forms and episodes of populism.

For example, when I wrote Dream Chasers, I noticed two things in terms of anti-immigration sentiment: one was illegality. However, it was illegality in the sense that it was a proxy for “otherness” because the claims of illegality are outrageous. The actual infraction of someone coming across the border is a misdemeanor, not a crime—it’s a civil infraction and the same with overstaying a visa, it’s not a crime. The other thing I noticed was an obsession about Spanish—you can hear complaints about how they [the immigrants] won’t speak English which is nonsense because Hispanic immigrants adopt English at the same rate as other immigrants. But it’s become this hot-button issue and I think again it’s about otherness and changing the dominant white culture. Populism is driven by a number of issues—some of which may be people feeling left out of prosperity—but its manifestation is cultural and about maintaining some idea of White-Anglo purity.

précis: A while back, the MIT community received an email from President Reif about MIT’s supportive policy towards Dreamers. In light of this, what do you think academics, universities and American civil society in general should be doing as pushback against the federal government’s pressures on DACA?

JT: Certainly, MIT should be applauded for taking this view and they have always been good about these issues. Of course, there is an immigrant as a president of the university which helps because he is sympathetic and understands this. But there’s also a real problem when it comes to the Dreamers: there is a problem of federalism just as there is with sanctuary cities. Who has the authority to protect dreamers? If the state, universities or institutions are protecting, even in a passive way, can the federal government intervene? I can imagine under this administration a policy emerging in which universities are being punished, much like sanctuary cities are being punished.

More broadly, I’ve been interested in having a national conversation about citizenship and belonging. My sense is that even among political elites who are not liberals, you may find those—for example mayors in cities in the Southwest—who believe that it is wrong to deport people who have become part of American society. But we really don’t have a discourse about this between public officials and
academics. Professor Cristina Rodriguez from Yale has written a very interesting essay about deconstructing citizenship and expanding its concept beyond a narrow legal definition and towards a concept of community. Those kinds of things I think academics can really dig their teeth into because they take some very thoughtful research and engaging opinion elites and political elites. Presently, liberals who want to defend the dreamers really just play on sentiment rather than on anything substantive, instead we should be talking about how to build a multicultural society and what that means.

précis: In many ways, the Human Rights Revolution is a set of norms that the international community has accepted. However, in the past few months we have seen states being willing to ignore these norms—particularly Russia and Syria in their use of biological and chemical weapons. Do you think there is also a rise in norm violations committed by states? Or is there simply an increased awareness of violations?

JT: In the cold war there were a lot of violations on both sides. The US, for example, could pursue regime change in any number of countries—Iran, Guatemala—and the president and other political elites would pay no penalty for that. I think that the Human Rights Revolution was not so much about states behavior towards each other—although it should be—and more about states behavior towards citizens, individuals and communities. I don’t think it’s deteriorated necessarily since the depths of the Cold War. During the Cold War, you did have accountability in a funny sense—if the Soviet Union did something particularly odious to a group of people, like the invasion of Afghanistan, it could be a propaganda victory for the US.

The one thing that has really changed is the way the information is gathered and transmitted. Today, you have thousands of news organizations and entrepreneurs who are gathering and transmitting information and that’s very different and potentially a good thing in terms of holding states accountable. The problem is not that we don’t know what’s going on. But that we know what’s going on and we don’t do anything about it. For example, we clearly have violations of refugee law not just in the Syrian case but also in the US when kids coming in from Guatemala and Honduras who should qualify as refugees fleeing violence aren’t treated as such and no one calls us out on it. I’m not sure if it’s because we know more about when states are acting irresponsibly or if states are acting more irresponsibly than they used to.
The International Policy Lab (IPL) was set up within MIT’s Center for International Studies (CIS) to help make the leap from the lab bench or seminar blackboard to the halls of Congress or a decision-maker’s desk.
"The genesis of IPL was the realization that we had a number of faculty members at MIT whose research was relevant for public policy”—with bearing on such important issues as energy, environmental science, national security, or health and medicine—"but who weren’t sure how to engage with the policy community," says Chappell Lawson, associate professor of political science and IPL’s faculty director. As he puts it, “Sometimes we fumble the ball on the one-yard line, so that after a massive amount of work on the research side of things, for whatever reason that material doesn’t get into the right hands of the right people at the right time. That last piece is often what’s missing.”

Lawson joined MIT after a stint in government on the staff of the National Security Council in the Clinton Administration, and later took time out to serve in the Obama Administration working on border security issues for the Department of Homeland Security. It was upon returning from that second adventure in Washington that he, along with several other like-minded faculty, recognized that an opportunity to solve this problem was staring them in the face. “An assistant secretary in the federal government is not going to read a 30-page report, but they might take a meeting, listen to a short pitch, or read a one-page memo,” he says. What if MIT could help faculty members find the right way to engage with policy makers? About three years ago, Lawson and his colleagues secured funding from CIS, the dean of the School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences, and the Office of the Provost, and began soliciting project proposals from the MIT community.

"An assistant secretary in the federal government is not going to read a 30-page report, but they might take a meeting, listen to a short pitch, or read a one-page memo,” Lawson says.

A good early example of the sort of projects that IPL has come to facilitate came from R. Scott Kemp, associate professor of nuclear science and engineering and director of the MIT Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy. Kemp’s project concerned the proliferation risks of a new laser enrichment process for uranium.

“The reason this was of interest was that there had been a quiet push to license and build a facility in the US, but no government agency had carried out a technical assessment of the nuclear weapons proliferation risk that the technology might bring if it were commercialized,” Kemp explains. According to Kemp, neither the Nuclear Regulatory Commission nor Congress chose to examine the problem, meaning “the US was moving forward in blind ignorance of potential risks to international security that this technology might involve. So we took it upon ourselves here at MIT to actually carry out that assessment.”

That’s where IPL came in. Says Kemp, “IPL not only supported our work and outreach, but also in essence carried out research relative to what the perceived risks were in government, so we understood what was already being taken into account, what was not being taken into account, and then who were the right people to talk to.” As it happened, the companies involved with the laser enrichment technology ultimately decided not to pursue it, but IPL was “instrumental in helping us get important technical facts into the hands of the people who needed to make decisions.”
Kemp’s next IPL project involved a new technical solution for the verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement. He says that IPL helped his group cut through the “not invented here” syndrome that often pervades federal bureaucracy and creates resistance to outsiders’ ideas. “We’ve certainly put them on notice that some of the technology development being done at MIT should be looked at more seriously, and IPL was very instrumental in making that happen,” Kemp says.

