

CHAPPELL

Well, let's start. Good afternoon. I'm Chappell Lawson. I'm an associate professor in the political Science Department, and also a faculty affiliate at the Center for International Studies. Welcome to today's MIT Starr Forum, "Beyond 9/11, Homeland Security for the 21st Century." This event follows the publication of an edited volume of the same name-- you can see the title behind me-- to which all of today's speakers contributed.

LAWSON:

It is also the Center's way of commemorating the terrorist attacks of 9/11 that killed nearly 3,000 Americans on this day 19 years ago, and as academics, to reflect upon the progress that has made or not made since then.

I hate that we cannot all be in the same room. And I hate that we cannot have the kind of aerobic in-person exchanges for which the Center and the Security Studies Program are justly famous. On the other hand, the silver lining is that it would have been logistically impossible to get this group of speakers together in the same venue at the same time, especially so soon before a presidential election.

So I'd like to thank all of them in advance, and especially Juliette Kayyem of the Harvard Kennedy School, who has graciously agreed to act as our moderator. She will be directing questions of her own convection, first to the panel, and then directing questions from all of you. So if you haven't already, you can find the Q&A feature at the bottom of your toolbar. And that is where you can type in your questions.

I also hope you'll find the chat function at the bottom of the toolbar as well, where we'll be sending out links to bios of the speakers, upcoming events, links to curated information and other information that might be of interest to you. So with that, Professor Kayyem, over to you.

JULIETTE

You're a big crew. And just grateful for all of your time today. It was a coincidence that we were able to get everyone together, and just the Friday after Labor Day seemed like a good time. Obviously, that coincidence has meaning for all of us, personal and professional. So we are cognizant that this is not just an intellectual exercise, but for so many of us one that touched us deeply on that day, and even 19

KAYYEM:

years later.

But it's also a time to account for what does this all mean. 19 years is a long time. A lot has happened since that 19 years. We are talking to you, talking in quotes, during a crisis that is having a fatality impact every two to three days, the equivalent of the single day of 9/11. And so a lot has changed.

And the department that was built in the name of the post 9/11 structure has changed. All of us here have changed about how we think about homeland security. And so with Chap and Alan Bersin, who you'll meet in a minute, we thought it was a good time to account for what those changes meant, how to think about 9/11, a post 9/11 homeland security architecture that wasn't just focused on a department.

Homeland security, if you haven't guessed already, given that we're talking this way, touches us in ways that are intimate, that are about our homes and communities, and the threats that we face as parents and community members as well.

So what we tried to do in the book is to look at those themes. So while we talk about terrorism, and climate change, and border, and immigration, and pandemics, and all the borderless threats that we now face as a nation, we also wanted to look at, more thematically, what is going on with homeland security, and how can we think about it holistically. So this is not just about the department.

And I think we were incredibly lucky to get an amazing crew, not just the people here, whose bios-- I'm not going to do the bio thing-- you're going to see on the screen, with them and others, to contribute to a book that I think, arrogantly, I guess, is really the first accounting of what homeland security should be as we think past the current moment into the rest of the century.

So without further ado, how it's going to work is I'm going to do a quick round with a simple question to give everyone an opportunity to tell us their thoughts, and then direct questions, both related to the headlines and some of the dramas of today for the second half hour. And then open it up to you for the last 30 minutes.

Once again, I want to thank the team of MIT for putting this together, with Chap, and Michelle, and others. And then, the team at the Kennedy School, Tara Tyrrell, and I

think Yvonne is on, who have just done a wondrous job with an edited volume and getting these events started. So thank you all as well. So Amy Pope, you are on from London.

AMY POPE: Fantastic.

JULIETTE Amy served as Deputy Homeland Security Advisor. And we'll get her up on screen.

KAYYEM: The question I want to ask is pretty simple and open ended, which is basically, how would you fix homeland security?

AMY POPE: Well, look, there's a question-- an answer to that question that predates Trump and there's an answer to that question that post-dates Trump. If we look at what the department has become post-Trump, it's been entirely focused on immigration, but not on immigration threats.

So number one, I would bring the department back to its primary mission of recognizing that most immigrants pose no threat at all. The real question and the challenge is how to figure out those who do. And the way that the department is now going about that mission, from my point of view, is the wrong way to use scarce resources.

But if we just even look back a couple years before Trump, I think the number one issue is that it basically still functions as a bunch of different agencies that have been thrown in together. They don't have similar technology. They don't have similar oversight within Congress. They don't always have the same outcomes and objectives. And that's where you've got to start if you want to fix the department.

JULIETTE Thank you, Amy. Chap, I'm going to turn to you, who also-- who served in the
KAYYEM: department, not at the White House, thinking about this question about-- which basically animated us for the book, which is, is there a beyond 9/11?

CHAPPELL I think it's the right question for all of us to address. So I'm not going to talk about
LAWSON: what is necessarily the single most important and pressing short-term issue, but over the long term, I have noticed something that's quite disturbing. And to me, that's an increasing gap between the American people on the one hand and the federal homeland security enterprise on the other.

As this enterprise has gotten more centralized, and more capacious, necessarily so,

it's unfortunately also become increasingly detached from the people it was supposed to protect. And anyone who remembers, in the pre-COVID era, flying into the country, or on an airplane domestically, or applying for a visa to MIT, probably does not find the face of DHS particularly friendly. And if anything, it has become less friendly still-- witness the dispatch of WARTAC teams to the streets of Portland against civilian rioters.

And I think if we continue on this path, we will, at best, obtain resigned compliance from a reluctant citizenry that has relatively little trust in the federal government's homeland security efforts. And that will show up, whether it's declination to share personal information with the federal government, or local resistance to federal immigration reform efforts, or in some other way, will handicap and hobble federal homeland security efforts.

So I would love to blame everything on the current administration. And they certainly deserve their share of the blame. But I think there's a structural problem here that's more fundamental, because homeland security sits at the intersection of law enforcement and national security. And so it inevitably raises these vexed questions of civil liberties, and privacy, and emergency powers.

So what should we do? My recommendation is that we engage in a strategic rethink about how to approach the relationship between the Homeland Security enterprise and American civil society. And that can take many forms, which we can discuss later. But it ranges from everything from making sure that Americans have enough information about day-to-day operations to be able to monitor the street-level bureaucracy in homeland security, to finding ways to engage Americans in homeland security operations without having vigilance shade into vigilantism.

Again I can come back to the specifics, but I would just say, in closing, that if we do address this problem, we will both improve the Homeland Security enterprise materially, and we will help mold it to American political culture. And if we don't, our problems are going to multiply regardless of who's in charge one year hence.

**JULIETTE
KAYYEM:**

That's fantastic, Chap. And Alan, that leads to you. Alan Bersin, who had a variety of important roles at the department. Chap talks about this detachment. And in some ways, what was your key docket, which was the homeland to the outside world,

really does speak to that as well, the necessity of the outside and inside. So was curious your thoughts to that more open-ended question that I raised.

ALAN BERSIN: Yeah, so thanks, Juliette. And hello to everybody. Building on Chap's point about the gap that exists between the public and the homeland security enterprise, I want to focus on a fundamental gap in the public's understanding of homeland security with regard to its international functions.

