RICHARD SAMUELS: All right, why don’t we begin? I’m Richard Samuels. I direct the Center for International Studies here at MIT, and I’m delighted to see how many of you are here this evening. I suppose it’s because one can’t engage with the news of the past several years without tripping over the observation that populism has again reared its ugly head, whether in the United States, where Donald Trump has crafted a hard-to-dent bond with that base that he has, or in Europe where the right has seized upon some of the same nativist, anti-immigrant, anti-elite tropes— not least of all, sadly, in liberal and progressive Germany, where the AFD, the Alternative for Deutschland, now evokes memories— nightmares, really— of a history that ought to be remembered, that deserves to be remembered but that ought not be resuscitated.

And just this week, The Economist, some of you may have seen the current issue of The Economist, which referred to the transformation of Britain’s ruling Tories from conservatives to what they call radical populists. Populist politicians, whether they’re wannabe or actual demagogues, are likely to insist that their people and their nation are safest and most productive when they’re homogeneous— and forgive me for saying this to this audience— but they also will insist that elites with their multicultural cosmopolitanism are basically evil. We know that promises and demagogues are made and often abetted by rank amorality. And we observe how power is seized from institutions.

Populists can successfully redefine as is illegitimate. They run for the people. They run against the establishment, and as we’ll hear this evening, they run for themselves above all. We’ll also hear that not all populists are the same. But I’m reminded of one often invoked archetype of Benito Mussolini who was a socialist until 1919 before proclaiming himself an anarchist for six years until 1925 when he became a free trade liberal for a short time— contradictions that were lost on adoring crowds that he posed for and that he lied to. But this evening, we’re going to hear about the difference— fundamental differences— between Mussolini’s politics and an evolved contemporary populism from two distinguished scholars who can help us sort out a very complex phenomenon, including how populism in the United States might compare with its European variant.

Our first speaker, Jan-Werner Müller, studied at the Free University in Berlin at University College London at Oxford and at Princeton where he received his PhD— shouldn’t say received— earned his PhD in 2005 and where he teaches in the politics department today.
He’s been affiliated with The institute for Advanced Study there as well as the collegian Budapest Institute of Advanced Study and with major research institutes in the United States, including at NYU and here in Cambridge at Harvard. He’s the author of highly regarded intellectual histories published by Yale University Press as well as his latest book, which I'm calling for you, *What Is Populism*, which will help frame his remarks this evening. I've been asked to remind you that there are books for sale in that side in the back of the room, in the back of the hall, and that he'll be available for signing down here.

So you'll have to make a trek, but I think it'll be well worth your time and effort. He'll be signing at the end of this event. Jan-Werner will address the diversity that's hidden, as I've already suggested, that's hidden within the simple label populism and will offer his views on what he calls the populist art of politics.

Suzanne Berger is the inaugural John M. Deutch Institute professor at MIT, which makes her one of the most distinguished faculty members in this institution. Her current research focuses on politics and globalization. She recently co-chaired the MIT production in the innovation economy project and in 2013, published *Making in America from Innovation to Market*. She created the MIT International Science and Technology initiative here at the Center for International Studies and was a leading contributor to the widely praised Made in America Project at MIT.

Susanne has served as head of the MIT department of political science, was the founding chair of the Social Science Research Council’s committee on West Europe, and was vice president of the American Political Science Association. She’s been elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the French government has awarded her many honors, including the Legion of Honor. She's going to focus her remarks on how to fight populism.

We're going to start with Jan-Werner. I asked him to speak to you, then Suzanne, and then the two of them will have an opportunity on stage here together to interrogate one another, and then we'll broaden the conversation to the audience. So without further ado, I bring you Jan-Werner. Thank you.

[APPLAUSE]

**JAN-WERNER MULLER:** Thank you for the very kind introduction. Thank you for having me here today. As you all know and as was also just mentioned in the introduction, our era is characterized by an absolutely inflationary use of the word populism. All kinds of political actors, primarily perhaps on the
right, but also on the left, are nowadays labeled as populists, even though someone like Emmanuel Macron, who at a certain point during the 2017 presidential election, was also called a populist. People at the time in France accused him of being a populist of the extreme center, whatever the hell that was exactly supposed to have meant.

Moreover, as you also all know, commentary on our era is dominated by one particular image, or if you like, metaphor. I'm talking about the image of the allegedly unstoppable wave, or as Nigel Farage, who apparently thought that the image of the wave was too puny to do justice to his world historical role put it, the tsunami of populism, which to stick with a metaphor, is now bound to wash away the elites and the establishments everywhere. I actually believe that this is a profoundly misleading image, and I'll try to explain towards the end of my remarks why I think that.

But before, allow me to offer you one brief set of remarks as to the question, what are we actually talking about? What is populism? Can we make meaningful distinctions such that we don't end up with this ever-expanding set of allegedly populist actors?

And secondly, allow me to say a few words about the question whether populists can actually govern. This is against the background of the fact that many observers—dare I say, in particular—more liberal observers often hold the view that well populists are all demagogues, or they constantly lie. Or they make promises, which can't be kept so that essentially once they get to government, they have to renege on their promises.

No walls actually get built. No trade agreements are really going to get renegotiated so that essentially they disappoint their followers. Or if they don't go down that road, they tend to moderate and hence perhaps cease to be dangerous populists. That's a very widespread view, and I'll tell you in a moment whether I think that view is correct or not.

But before, a few words on the question of what is populism, anyway. Of course, the conventional wisdom of our era is that populists are those who as the cliched phrase goes criticize the establishments, establishment, or some are angry about elites. So far, so obvious, except when you think about it, it's actually a very strange thought. Up until just a few years ago, any civics textbook would have told you that keeping an eye on the powerful is actually a sign of good democratic citizenship.

All of a sudden, at the beginning of the 21st century, were constantly told that having a problem with the powerful might somehow turn into populism, which somehow might be
dangerous for democracy. Clearly, things can't be quite as simple as that. It is true laziness. It is true that populist when they are in opposition, criticized sitting governments and usually also other parties and in that sense are indeed anti-establishment or anti-elitist.

But above all, they do also something else. In one way or another, they suggest that they and only they represent what populists often refer to as the silent majority or also very typically as the real people.

Now at first sight, you might say, well, that doesn't sound that dangerous. It's not the same as, let's say, racism or in the context of Europe, sort of fanatical hatred of the European Union, and yet this claiming of a monopoly of representing the people, I believe always does have to for democracy detrimental, if not outright dangerous, consequences.

First and rather obviously, populists are going to say that all other contenders for power are fundamentally illegitimate. This is never just about differences in matter of policy or even differences on questions of value, which after all is completely normal-- ideally even productive in a democracy. No, in a sense, populists always immediately make it moral, and they immediately make it personal. One way or another, they're going to say that all other contenders for power are simply corrupt or crooked.