The IPL has helped MIT faculty reach international policy makers as well. Jessika Trancik, associate professor at the Institute for Data, Systems, and Society (IDSS), engaged IPL resources to respond to an Obama Administration request for a report on her research addressing the feedback between emission reduction policy and technological innovation in clean energy. That report was used by the White House to inform its work in the months leading up to the COP21 Paris Climate Conference in 2015, and referenced by State Department negotiators during the COP. Another of her IPL projects examined methane emissions, their effect on meeting US climate goals, and their relevance to energy policy. IPL has been “an invaluable resource for strategizing about how to translate research results into useful information for policy makers,” she says.

Trancik is also co-faculty director of the IPL with Lawson and Noelle Selin, an associate professor affiliated with IDSS and the Department of Earth, Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences. “So now I’m also working with IPL to think about how we can expand our footprint and build on this initial success and amplify that further,” Trancik says. “We’re brainstorming ways to get different projects and faculty members and researchers to engage with each other to share lessons and build a community around policy research here at MIT.”

What was originally conceived as a more or less one-way conduit from MIT to Washington is becoming more of a two-way connection, the beginnings of a symbiosis.

In addition to using IPL in their own work, faculty participants help to review the project proposals that IPL solicits annually from the MIT community. “The idea is to serve faculty at all five schools, including social scientists and urban planners and MIT Sloan faculty as well as scientists and engineers,” Lawson explains, noting different projects call for a range of approaches. “For some, the right strategy might be to meet with people in the executive branch. For others, it might be to meet with people on the Hill, or some combination of the two. And for still others, it might be a much larger audience, like experts who are outside of government or even the informed public who cares about the issue.”

Lawson boils down IPL’s services to three points: “The first is working with faculty members to define what it is that they want to get out of engaging with the policy community. The second is almost a matchmaking service, connecting faculty members with people in government, the executive branch, legislative staff, think tanks, the media, who are interested in the results of their research and are in a position to make policy that’s related to it. And we provide staff support and modest grants to faculty members for engaging in this sort of outreach.”
“IPL not only supported our work and outreach, but also in essence carried out research relative to what the perceived risks were in government, so we understood what was already being taken into account, what was not being taken into account, and then who were the right people to talk to.”
An historic April 27 summit between Moon Jae-in, president of South Korea, and Kim Jong-un, supreme leader of North Korea, has been lauded as a path to peace for the divided peninsula as well as a tipping point of the North Korean nuclear crisis. But what concrete actions should we expect from the meeting between Kim and Moon? And how will this affect the forthcoming summit between President Trump and Kim?
How does the recent Kim-Moon summit pave the way for the upcoming meeting between President Trump and Kim Jong-un?

VN: The Kim-Moon summit achieved its main objective: to set up the main event between President Trump and Kim Jong-un. As expected, it was long on optics and bonhomie, but short on specific details. The joint statement pledged aims and goals that mirrored previous North-South summits. The language on “denuclearization” was vague enough that President Moon could tell the US administration that the North reaffirmed the goal of “complete denuclearization,” while leaving enough ambiguity so that the North could claim that it reaffirmed goals such as the full denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (which would have implications for the American extended nuclear deterrence commitment to South Korea) or as lofty as global nuclear disarmament.

What should we expect from U.S.-North Korea summit?

VN: The devil will be in the details in the upcoming Trump-Kim summit and whether they can agree upon a common definition of “denuclearization” and steps that concretely achieve whatever that may be. Unfortunately, with the Trump Administration’s continued insistence on unilateral complete, verifiable, irreversible North Korean disarmament—and nothing short of that—something North Korea is exceedingly unlikely to agree to, the prospect of meaningful progress short of that (such as freezes on certain missiles and nuclear weapons) may be dwindling.

What advice do you have for President Trump?

VN: The most important thing is to keep expectations realistic. If President Trump believes that he is going to go to the summit to be handed the keys to Kim’s nuclear kingdom, he may be in for a rude awakening. There is no reason that the summit cannot achieve progress toward denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula, but it will have to be steps and over a long period of time. Implementation and verification will be difficult, but not impossible. There is a deal to be had that benefits both sides, and the world. But it is unlikely to involve the unilateral surrendering of nuclear weapons by North Korea. So if the Trump administration is open to a deal short of that—which will still require some concessions from the United States—but which is a win-win, then the summit may yield fruit. But if not, a spectacular failure can be equally dangerous and pave the way to conflict. In my view, both the extreme success—unilateral North Korean disarmament—and the extreme failure—he meeting blowing up—are unlikely.

The most likely outcome is probably a nice photo-op and declaration which is long on rhetoric, pledging to work toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by some timeframe, but which commits neither side to anything immediately. This allows both sides to claim victory—Kim having met the president of the United States as an equal and as a nuclear weapons power, and Trump extracting some vague commitment on denuclearization—and kick the can down the road.
Is democracy dying, in the US and around the world? Why or why not? And if so, what can anyone do about it? Those vexing questions were at the heart of a public forum on the MIT campus Monday night, as scholars and journalists examined the current pressures on democratic systems of rule and suggested some measures to protect them. Held in the Stata Center, the event drew a standing-room only crowd of more than 300.
“Is democracy dying? Well, I don’t know, but it’s certainly having a rough ride,” said Daron Acemoglu, the Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics at MIT and co-author, with James Robinson, of the 2012 book, “Why Nations Fail.”

“We’re seeing attacks on the very norms and rules that we need for liberal democracy to be stable,” said Yascha Mounk, a lecturer on political theory at Harvard University and author of the new book, “The People Versus Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It.”

And as the panelists noted, the erosion of democracy is an international trend, given a recent withering of rights and norms in Hungary, Kenya, Poland, Russia, Turkey, and Venezuela, among other countries—as well as contentious debate about governmental norms and the balance of powers in the US.

Journalist Maria Ramirez, who covers US politics for the Univision network, noted that there is now considerable public information about “a lot of details about the Russian operation to discredit democracy in the US,” underscoring that people need to understand the vulnerabilities such incursions exploit.

