JUSTIN STEIL: Hello, everybody. Thank you for being here. My name is Justin Steil. I'm an associate professor of law and urban planning at MIT. I research spatial dimensions of inequality broadly, with a particular focus on local government responses to immigration, on housing and land, use and on environmental justice.

I'm excited today to welcome Jia Lynn Yang for a talk about her new book, *One Mighty and Irresistible Tide*. We'll have time for questions after the webinar. And please put your questions into the Q&A function at the bottom of Zoom. Jia Lynn is a deputy national editor at *The New York Times*. She was previously a deputy national security editor at *The Washington Post*, where she was part of a team that won a Pulitzer Prize for coverage of Trump and Russia.

Before becoming an editor, Jia Lynn wrote about business and economics at the Post, and at *Fortune* magazine for over a decade. *One Mighty and Irresistible Tide* is her effort to understand the people who fought to give her family a place in America. The book is a joy to read. I highly recommend it. And we are so excited to have Jia Lynn here with us today. Thank you so much, Jia Lynn, for being here.

JIA LYNN YANG: Hi, Justin. Thank you for that lovely introduction. And hello to everyone who's joined. It's wonderful to be here with you, if not in person, then virtually.

I guess I'll start today by talking about what led me into this project to begin with. I feel like sometimes when you read books, you only learn that in the acknowledgment section, but I feel like that backstory is actually really integral to understanding the substance of the book itself. So I usually am based in New York, but since the pandemic began, I've been in northern Virginia staying with my parents. And I think this corner of the country that I'm in right now, where I also grew up, says a lot of it where the country is headed.

So my own family's story is that my parents came to the US in the '70s for their education. My dad for college and grad school, my mom for grad school. Our family is from China and Shanghai originally. They fled in 1949 after the communists won and my parents basically came from Taiwan to the US.

And when they began to live in the DC area in the '70s, it was a very different place
from what it is like right now. There were very few Asian immigrants around or Latino immigrants. They've told me stories of when they needed to buy groceries-- these days there are H Marts on every corner-- and this is true in lots of parts of the country now-- but back then they had to drive into Chinatown in DC where there was-- it was the only place in the area where they could buy Asian groceries.

By the time I was growing up here in the '80s and '90s, things were beginning to change to some degree-- some ways, yes, some ways, no. There was a neighbor up the street with a Confederate flag on his truck. But my friends were also from all around the world. Their families were from places like Iran, Afghanistan, Bolivia.

And there were hookah lounges with Arabic shows playing on TV. There is a place down here called the Eden Center, which has historically been a really important center for the Vietnamese refugee community here. There were Salvadoran restaurants. And so I sort of took for granted that there were always immigrants around.

And since I grew up here, those changes have only accelerated. I was just looking at Loudoun County, which is the next county over from where I'm, sitting Fairfax, County between 2000 and 2010, the number of Asian-Americans in the county quintupled in those 10 years. And the number of Hispanics tripled.

And I'd argue we're seeing this now all around the country. You saw it in the most recent election, and the electorate is changing with every election cycle. You can see what's happened in Virginia happening in places like Georgia, and Texas, Arizona. And so I think you kind of have to-- to understand the country, you kind of have to understand how we got here. Why are there so many immigrants here?

Although I have to admit that for a very long time, I never really stopped to ask myself this very question. I think when you hear about America's being a nation of immigrants, and you hear about the Statue of Liberty and the Emma Lazarus poem, it's very easy to take for granted that your family was allowed to come here. And I didn't really have, to be honest, a conception of a world in which they had not been allowed, in which we would not have been allowed to be here.

Until about four years ago, I happened to be in Austin, Texas, for a friend's wedding
and stopped at the LBJ Presidential Library and Museum, which any of you haven't been there, I couldn't recommend it more. It's very close to downtown and very easy to get to. And in that museum, there's a really extraordinary room that basically pays tribute to all of the extraordinary successes of the Johnson administration under his program, the Great Society.

So these were all the laws that passed that still very much shape American life today. The creation of Medicare and Medicaid, the Voting Rights Act, the Civil Rights Act, and a law that I-- again, I'm confessing to my ignorance prior to this project--that I really was not familiar with called the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. And in that room, you can see underneath this sort of photo of LBJ signing the law at the foot of the Statue of Liberty, there was a little note that said, this law helps explain why there are so many Asian-Americans in the country.