Secondly, and less obviously I think, populists are also going to say that all those citizens, all those among the people themselves who do not share their, if you like, symbolic understanding of the allegedly real people that with all those citizens, you can put into question whether they truly belong to the people at all. Let me try to illustrate this perhaps less self-evident point with two examples from recent history. At the end of the night of the Brexit vote, Nigel Farage, gave what became a famous speech when he said that the vote had been-- as he put it-- a victory for real people, implying, of course, that the 48% who wanted to stay inside the European Union well, on some level, aren't quite real-- do not truly properly belong to the British or maybe in the case of Farage, specifically, the English people. Or if you forgive me, another example from that fateful year, 2016.

In May of that year, our president-- but is now our president-- gave a campaign speech, which given all the other interesting things he was saying at the time, got virtually no attention. But it contained what I think turned out to be a deeply revealing sentence. Trump, at that time said-- I'm quoting Wallace from memory-- the most important thing is the unification of the people, and all the other people don't mean anything.
I hope you can see where this is going. The populace decides who truly belongs to the people and who doesn’t. And whether you happen to legally belong whether you happen to have an American passport, that’s not really the question at issue here.

So long story short, what I’m trying to make plausible to you is that what is distinctive and dangerous about populism is not anti-elitism. Any of us can criticize the powerful. Doesn’t mean we are right, but this is not in and of itself a danger for democracy quite possibly on many occasions the contrary. What is distinctive and dangerous about populism is for shorthand antipluralism, the tendency always to exclude, obviously at the level of politicians and party politics, less obviously at the level of the people and citizens themselves.

One footnote, if I may, if what I’ve said so far seems remotely plausible to you, the thought will probably occur to you that populists who don't win elections have a massive problem. How can it be that they say, on the one hand, we and only we represent the people, and on the other hand, they don't win elections or let’s say, don’t get overwhelming majorities?

Well, I think there is typically populist response to this conundrum. And by typical, I mean it doesn't always happen, but it happens quite a lot. What I’m talking about is this. According to their own logic, if the silent majority is able to speak, they're always going to win.

If they don't win, they very often suggest that perhaps it's time to take another look at the majority, and in particular, one way or another they start to suggest that perhaps we're not talking about a silent majority, but about a silenced majority. In other words, the suggestion is if only the people had been able to express themselves, they would have won. The fact that they didn't win doesn't show that they are unpopular. It only goes to show that somebody must have manipulated things behind the scenes to prevent them from winning.

Again, ladies and gentlemen, I'm not saying that this always happens. But if you look closely, it happens a damn lot that populists who lost are going to start to question the integrity of the electoral process. Most recent example that probably most of you will remember is the mayoral election in Istanbul in Turkey where after the initial loss of the governing party, the allegation had been that, well, this can't be that really lost this, so there must have been irregularities.

Now footnote to the footnote, of course, it's also true that eventually the ruling party conceded, and occasionally then observers, liberal observers, rushed in to write about 2000 op ed
saying, oh, populism can be defeated. Great, this just shows that democracy is alive in Turkey.

Well, yes and no-- it can be defeated at the polls.

But if you look more closely, what did the government in Ankara end up doing? Well, they transferred as many powers of the mayor as possible to other people who basically are beholden to them.

Anyway, I thought it might be worth slipping in that footnote, because I could think of a country where a populist losing is perhaps a not totally remote scenario. And then the question comes up, how would a populist who lost at the polls react to such a situation?

Allow me to, in the second step of my remarks this evening, say a few words, as promised earlier, about the question of what populists do when they come to power. As I hinted at earlier, there's a widespread view that, well, almost by definition they can't really govern. They're all crazy demagogues. They all have unbelievably silly policy ideas. So if they really come to power, then start to implement these ideas, nothing is going to work. So their followers are going to get disappointed. But actually if they sort of see the light of, let's say, liberal reason, they will change course, become more moderate.

Or a kind of variation of this idea. All populists are anti elitists. Once they come to power, they themselves have become the elite. So they can't continue with their anti elite discourse.

You can see where this is going. According to these kinds of arguments, the problem is always bound to solve itself. Either they cease being populist in a certain way, or it's going to look so disastrous to their followers that they're going to be out of office the next time an election rolls around.

It's a widespread, complacent, and, I think by now it's fair to say deeply, deeply mistaken view. If you look around in the world today, I think we have enough examples of what you might call the populist art of governance.

Look at in the European context Hungary, Poland. Look at Turkey. Look at maybe by now India. Look at Venezuela. And perhaps, to some degree, look at here.

What I'm talking about is the fact that not only can populists govern, but they can govern specifically as populists. Which if you find what I've been trying to say earlier unplausible, means that they can govern as actors who on a fundamental level are not going to recognize the legitimacy of an opposition.
What that means in practice-- you might say that's rather obvious-- is that whenever these sorts of actors are challenged by independent institutions, be it courts, or be it free media, where free media still exists, the response is always going to be, we and only we represent the people. Who elected you? You are not legitimate.

That's not totally new. I mean, Napoleon III already said pretty much the same thing about the press in the 19th century. But that's always going to be the first move.

Less obvious I think are three other elements of this populist art of governance, which I briefly try to put on the table for you, and hopefully we can talk about them in more detail later on.

First of all, I think it's noticeable that with all these regimes the governing part of the governing populist party will try to take possession of the state itself, which is to say that they will try to replace what at least in theory should be a neutral civil service with their own partisan actors.

Now, some of you might say, yeah, OK. But I can think of plenty of examples of parties that try to do that. And there are plenty among those that we wouldn't necessarily associate with populism. Completely correct.

The difference, though, I believe is that in the case of these populist regimes something that is usually carefully hidden is done very openly, and with what, in the eyes of the populists, is actually a legitimate claim.

Remember that they say we and only we represent the people. Who is the state, therefore? Well, it's therefore the people, of course. So if the party takes possession of the state, that's not something to be ashamed of. That's actually how things should be.

Second element of this populist art of governance, what scientists often refer to as mass clientelism, which is just another way of saying that those citizens who support the ruling party get benefits or maybe bureaucratic favors of one sort or another.

Again, some of you are going to say, but, look, I can think of plenty of parties who try to do that. That's not specifically populist. Correct.

But again in this case, populists can do something very openly. And even with, what in their eyes, is a kind of moral claim, that others rather try to hide. Why?

Again, back to the beginning. In the eyes of the populists not all citizens are the people. Only
Again, back to the beginning. In the eyes of the populists not all citizens are the people. Only some citizens are the real people. So the fact that only these real people get benefits and bureaucratic favors is not something to be ashamed of. That's actually how things should be.

And another footnote, if I may-- forgive me for being so professorial-- this thought might perhaps generate at least a hypothesis to explain something which otherwise is really, really difficult to explain. I'm talking about the fact that a lot of these populists of course when they start out are the great anti-corruption crusaders. Right? I mean, the establishment is corrupt. And let us come to power. We'll clean up, drain the you know what, et cetera.