Acemoglu emphasized, in a central theme of his remarks, that democracy cannot be protected through anything other than ongoing citizen mobilization. Even the checks and balances of the US Constitution, he asserted, are not especially powerful. “They are not strong, and they weren’t designed to protect democracy,” Acemoglu said. “The only thing that can save democracy is society itself.”

**Causes: Inequality, and much more**

The Starr Forum is a long-running Institute event series sponsored by MIT’s Center for International Studies, which provides public discussions about international politics and global security issues.

Melissa Nobles, the Kenan Sahin Dean of MIT’s School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences and a professor of political science, provided introductory remarks, noting that the status of democracy was “a question that is now probably occupying many of our fellow citizens in this country, and indeed around the world.”

Acemoglu suggested multiple factors have created stress on democracy, including a long-term shift toward income inequality, the exploitation of the media by authoritarian leaders around the globe, and a decline of manufacturing and trade unions — not strictly because of the ideological orientation of unions, but also because the capacity for civic engagement they once created is now dwindling.

So while economic inequality and the ensuing resentment against the political status quo is a factor, “It would also be a mistake to think it’s just about economic hardship,” said Acemoglu, who has written extensively on the relationship between political institutions and economic growth.
Conversely, Acemoglu added that despite the political stresses of the moment, “It’s not that easy to take down democracy,” because of the public awareness of rights and liberties that has accumulated over time.

Mounk pointed out that in concert with such trends, there has also been an alarming generational shift in tolerance for authoritarian rule and military rule; in surveys, about two-thirds of people born in the 1930s and 1940s said democracy was absolutely important, but less than one-third of those born in the 1980s and later agreed.

Mounk also noted that even recently political scientists regarded places like Hungary and Poland as democratic success stories, and thought the income levels and multiple transitions of power indicated such places had reached a state of stability. Instead, key rights have been eroded in those countries in recent years.

And while the US has “an astounding record of political stability,” Mounk said, he expressed concerns about transitions of power at the state level, citing actions by the Republican-led state legislature in North Carolina, which moved to strip certain powers from the governor’s office after Democratic Party candidate Roy Cooper won it in November 2016.

For that matter, Mounk said, as much as democracy has built up a strong track record, we “don’t yet know what the dynamics of multiethnic democracy and the reaction against it are” in the long run, given the relatively short time periods in which such democracies have existed.

**Maintaining democratic standards**

In response to audience questions, the speakers suggested a few measures that could help the health of democracies around the globe.

“Support journalists is my message,” Ramirez said, calling good reporting “a public service that now is maybe more clear than ever.”

In response to one question, Acemoglu expressed some skepticism that technical tweaks to voting methods (such as preferential or instant-runoff voting) might ensure political stability, although he did assert that a reduction in gerrymandering, limits to the amount of money in US politics, and a smaller political influence in the U.S. civil service would be valuable changes.

Still, Acemoglu reiterated, “I think this is really about social mobilization.”

Mounk, who quipped that the panel consisted of “one semioptimist and two pessimists,” underlined that there are no certainties when it comes to the status of democracy, meaning that citizens who care about it should think about how best to engage with their governments.
“It makes you reflect a little bit about what you can actually do,” Mounk said. For US citizens, he told the audience, “You maintain agency” to take action where rights have already been stripped away from people in many other countries.

“So let’s use it,” Mounk concluded.

Mounk pointed out that in concert with such trends, there has also been an alarming generational shift in tolerance for authoritarian rule and military rule; in surveys, about two-thirds of people born in the 1930s and 1940s said democracy was absolutely important, but less than one-third of those born in the 1980s and later agreed.
On May 3, 1946, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) officially opened, with film cameras whirring and flashbulbs popping. The spectacle was planned to attract the world’s attention, which it did, although not as a well-orchestrated triumph for justice. The courthouse was located inside the large former War Ministry building, in the Ichigaya District of Tokyo. The War Ministry was positioned high on a hill and protected by a fence and armed Allied guards. Starting at 7 AM that morning, two lines formed, one at the side entrance for the Japanese, the other at the main door for the Allies and their guests. The defendants, on public view for the first time since Japan’s defeat, were driven over in a bus from Sugamo Prison. Two hours later, the nine judges arrived in limousines.

At a cost of a million dollars, the ministry’s gymnasium and assembly area for cadets had been transformed into a replica of the Nuremberg court, high-ceilinged, with oversized windows, in grand European style. By 10 AM all the gallery seats were filled and the press box on the ground floor was jammed with a mix of Western and Japanese reporters.

At 10:30, the Klieg lights hanging from the ceiling were switched on and the filming began. Spectators and news reporters leaned forward expectantly as 26 well-guarded defendants (two were still in transit) filed into the courtroom, on public view for the first time since the war’s end. After a forty minute delay Court President Sir William Webb led the judges into the hushed, packed courtroom and up the stairs to the bench. The order of the judges’ seating had been determined by Webb, in consultation with General MacArthur. Webb was at the center, with the only microphone on the bench reserved for him. On his immediate left was China’s Judge Mei, who had argued successfully to be seated in a place of privilege. Next to Mei was Judge Zaraynov from the USSR, followed by France’s Bernard, and New Zealand’s Northcroft. On Webb’s right was US Judge Higgins and next to him Britain’s Lord Patrick (whom Mei had displaced), followed by Judge McDougall of Canada, and the Netherlands Judge Röling. The two end seats were reserved for the most junior members, the Philippine’s Judge Jaranilla and India’s Judge Pal, still to arrive.

President Webb made a brief opening statement, which was then translated into Japanese. He spoke of the bench’s commitment to administer justice fairly. “To our great task,” he said, “we bring open minds on both the facts and the law. The onus will be on the prosecution to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” To finish, he waxed even more grandiloquent: “There has been no more important criminal trial in all history.”

Following a brief preamble by Chief of Counsel Joseph Keenan, the prosecution began by reading Count 1, from which the other 54 counts, more or less coherently expressed, had been derived. From January 1, 1928 until September 2, 1945, the charge went, the defendants together and with others participated in a common plan, whose object was “that Japan should secure the military, naval, political and economic domination of East Asia and of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and of all countries and islands therein and bordering thereon and for that purpose should alone or in combination with other countries having similar objects, or who could be induced or

The image shows Japanese soldiers wearing gear that protected them against their own troops’ resort to chemical warfare during the 1935 battle for Shanghai.