Most people find it oxymoronic to think that homeland security is not exclusively concerned with domestic concerns and domestic safety. But to the contrary, in an age of globalization, and with technology drawing this all together, and as we're particularly seeing nowadays with the pandemic, there's nothing that affects the homeland adversely, and I would argue positively, that doesn't have a cause or effect that's generated abroad.

So homeland security is intrinsically transnational, inherently transnational. And let me just make three quick points, and we can pick this up in the later discussion. So the first is that today's threats, contemporary threats, don't recognize national boundaries. We talk about the borderless threats of cyber security, and pandemics, obviously, counterterrorism, which is not within one jurisdiction.

Unlike what we saw on the in the past, and what we believed in the past, ports of entry, the 327 airports, seaports, and land ports, that we welcome goods and people into the country, are not the last line of defense. They're really the first-- not the first line of defense, they're really the last line of defense. So we have to actually get out in front of it.

We cannot-- the second point-- we cannot protect the homeland without having DHS personnel abroad. And it will surprise some people to discover that the Department of Homeland Security, and the eight operating components, the main operating components, actually have the largest civilian-- third largest civilian footprint abroad, after the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department.

Third, and this is a point that Chap alluded to in a slightly different context, the distinctions, the old traditional distinctions between homeland security and national security, between foreign affairs and domestic affairs, between law enforcement and national security, these sharp divisions really have given way to a continuum

that we have to recognize and take into account as we restructure the enterprise.

The upshot of all of this is that the current administration's effort to withdraw from the world behind a fiercely nationalistic America first regime, the point is that it not only does damage to our international security posture, but also to our homeland security posture. And that's a point that I think we need to hammer home as we rebuild the relationships with the world. So the bottom line is that we cannot do this alone anymore in a global age. We can't go it alone, at least not successfully.

**JULIETTE
KAYYEM:**

Thank you, Alan. That's terrific and a great segue to Pete Neffenger, who spent a career in the Coast Guard, but then-- or and then-- I shouldn't say but-- would run TSA at the end of the Obama administration. About this idea of this-- you dealt with borders every single day with the transportation industry, so curious your thoughts now that you've been out a while as well.

**PETE
NEFFENGER:**

Thanks, Juliette. And that's a big question you ask. And the book does a good job of tackling some of those component level challenges, and policies, and the like. But for me, any answer begins at a real fundamental level. And it was implied by Chap, Amy, and Alan in their comments.

First, why is there a Department of Homeland Security? What's the DHS mission? And most importantly, who is DHS? And you can find DHS's answer in their mission statement-- "With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values." And there's actually a lot packed into those 15 words-- how to act, on whose behalf we have to act, and why to act.

So it's a pledge, and a pledge that defines and sits astride the oath of office that every one of us in public service took. And it asserts both the expected and the required DHS identity for every member of the department.

As you noted, I spent 36 years in public-facing mission focused agencies tasked with protecting the country, first the US Coast Guard, then the TSA. And agencies like these are the retail public face of DHS. And in the case of TSA, it's arguably the retail face of the federal government, with some 2 and 1/2 million people each day passing through a TSA checkpoint, pre-pandemic.

So if we believe in honor, and integrity, in safeguarding the public, in protecting the

nation's values, then you have to define, exemplify, and emphasize that every single day in that public face. Because no matter what we say, the public face is the real face. And that's our true identity in our airports, along our borders, in our cities, and anywhere else the department presents itself.

The public we serve determines the real identity of DHS based upon what they see and how DHS acts, how we all acted when we were there. And how DHS acts in turn shapes the DHS identity and culture. So you have to be very careful how you act because identity is a reinforcing loop.

So I'd fix DHS but binding every component of the department first and foremost to that pledge, by specifically embedding the promise and the intent of the pledge into the department's policies and procedures, into agency operational doctrine and tactics, into use of force policy, into domestic and international deployment considerations and training, into our emergency response operations, into every one of the thousands of operational and tactical decisions that the department collectively makes every single day, and that directly affect the public and the nation that we've sworn to serve.

That's really hard work. It takes commitment, courage, and a constant effort, but it can be done, because I've seen it done. And leaders in the agencies they lead can be held accountable for living up to those values that we claim to hold dear and important.

JULIETTE

KAYYEM:

I think that's an important point. Most of us have put a footprint, at least at DHS at some point, we both-- at the same time, you know all of its tremendous flaws, but also all of its potential if we could only get it right at any given moment. And I think in that point the lawyer for us all-- Steve-- Steve is there-- general counsel at DHS from 2013 to 2017, got a flavor, or oversaw every legal aspect, and has written a terrific chapter on privacy. And from your perch, wanted you to answer the question as well, and also as a lawyer in the space as well.

STEVE

BUNNELL:

Well thanks, Juliette. And I really do appreciate Admiral Neffenger's comments. I think it all starts from having the kind of culture that he was describing. And the structures really are only as good as the culture and the people at some level. But let me just suggest one area. I'm not it is the critical problem.

But with respect to data security and privacy, I really think that is an area where the department needs to get more serious. I think it's the central challenge of the future. Data security and privacy are really not law enforcement challenges. They're risk management challenges. And that is really what DHS specializes in. And I think DHS needs to be given more authorities, more resources, so they can actually tackle those problems.

I would-- try to figure out what happened to my iPad. It just died. So I'm going to have to wing this. I would try to re-think the way we approach the tradeoff between security and privacy, so that we are looking for what we could call security privacy win-wins. I think there are ways that-- many ways, frankly, that we can leverage two things-- technology and trust-building exercise, trust-building measures.

And if we do those things in a smart way, we can find ourselves with things that both make us more secure, measures that make us more secure, but also are more protective of privacy. And historically, we have-- we've effectively relied on the inefficiency, and to a certain extent the incompetency of [AUDIO OUT], the fact that the government's not very good at collecting data and using it.

But with modern technology we're actually getting more capable. And agencies like TSA are making really smart use of data to be smarter about the way they advance their screening mission, at airports for instance. And we don't want to give that up, but in order to do that in a way that people trust and feel safe about we need to be much more intentional about the way we build the privacy protections into what we do.

So I think a central challenge going forward is to get serious about data security and privacy, and not just focus on what I would call the traditional challenges of the 9/11 era.

JULIETTE

KAYYEM:

Thank you, Stevan. Seth, I'm going to turn to you. Seth, has extensive operational and policy experience in trade, and borders, and immigration. Sort of the other-- we think about threats, but there's lots of good things that we want to promote as well. So I'm going to turn to you last and then we'll start round of questions.

SETH

STODDER:

Sounds great. Thank you so much, Juliette. And thanks for inviting me to participate in this. It's really great. And it's also quite daunting to go last after hearing the

eloquence of all of my great friends and colleagues before me.

But I'm going to talk-- I'll talk about borders and COVID a bit later, but I think in terms of answering the initial question, I guess I'll just go back to, as my late father would say, going around Hogan's barn a little bit on this question, is I was actually in New York City on 9/11 itself and saw much of what happened, including the fires in the World Trade Center and all that. And I was yanked into what ultimately became the Department of [AUDIO OUT].

JULIETTE

Did we lose him? We lost him. Seth, see this is why I have to be on my toes. Seth, we'll come back to you. You may want to reboot. OK, so I'm sure what Seth was going to say was genius, and we'll let him say it next, but this is the nature of the game.