Very often-- again, I'm not saying always-- but very often these actors then come to power. And they turn out to be 10 times as corrupt as the previous establishment. And the innocent observer would think, well, this must be fatal for them politically. I mean, how can Jorg Haider in Austria run for office, and then the state that his party ran for decades still has lawsuits with banks, and horrendous stuff that came out? Or the same to some degree in Turkey and other countries. You would have thought this is a pretty big blow against anybody who initially appears as an anti-corruption crusader.

Well, perhaps in the eyes of the followers this isn't really corruption or some kind of illegitimate clientelism. This is sort of them doing something for us, the real people, who, by the way, have also long been neglected by the previous elites. I can't prove that thought to you entirely, but it seems to me very plausible that this might hold the key to understanding something which otherwise is very tricky to make sense of.

With the possible explanation that some of you may also reasonably say, well, in some of these countries at least media pluralism has been radically reduced. So the fact that we read about these corruption scandals in The New York Times is one thing, but we can't assume that everybody on the ground necessarily hears exactly the same story.

Anyway, very last point I want to make about this populist art of governance. It's one that I think will not surprise you in the least. When there is opposition, real opposition, let's say, on the streets, from civil society against these populist regimes, they all tend to respond in a particular kind of way. Or they all tend to deploy a strategy which arguably was pioneered by Vladimir Putin at the beginning of this decade.

What I'm talking about is their tendency to from the get go say, look, what's happening out there? Demonstrations. People in the squares, and so on. That's not really civil society. That's
fake. That's all been sponsored by, manipulated by-- well, and then we have the usual range of suspects who can be trotted out on these occasions. CIA. George Soros always a favorite. But no limits to creativity.

Some of you may remember, in 2013 at the time of the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul some members of the Turkish government immediately came out and said, look, this is not real. Turkish citizens demonstrating against this crazy plan of destroying this park. No. It obviously has all been organized by, as I'm sure you all know, Lufthansa, the German airline.

Why? Because as Morgan Freeman keeps telling us in these great ads in the paper, Turkish Airlines is now the world's best airline. Erdogan had his mind set on building this grand new airport. So that's why Lufthansa got so scared and basically paid all these people to demonstrate.

Notice again that this has a kind of symbolic dimension, which goes back to what I was trying to make plausible to you at the beginning. If you tell people constantly that you and only you represent the people, then by definition it cannot be that there are people out there who demonstrate against you.

So the obvious thing is to tell people that these aren't real people. That this is basically fake civil society, fake citizens, or something is going on which essentially devalues their claims immediately.

Hence also, I think it's a telling sign, a sign that tells us something if the reaction of a government is that its leader immediately says, or rather tweets, that the demonstrators are paid up activists. Of course every government is initially going to react by saying, look, we are elected. We have these policies. We have the mandate. We're doing it. We listen to the criticisms, but if you really don't like it, you can vote on somebody else. That would be normal.

It would be abnormal if somebody immediately cuts away the legitimacy of protesters by saying, I don't even have to listen to them because it's all been paid, manipulated, and so on. So I hope you can see the difference between how different kinds of governments would react to protest.

All right. Very last point. Because I promised you at the beginning that I was going to say at least one word about the wave slash tsunami as supposedly the metaphor that best captures what's going on.
I think the problem with that metaphor is that it somehow suggests that a figure like Nigel Farage brought about Brexit all by himself. Or that our current president sort of single handedly came to power as a populist. When in fact, just to remind you of the obvious, Nigel Farage needed his very established conservative collaborators in the Tory party, who basically told British citizens, Nigel over there is maybe a bit eccentric, but Brexit is a jolly good idea. I mean, serious people with a sense of responsibility, such as Boris--

Well, OK. Michael Gove. Somebody who had some real standing and was seen even as a leading intellectual in the Tory party. Or to remind you of the obvious in our context here, it was not irrelevant that people like Rudy Giuliani, Chris Christie, and Newt Gingrich came out and said, he's a bit eccentric, but I know him. And as a citizen who votes for the Republican Party, you can vote for him.

And as completely banal as it's going to sound, the single most important explanatory factor for what happened on the 8th of November, 2016 remains partisanship. More than 90% of citizens who identify as Republicans voted for their party. That's pretty normal. People go to the polls and vote for their party. That's sort of what happens in most elections. Maybe not an entirely normal candidate.

But the suggestion I think is clear enough. That had he not been the Republican candidate he may have gotten maybe 20%, 30%, the kinds of numbers that far right populists might get in some European countries.

OK. Why am I belaboring these points? What I want to make plausible to you is that up until today, with the possible exception of Italy, up until today at least no right wing populist has come to power without the collaboration-- and I use that word consciously with all its historical overtones-- without the collaboration of established conservative elites. In countries where these elites have refused to collaborate with populists they also have not come to power.

So it's not some unstoppable, quasi natural phenomenon. The wave is now going to roll, and roll, and roll. No. This is still up to individual actors.

And one might be tempted to draw the further conclusion-- but I'll only say this very briefly, and it's a much longer discussion to be had, of course. But one conclusion from this might be that, contrary to what we sometimes hear from, broadly speaking, liberal observers, it's not the people who destroy democracies. It's elites who destroy democracies.
You might say, well, now he sounds like a populist. But remember, not all criticisms of elites are populist. Thank you.

[APPLAUSE]

SUZANNE BERGER: Well, this afternoon I’d like to talk about how to respond to populism. And in particular, I want to ask whether we need to give up on internationalism and globalization in order to beat back populism.

The rise of populism around the world has motivated some of the most interesting social science research over the last five years. There is a big debate over what concept we should be using, how to define populism. Should it include left wing populism, as in Greece and Spain, as well as right wing populism? Does it include the French gilets jaunes? Isn’t it really basically a form of nationalism? We really need a new concept?

And I think it's a real honor for us to have here today Jan-Werner Mueller, since his book, *What Is Populism?* was really among the very earliest serious efforts to tackle these questions.

And I think there is also debate over why populism has become such a huge phenomenon just now. Some of the early accounts of the rise of populism in the United States right after Trump's election focused on economic factors, and, in particular, on manufacturing job loss in the rust belt. Then there were a wave of research projects that focused on fears about status loss, and status anxiety, white males fearing that somehow their value in society, their power in society was under attack. Then there were accounts that focused on disappointed expectations, disappointed economic expectations. And yet another generation of projects that focus on how economic losses might trigger authoritarian values.

But in all these different theories there is a single common element or background condition. And that's that in all of these different explanations of why populism has become so big now there is the idea that globalization is ultimately responsible. And since it's the elites who brought about globalization in their own interests, it's understandable that they have been targeted as the enemy of most or all of the other 99% of the population who do not benefit from globalization.

I want to start by quoting from David Goodhart, whose book *The Road to Somewhere* is a really powerful defense of Brexit. Goodhart writes, "It was global elites and their choices that
led to hyper globalization, including at the regional level with the effort to create a single fiscal and economic space within the European Union. Under the banner of free trade and European integration they battled against so-called market frictions. But what they call market frictions are what most people look at as vital national interests.” This is Goodhart.