Photo: Jeanne Guillemin
coerced to join therein, wage declared or undeclared war or wars of aggression, and war or wars in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances, against any country or countries which might oppose that purpose.”

And so, the charge continued, to the detriment of the Japanese people, the defendants engaged in a conspiracy with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy to “secure the domination and exploitation by the aggressive States of the rest of the world, and to this end to commit, or encourage the commission of crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity as defined in the Charter of this Tribunal, thus threatening and injuring the basic principles of liberty and respect for the human personality.”

At 3:40 PM, Webb called for a short recess to allow the press to photograph the defendants. When the court reconvened at 4 PM, the reading of the charges continued. Just as a clerk was describing Japan’s December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor initiating an illegal “war of aggression,” the propagandist Okawa Shumei, who was seated directly behind Tojo Hideki in the dock, reached forward and slapped the former premier on the head. Caught on camera, the premier winced and grimaced. As Okawa reached to strike Tojo again, two military policemen took hold of him and dragged him from the courtroom. Given the uproar that followed, President Webb called for a recess until the next morning. US journalists assessed the IMTFE commencement harshly—one called it a “third string road show” much inferior to Nuremberg—and some among the judges, particularly New Zealand’s Northcroft, were dismayed by the bright lights and pandering to the media.

The IPS prepares

Back at the Meiji Building, the China Division team held daily meetings to organize its presentation. Chief Prosecutor Hsiang Che-chun would make the opening statement. He and his secretary Henry Chiu would handle the opium charges, while four to five American attorneys, including Colonel Thomas Morrow and David Nelson Sutton, who had spent a month gathering evidence in China, would fill in to argue the rest of the case.

The Chinese Division, like the others at the International Prosecution Section (IPS), was under pressure to adapt its evidence to a standard format that would allow Keenan’s Special Assistant Eugene Williams to coordinate the overall case argument. Williams cited a particular model for the “Form of Brief” he wanted: the one being drafted by Colonel Morrow entitled “All China Military Aggression 1937-1945.”

Repressed evidence

Unknown to Sutton, whose investigation of Japanese 1940-1941 plague attacks on China had foundered due to insufficient evidence, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department in Washington was circulating a Top Secret report that emphasized the centrality of germ weapons to national security. Called Biological Warfare: Activities and Capabilities of Foreign Nations, the report asserted that the Soviet Union, France and Great Britain could wage large-scale biological weapons within five
“Biological warfare,” the authors stated, “is a demoralizing, silent, and insidious weapon which can be used in a ‘sneak attack’ far more destructive than the strike at Pearl Harbor.” In a concluding statement, intelligence analysts stated that significant quantities of biological agents were immediately available to the “probable enemy” of the United States, referring to the Soviets. The US should be prepared, the report urged, to strike the enemy’s populated areas.”

The report also contained an update on the Japanese germ warfare program based on classified G-2 inquiries that had yielded detailed information on Unit 731 in Manchuria and its leader, General Ishii Shiro.

Instead of intelligence, Sutton received a curious fragment of information from the Chinese Division. On May 9, Sutton found a note on his desk from Judge Hsiang and with it several translated pages of testimony. On April 17-19, in a small town west of Tokyo, Mr. C.C.H. Hataba had been interrogated by an unidentified agent, likely American. Hataba identified himself as a former member of the Epidemic Prevention Section of the Ei 1644 Forces in Nanjing. Starting in May 1942, Hataba recounted, the Japanese army caused “a great scourge” throughout the Zhejiang and Jiangxi provinces. As they drew back their forces, they wanted to leave only devastation for the KMT troops. “They were angry, too,” he said, “at the Chinese who had sheltered your Doolittle pilots, so they executed them. It is said that they brought in General Ishii to infect the region with terrible diseases. He had made his reputation with the plague attacks and promised the army he could do even worse killing and get away with it again.”

Hataba, who had not witnessed any germ attacks, offered the name of Tatsuzawa Tadao, a member of his unit who “flew to the front lines to scatter microbes.” Sutton immediately jotted a note to ask GHQ’s Legal Section to locate this pilot, whose testimony could verify Hataba’s account.

On May 5, Colonel Morrow’s report on Japanese chemical warfare in China for Chief of Counsel Keenan went to General Headquarters and Major General Willoughby at G-2. It was then forwarded to Major General Alden Waitt in Washington.

On Wednesday May 13, Morrow and Kenneth N. Parkinson, another IPS attorney, submitted to Keenan their “Form of Brief” on “All China Military Aggression, 1937-1945.” The draft meticulously described the relevant counts of the Indictment as they related to China’s charges against Japanese defendants. Into the argument, Morrow inserted Japanese chemical warfare, a violation of The Hague Conventions:

This waging of war by Japan in China was characterized by gross violations of international law and treaties, by massacre of civilians and Chinese soldiers, prisoners of war, and by the outlawed use of poison gas.

Starting with his own list of Chinese witnesses, Morrow quoted testimony from Major General Chang, deputy director of China’s Army Medical Corps, who stated that the Japanese used poison gas at Ichang (outside Shanghai), where he “personally saw men who were burned about the eyes, arm pits, and the crotch whose cases were diagnosed by himself. He saw 30 or 40 soldiers affected this way.” A photographer at
If Japan were to be prosecuted for chemical warfare, as Waitt knew that Colonel Morrow was proposing, the publicity could cause a reprise of World War I revulsion against noxious gases.

The scene, Major Yang Chu Nien, a gas defense officer of the 34th Army group, could testify to having observed soldiers badly blistered by vesicants. Brigadier General Wang Chang Ling, director of the army’s gas defensive administration, could testify that in 1943 he found on a battlefield fifteen-centimeter howitzer shells containing highly lethal hydrocyanic (prussic) acid, banned after World War I, and that he saw a dozen soldiers suffering from gas poisoning by the Japanese, three of whom died. The general still had his notebook containing his notations of analyses of the contents of the shells.

As for official data, Major Woo Chia Shing of the Chinese Army, a custodian of records obtained from the Japanese Ministry of War, stated that 26,968 persons were injured by poison gas in the Sino-Japanese war, of whom 2,086 died. These records, the Major said, showed that gas was used by the Japanese 1,312 times in ten battles. In its 1938 complaint to the League of Nations, China had identified Field Marshal Hata Shunroku and General Matsui Iwane, both indicted by the IPS, as the principle “defendants” responsible for chemical warfare in China.