KAYYEM:

So what I want to do for the next half hour, just now that you've heard sort of a conceptual thing, is maybe drill down on specific topics and, of course, with COVID. So one way to think about homeland security-- so I'll get out of my moderator mode since I was also a contributor-- is to think that-- that as Steve was saying, don't think of things as binary, as choices between we're either pro liberty or pro security.

For homeland security, you're trying to do three things simultaneously. And we'll get into this related to specific threats. You're trying to minimize all risks. So the interesting thing about the book is it's not a terrorism book. It's not a COVID book. It's not a climate change book. It's all of the above.

You're trying to maximize unified defenses. In other words, it's the private sector that Alan was talking about, it's the international community, it's local and state governments. Look at COVID-- the hospitals, individuals, who are-- we have a chapter on emergency management. What are we supposed to prepare for?

And then third is, you want to maintain-- and this is where we'll focus now-- on who we are as a homeland. In other words, even if arguably you could say, for example, just to touch a third rail, child separation would minimize some risk, maximize some defenses. At some stage, a department or a policy has to step back and say, we just don't go there. It's just not who we are.

And that's, I think, what the debate is. And with this, I'll then turn back to you, Seth.

The hard part of homeland security is not the security part. Every person on this panel can tell you how to do the security part. It's the homeland part and who we are. So Seth, let me go back to you. I was filling time.

**SETH
STODDER:**

Thank you. I've no clue what happened. Suddenly I just got thrown off the Zoom. Maybe it's something I said. But anyway, what I was saying was that, so I was in New York on 9/11 and was brought into the administration very quickly. It was first day. It was September 24th, 2001, and what became the administration-- what became the department. So I'm a double-header. I served in Bush and Obama.

And what I remember at that time was the sense of unity that we had coming in and the sense of purpose, real national unity. And when the Department of Homeland was ultimately created, it was created in that spirit of unity. And I remember Tom Ridge, who I worked with a fair amount, saying repeatedly, "We don't do politics in Homeland Security. It's not our job. We don't do politics."

And I'd say-- what I would say is that the biggest problem facing the Department of Homeland Security right now is actually the politicization of the Department of Homeland Security, reverse of what Tom Ridge said at the very beginning, as the key plank of DHS.

And so you could see it, I think-- let's face it, DHS is an inherently political department. We fight over immigration, and trade, and all these things. And that's OK. That's necessary. But I think it's different to say that it's politicized in the sense of-- you could see it in so many of the things we've seen recently, like the decision on global entry in New York, which was-- which basically DHS kicked New York residents out of global entry, the CBP Trusted Traveler program, essentially in retaliation for New York sanctuary state law.

Ultimately, it was challenged. And DHS and CBP had to recant. And actually admitted that they had lied to the court in saying why New York had been kicked out. Also you can see it in the politicization of intelligence and analysis, dossiers on journalists that were covering Portland. Or the fudging of intelligence analysis in downplaying on the white nationalist terrorist threat or the Russia threat, or in Portland, you're seeing this.

And it's extremely dangerous from all kinds of different perspectives. I think it's

dangerous from the perspective of authoritarianism, in the sense of DHS is the largest federal law enforcement agency. And you can see it, the fearsomeness of the BORTAC units, in fatigues, with M4 rifles, and body armor, and unmarked cars in Portland. It's dangerous.

I think it's also, as again, citing Tom Ridge, DHS was not intended to be a personal presidential militia going into the cities. That wasn't the intent of DHS from the beginning. And yet, that seems to be what's happened. So I think that's dangerous.

It's also dangerous from the perspective of the long-term interests of the department, not only the credibility with the people in the country, but also state and local governments. DHS depends on state and local governments to function. And if we poisoned our relationship with state and local governments through, not only the Portland and Chicago episodes, but also through fighting in sanctuary cities, and immigration enforcement against the expressed wishes of local populations, it's a real problem.

And it's also, it's a problem-- again, federalism was meant to be one of the key protectors against authoritarianism. And we have an Insurrection Act with limitations as to when the president can send in troops against the wishes of a governor. And that's only happened four times in history, once during the reconstruction and three times during the Civil Rights Movement.

And now we have this potential end-run around the Insurrection Act, and the ability of the president to send paramilitary troops into our cities-- dangerous. Undermines the ability of DHS in the future to work closely with state and local governments. And I think it undermines public support for the department altogether.

So I think that's the biggest problem facing it. And I think in terms of solutions we might need legal guardrails around the department, including amending the statute that enabled Acting Secretary Wolf to send people into the cities. We will need also stronger management. We have a lot of actings in place, but people who aren't Senate confirmed. And finally, the abdication of the Senate's role in advice, and consent, and oversight over this. So I think DHS has a lot to do, I think, to really bring its credibility back with the public.

JULIETTE

Yeah, that's-- for those of you taking themes here, this is a huge concern for this idea of Homeland Security, is it seeming detachment from its consumers, and the people who should be protected by it, but also have to be integrated into it. And on that point, Alan, I want to turn to you first.

KAYYEM:

You talked about integration, both in the homeland with the enterprise, and then also globally. I can't think of an instance where we feel more disintegrated, more detached than how we are right now, in terms of a response to COVID, both a global and a domestic response. And I wanted to ask you, is this fixable with either a change in a presidency or is this the nature of borderless threats?

ALAN BERSIN:

So, Juliette, I think it's interesting. When we set out to create this book, we thought about looking back. We thought where had homeland security been, how was DHS doing, how could we actually assess the homeland security enterprise at that point, now 17 years after DHS was created, 19 years today, since 9/11.

What's interesting is that so much of the book is now relevant to the agenda going forward, to figure out how actually do we build on this. One of the chapters, given your responsibilities at DHS, for inter-governmental relations, and then mine with regard to international affairs, was the stress how the entire homeland security enterprise is dependent on partnerships.

This is the way it would operate within a federal system. And we have to build these up. And as all of us know who've been involved government service, stovepipes characterize bureaucracies. By the way in which our government is divided, it's very difficult to actually ensure coordination, or data sharing, or operational cooperation, and the like.

I could take the-- Seth and I should debate this. I actually don't think it's a matter of law. It's a matter of good sense and public leadership. We can't legislate against stupidity. And what we need to do is integrate, but do it the old-fashioned way, which is respect, listening to agencies at every level of government, and also taking our foreign partners seriously again, and engaging for the reasons I indicated.

JULIETTE

OK, great, Chap and Amy, do you have any follow-ons to that?

KAYYEM:

AMY POPE:

Yeah, look, I think the mistake that we're seeing play out in this particular administration is a suggestion that our response to COVID is really resting on the shoulders of the governors and the mayors at the local level. There's a very important role for the federal government to play here. And there's a very important role for the Department of Homeland Security to play here.

In the first instance, in terms of setting nationwide standards and really creating a culture around them, it's critically important. I think when we dealt with Ebola, for example, the goal was to make sure all the information that we had about how to manage infections was shared with the state governments, with the governors, with the public health authorities, so that people weren't trying to make it up on their own as they went along. And that's just not happening here. And that's a critical role for the federal government to play.

Likewise, when it comes to things like reporting where the cases are happening, if you're not tracking, and tracing, and sending out response teams if there's an outbreak, then you're just not managing the response effectively. We learned that the hard way through multiple experiences. It's in a playbook that when we were in the Obama administration we left for this administration.