So in many versions of this story, the European Union is presented as a kind of Trojan horse for globalization. And so from that point of view you can see why populism in Britain has coalesced around Brexit, the movement to leave the European Union and to evict the Trojan horse from Britain.

Goodhart, the journalists, and scholars on the left, center, and right now claim that in a country with open borders, those who gain from globalization, that’s the group that Goodhart calls the anywheres, people who are comfortable anywhere, who have lost all attachment to their own community, that the anywheres lose all sense of commitment to more vulnerable groups in their own home population. Those are the people that Goodhart calls the somewheres, people who are grounded in local communities, who are tied to the communities where they grew up, who are educated in their own home communities, and are employed in their own home communities.

And I would say that unlike all of us in this room, I would guess, who grew up far away from Cambridge 02139, the somewheres are people who stay in their own home communities and deeply resent the anywheres who have lost their attachment to the plight of their own fellow citizens.

So the argument here is that social solidarity and feelings of care and responsibility for your own more vulnerable fellow citizens wither away once the borders open up. All kinds of ethnic others flood in over the borders. In Britain the resentment was against Polish people moving into Britain. In the United States the resentment about people from Latin America, from Mexico, from the Caribbean moving in.

And the results of this, the outcome of these resentments of how impossible it becomes to sustain public support for a generous welfare state, the result of this feeling that somehow opening the borders has led to an abandonment of the most vulnerable people in your own society. The results are polarization and deep anger against elites.

There's a cartoon that appeared by a Greek cartoonist, Panos [INAUDIBLE], that I think sums up this story in one frame. The cartoon shows three sheep looking at an electoral poster on a
tree. The candidate on the poster is a wolf. And one sheep says to the others, I’m going to vote for that wolf. That’ll really get the shepperd.

The sheep knows, like many of our fellow citizens who vote for populists know, that the wolf will do nothing to advance the interests of the sheep. The sheep even knows he’s likely to be dinner for the wolf. But just getting back at the sheppard is good enough. Anger against the elites is the common denominator here, I think, of these shifts towards authoritarianism that we see in many countries today. I think it’s the greatest danger today for democracy.

So among leading scholars, both of populism and of globalization, there has emerged the idea that globalization destroys liberal democracy, and that we need some kind of return to national borders, to the state on the borders, and to national control. I think probably the best known advocate of this idea in the academic community is Danny Roderick, an economist who teaches at the Kennedy School.

He claims there is a globalization trilemma. Those of you who’ve ever taken a class on international economics may recognize that the expression trilemma plays off the Mundell Fleming’s impossibility trilemma. The idea in economics is that it’s impossible for a country to be able to control its exchange rate, to have open borders, and also to have an independent monetary policy. A country can only have two of those three options at the same time. And what Roderick is arguing with his globalization trilemma is that it’s impossible for a country to have, one, borders open to globalization, two, have national sovereignty, and three, have democracy.

Now, according to Roderick, only two of these three are possible at the same time. Since nation states do not seem to be going away any time soon, we don’t seem to be moving towards anything that could look like world government, and so since national sovereignty seems to be a given, the demonstration that Roderick is providing is of the impossible coexistence of democracy and globalization.

And so like many others who see the politics of the past few years as real threats to liberal democracy, Roderick ends up defending nationalism and closing the borders. And you can find a very powerful development of this idea in a book by a left wing philosopher, Yael Tamir. The book’s called *Why Nationalism?* And it basically is a left wing defense of nationalism. And it’s this perspective, this response to populism that I would like to challenge this afternoon.

First of all, I think that nationalism is dangerous and uncontrollable. Economic nationalism is a
First of all, I think that nationalism is dangerous and uncontrollable. Economic nationalism is a politics focused on borders. And as we can see today, a commercial war between the United States and China, or the United States and the European Union, or even the threat of a commercial war spills over very rapidly into threats in multiple domains, into threats of security collaboration, into threats that effect scientific cooperation, into policies about the entry of foreign students and foreign researchers into our universities and laboratories. More generally, I think there’s no way of drawing a line or building a wall between good economic nationalism, in which we close the borders and induce more social solidarity within our own group, and bad nationalism, in which hostility to outsiders and aggression become more and more likely.

Secondly, I believe that globalization and national liberal democracies are compatible, but we’re going to need great changes in how we go about it. And on this critical point of the compatibility of globalization and liberal democratic regimes, I’d like to suggest that there are lessons to be learned from the period of the first globalization. That was the years between 1870 and 1914.

So first, the lessons of history. We’ve been here before. Over a century ago the first globalization, that between 1870 and 1914, ended on one day when England declared war on Germany on August 4, 1914. The city of London, the epicenter of the world's financial markets, stopped sending capital out of England and globalization was over. Not just for the duration of the war, but for the next 70 years. Border walls went up all around the world, and they didn’t come down again until the 1980s. Capital markets were more integrated in the 1880s than they were in the 1970s.

We know that the first globalization, like ours, was made possible by great technological advances. Telegraph. Telephone. Steamships. The transatlantic cable. Now, when war broke out in 1914 none of these new technologies disappeared. No one went back to carrier pigeons or sailboats. But the protectionists barriers on the frontiers just didn’t come down again for the next 70 years.

And I think that today we’re beginning to understand that in 2019, just as in 1918, that the foundations of globalization are basically political, not technological. In normal times we barely see those political foundations. But in moments of crisis, like today, they become visible and operative.

My conviction is, based on historical experience, globalization could end. Barriers on our
national frontiers not only could come up. They are coming up. And this is a conviction that's, I think, strongly reinforced by what we've seen over the past few years with populism, Brexit, and Trump's election.

Now, you could say there's a big difference between globalization today and globalization 100 years ago. And I agree. But even leaving aside the lessons from history, there's a second reason to question the future of globalization. It's that even before Trump and Brexit, we were already seeing slow down and retreat in the volumes of products, goods, and capital that were being exchanged across borders. The advances of automation and of artificial intelligence are beginning to make localization and re-localization of production more possible and profitable. This is a topic that we're exploring here at MIT in our current research on work of the future.

The extent that robots can replace human labor in simple repetitive tasks, there will be less and less reason to offshore for these activities to low wage economies. Companies have already become, in any event, much more realistic than they were 20 years ago about what the real costs of offshoring and outsourcing are. They now realize that the real costs include delays in delivery, difficulty, and maintaining quality, demands for technological transfer, IP theft, and other stuff.

So there is a variety of reasons, economic, technological, as well as political that the motors of globalization seem to be turning far more slowly today than they were in the recent past. So should we care? Should we care if globalization is in retreat? After all, it was the globalization of finance that gave us the financial crisis of 2007, 2008. The opening of the borders to goods and services with the entry of China into the WTO in 2000 was at the origin of a massive loss of manufacturing jobs in our own country. The opening of borders to a huge wave of refugees and immigrants in Europe triggered the rise of the far right in Germany, and Brexit in England.

I'm simplifying. But really I want to ask the basic question. Should we care if borders are closing up? And particularly, if we're worrying about the impact of globalization on liberal democracy, maybe we might think that a return to nationalism, and to more closed borders around national states, and to more national controls could be a good thing.