On this same May 13, Sutton received a message from the Central Liaison Office of G-2, to which Legal Section had forwarded his inquiry about the pilot from Unit 1644. It read: “Tatsuzawa Tadao, a lance corporal of the “Ei” 1644 Force, cannot report as directed, because the said Force has not yet been repatriated from China.” A potential witness to back up Mr. Hataba’s statement about biological warfare had come up missing.

The next day Sutton found out that he had lost another witness. On his desk was the summary of the interrogation of the Reverend E. J. Bannan by Lieutenant Colonel Arvo Thompson of CWS regarding the alleged 1941 plague attack on Changde, conducted on April 22 in San Francisco. General Willoughby in Tokyo and General Waitt in Washington had received their copies a week before Sutton.

According to Thompson, Bannan, an eyewitness to the air attack on the city, remained certain that the subsequent outbreak of plague in Changde was caused by a deliberate Japanese experiment in bacteriological warfare. In his conclusion, though, Thompson dismissed Bannan’s testimony for its reliance on “assumptions, suspicions, and unexplained facts.”

Meanwhile, at the court, the defense counsel introduced the taboo subject of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. If Japanese leaders could be individually accused of bombing Pearl Harbor, then the same culpability should apply to the American decision to bomb Hiroshima. Webb huffily dismissed the argument, with its obvious accusation of President Truman.

For Major General Waitt in Washington, Hiroshima had seriously challenged the future of chemical warfare operations by outclassing them. Yet advanced chemical weapons, he believed, could eventually match the strategic capability of an atom bomb. The UK Chemical Defence Advisory Board had already pondered the future of chemical weapons and settled on nerve gases (toxic, easily disseminated, and odorless) as its advantage in the new nuclear age. With claims that chemicals (along with biologicals) were “weapons of mass destruction,” Waitt foresaw similar possibilities for the CWS program, provided it had latitude for first use. According to the US Ar-
my’s “Rules of Land Warfare,” the United States, not having ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol, was not prohibited from the use of “toxic or nontoxic gases, or the use of smoke or incendiary materials,” but President Truman had continued the Roosevelt policy of “retaliation only.” What Waitt sought was complete latitude to attack the enemy first, based on the belief that Soviet attacks were nearly inevitable.

If Japan were to be prosecuted for chemical warfare, as Waitt knew that Colonel Morrow was proposing, the publicity could cause a reprise of World War I revulsion against noxious gases. It could emerge that the Japanese military used chemical weapons against Chinese civilians, to flush them out of hiding places, for example, or lay siege to villages, which would link the US chemical program to another barbarity. The revelation that Japanese munitions contained hydrocyanic acid, the killing agent in Zyklon-B used to exterminate Jews in Nazi concentration camps, could only arouse more antipathy. If China’s chemical warfare charges went forward, the entire, dark history of Japan’s CW munitions industry could also emerge, to the detriment of Waitt’s plans to increase US production and include nerve agents.

In mid-May, Volume I of the CWS report on Japanese chemical warfare was issued. Volumes II-VI had already been completed, making this one a culminating statement. Apparently made for broad distribution, the report was a whitewash. Its numerous battle plans from Japanese sources referred only to the use of “smoke,” never to any lethal gas agents—as if the Japanese had never manufactured munitions of mustard gas, lewisite, phosgene or prussic acid and used them in China.

Following this report, with intervention from CWS and G-2, the Chinese Division’s chemical warfare charges against Japan were deleted from the IPS case argument. With the cooperation of Williams, the May 13 “All China Military Aggression” draft that laid out those charges was transformed into a sanitized May 24 version that removed all the “best evidence” Morrow had assembled—the promised eye-witness testimony, hydrocyanic acid analyses, diaries, photographs, and victim counts—and referred only vaguely Japan’s use of “poison gas.” Tear gas, sneezing and vomiting gases, not vesicants, were used, causing only “a very small proportion” of the 3.8 million “total casualties suffered by China during the war.”

The May 24 report also distanced the prosecution from China’s initial complaint to the League of Nations about Japanese CW in 1937:

The reference to the use of poison gas in this warfare appears to have been made in the form of a complaint by the Chinese to the effect that the Japanese army used gas in Shanghai three and four October 1937, but which the Japanese emphatically deny.

With its accusations of CW reduced to a “complaint” and its germ weapons charges without proof, the Chinese Division pursued prosecution for the more flagrant Japanese crimes resulting from “aggressive war” and “crimes against peace.” The enormity of their 3.8 million “total casualties” would carry their arguments, not Japan’s disregard of the laws of war or treaties to prevent chemical or biological warfare.
The potential for the United States to fight a war against an advanced military is rising. A conflict with North Korea looms largest.
A strategy of economic isolation or blockade is likely to play an important role in any near future US conflict. The United States is already doing its best to economically isolate North Korea. How does economic isolation effect the wartime behavior of states it targets? The importance of this question extends beyond North Korea. China fears the US Navy could block the Strait of Malacca and disrupt its supply of oil. Japan fears China could use its reclaimed islands in the South China Sea similarly. While economic isolation does not ensure defeat, it constrains states’ strategic decision making. Economically isolated powers pursue riskier strategies, and often these strategies make it harder for them to achieve a favorable outcome. Economic isolation, however, can create risks for its implementer as well. Isolated states are frequently defeated because they expand their wars in response to economic isolation.