Not because-- not because we did it perfectly, but frankly, because we learned so many lessons along the way, and we wanted to make sure the next administration had the tools it needed. And that goes also with respect to things like PPE. We don't want states competing with one another over very important critical resources. There needs to be a method of coordination, sharing of information, sharing of materials. And so we're just really seeing the impact of the lack of all of that in the current response to COVID.

JULIETTE

I think that's--

KAYYEM:

CHAPPELL

Beyond all of that, I just--

LAWSON:

JULIETTE

Chap, let me turn to you, sorry.

KAYYEM:

**CHAPPELL
LAWSON:**

Yeah, thanks, I obviously agree with all of that. The only other thing I'd mention is that COVID shows us the problems when we don't have a good regime for understanding privacy, as Steve was discussing, and we don't have a lot of trust in government. And this has raised its head with respect to contact tracing. So unless we solve that issue, we will be less effective in the next pandemic.

**JULIETTE
KAYYEM:**

I think that's right. And Seth, a little bit about just in terms of a national approach to just getting stuff-- I always say this when I'm on air, which is-- no offense to my doctor friends of the doctor analysis, they're not saying-- we know exactly what to do. This is an execution problem now. I don't need to be told to wear a mask anymore. I'm there.

**SETH
STODDER:**

Yeah, absolutely. I think that, again, the problem here is a failure of leadership I think from the top. And I think it's also a failure, again, back to my previous comments, I think certainly politicization. I think we see-- we saw that with the FEMA Supply Chain Task Force, in essentially turning what was relatively a simple problem-- it is a challenging problem in the sense that most PPE, N95 masks, made in China, other places around the world, had to get across difficult borders now after COVID that had to get here.

But for whatever reason, failure of leadership or politicization at the top, the Supply Chain Task Force of FEMA screwed it up, and turned into-- a normal problem turned into a wild west global market of PPE, with scams everywhere, unclear where people were getting their PPE coming into the country, and continuing shortages, not only for health care workers, but also for other essential workers, including teachers, and meat processors, and whoever else.

And so you had this real crisis that really continues today. And then on top of it you have, I think, probably irrational decisions on exports of PPE and also inability to make decisions between FEMA and HHS with regard to increasing hospital ICU capacity and all that. I think it's really just been a breakdown of leadership here.

**JULIETTE
KAYYEM:**

Yeah, I want to turn to Steve on that, on that-- just given your role at DHS. So over the course of the Trump administration, there's a huge challenge, I think, politically. You have the rallying cry-- abolish cops. But people should remember that maybe a year, year and a half ago, or two years ago, with the child separation, it was

abolished ICE.

And then in light of what happened with Portland was an abolish DHS movement, which I think does put the other party, Democrats in this case, in tough footing. So maybe, in some ways, I want to ask you, is the department defensible? And if it were just to disappear and its various components, what would be lost? What's the best case at this stage, given all the problems we've seen?

STEVE That's a big question.

BUNNELL:

JULIETTE I know.

KAYYEM:

STEVE I'm not necessarily an advocate for keeping that department exactly the way it is,
BUNNELL: but there's a problem of moving the deck chairs around just to feel like you've created new boxes and have actually done something. I think one of the things that's going on, and we've seen it-- we saw it in Portland and in other contexts-- is there's a part of the department's mission, which you can call it fear management.

Certainly in a counterterrorism context, one of the department's roles is not to magnify a violent incident into something that really scares the heck out of everybody. That's what terrorism is all about is creating terror. So one of the core missions of the department is to project a competence and a reassuring presence. And part of that is being candid about what's going on and not using fear to rile people up in order to advance a political agenda.

And so when we say we see the politicization of DHS, what we're really seeing is something that is undermining the ability of DHS to combat fear and reassure people. That's what-- feeling more secure about is not feeling afraid. So we've turned it around. We've done that in the immigration context. We've done it in the response to the protests. And that's a lot of institutional capital that's been dissipated. And how you rebuild that is a real challenge.

I will say when I hear people talk about abolishing DHS or abolishing ICE, that to me tells you-- it tells me that people do not respect the rules that those agencies are supposed to be enforcing. And certainly in the immigration context, although there

are plenty of problems with ICE, one of the core problems with ICE is that they are enforcing a series of rules that, from both the left and the right, people don't agree are the right rules.

So what we need to do is come up with the right rules and the right standards. We need immigration reform. And then we could have an ICE or a DHS that could enforce those rules so we live by the rules that we agree are reasonable. Right now we've got rules that don't work. And so the people who are tasked with trying to enforce those rules are on the front end of the public backlash. And so, I'm not really answering your question so much as pointing out the fundamental issue here goes deeper than just DHS.

**JULIETTE
KAYYEM:**

Yeah, look, the abolish ICE is because immigration enforcement is crappy. Like, it's not fun. Someone's got to do it. That mission will continue whichever presidency it is, but it's understanding how would you want to do it and how would you want to enforce it.

I want to turn to Pete Neffenger, because you've worked at various components at the department. And thinking you know each of their cultures. You grew up in one and ended in the other, their cultures. But there's this question of, especially for progressives or Democrats, that the department was a beast of Bush in the 9/11 world, and then all sorts of horrible things happened. And then now being used in a way that feels very isolating or irrelevant to most Americans.

**PETE
NEFFENGER:**

Thanks, Juliette. So I'd like to build on a couple of things that Steve brought up. And I think Steve makes some good points about reorganizing without a clear vision as to what that is. I spent-- I think I went through 12 major reorganizations in the Coast Guard during my time in the Coast Guard. And some of those made sense, and some of those just confused people. And that's from an agency that I consider one of the better agencies in the federal government.

So I think reorganizing sounds like an easy answer, but it typically does exactly what Steve says. It just moves a bunch of boxes around, and gives people new titles, and maybe redraws some chains of command, but the fundamental problems will all still be there. To me, the challenge in the department is that it has a huge remit, if you look at the totality of the authorities, and the requirements, and the missions

that have been put on the shoulders of the various components and agencies.

That's never been well explained to the American public. It's not always fully understood by the individuals within the department, because there's a real confederation within the department, and not a real consolidation of effort. It goes back to what I was trying to-- the point I was trying to make in my opening comments, was until you build to a common understanding of what the face is that you want to present, it's very hard for the department as a whole to present a face to the--

So it doesn't surprise me that agencies default to what the law requires them to do, and sometimes default in the most egregious ways to what the law requires them to do, because it's a safe place to be. It's a safe place to say, I'm just enforcing the law. I think the-- so the calls to abolish, or transform, or do things, while I understand where they come from, it doesn't answer the fundamental question.

You still have issues with respect to managing borders, to protecting the country, to safeguarding our trade and our other-- all the things that the department does, and responding to natural disasters and the way in which we do it. So all that stuff still has to be attended to. And if you just say, I want to throw it all away, you're still left with this big question, as to all right, now, what do we do? Who's going to take care?

Juliette, it's kind of like back during the BP oil spill, when there was a question that said, why don't you just fire BP? And Admiral Thad Allen quite rightfully said, well, then what would I do? They're the ones with the money, the resources, and the ability to fix this.

JULIETTE

Alan, you wanted to chime in on this and then Seth.