Personally, I think that closing the borders would be a great error. And that for three reasons. First of all, open borders seem to me to be the essential condition for a more just and stable international order. If we look at the history of very poor countries, like South Korea in the 1950s, or China, or Mexico, without policies based on export industrialization, without the
possibility of access to consumers in rich countries those poor countries would never have been able to extract hundreds of millions of human beings from very extreme poverty.

Now, obviously that success of globalization has to be qualified. Because it didn't work everywhere. Certainly it didn't work for Africa. And it didn't work for Latin America. But it did work for large populations of very poor people in Asia.

It also has to be a qualified success, because it gave rise to great inequalities in the economies that did succeed. But still, this is the only success that we know in which large sectors of the population in very poor countries have been able to rise out of poverty have been these cases of industrialization oriented towards consumers in countries with open borders. So that's the first reason.

I think the second reason to care about saving globalization is the damage that we would inflict on ourselves, in this case, being Americans. If we closed our borders, if we engaged in commercial wars, what would happen to us? Let me just suggest a few of the self-inflicted wounds that we would suffer.

In the United States a quarter of the technology startups that were founded between 2006 and 2012 had immigrant founders. 28% of new entrepreneurs in 2014 were immigrants. If we look at the impact of Trump's steel and aluminum tariffs there are only 400,000 workers in those industries in the United States. But there are millions of jobs in industries in the United States that use steel and aluminum. There are a million in automobiles, a million and a half in metalworking, and on and on. There are estimates that for every job created in steel by the new tariffs, 16 jobs will be lost in other sectors.

And as we now move to even higher tariffs, the possibility that protectionism will lead to recession has become a real one in this country. And so I would say the self-inflicted wounds are a second reason to care about globalization. And the third reason I think is an even deeper one. It's the relationship between globalization and democracy.

The case for globalization depends not only on material gains, which, I admit, economists have over overestimated and exaggerated. The case for globalization also depends on possible political gains, which I think we have too much neglected.

Again, if we look back at the history of that first globalization, 1870, 1914, this was actually a period in which democracies expanded and consolidated. It was a period of democratic
reforms. In advanced industrial countries, more and more groups in the population were given the right to vote. In Britain in 1867, 1884, Germany, 1871, Australia, Austria, Belgium. These were countries which through that period arrived at universal manhood suffrage.

It's in this period that the income tax was introduced for the first time in most of the leading advanced countries. It’s the period in which the first welfare reforms, limitations of hours of work, unemployment insurance, pensions, child allowances are introduced.

Lloyd George in Britain, after winning the 1907 elections, which are basically elections about free trade, he immediately promulgates what he calls the people’s budget, with an array of democratic social reforms.

So I think if we want to understand why these democratic reforms were introduced in that period, I do not think that it was because being enclosed within the borders of the national state that the elites of that period acted out of a sense of commitment and concern for their fellow countrymen in the lower classes. Rather, most of these reforms were won in hard fought battles with unions, strikes, and large scale mobilization. The elites acted out of necessity and out of concern for social peace. And the elites proposed social and economic reforms in order to build political coalitions that would support opening the borders to flows of trade, capital, and people.

In those days, as today, there were multiple challenges to opening borders. The challenges came up over trade and tariffs, over immigration, over capital flows. And I think the most important lesson we can derive from that period has to do with the political coalitions between natural supporters of an open international order and other groups that had more mixed and conflicted interests. And by natural supporters of open borders I mean groups like bankers. And by groups that had more mixed and conflicted interests, I mean working class groups. So what is, to me, amazing is that unions, working class groups, and left wing socialist parties in that period all supported opening borders through free trade and open capital mobility.

So what remains relevant to our own times I think today is that in the first globalization the coalitions that supported free trade, immigration, and cross-border capital flows were joined to a program of political, fiscal, economic, and social reforms. In exchange for support for globalization, unions and parties of the left demanded social reforms. And they got them. Nowhere in the world did globalization advance alone on its economic merits. It always was linked to larger visions, in which internationalism was defended as the outward face of a nation
in which the domestic order was on the move towards greater well-being and greater social justice.

The difference this time is that globalization moved ahead without any of those social and democratic reforms that had previously been its domestic legitimation. The anger of voters who turned out to elect Trump, discouragement, depression in rural areas and old manufacturing centers, all these suggest that globalization today is in deep trouble in the United States. Most proposals to rescue it center around providing something like individual retraining, individual compensation to people who lose jobs because of imports and offshoring.

I think it may be fair and decent to justify individual compensation. But I don’t think there's any evidence that such policies of individual compensation would deal with the deep anxieties of people about the impact of leaving borders open.

And so I think that drawing lessons from the historical experience with globalization for our own times suggests three things, three approaches that we need to go beyond individual compensation. In the first globalization the parties and unions in the coalitions that advanced both free trade and social reforms were organizations close to their base. They played an essential role in transmitting grievances, demands, and aspirations of workers and rural populations into public debate.

In the United States from the depression through the 1960s unions and the Democratic Party were just that kind of transmission belt. They are no longer that. Unions have shrunk. And they only represent less than 7% of the workforce today in the private sector. The Democratic Party, I think its critics claim with some justification, that the party has given up on its link to working class voters for connections to Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and the educated elite. That's us.

With no channels for voice, people who are fearful of globalization remain isolated and vulnerable to the siren calls of populist politicians.

Voice requires more than simple expression. It's true that anybody today can tweet an instantaneous reaction to anything. But it's not just the volume or the tone of demands that shape policy. What parties, unions, and social organizations can do is to process this noise into useful social and political information, and connect it into the sites where public policy is made. And it's this function of transmission and transformation into policy that makes it crucial to build organizations that can bring the voices of those people who are most affected by
globalization into arenas of policy.

Second, I think we need to slow the pace of globalization in order to gain its acceptance. This can be hard to justify for free trade purists. And I think it's even harder to justify in the case when we're thinking of immigration. How do we morally justify slowing the rate at which refugees and immigrants enter our own country?

It's really hard to know where to draw the line, or where to put up a border level barrier when, in principle, one is committed to a borderless world. Take the case of H1B visas, for example. It's common knowledge that entry tickets to the US labor market that are used not only to fill skilled positions that cannot be filled with US workers, it's also used to bring in workers who will do the job that domestic US citizens are already doing at lower cost. Indeed, in some cases the H1B jobs are already held by US workers who are being required to train their replacements. Many of these jobs could be filled by US workers, if only companies were willing to invest more in training.

But however inconsistent with our basic ideals and with theory, the practical consequences of not slowing the pace may just be too dangerous for liberal democracies, as we saw, for example, in the reaction of the German public to the enormous surge of immigrants in 2015, and the reaction to Angela Merkel's generous, courageous, but probably too optimistic statement of Germany's welcome.