Economic isolation leads to risky strategies

Scholars have found that wartime economic isolation is generally ineffective at coercing states to surrender. Mancur Olson’s study of the submarine blockades of Britain finds that substitution and trade reorientation minimize the impact of leaky blockades.\(^1\) John Mearsheimer finds only one example of a blockade winning a war (the defeat of Japan), and asserts that blockades fail because they are difficult to implement, become porous, and because Great Powers adapt through substitution, stockpiling, and conquest.\(^2\) These analyses assume that economic isolation acts directly through limiting available resources, but, empirically, resources alone are a poor predictor of war outcomes. Strategy proves an essential variable.\(^3\)

Lack of economic access, however, affects state strategy. First, economically isolated states have fewer resources for their war effort, which may exclude strategic options otherwise available. Second, leaders need to adjust their strategy to deal with specific resource shortages, like insufficient oil. States may be forced to direct their economic production toward less efficient industries or to attempt additional offensives to secure new sources. For example, when the US embargoed oil after the Japanese occupied French Indochina in 1941, Japan seized oil fields in the Dutch East Indies.\(^4\)

By limiting the time states have to fight, foreclosing options requiring more resources, or forcing states to seize new resources, economic isolation leaves states with riskier strategic options. Strategies can be risky in two ways. First, strategies with a low probability of success are inherently risky. Second, and easier to evaluate a priori, strategies are risky if only complete success leaves the initiator better off. Strategies that trade short term advantage for long term disadvantage are risky because they leave states worse off even with partial success. The German decision to invade the Soviet Union before defeating the Western allies illustrates how economic isolation can lead to riskier strategies.

Germany attempts self-sufficiency

Adolf Hitler believed that Germany needed to be self-sufficient in food and raw materials, which led to his obsession with lebensraum. In the 1930s, Germans blamed the Allied economic blockade during the First World War for the deaths of more than
424,000. As soon as he came to power, Hitler created a ministry to manage food supply and set food prices. By 1939, Germany had enough grain stockpiled to provide a year’s worth of bread. Germany, however, never reached self-sufficiency in fodder, fruit, eggs, or fats, importing 40% of the latter before the war began.

Germany attempted, but failed, to achieve self-sufficiency in raw materials as well. By 1939, trade had fallen to 10% of Germany’s GDP, the lowest fraction since unification. German chemists developed advanced processes to produce synthetic oil and rubber, but these efforts created substantial inefficiencies. The 1939 industrial plan to increase German oil production required enough steel to build a fleet 3.5 times the size of the British Navy. Synthetic rubber cost seven times its natural equivalent. On the eve of the war, Germany imported 65% of its iron ore and oil, 90% of its bauxite and 80% of its textiles. Only half of its oil imports came from Europe, making the remainder susceptible to naval blockade.

**War and blockade bring crippling shortages**

When war began with Britain and France in September 1939, the Western allies imposed an economic blockade. The conquest of Europe should have eased Germany’s food shortages, but instead Western Europe agriculture collapsed. Western European farms depended on the labor of millions of horses, oxen, and humans, many of which were redirected to the war. European agriculture also relied heavily on nitrate-based fertilizer, but nitrates were an essential ingredient in explosives. It was a literal guns-butter trade-off. As a result, grain yields fell dramatically across Denmark, Holland, France and Germany. The highly productive dairy farms of France, the Netherlands, and Denmark relied on imported fodder, which they could no longer access.

Food shortages resulted across Europe. The Germans began the war with 8.8 million tons of grain in reserve, but by the fall of 1940 only 1.3 million tons remained. The Germans attempted to compensate by starving the people of Europe. In 1941, Poles received 938 calories a day while the French and Belgian rations dropped as low as 1,300 calories a day. Still, food remained in short supply.

Raw material shortages also developed. In 1940, French coal production, the third highest in Europe, fell 18% and never recovered. In the spring of 1940, German-controlled Europe faced a 36.4-million-ton annual coal deficit. In the spring of 1941, the Wehrmacht discharged trained mine workers to head off criticism should another coal shortage materialize. Oil posed another problem for the Germans. Romanian and synthetic production provided only 5.5 million tons in 1940. In contrast, Britain imported 10.2 million tons in 1942, the darkest days of the Battle of the Atlantic.

**The Soviet Union as a solution to the blockade**

These problems persisted despite one critical hole in the blockade: the Soviet Union. Under the 1940 Soviet-German commercial pact, the Soviet Union exported millions of tons of supplies to Germany. In 1940 alone, the Soviet Union provided Germany with almost 900,000 metric tons of grain, almost a million metric tons of timber.
protects, more than 650 thousand metric tons of oil, as well as textiles, metals, raw and finished materials of all types. These resources were so important to the German war effort that Germany continued to supply the Soviets with machine tools, of which there were a critical shortage in Russia, right up to the German invasion. Hitler even placed their production priority on par with the Wehrmacht’s needs to ensure continued Soviet supplies.

For Hitler, this dependence created a problem. His ideology required eastward expansion, but he wanted to avoid repeating the mistake of a two-front war. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact had demonstrated Hitler could accommodate the Soviets when needed. So why did Hitler choose to invade the Soviet Union in 1941 before finishing the fight in the West? The pressure of the blockade drove risky decisions. Considering the shortages in Europe and the industrial capacity of the Britain and the United States, Hitler could not be certain of victory in a long war. The German Army was the most powerful in the world, but he could not get it across the English Channel. The German Army could, however, invade the Soviet Union and seize its resources to feed his population and supply his war machine for the fight with the West.

As Historian Adam Tooze put it, “the strongest arguments for rushing to conquer the Soviet Union in 1941 were precisely the growing shortage of grain and the need to knock Britain out of the war before it could pose a serious air threat.” In this situation, invading the Soviet Union appeared the best option. It proved Hitler’s fatal mistake.

**Most likely risky strategy: Expand the war**

Economic isolation constrains the wartime strategy of those isolated, forecloses less risky options, and makes achieving a favorable outcome more difficult. Importantly, even Nazi Germany, a state which consciously sought self-sufficiency and had the resources of an entire continent at its disposal, still felt the pressure of economic isolation. This situation makes this case both a hard test for the argument and suggests that we should expect isolation to affect the wartime strategies of even poorly-integrated states like North Korea. Nonetheless, this finding does not mean economic isolation is always a wise strategy for states capable of imposing it. As the German case demonstrates, economically isolated states are frequently defeated because they expand their wars. When combined with long-range missiles, nuclear weapons allow states on the verge of conventional defeat to inflict severe damage on their adversaries. A nuclear state that perceives its government at risk because of the consequences of economic isolation might choose to risk nuclear use. States considering imposing economic isolation must weigh the costs of an expanded war along the path to potential victory before implementing such a strategy.

**Consider cross-domain effects**

More broadly, this analysis suggests strategists must consider multiple levels of effects. That states rarely appear to surrender due to the direct effects of wartime economic isolation does not mean those efforts do not play a critical part in determining the outcome of wars. The state with the strongest army will not have the strength it appears to have if strategic constraints imposed upon it by economic isolation require...
its employment in a poor or highly risky manner. Hitler was defeated on the Russian steppe, but the Allied blockade was a key reason he was there in the first place.