KAYYEM:

ALAN BERSIN: Just quickly, I think the book, actually, while we disagreed on many points in the debate, readers will find, we actually ended up agreeing that the homeland security, for all the imperfections, for all of DHS's problems, that it really was not unexpected that a 10-year bureaucracy, now a 17-year-old year-old bureaucracy would take a long time to unfold in a rational way.

We're still seeing the Pentagon, arguably one of our more effective bureaucracies,

actually it took almost 50 or 60 years before it started functioning. It required legislation, like Goldwater-Nichols in the 1980s, to actually realign it.

Now, it may well be that we could use a Goldwater-Nichols to integrate DHS more effectively. But that's far more limited than saying we're going to abolish the department, or abolish any of its components, or move the Secret Service back to Treasury or open to DOJ. That gets into what Steve and Pete identified as moving the deck chairs.

So I think what we need is a recognition of the partnership function of DHS and its outreach to the private sector, to the world, and also to other state and local governments. If we eliminated DHS, we'd have to reinvent it soon enough. The fact of the matter is that after 9/11, and the purpose of the book was to say we've evolved past counterterrorism as the cornerstone. Not that counterterrorism isn't a concern, but it's no longer the cornerstone of the department.

What we need to avoid now is not to make-- to recognize the need for public health without making pandemics the cornerstone of DHS for the next generation. But balance is not something we do well at DHS.

JULIETTE Seth, I'm going to turn to you.

KAYYEM:

SETH OK.

STODDER:

JULIETTE Seth and then Chap, are you on this one? Yeah, OK, great.

KAYYEM:

SETH Yeah, I was just going to say, back to a few points, first off with regard to responding to Steve's comment on immigration enforcement, 100% agree with that, in the sense of having been at CBP and also at DHS overseeing borders and immigration. There's no substitute for political consensus in terms of making law enforcement function better. And we absolutely need immigration reform, which will help with the process in gaining consensus on immigration enforcement.

But on the issue of reorganizations, yeah, I, again with Steve, and also with Pete, there are plenty of areas where I could see rearranging deck chairs a little bit. But I

go at the reorganization question from the perspective of having been at DHS, or what became DHS when DHS was created, and having been head of policy for what became CBP when we were detangling the budgets of CBP, ICE, and USCIS, and the fight over the simultaneous divorce of customs and INS, and the breakup of those agencies, and then simultaneously of marriage to create CBP and unify that agency.

And I'll tell you, the organizational churn that was involved with that was truly epic. And enormous fights between CBP and ICE that continue to this day over-- no, those are our airplanes-- no, those are our airplanes. It reminds me of the fights between my two children, my two boys. It's not something that I'd want to go through again unless it's absolutely necessary.

And the one thing-- the last thing that I'll end on is, I remember early on, when DHS was created, Tom Ridge brought in a great guest speaker to talk about the successes of mergers and how we can actually do this. And that guest speaker was Carly Fiorina, which was right before the HP Compaq merger collapsed.

JULIETTE Right.

KAYYEM:

SETH And she was talking about how you can do a successful merger. And this is how
STODDER: we're going to do it. And Tom Ridge was very confidently showing Carly Fiorina, and little did we know, six months later, the whole house of cards at HP Compaq collapsed. So words for the wise.

JULIETTE Yeah. Chap, let me turn to you quickly. And then Amy, I want to ask you a question
KAYYEM: about new terror threats.

CHAPPELL Yeah, I just want to echo what my colleagues have said about this misguided
LAWSON: impulse to redraw lines on an organizational chart for the hope of obtaining greater aesthetics or clarity, paper and pencil style. That's a terrible way to go. After 17 years, the bureaucratic lanes are much clearer now, and we don't want to reinvent them.

I would also say this is the kind of discussion that we might want to have at a very nuanced operational level with regard to specific elements, if DHS were in a better place right now. But this is an analogy that Seth and I have talked about.

When the Obama administration left office, I would say DHS looked like Berlin in 1990. There were parts that were under construction. There were parts that were beautiful. And you could sort of see the gleaming city that it was going to become 30 years hence, right? Unfortunately right now, DHS looks more like Berlin in 1948, as a kind of bombed out hulk. And so we need to first get to 1990. And we also need to make sure that DHS doesn't become like Berlin in 1938, which is another terrifying possibility.

JULIETTE

KAYYEM:

So, Amy, I want to turn to you. Thank you, all. Amy, I want to turn to you we have some great questions actually lined up. I'm going to steal a couple more minutes over here. So you think about a certain threat-- and there's a great child in the background, I love it-- you think about a certain threat-- and a dog. I love that even better-- a certain threat that started on 9/11-- well, that started Americans' conception of homeland security, even though all of us had somewhat been in the space before that.

It was called different things, civil defense, domestic preparedness, whatever it was. 9/11 happens. It makes us it focuses us on a certain terror threat, al-Qaeda in that instance. And then the way I think about the department is there was a course correction, call it what you will, in 2005 with Hurricane Katrina, that a department so focused on one threat had lost its capacity to save an American city from drowning or help save an American city from drowning.

Fast forward to today, and when you think about the threat, there is just no question, quoting the FBI and anyone who's in the space, about the white supremacy, neo-Nazi threat, domestic threat. But it raises different issues. It's not an immigration, a border, keep them out. It raises different issues from a homeland security perspective-- the right to bear arms, the right to free speech, the right to assemble.

And just wanted to know, you were in the Obama administration when Charleston happened, the killings in Charleston and others, when we started to see that uptick. It's now gone-- now it's-- now three or four times of what it used to be. So I'd love your thoughts on what are those challenges? And then how would you address it moving forward, different type of terror threat?

AMY POPE: So there's no question that right now the major threat to the United States, in terms of numbers of incidents, is coming from a white nationalist extremist violence. And frankly, the department is not really built to respond to it.

And this goes back to something I wrote about, actually, for the book, which is that there was kind of a failure to capture all of the pieces that should have been in a department focused on homeland security, and specifically thinking about the law enforcement functions that we see within the FBI. And so instead of having agencies that are working very closely together, you end up in a situation where you often have agencies that are competing with one another, not always effectively sharing information, the way they need to, suspicious of one another's motives, and suspicious of how each other vital information that's critical.

So the department, really, I think of it as capabilities that needs to be addressed. The capability to defend our coastline. The capability to defend aviation. That capability to identify threats coming in on our airplanes or across our border. But the one capability that is missing is the capability that allows for the effective addressing of threats that are developing inside the country.

And I think that's part of why the department has not handled that very well in the past. We all remember when Janet Napolitano tried to take on the issue of white nationalist violence.

JULIETTE Yeah, and I wonder, Steve, you've dealt with it. The legal regime is very different.

KAYYEM: The rights of the potential perpetrators are very different if you're talking about a foreign terrorist versus domestic. And are there ways for it to be solved within the department or through a different legal regime?

STEVE BUNNELL: Well, we don't really have a legal regime that designates things as domestic terrorism. So it's kind of a made up concept from a legal perspective. And it is, at the first instance, it's a local law enforcement challenge. I think there is room for DHS to, through the fusion centers and other information sharing methods, to share useful intelligence, and help law enforcement and local jurisdictions be prepared for things, and be strategic about the deployment of resources.

But the line between what's political and what's a domestic terror agenda

unfortunately is getting more blurred lately. And so, that really does create some challenges that go beyond the things that DHS typically does. So I'm not sure DHS is well positioned to actually do very much directly with respect to the domestic violent organizations. It's just we're not really set up legally for that to happen. The federal government doesn't have general federal police power.