And when I saw this, I thought, well, I wonder if this law is somehow connected to me and my family. And so I went home and began to explore, and dug in further and further and further. And what became exciting to me about learning more about this law-- and for any of you joining us today whose families also came after 1965, this might appeal to you, too.

It was a way of doing-- not family genealogy, like, who is your grandparent or great grandparent-- because I think for some of us whose families left our home countries, within a generation or two, that work can be very difficult, right? It's hard for me to research what was happening in my family in the first half of the 20th century in China.

But learning about this law becomes I think a form of political genealogy. So understanding not just the dramatic story of why your family-- why my family-- left Taiwan and China and came here, but why we were even allowed to come at all. And I discovered for myself through this project two things that I want to impart today.

One is that, as I kind of alluded to already, it was never a given that we would be a nation of immigrants. This is a thing that we have chosen to do in the past. We've also chosen to step away from that and stop doing it. And I think the best way to understand this law that I'm going to describe more of is to imagine it as a response
to a long period in which we really had abandoned a conception of a nation of immigrants. So this is the thing that we can toggle on and off, as we've seen in the Trump administration, but that's sort of the underlying principle that I want you to take away.

The other is that to the extent the law is discussed, I think it's a little bit misunderstood. I came into this project a huge fan of reading books on the history the Civil Rights movement. And you'll see allusions to this law often in these books. And they are very fast. They are usually sort of almost a footnote to all the other extraordinary legislation that's passing.

And it is very much true that the law and the passage of it relied on a moral framework that Civil Rights leaders were pushing forward and demanding that the country pay attention to. But it's also actually the culmination of a very separate fight. A very different people, not people associate with the Black Civil Rights Movement explicitly, but people who were descendants of Jewish, Italian, and Catholic immigrants, who were fighting a completely separate battle of belonging to this country.

And this law in 1965 is a culmination of that separate fight. And I think when you begin to see it that way, you see both kind of the promise and the perils of the law, once you understand the origins, and it helps you understand better if you are Asian-American, or not white or Black, how we got here and how should we imagine who we are racially in this very quickly changing country.

So what is the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act and why should we care about it? I'd argue this law is one of the least understood and most influential laws in modern American history. This law transformed the American Immigration system from something that was closing its doors to most of the world to opening them, especially to immigrants from outside Europe, and allowing many people from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and beyond to come to this country in ways that they hadn't been here before.

And just to give you a sense, I was alluding already to the demographic changes in Virginia. If you just look at the Asian-American numbers, they are really astonishing. So before 1960, no more than 1 million people of Asian descent had ever been in
this country at once. Now there are more than 20 million, 2/3 of them foreign-born. Between 2000 and 2015, this population grew 72% faster than any other major racial or ethnic group.

And together with larger numbers of immigrants from Central and South America, the Middle East, and Africa, this is why we project-- or demographers project-- that within decades, the number of non-white Americans are going to surpass the number of white Americans. And I'd argue this is very much the legacy of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. This law abolished a system of ethnic quotas from the 1920s that really if you just sort of lay it out, this country has passed many racist laws. This one is, I think, very explicitly white supremacist.

This system from the 1920s had an entire elaborate fiction around it that justified its passage, which was that the country needed to preserve an Anglo-Saxon white Protestant identity to protect itself from dilution from people from outside of Western Europe, essentially. And it was really a response to greater numbers of people from Italy and Eastern Europe coming, and a fear of Asian immigrants as well. These quotas also banned nearly all immigration from Asia in addition to cutting off Jewish and Italian immigrants. And this was a dramatic expansion of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, which if you're not familiar, banned Chinese laborers decades earlier.

And so these quotas really were a very full-throated statement that America not only was inherently a white Protestant nation, but it had to be protected as such. And immigrants from outside of a few select countries threatened that identity. And so 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act removed these quotas. And it took 40 years of struggle to do this.

And this was truly a watershed triumph of Civil Rights. It was a full denunciation of white supremacy in American immigration law. And it also, as I've described, set in motion a demographic fate that few people would have anticipated. And the more you dig into the history the law, the more you see that people were trying to do something good by saying we don't want our immigration laws to be premised on Anglo-Saxon Protestants being superior to everyone else. But the people doing it also had no idea what they were going to-- what they were going to set in motion.
And so it's also hard to describe this law as sort of a simple moral parable of liberal triumph as well. And that's, again, another challenge to the idea that it was totally part and parcel of the Black Civil Rights Movement. It had a much more complicated origin. And so to understand, you have to think about the people behind it, who are, again, really descendants of a different sort of stream of immigrants coming in.