So slow the pace. And then finally, rebuild a coalition for globalization, for support for open borders. We need, once again, to link change on the borders to a broad program of political, social, economic reforms. There are many obvious candidates. Raising minimum wages. Consolidating national health insurance. Lowering financial barriers to college education for working and middle class children. Tax reforms. Tackling the sources of inequality. Building such coalitions in this period of slow productivity growth, and after years of stagnation of middle class incomes is going to be very difficult. But it's a time when we need to make good on our old promises to use globalization as a lever to raise everyone's well-being.

Saving globalization is going to take massive expenditures on education and job retraining, rebuilding our infrastructure, and also flat out compensation for lost income and benefits. I think that protecting globalization and liberal democracy has to go far beyond defeating the populists. It will take moving beyond our broken, polarized politics and paralysis at the center. We need a politics capable of massive initiative in state and society. Thank you.
RICHARD SAMUELS: Well, I know that our plan was to have Suzanne and Jan-Werner interrogate each other directly. But I also know that they agree it's important to engage with you, to the extent possible. So with their indulgence, I want to change the format slightly and go directly to the Q&A, and ask those of you who have questions to step up to the microphones and frame them. Identify yourself please. And then be as succinct as possible so that we can get as many questions in. And I'll do my best to umpire that.

Sir.

AUDIENCE: My name is Dick Madden. And I'm a retired educator. And I think not enough was said, for me, about income inequality, which has gone on for 35 or 40 years. And I think if people's incomes had-- if they were able to share in the wealth that technology and globalization generated, this kind of right wing, Trumpy populism would not have gained the ground that it has gained.

Also, Suzanne, you mentioned global markets and financial markets, and globalization of financial markets. And I don't think that that is the issue. It's the abuse on Wall Street that caused the depression, which was worldwide, and the abuse on Wall Street that caused the financial crisis of 2009, which was worldwide. And nationally, people who owned homes were encouraged to refinance them. And then they lost their homes in the financial crisis.

RICHARD SAMUELS: So sir, do you want to focus a question to Jan-Werner?

AUDIENCE: OK. I would like you to comment on my comments.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Thank you.

AUDIENCE: [LAUGHTER]

SUZANNE BERGER: Well, I largely agree with you that we have failed to tackle the inequalities that have developed over the past 30 years, and that it's the absence of an agenda of social and economic reform that we've sort of proceeded to do a border opening without having any domestic agenda of the kinds of reforms and changes that would have made this not only domestically acceptable,
but domestically desirable to have this kind of more open world. So I think I would agree with you.

**RICHARD SAMUELS:** OK. Let's move to that side. Yes, sir.

**AUDIENCE:** First of all, let me say, this is a great discussion, and I really appreciate what both of you have said. I am a policy advisor, and I've given input that you would like for one of the European countries, for the same reason that you gave it.

My question. China closed its borders at one point. Someone said I think it was about somewhere around the 1500s or 1700s. Perhaps someone would know what year or frame. What was the impact? Is anyone familiar with that?

**SUZANNE BERGER:** I'm sorry. I didn't hear your question.

**AUDIENCE:** Yeah. So there was a period of time when China's economy was growing, but for whatever reason the emperor at that time period closed its borders to the outside world.

**SUZANNE BERGER:** Uh-huh.

**AUDIENCE:** And I don't know if either of you are familiar with that and what impact that had.

**SUZANNE BERGER:** I'm sorry. I don't know the answer. Perhaps some scholar of Chinese history in the room might know the answer to the question?

**JAN-WERNER MUELLER:** You know how academics when they don't know the answer start talking about something else? So that's what I'm going to do for one second, if I may.

Just for the record, I agree with almost everything you said. But that's also a danger, because then people say, oh, typical liberal homogeneous elites. Always groupthink. Always the same. So one quibble. And that, in a sense, indirectly maybe goes to your point as well.

So I think David Goodhart is profoundly wrong, empirically. Elites remain profoundly national with the possible exception of some pockets in academia. So the bad news is, with all due respect, we are not-- OK. Maybe you at MIT. I can only speak for Princeton. But we are not the real elite. The real elites in the economy and the administrative state remain profoundly
national. It's not true that anybody can go anywhere and take on any job, and so on.

Yes. We can think of a couple of examples where that actually happened. But overwhelmingly this is simply not true. Nor is it true that elites are particularly cosmopolitan when we think of this as a substantive ideal, of free movement, open borders, and so on and so forth.

Yes. They want globalization. But globalization was always justified in the name of the national interest. We did it because it was good for us, not because we believe in global justice. I mean, even in political philosophy, I can only think of about 2 and 1/2 people who actually truly advocate open borders.

So I know this doesn't answer your question, but I hope it's still interesting to point out that we should I think be careful with words like open borders. Yes. Angela Merkel, for a brief period, said there is free entry into Germany. By the way, not for immigrants, but for refugees. And then it was closed again.

Good luck emigrating to Germany today. It's not an open country. The whole EU is not an open anything. OK. So I think it's important to remind ourselves that very often people like Goodhart and others, in a sense they start off with a caricature. And they do it for particular reasons.

And they partly sort of play on the idea that I think David Brooks first convinced people of, that cultural capital is so much more important than financial capital. Well, I hate to tell you that in many ways it's not. And the world is not nearly as cosmopolitan as populist rhetoric would make us believe.

Again, I know this absolutely doesn't answer your question, but I hope it was still interesting.

AUDIENCE: What was said more than compensated. Thank you very much.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Sir.

AUDIENCE: Yeah. My name is [INAUDIBLE]. I want to make two quick remarks. One of them is general.

As the good speakers probably made it clear, it seems to me that this populism is a misnomer. It is just kind of the different reactions of what I may call-- it's a meeting of the mind of the scared, for whatever reason. This is just a reaction to certain conditions. It's not a political
ideology. It's not a political philosophy. It does not have a unique economic background or kind of just for the nationalists. It says we know that among the Brexit people, there are the monarchists, there are some left wingers, and so on and so on.

Populism is kind of a very vague, fuzzy thing. For the lack of any other name, people just decided to call it. And then the populism in the west is different than the populism in other places, which brings me to the second remark about Turkey.

Now, Turkey kind of especially-- and I'm not Turkish. So I want to make that clear. Turkey, in the [INAUDIBLE] of, say, the Arab and Islamic world is considered for the liberal Democrats, comparing it to Saudi Arabia, to Iran, to Iraq, to Libya, is a success story, that basically here is a regime that succeeded in ending up the rule of a military dictatorship.

Now, who is to blame for this kind of reactionary policies later as Erdogan is the European Union for not accepting Turkey in the European Union, France in particular. Because had Turkey became part of the European Union they had to live with the rules and regulations of the liberal democracy of the European Union.

So Erdogan does not go kind of under this thing of being a populist. Nationalist he is. But all things are relative. We speak of populism in very absolute terms. The populism of the west, different than the populism of, say, North Africa, where populist is considered good people who are standing up against the hegemony of the west, and taking over national resources and all that.