JULIETTE

Seth.

KAYYEM:

SETH

STODDER:

Yeah, just actually chiming in exactly that point, is that the government does not have general police power. So while certainly I think in terms of the terrorist threat, I think I would agree, and I think DHS would agree, although it seems now reluctant to agree with itself, on the threat presented by white nationalist extremists. And certainly, more people have died from white nationalist extremists since 9/11 than Islamist terrorists. It's just barely, but it's more.

And I think obviously, the obvious problem here on DHS's role is no general policing power. Also, there's the role of the FBI. The FBI also has a significant role in countering terrorism, and countering violence, and federal crimes. So there is the turf fight between the FBI and DHS as to who's got the lead here in different areas.

And then obviously, state and local governments-- Steve's right, Dylann Roof in Charleston, he wasn't charged with domestic terrorism. The El Paso shooter, not charged with domestic terrorism. They're charged with either federal hate crimes charges or they're charged with state or local-- state and local murder charges. So it's a challenging thing legally to think about with white nationalism.

And the other thing also I guess I would say with regard to the white nationalist threat, it's a serious threat that we need to take seriously. However, I think certainly there are other threats I think that perhaps are more cataclysmic, I think, for DHS to be thinking about as well, including conceivably the threat from China and Russia with regard to critical infrastructure, with regard to communications, with regard to critical technologies, and the role that DHS plays in all of those areas.

Also, in the issues of social media, not only for radicalization for terrorism, as we saw with Kenosha and with white nationalists, but also more broadly with regard to disinformation from the Russians and whatever else. And I think DHS has a role in

that. Again, it's a very careful role, consistent with the First Amendment.

And then I think-- I'm sitting in California right now. And our state is on fire. And I think the other huge issue that DHS-- huge threat that I think DHS is going to have to face in the next 10 years, perhaps maybe the biggest one, is the implications of climate change and natural disasters.

**JULIETTE
KAYYEM:**

Yeah, let me end this panel, this part of the panel with Pete. Because if you think we've done terrorism, public health, or the borderless threats, I know there's lots of questions about election security and cybersecurity, but climate change. If you think, there's pressing threats and then there's existential ones. The West is on fire. 10% of an entire state has been evacuated.

Pete, you spent a lot of time in disaster management-- obviously the BP oil spill, but other efforts by the Coast Guard, Hurricane Katrina. Each individual one can be excused as a fluke. And then you start to see a theme. So is the department, or even the way we think about it the correct way to think about what I would view as the thing my kids-- my kids are going to be dealing with pandemics and white supremacy, they are going to be, I think, unfortunately, existentially, their lives will be different because of climate change?

**PETE
NEFFENGER:**

Well, Juliette, I'll build my answer off of the comments that Seth just made with respect to being ready and thinking about the way in which you present yourself. Part of the challenge for homeland security, and it's something that DHS just doesn't do well, is communicate with the public about the risks and the challenges that we face, particularly those that are existential.

So there's a communication piece that's been-- that's largely been missing over the years. And then it just becomes this face that shows up periodically with differing levels of acceptability on the part of the public. That's particularly important when it comes to things going wrong. If you think that the department is largely designed to prevent bad things from happening, well, it doesn't always happen. And sometimes the bad things happen irrespective of anything the department could do, because it's a natural disaster or you've got some other issues going on.

So you always have to be prepared to respond. And I don't think that we have communicated that very well to the people who have to do it, nor do we prepare

very well for the very things that we have to respond to. And instead look to place blame for why something happened, instead of looking to understand the structural and underlying reasons for things-- climate change, increasing urbanization of areas that were never urbanized before, or pushing out into wild areas that are more prone to fires, and so forth.

And not looking to place any blame on people, but these are just management issues that have to be addressed. And then we have to have some means of supporting the kinds of response that has to happen. You can't just pretend that this is a fluke. We know that these things-- this is the fourth or fifth fire season in a row that's become increasingly worse for California. I spend a lot of time in California. I can tell you it's a pretty frightening place to be for a lot of my friends and colleagues now.

So I think that the response mission of the department can't just be an afterthought. And it can't just be a FEMA problem. And it can't just be a Coast Guard problem if there's a hurricane. It really is-- it's one of the fundamental reasons the department was created. If you think about it, it was the response to a terrorist attack. And then over the years, we've evolved the department to be much more involved in the full range of things that can affect us domestically.

And I think you have to give voice to that. You have to communicate that. You have to help people understand what the risks are that they face. What's my play in this as an individual? What are you doing for me? How are you communicating those risks to me on my behalf, whether it's risk from domestic terrorism or risk from domestic disaster?

**JULIETTE
KAYYEM:**

Listen, I want to thank everyone. I don't want to ignore this great audience of a couple hundred people. But I want to thank the panelists first. We'll go round at the end. But there are some great questions and some hard ones. I want to begin with one that I think is very fair, and that we have to address, which is essentially-- and Alan, I think this would go to you first-- which is the extent to which financing supports potentially some of the protest movements, either on the left or the right.

I'm going to read this, and I can't pronounce the name, so I apologize, I'll just read it from one of the audiences. Could this be the cartels, mafia, and others supporting it,

in terms of some of the paramilitary activity that we're seeing on-- and I'll add this-- on both the right and the left, I think it's safe to say? But it's a big issue that I think needs to be addressed.

ALAN BERSIN: So this is the problem of everything being transnational. And we're in a situation where social media will spread a point of view such that it's no longer debatable, but rather accepted. It's part and parcel of the polarization that we have. But the interesting problem that we have is that there is no reliable way to actually get an investigation of that allegation that would be believable or credible across the spectrum of political opinion.

That's one of the larger wounds currently in our in our body politic that needs to be repaired. So I think the idea that the Russians are interfering in the election and in this campaign, I think generally accepted by the intelligence community. I've seen no reports that I deem credible that suggests that the Black Lives Matter is being funded by the mafia or by the GRU, or that right wing supremacist groups are being funded by outside sources.

What we have to do is rebuild the institutional credibility of our government so that we don't have endless debates on social media, let alone between our chief executive officer and any particular citizen. So it's a fair question to be sure. And one of the things that I think we've been suggesting needs to be rebuilt is a capacity to answer questions like that, to do it efficiently, and to do it in a way that's credible and beyond reproach. We have a lot of work to get there.

JULIETTE KAYYEM: Does anyone else want to add into that? Because I know that there's a question on the private sector that Amy, that I would love Amy to answer, just it's immigration, but also budgetary issues and other issues.

CHAPPELL LAWSON: Can I just take a quick swing at the-- because I have a slightly heretical view on this issue of countering violent extremism.

JULIETTE KAYYEM: Great.

CHAPPELL LAWSON: I think it was one thing when the violent extremism that was being countered was based abroad and it was akin to helping the enemy in the context of a war I think

it's another thing when we're looking at domestic political movements and then trying to approach them through the lens of terrorism when we could be approaching them through the lens of ordinary law enforcement authorities. And in this sense, I think it's a slippery slope, and a dangerous one, and a direction we don't want to go.

There are questions coming through in the Q&A about Incel, about QAnon, and about Antifa, and I think if we go down this road, we will regret it. So I would move away from that and move much more in the direction of using ordinary law enforcement authorities in the normal way.