Strategists must integrate all aspects of national power in their analysis. While each state’s power is the combination of its power across various domains, power does not aggregate across them linearly. Cross-domain interactions occur in sometimes seemingly counterintuitive ways. One must consider how they affect what battles are fought as well as what happens in those battles. As technology proliferates and with the increased focus on space and the development of cyber weapons, these considerations will only become more important.

A nuclear state that perceives its government at risk because of the consequences of economic isolation might choose to risk nuclear use.
References


11 The blockade evolved over the course of the war. After the fall of France, the British began to focus on “Control at Source” rather than intercepting all ships bound for the continent. The threat of denying access to British marine shipping insurance, coal bunkering facilities, and repairs yards to all ships belonging to any company that had even one ship that failed to produce the proper pre-clearance documentation upon inspection was an important tool in convincing private shipping companies to comply. W. N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series (London: H. M. Stationery Off, 1952), 422.

12 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 418.

13 Tooze, 419.

14 Tooze, 366.


16 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 418.

17 Tooze, 412.


19 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 423.

20 Tooze, 425.

21 Tooze, 431.
Diversity, equity and inclusion at MISTI
Through the efforts of MIT-India managing director Mala Ghosh, MISTI has been awarded two grants from The Committee on Race and Diversity. The grants support the following: a staff professional development workshop with a leading facilitator; a student workshop on embracing identity abroad; IdentityX Abroad MISTI Ambassadors who will create written and video content; and student discussion workshops called the “IdentityX Series Abroad” on topics of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and sexual orientation abroad. MISTI has utilized the grants to build partnerships across the Institute with various program offices, student groups, and administrative leaders. Special thanks to the ongoing support received from MIT ICEO.

SSP panel on North Korea in DC
The MIT Security Studies Program held a special seminar in Washington, DC, on April 26. More than sixty people attended the talk, “The Nuclear Crisis with North Korea,” at the National Press Club. Chaired by SSP director, Barry Posen, the panel (Jim Walsh, Taylor Fravel, and Vipin Narang) discussed the current issues and answered questions from the crowd.

CIS awards 16 summer study grants
Sixteen doctoral students in international affairs at MIT were awarded summer study grants. Each will receive up to $3,500. “The awards were made to an outstanding cohort of MIT students from across the Institute. We’re so pleased that the appeal of these grants has broadened and students are responding,” said John Tirman, CIS executive director and principal research scientist.

Joint Seminar on South Asian politics
The Joint Seminar on South Asian Politics, co-sponsored by MIT, Brown University, and Harvard University, explores the region with leading experts. Spring events included: Maya Tudor (University of Oxford) on “Is Nationalism a Democratic Resource? Evidence from India and Malaysia,” Adam Auerbach (American University) on “Client Preferences in Broker Selection: Competition, Choice, and Informal Leadership in India’s Urban Slums,” Nicholas Sambanis (University of Pennsylvania) on “Violence Exposure and Ethnic Identification: Evidence from Kashmir,” and Alison Post (University of California Berkeley) on “Infrastructure Networks and Urban Inequality: The Political Geography of Water Flows in Bangalore.”
MISTI Excellence Awards

MISTI held its annual awards ceremony on April 19 at the Samberg Conference Center. The awardees and the respective categories for this year are: MIT-Japan’s Samantha Amey-Gonzalez (Biology, 2018) who received the Ambassador Award, MIT-France’s Kristen Frombach (Biological Engineering, 2019) who received the Achievement Award, and MIT-France’s Pelkins Ajanoh (Mechanical Engineering, 2018) and MIT-Israel and MIT-India’s Matthew Chun (Mechanical Engineering and Management Science, 2018) who both received the Suzanne Berger Award for Future Global Leaders.

IPL completed 3rd annual call for proposals

The International Policy Lab received a record-breaking 42 proposals from 31 principal investigators representing all five schools at MIT. The committee chose 10 projects for full support. In an effort to assist as many PIs as possible with policy outreach, the majority of the remaining projects received partial support, with only six projects deemed too early to begin engagement with policy makers.

Starr Forums

The Center hosted a series of public talks including: “Women’s Empowerment: Are Global Development Organizations Helping or Hurting?” with Nimmi Gowrinathan (City College New York) and Kate Cronin-Furman (Harvard’s Belfer Center); “US-Russian Relations: What’s Next?” with Barry Posen (MIT), Carol Saivetz (MIT), Andrei Kozyrev (Wilson Center), and moderated by Elizabeth Wood (MIT); “The Uncounted: Civilian Victims of America’s Wars,” with Azmat Khan (Journalist); “Artificial Intelligence and National Security Law: A Dangerous Nonchalance,” with James Baker (MIT); and “Is Democracy Dying?” with Daron Acemoglu (MIT), Maria Ramirez (Harvard Nieman Fellow), Yascha Mounk (Harvard), and moderated by Melissa Nobles (MIT). All Starr Forums are available to view in their entirety on the Center’s YouTube channel.
PhD candidate Marsin Alshamary presented “Iraqi Youth: Between Rising Unemployment and Declining Educational Standards” at a conference on Youth in Iraq: Developing Capacities for Active Citizenship co-hosted by PRIO, The Kalima Center for Dialogue and Cooperation and the Center for the Study of Islam and the Middle East from February 2-4th in Kyrenia, Cyprus. Alshamary also presented “Authoritarian Nostalgia in Post-Baathist Iraq” at a symposium on Growing up in Contemporary Iraq hosted by CMES at Harvard University on March 23rd. She will be presenting her paper “Religious Capital: Pilgrimages and the Development of Civil Society in Post-Baathist Iraq” at the Project on Middle East Political Science’s annual meeting in Washington, D.C. on May 24-25th. Alshamary also received a POMEPS travel research engagement grant to support her fieldwork in Iraq.

PhD Student Ben Chang received a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship grant.

SSP Senior Adviser Jeanne Guillemin was quoted by NBC in an article “Despite delay, experts say any evidence in suspected Syria chemical attack likely remains” on April 22nd.