So one has to be very, very careful. I don't think there is such a thing as populism. There is different reactions. And these are, as I said, meeting of the mind of the scared, whether they are the elites or the working class.

RICHARD SAMUELS:

Thank you. Do you want to respond?

JAN-WERNER MUELLER:

So two things, if I may. First of all, I think Viktor Orban has proven to the world that you can build an autocracy inside the European Union.

If we had had this discussion 10 years ago, we all would have said this is impossible. Yes, there are rules. There are criteria for how you get in. There are watchdogs who protect the rule of law and democracy. And alas, in 2019 it's no longer a debate I think whether you can be entirely in this club, and yet basically not respect the rules of the club.
And it's also, by the way, an interesting example how you can talk the anti globalization talk, and say that these things-- a socialist government that actually sold out to multinationals and so on. And yet, at the same time, basically provide what a colleague of mine once called Chinese conditions in terms of work, safety, and so on to German car companies, which are absolutely integral to the success of the Orban, Orban, Orban regime. So I fear that this is an instance when we have too much faith in supranational national organizations.

On the other point, very briefly if I may, so I, of course, am bound to say that, no, I don't think populism is entirely fuzzy, because I was trying to convince you that it has a somewhat more precise meaning. What I would agree with in a sense-- and, again, this might be a slight quibble between us-- is that, at least for me, it's indeed, just as you said, not associated with any substantive policy position or a philosophy. So it's true that right wing populism and nationalism have a kind of elective affinity. It's not an accident that right wing populists today are usually also all nationalists.

But for me it has no particular affinity with highly specific anti-globalization stances. And even within that, one would have to disaggregate, just as much as Donny Roderick has also disaggregated, and said, for instance-- has, for instance, pointed out that northern European right wing populists, yes, are very xenophobic. But, of course, they're not anti-globalization when it comes to markets. And in the south of Europe, it's the other way around.

So Syriza, or if you think of Podemos as a left wing populist movement, they have a big problem with financial capital moving freely. But they have no problem really with people moving freely. So I think we always have to be-- forgive the pedantic point-- very precise about where we sort of see the opposition. And even then I would not say, oh, it's populism because of that. It's populism because of the anti-pluralism.

AUDIENCE: Hey. Thank you both for being here. I appreciated that you both spoke to two different characterizations of populism. The first as a self-stylization for political leaders and movements. And the latter as a reaction to the economic discontents of globalization. And I'm curious to get your thoughts on another characterization, such that defenders of populism often describe it as a return to the common sense of common people. And I'd like to hear your thoughts on whether you think there's room on possibly describing populism as culturally reactionary movements to the ideological excesses of the progressive movement in sentiments such as political correctness.
So the question of whether populism culturally is kind of the common sense of ordinary people.

There's a wonderful book by a woman called Arlie Hochschild, who spent several years in Louisiana trying to understand how some ordinary people thought about government. And she sort of sums it up as people imagining that they're poor people advancing slowly, slowly down a road towards the American dream. And suddenly they realize that they're in a line. And the line is not only not moving very fast towards the American dream. In some ways it seems to be moving backwards.

And even worse, it seems that there are some people cutting into line ahead of those who are standing there. And the people cutting into line, who are they? They're women. They're African-Americans. They're immigrants. They're cutting in ahead of others in line. And, in fact, the US government is even helping them cut in line ahead of the rest of us who really somehow deserve to be getting to the American dream faster.

In fact, in this very vivid image of people's resentment in feeling that the government is actually promoting the interests not of real citizens, not of the real people, but of these folks, really the immigrant, the woman, the African-American-- these are not really quite the real people, in Jan-Werner's sense. It's promoting other people.

And then her image ends with at the head of the line there is a big brown pelican stained with oil. So the government even has put, in response to the Deepwater Horizon crisis, it's even put the protection of birds ahead of the welfare of those of us here in Louisiana who are just working.

So I think the idea that there is a kind of anxiety about status loss, about the interests of other people who are not really quite real people, or not really the real people being advanced as a component of what you might see as the common sense. And I think this, of course, shades off into racism. This shades off into some of the things that we find most dangerous in our own culture.

Thank you.

I think Jan-Werner had a--
Since you asked both of us.

And just as much as common sense is not really given, neither are grievances necessarily given.

I'm not saying that, oh, this is all manipulated, constructed, and so on. But we often tend to forget that the nature of the public sphere and the media play an important role in how people perceive their interests, but even their basic identities. And if nowadays in this country there's so much lamentation about, oh, we're so divided, and we're so polarized, and we need a presidential candidate who is a healer, and so on, people sort of assume this image of the deeply divided country. It's just sort of what naturally spontaneously emerged between the bi-coastal liberal elites and flyover country.

And then it, furthermore, leads to a sort of guilt complex, especially among liberals, who said, yes. We were disrespecting all these people. And this is so wrong, and so on.

But I daresay, many people actually don't really experience this kind of disrespect in their normal lives. What they do experience is being told by talk radio and certain television stations day and night that they are being disrespected. And this is not just impressionistic. Some of you may have followed the story, that because The Sun, the British newspaper, maligned the supporters of Liverpool FC, so the soccer club for complicated historical reasons at a certain point, nobody bought The Sun in Liverpool for a long time.

And guess what happened. Euro skepticism plummeted. So it's not true that one day people in Britain wake up and they say, ah, bloody European Union. That's the thing to hate.

Again, I'm not saying it's all manipulated and constructed. But it's also not just as much simply given as some of our commentary sometimes suggests.

Thank you.
RICHARD SAMUELS: We have about 7 to 10 minutes remaining. So what I want to propose is we take sharp questions from two at a time. And we'll see what we can get in. OK?

AUDIENCE: OK. Well, as the last question intimated, there's nobody on the panel to defend populism. So it's a little one sided. But at least your key takeaway that it is the elites that have destroyed democracy, it tends to stand out. It's also the elites who destroyed Iraq, that destroyed Libya, that destroyed Yugoslavia, and many other places. And I think you have to give some credit to populists, don't you, for their non-interventionist instincts, and for following through on them? Trump just fired Bolton. And Trump, unlike his predecessors, hasn't started any new wars in 2 and 1/2 years. And he's doing his best to wind down the existing wars, unlike Obama who created a surge in Afghanistan and so forth.

So I think a large part of this can be traced to foreign policy and the way in which the elites think they can remake or impose democracy or nation building from outside. And nationalism, if it's a force for non interventionism, can actually be a very positive innovation in foreign policy and among people that have to pay the price for being the foot soldiers in those futile and destructive wars. Can't it?

RICHARD SAMUELS: And let's take one more.

AUDIENCE: Yeah. Hi. My name is [INAUDIBLE]. I am former minister of defense of Armenia and currently a fellow at the Sloan School at MIT. I wanted to congratulate you for the very good panel, and Jan-Werner for publication of your book in Armenia a couple of days ago, which was presented to the public.

And I want to raise two brief questions. First is about a statement in your book that the best way to fight populists is to talk to them. So my question would be, how do you talk to populists without slipping into populism? And how do you really withstand that debate without really finding yourself in that famous Mark Twain debate with idiots, where they pull you down to the level of their ignorance and [INAUDIBLE] their experience there?