STEVE Hey, Juliette, can I just jump in quickly?

BUNNELL:

JULIETTE Oh, yeah, sorry, Steve, yeah.

KAYYEM:

STEVE There is a component of DHS that doesn't get a lot of attention, which could actually play a very constructive role in the domestic issues that we're seeing right now. And that's FLETC. So that's the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. And it trains not only federal law enforcement officers, but typically 30,000 or 40,000 state and local police go through their training programs on use of force and best practices for policing.

That is a tool that perhaps a different administration would have pushed to the fore as part of a response to what's going on as a way to not defund the police, but make the police better serve the communities that they're there to serve. And so that's a lost opportunity as far as I'm concerned.

CHAPPELL Yeah, Amy, I wanted to follow up on a question that I think got lost, but I think it actually relates to-- and this is a role that the White House would have done, which is basically the-- it sounds boring, but budgets are about values, and also the extent to which the private sector and other parts of the enterprise may be able to pick up some of the burdens that the department has. Is that even realistic?

AMY POPE: So there are two separate questions in there. And I'm happy to take a swing at both. The question of budgets, budgets matter. So in some ways they're symbolic, but

they really frame the vision and the policy direction that a president intends to take. So when it comes to something like immigration, in a Biden administration everybody's going to be looking at what are his detention budget numbers. Does he really intend to fulfill the vision of immigration that he's laid out?

When it comes to dealing with the most significant threats to the United States, people are going to be looking at, well, where's the money going? And in this administration, we're seeing a lot of money going to building a wall, right? So it does signal what the president really cares about and where the administration should be functioning or focused.

But there's a secondary question, which is what is the role of the private sector? And I thought, and Juliette, I'm sure you have lots of experience with this, so much of what DHS does relies on relationships that are within the private sector. So for example, look at the threat of cyber attacks. DHS doesn't control every entity that is going to be subject to cyber attack.

You look at the airlines, you look at many, many of our critical infrastructure entities. You have to have a relationship of trust and information sharing for the homeland to really be safe when it comes to some of the most specific threats where we could be quite vulnerable. And so that's tricky, figuring out how to get the right relationship with the private sector so that we can share information without necessarily disclosing confidential information. It's something that I know the department struggled with, and may not have it right yet, but it's a place where we need to be able to be in the future.

JULIETTE

KAYYEM:

I want to pick up on a question that-- and I apologize. I seemed to have lost it. And maybe, Pete, I'll start with you. There's been a lot about the military in the homeland, whether it's the Insurrection Act. But there's an entire structure and legal regime around the use of the military. coast Guards fall slightly in between the two.

But the North Com, National Guard, the question-- I think the question-- I'm not sure we can let the person in, but what is the legacy of that? And how do we put the military genie back in the bottle if we need to?

PETE

NEFFENGER:

Well, you're right, there is a process for using the military and it has to be pretty extreme. The good news is you don't need to use the Department of Defense

anywhere for domestic law enforcement. There's so many entities that are already available. It goes back to Chap's point. I thought it was well made, that first and foremost, we are dealing with a lot of law enforcement related issues. And that starts at the local level.

Governors, if you want to get people in a military uniform, governors have at their disposal the National Guard. And they can activate them under a state authority and use them for law enforcement assistance, if you will, if not direct law enforcement, for those entities of the National Guard that are trained in police force or police actions.

But I think it's a mistake to think about turning to the military. That would be an extreme last and I hope a never type of resort. You don't really need that. We've got we've got hundreds and hundreds of local law enforcement agencies.

You've got a lot of law enforcement capability, even within the federal government. There's FBI within the Department of Homeland Security. The Coast Guard, as you mentioned, is at all times a federal law enforcement entity, primarily for Maritime matters. And you've got any number of different entities. So I don't know why we would immediately turn to an organization like the Department of Defense for domestic purposes.

You saw the organ rejection from the Department of Defense for that, from the Joint Chiefs all the way through the political leadership, they just said, this is not an appropriate use. And I think that's true. We don't want a politicized military and we don't want our military used against our own people

**JULIETTE
KAYYEM:**

I'll chime in here. I'm getting out of my moderator role. But I was a state homeland security advisor, which meant I worked for a governor. So I oversaw the National Guard. And I've never served in the military, but obviously spent most of my career with the military in that role, where there are sort of very, very defined roles. And what people don't understand, you even get well-meaning people during a disaster saying, let's bring in the military.

The military is integrated with emergency management functions. Quite easily they're working with state emergency management agencies all the time. So whenever I hear the administration say, well vaccine distribution will be done by the

military, I'm like, oh, please. Military does bulk really easily. The intimacy of a vaccine campaign, for example, is not going to be done by the military. They'll move it. But then you've got to work with your public health, and local, and state officials.

So one of things that was amazing to me from that perspective, which I saw repeated when I was at the department, we created the Council of Governors with the Department of Defense. That was 10 governors, five Republican, five Democrat, that I served on, that was really trying to define these roles. Because the culture of the military was we don't want to be used this way.

And the culture of the National Guard was essentially, if not deployed to Iraq, we're owned by the governor. This bifurcated thing that you've seen recently is not part of their tradition. So if you ask me as a Obama administration official, what day-- what moment was I incredibly nervous about the transition of power, potential not peaceful transition of power, it was Lafayette.

I went to bed that night thinking something's terribly wrong here. And I spend enough time on Twitter to believe lots is wrong, but I then began to think something-- this is-- could it be that I am-- my children will live in a very different country? So you saw the pushback by the Pentagon was really, really important, to say these roles are well-defined.

So for those who worry about that, there was a moment that then got I think corrected, which is part of the culture of both-- the distinction between homeland and homeland resources with the governor and more traditional--

PETE NEFFENGER: And Juliette, there is an appropriate role for the Department of Defense and the military agencies. And that's support to civil authorities in times of emergency.

JULIETTE Exactly.

KAYYEM:

PETE NEFFENGER: Nobody does logistics better than the DOD. And they provide that kind of support. They want to provide that support because they have that capability. Whether that's generators, or food, or just distribution of supplies, but they're very happy to do that, and appropriately reluctant, and if not opposed, directly opposed to any other types of direct engagement.

JULIETTE

KAYYEM:

Right. Seth, I want to turn to you. We have a whole bunch of questions really on the white supremacy issue. And Rachel raises-- adds an adjective, which I think is important-- the male supremacist terrorism. In other words, that a lot of this is also a type, I guess a gender type of white supremacy.

In terms of your thoughts about what is both a domestic threat, but also transnational, the rise of right wing extremism and very distressing story in *The New York Times* or *Politico* about the rise of neo-Nazism abroad looking to our neo-Nazi movement as something to model.

SETH

STODDER:

Yeah, well, that one, that's a long-- that's a long story of American history in a sense. Our eugenics, pseudoscience in the late 19th century, early 20th century, race science was very influential on Hitler and the Nazis. So there's certainly a dialogue on white supremacy between the United States and the rest of the world that's been going on for about 150 years.

So yeah, it's not surprising of that. It's also-- I highly recommend-- there's a great book by Anne Applebaum, she just wrote, about *Twilight of Democracy*. It talks-- really, it's about the split of the right wing, a split of the center-right into the blood and soil nationalists that we're seeing in the United States and Europe, as well as-- and then sort of the old center-right.