Total Professor of Political Science and Contemporary Africa Evan Lieberman presented joint research with PhD candidates Phil Martin and Nina McMurry, “Do Party Elites Impede Accountability? Evidence from South African Local Government Elections,” at NYU Abu Dhabi on March 28th and at the University of Michigan on April 25th. Professor Lieberman also presented joint research with PhD candidate Andrew Miller, “Explaining Quotidian Ethnic Hostility in a Divided Society: Categorization and Online Expressions of Animus in Nigeria,” at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign on April 27th.

PhD Candidate **Andrew Miller** received a CIS summer study grant.

PhD candidate **Kacie Miura** presented “Biting the Hand that Feeds: Foreign Economic Partners as Diversionary Targets in Subnational China” at the 2018 International Studies Association conference, for which she received a CIS Starr Student Travel Fellowship.

PhD candidate **Cullen Nutt** was awarded a grant from the John Anson Kittredge Fund, a Charles Koch Foundation dissertation grant, and a CIS Summer Research Grant. In April, he presented “Inside Source: Intelligence Infiltration in Civil Wars” and, with PhD candidate Reid Pauly, “Covering Up for Cain: The Strategic Logic of Obfuscation in Coercive Bargaining” at the 2018 International Studies Association conference in San Francisco.

PhD candidate **Rachel Esplin Odell** was awarded a World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship by the Smith Richardson Foundation to fund her dissertation field research in India and China this upcoming fall 2018. In addition, at the annual International Studies Association conference in April, Odell was awarded the Alexander George Award for Best Graduate Student Paper by ISA’s Foreign Policy Analysis Section. At the same conference, she presented “Freedom of Navigation in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Case Study of Japan’s Maritime Jurisdictional Claims” in a Junior Scholar Symposium.
PhD Candidate Reid Pauly presented “Elite Aversion to the Use of Nuclear Weapons: Evidence from Wargames” and “Stop or I’ll Shoot, Comply and I Won’t: Coercive Assurance in International Politics” at the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School. He also won a Graduate Research Award for Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control from the Simons Foundation.

PhD candidates Sara Plana and Rachel Tecott have co-created and organized the inaugural conference (“The Future of Force”) for the Future Strategy Forum which will take place in Washington, D.C. on May 18th with support from Smart Women Smart Power Initiative, the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins SAIS and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

PhD student Mina Pollmann received a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship grant.

Ford International Professor of Political Science Ben Ross Schneider presented “Contention, Coalitions, and Consultation in the Politics of Education Reform in Latin America,” at CIDE in Mexico City in January 2018 and at Harvard University in April 2018.

Associate Professor of Political Science David Singer presented “Attitudes toward Internal and Foreign Migration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in China” at invited talks at the University of Zurich and Johns Hopkins SAIS in April 2018.

PhD Candidate Meicen Sun has received a Smith Richardson Foundation World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship for her dissertation research on Internet policy and great power relations.

Ford Professor of Political Science Kathy Thelen will be receiving an honorary degree from the European University Institute in Florence, Italy in May.
PhD candidate Marika Landau-Wells was a panelist at “Climate Science in a Time of Political Disruption,” a workshop hosted by the Program on Science, Technology, and Society at the Harvard Kennedy School on April 6th. On April 27th, she spoke at “Accelerating Nuclear Threat in the Midst of a Diplomacy Vacuum,” an event hosted by PopTech, Beyond Conflict and N Square Collaborative, where SSP Senior Research Associate Jim Walsh delivered the opening address.

Professor of History Elizabeth A Wood received the 2018 Levitan Teaching Award. She also received a grant from MIT-Skoltech for “Collaborative Russian-U.S. Science Projects: An Analysis of Best Practices.” Professor Wood presented on “Mobilizing, Silencing, and Exploiting Women after the Russian Revolution: Ambivalence about Gender Difference,” at Barnard College on January 31st; “U.S.-Russian Relations: Beyond Reciprocity” at Boston College Law School panel on March 14th; “Masculinism as a Political Strategy of Governance: Order and Chaos in the 21st Century Turkey and Russia” at a conference at Northeastern University on “Gender and the Global Right” on March 23rd; “Putin, Erdogan and Politicized Masculinity in a Global Context,” at UMass-Boston’s Consortium on Gender, Security, and Human Rights on March 27th; and she presented “The Russian Politics of Insecurity in the Presidential Campaign Cycle of 2018,” at the Consuls General Briefing at the Center for International Studies at MIT on April 10th.

PhD Candidate Ketian Zhang received and accepted a Postdoctoral Fellowship from the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University (2018-2019). She also received and declined the Chauncey Postdoctoral fellowship from the Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy and International Security Studies at Yale University as well as a postdoctoral fellowship from the Notre Dame International Security Center at Notre Dame University.
PUBLISHED


Elizabeth Nueffer Fellow Audrey Jiajia Li, “‘Fire and Fury’ shows Trump’s shifts on China,” The Boston Globe (January 19, 2018).

PhD Candidate Philip Martin (with Dan De Kadt and Evan Lieberman) “South Africa’s Healthy Democracy: Why Zuma’s Resignation is a Good Sign” Foreign Affairs (February 20th, 2018).


Associate Professor of Political Science Vipin Narang (with Nicholas Miller), “North Korea Defied the Theoretical Odds: What Can We Learn from its Successful Nuclearization?” Texas National Security Review (February 12, 2018).
(with Ankit Panda) “Trump thinks his North Korea strategy will work on Iran. He’s wrong on both.” The Diplomat (March 15, 2018).


FCIS Executive Director and Principle Research Scientist John Tirman, “An Adolescent’s Foreign Policy,” The Helsinki Times (February 6, 2018).


Elizabeth A Wood published “February 23 and March 8: Two Holidays that Upstaged the February Revolution, 1917-1923,” Slavic Review 76, 3 (fall 2017)
précis n. a concise summary of essential points, statements, or facts.

précis is published twice each academic year in order to familiarize readers with the work of the Center for International Studies at MIT.

Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
One Amherst Street, E40-400
Cambridge, MA 02139

+1 617.253.8093
cis-info@mit.edu
cis.mit.edu

Richard J Samuels, Director
Stephen Van Evera, Associate Director
John Timan, Executive Director
Michelle English, précis Editor
Laurie Scheffler, précis Coordinator
Marsin Alshamary, précis Student Editor