And the second is, in our current situation where we have a movement in power which insists that they don't believe in isms-- and a key concept of their populist theory is that they react to whatever the right people, as you mentioned, want at that very moment. I think it's a very interesting form of legitimizing whatever policy you want to adopt on go, without proclaiming in
advance what your stance is on the issue. So I would add it to the list you said.

But you said in your presentation you address the issue whether populists can govern or not. But when you were speaking about that, you mostly spoke about can they survive a political cycle by manipulating it. You didn't really answer. Can they achieve and deliver results of their governance or not?

RICHARD SAMUELS: OK. So pick and choose among these questions.

JAN-WERNER MUELLER: Yes. Sorry. You said three more hours we have? Yeah?

[LAUGHTER]

So should we talk to them? First of all, I would say it's important to underline that not everybody who votes for a populist politician or party is necessarily populist, i.e. anti-pluralist. We know it about the leaders because they tell it to us all the time. But about many people who vote for them, we don't know that. And we shouldn't just assume and generalize.

I mean, I will not yet again go back to you know which speech by Hillary Clinton. But I think the truly scandalous word was actually not deplorable. The scandalous word was irredeemable, cause she basically said it's not worth talking to these people, as if she could assume that every Trump supporter was necessarily exactly like this, and you couldn't possibly have a conversation with. So I think that's just the wrong conclusion to jump to in terms of conversation is pointless.

But in terms of even talking to the leaders, I think a good politician, somebody with good judgment, let's say, can basically, on the one hand, have an open debate about many policy issues that we can disagree about in a democracy. Including questions of immigration where we would defend one position. They would defend another. But I think it would be wrong to say, oh, that other position is, in and of itself, undemocratic, can't be uttered, and so on. But the trick then, or the art even might be to distinguish between that normal, quote, unquote, policy debate, and then moments where populists specifically reveal themselves as populists.

Example. Somebody says that Angela Merkel has a secret plan to replace the German folk with Syrians. This is a real world example from a party that was mentioned earlier on tonight. It's, of course, very important that a politician then says, look, now we've left the territory of
debates about refugees, immigration, and so on. Obviously the leader of the IFD is not going to say, oh, sorry. I didn’t realize I was propounding a conspiracy theory with French origins.

But that’s not the point. The point is that hopefully enough people see this and say, wait a minute. Even if I like some of their policy stances, I don’t want to be in the same boat with crazy conspiracy theorists, and so on. Maybe it’s a pious hope. But precisely because we shouldn’t assume that all these people are totally sold on post truth and so on, because empirically that’s certainly not true, I think there is some hope in terms talking to them.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Suzanne.

SUZANNE BERGER: Well, I mean, I think that within our own population it’s incredibly important for people to be talking to other people who have different points of view on the direction in which the country has been going, what should be our priorities in public life. And I think that one of the things that has made what I do think is this kind of polarized environment such a dangerous one is that many of the places where people used to talk to each other, let’s say, within unions, within various kinds of civic associations, that those associations have lost a lot of their strength. And so some of the places in which people did talk to each other in the past no longer really are arenas in which much conversation is taking place.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Do either one of you want to respond to the first questioner’s connection between populism and non interventionism in foreign policy, which I thought was a very interesting observation?

SUZANNE BERGER: Well, I mean, I think it all depends which of the leaders you decide to look at as populists. If you look, for example, at Putin, we could hardly describe his foreign policy as non-interventionist.

Trump, it’s hard to know really what Trump has in mind, let’s say, for Iraq, or for Syria. He’s reversed himself so many times on basic issues of US foreign policy. I really don’t know that I could clearly characterize him as non-interventionist. And as for getting rid of John Bolton, I mean, the fact is that the policies that Bolton expressed before he ever was chosen as a national security advisor were the very policies that he argued for in his office. So I can’t really believe that the selection of Bolton didn’t mean at least some kind of potential sign on for those policies.

RICHARD OK. We are at the witching hour, but let me give you the last question. But please try to make
SAMUELS: it short and sweet. Thanks.

I apologize to the others who've been waiting. But we're going to have to make this the last question.

AUDIENCE: Yes. So I'm Chase. I'm a sophomore here at MIT. And I have, I suppose a question. And so, first of all, thank you guys for giving your thoughts and remarks on populism.

My question is with regards to kind of globalization, you see a lot of social fragmentation as a result of globalization, particularly with wage stagnation, economic anxiety. And even in the last, I guess, year or so, we've seen suicides at an all time high among the rust belt, higher than they were in 1972. So my question is, what policies do you advocate for to kind of cool this social fragmentation that comes as a result of globalization? And another question would be, as a populist would say, do we have even a moral imperative to kind of stand for globalization? Shouldn't we be for, of our own, for our local rather than being for the global?

SUZANNE BERGER: Well, I think for the rust belt, I mean, what we really need to do is bring new jobs and new skills into those areas.

And what we are beginning to see is that in some parts of the rust belt, in places like Pittsburgh, for example, that lost the steel industry, but now has re-created itself with a new set of industries, where universities have also played a role in trying to actually stimulate and work with local industries, there are real potential for rebuilding jobs and manufacturing jobs in the rust belt.

I mean, just to mention that as part of this MIT project I mentioned on work of the future we've gone back to 30 Ohio metal working companies that we had first visited seven years ago. And we found, amazingly, that in every one of them there were more people employed than they'd employed seven years ago. Incidentally, we were looking to see if robots were eliminating jobs. And we only found one robot purchase in one of the 30 companies.

So the idea that robots are coming and eating up the jobs very quickly, I think the robots really better get a move on if this scenario has any plausibility.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Jan-Werner, you get the last word, if you wish.

JAN-WERNER: Maybe I could just come back to the I think very important question from the gentleman from
MUELLER: Armenia. Can they really govern?

So I would stick with the point that it’s wrong to assume that by definition they’re all going to be incompetent and irrational somehow. Some of them will be de facto very pro-globalization, very neoliberal, if I may put it that way. But in a sense, given that their political business model, despite all the talk about unifying the people, is de facto polarization and division, I think we can also safely say that they create problems down the line if there ever is a transition back to a real democracy.

And I think this is something I would also implore you that we don't think enough about. We've sort of finally woken up to this idea that, oh, well, god forbid there are autocracies emerging and so on. But we also simply can't go back to the playbook of the 1970s and 1980s about how they might possibly end. Nobody has any idea how Erdogan's reign could possibly end, let alone Putin, and then also how you would deal with a legacy in terms of kleptocratic economies, including also maybe not something that's at the forefront of your mind, but also important, the kind of symbolic landscape they left. They reshaped cities profoundly. They build monuments. They built all kinds of stuff. What's going to happen? And I think this is something we should think much more about than we tend to do.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Right. Well, join me in thanking both speakers for a very stimulating conversation.

SAMUELS: [APPLAUSE]