And I think in that, yeah, you're seeing this is a transnational issue. The attack in Christchurch, New Zealand by a white supremacist attacking a mosque in New Zealand. But the interesting thing, the alignment of what we're seeing is one theory, which is this conspiracy theory that I think is in the white nationalist ideology, of the great replacement theory.

And you heard that in Charlottesville, of the people chanting as they were at the Unite the Right rally. They were marching down the street saying, you will not replace us. And they also we're saying, Jews will not replace us as well. So there's that dark side as well that's all out there.

And I think it's this sort of fear of what other people have called white genocide, of whether immigration, and whether demographic change and other things like that are essentially replacing whites at the top of the pyramid in Europe, in the United

States, and in Canada, and in New Zealand, Australia. So it's a real problem. It's a real ideology. It's a transnational threat.

I think there are some who raised the question of whether left wing extremism is as much of a problem as right wing extremism. That's not really borne out by the facts or the data, at least not right now. I mean, if you'd said in the 1960s and '70s, with the era of the Weathermen and all that, yeah, maybe we could talk about it then. But right now, I think the real threat is from the right wing.

And I think DHS would agree with that. And I also think in this sense, there is this tactic that's been used, I think called acceleration, the lingo of it, in the sense of the tactic of the white right extremists going into areas and trying to provoke violent responses and then tit for tat responses to therefore spark race war.

And also spark chaos, which would induce the federal government to come in with authoritarian measures, which unfortunately, has also been apparently the strategy, the political strategy I think of this White House. It's evidenced by Kellyanne Conway talking about three weeks ago saying, chaos works for us. And it's sort of-- there's some danger there in terms of the interaction, too.

And I guess the last thing I'll say is just the role of the federal government, in the sense of back to the concept of the military. We do need to think about, this is a federalism issue at the end of the day. And since the Civil War, the military has only been used in states without the consent of the governor four times. Once by Grant against the Ku Klux Klan in the South Carolina, then three times during the Civil Rights Movement, Eisenhower in Little Rock, and JFK in Mississippi and Alabama.

It doesn't happen very often and for good reason. And Juliette, as a former state homeland security director, it's a very sensitive issue here. In the sense that all of the use of federal resources for the most part should be used, unless there's extreme need, with the consent and usually at the request of the state or the local government, saying we need help, we need support. We need logistic support. We need help.

Like I lived in Los Angeles riots in 1992, and we asked for help. We had Marines from Camp Pendleton come up to help deal with the riots out here, and also federalize the California-- the National Guard out here. But that's the way it should work. That's

the way it works under the Stafford Act. That's the way it works under the Insurrection Act for the most part.

And that's the way it should work with DHS, generally, is that this should be done. Even in combating the white nationalist extremists threat, for the most part, these are state and local crimes that are getting into violence, and the state and local law enforcement authorities should take the lead here unless absolutely necessary.

JULIETTE

Yeah, OK. I want to go back just quickly. We have a couple more minutes. I

KAYYEM:

appreciate that, Seth. I want to-- because we get a lot of questions about the private sector. I think part of that may be-- in my mind, if you thought we have the absence of a federal government in some ways on the COVID response, you're seeing the private sector-- masks.

They were at masking first. Think of Uber, no mask, no ride. Think of the closing down of retail. So I'd like to just maybe pick up on that theme with Alan and Steve. And then we'll close out with Chap and I.

ALAN BERSIN:

So the private sector is absolutely essential, as it is an old dimensions of American life, society, and economics. And particularly in a democratic society, we're not in a situation where the government is required to do everything, think everything, and account for everything.

So while I don't think the homeland security enterprises has got yet a military industrial complex question, which was made and in part contributed so mightily to the Pentagon, the fact of the matter is many, many, many functions in DHS are actually either contracted out to the private sector or delegated to the private sector.

And this is something, this is a strength that we need to capitalize upon. It needs to be a proper relationship and an ethical one to be sure. But the private sector is essential to the homeland security enterprise. Not only, Juliette, the way you suggested with policies, but particularly in the cyber security area. This is a matter of government facilitating the private sector to actually care for itself.

And this is a trend that we need to continue. One of the questions that we ask at the end of the book is how much can we actually rely on the government? Have we

gotten to the point where De Tocqueville's America really is irretrievable? And I think the answer that we are all comfortable with, or most of us, is that we need to go back and rely on citizenry, as well as the private sector, more and more in dealing with the threats to the homeland.

**STEVE
BUNNELL:**

I don't have much to disagree there. I think Alan made some excellent points. There is a convening authority that the federal government and DHS has. It's a tool. And these are-- DHS is full of public servants. They're there to serve the public. They should be connected to-- the public being the private sector here.

So communication, dialogue, collaboration, those are the things that DHS ought to be doing better. Because it's not primarily in the eyes of the public a law enforcement agency. It's there as a security agency. It's there to help people be prepared and to recover. And those ought to be things that if the agency had a better reputation, basically if it were more trusted, it would be more effective at. And it's particularly true in the cyber space, but it's true across the board.

**JULIETTE
KAYYEM:**

Steve, I want to thank you for those final comments. Of course, Chap, Alan, Seth, Pete, and Amy, 90 minutes is a lot to ask of you all. And it's a lot to ask of the audience. I want to thank you all for sticking with us. It's amazing.

So there's one final question, which I think is a good way to end. Again, I want to thank-- from my team over at the Belfer Center, Yvonne and Tara-- I think Tara's still on-- for all of their tremendous work. If any of the editors over at Belfer are also on, I want to thank them. Edited volumes have the mythology of being easier than written volumes, but ask Chap and Alan, who really-- and Chap in particular, they are not easier.

But I want to get to that question about how the role of academic institutions and homeland security. It is a huge challenge. I have been in this space-- I was in counterterrorism. But by 2005, really homeland security, and then worked for state government and then federal government.

In the national security arena, and Amy probably felt this even in the White House, in terms of pecking orders in some ways, it really is hard to get that fancy people at the State Department, and these old institutions, to really think about what homeland security is. Because like Pete said, most people's interaction with it is a

TSA agent. So there is so much room for intellectual vigor.

And finally, after many years, I got the Kennedy School to really think about homeland security with our homeland security project as a core part. Who can deny it now with COVID? A core piece of our national security, not just in terms of homeland defense, but our projection of strength to the outside world. If you don't think our response has China dancing and our allies worried, think again.

These are huge national security implications for our homeland response. So there is so much room for more academic vigor. I think we start it here with the book. Well, this is weird. OK, there. And encourage it with so many students, and fellows, and others on. So I want to thank the team over at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, and my co-editors Alan and Chap. And Chap, I'll end with you.

**CHAPPELL
LAWSON:**

Thank you. First of all, can people hear the sound of my children hitting each other with wiffle balls in the background? And the dog bark? I hope not. And I apologize if you can. I'd like to thank the Security Studies program and the Center for International Studies, who sponsored this event.

And also Laura Kerwin and Michelle English. You never saw them, but they made the magic of all the technology work, including the chat, and the Q&A functions. And of course, our speakers, and most of all the audience, thanks to all of you.

As I think you heard, this is a crucial time for the homeland security enterprise. So even though we're concluding this event, I hope very much you will keep the conversation going with colleagues, with classmates, with friends, and with family, especially on this day. Good afternoon and stay safe.

[MUSIC PLAYING]