Another favorite stat I have-- so I've been describing just how many more Asians and Latinos there in this country. At the turn of the 20th century, similar huge changes were happening in places like New York with the arrival of all these Eastern and Southern European immigrants. So my favorite stat from this is, in 1880 in New York, there were only 12,000 foreign-born Italians and 14,000 Russian Jews in the entire city. By 1910, these numbers had soared to 341,000, and half a million Jews.

And so all of this change was really terrifying to people. And the quotas were very much in response to this. But what happened was that all the children and grandchildren of these immigrants after these quotas passed basically saw them as a personal affront to them and their ability to be in this country. They seemed like an anathema and an insult.

One family very much attached this law was the Kennedy family, which I found fascinating to learn because they were very much-- Joe Kennedy Sr., the patriarch, was very much about assimilating the family into sort of wealthy WASP culture. But by the time his sons were entering political life, they were beginning to sort of embrace the notion of an immigrant identity. And for these people and their constituents, especially in places like Boston, the quotas were this racist symbol. It basically said, even if you're here, we still have an immigration system built on keeping people like you out.

And so when the 1965 law came up for debate, Bobby Kennedy was someone who testified. He was AG under JFK, and when he got to the Senate and he testified, he said, we are past the period in the history of the United States when we judge a person by his last name, or his place of birth, or where his grandfather or grandmother came from.

But when people were asked about the effects of the law, what would the future
look like-- they were actually pressed in 1965 on, what demographic changes can we expect from this? And Bobby Kennedy, like many others, said, don’t worry. This is not going to change the really ethnic and racial status quo of the country. This is about righting a wrong from before towards Jewish, and Italian, and Catholic immigrants, not dealing with non-Europeans.

And he was even asked explicitly about the number of immigrants that we could expect from Asia, and he estimated in his testimony there would be an influx of about 5,000 Asian immigrants in the first year, after which immigration from that source would virtually disappear. So how is that possible that the people who fought for this understood that the law was discriminatory, but as they were doing it, they basically had no anticipation-- or really, I would argue, any intent to allow so many non-European immigrants in.

Now the core of this is that the law itself, you have to understand how hard it was to design it. So they were getting rid of ethnic quotas which said only so many people from these countries because these countries are desirable and these aren't. But to replace it became a very complicated puzzle to solve. And I'd argue we are kind of in a similar place now, right? We want to reform our system, but the fight is always over the details, like how are you going to-- how are you going to replace an existing system?

And in this case, the family reunification clause, which now the Trump administration has called chain migration, is really at the heart of this mystery. And I'll tell that story really quickly before wrapping up. So when they're negotiating how to replace the quotas, there's still a lot of nativist resistance to the idea that you can take away these quotas, still people saying America is fundamentally a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant nation. Even if we want to make these Jewish and Italian-Americans feel better about their place, we mustn't upset the apple cart of American-- America's racial makeup.

And so the compromise they create are a few criteria on the table. One is we should only want people who are-- we should prioritize people who have special skills. So this, for example, is how my mother was able to get a green card. If you have a graduate degree in the sciences or engineering, we want you here.
There was another criteria on the table that was especially appealing to people who wanted to keep America white, which was a family reunification clause, which said, if you have immediate family in the US already, you get priority. The thinking for this was this is going to keep the country basically at its racial status quo. If you already have family there, and at the time in the '60s, the vast majority of immigrants in the US were white, it stood to reason that if it's only those people who get priority-- family-- then that's not going to really change the racial makeup of America very much.

And indeed changing the criteria to make family reunification be number one priority for receiving a visa is how they passed the law. It's how they convince people who are resistant to the idea of immigrants coming and changing the racial makeup-- that's how they got the nativists on board. And it is very much the thing that led to-- now we see-- these demographic changes.

Even in my own family, and maybe some of yours, because of chain migration or family reunification, some uncles of mine were able to come. They were able to bring their spouses who brought their siblings, and then my cousins were born. And this is how the number of immigrants from outside Europe has multiplied and multiplied.

And this is interesting to me because it really establishes that this was not the intent, right? If the law was passed largely because nativists were comforted by the idea of family reunification as a way to keep away racial change, then that tells us that the legacy of this law again, is really complex and in a way, sort of perilous because it's also about assimilating into white culture. And now we have all these people like my family and others from outside Europe, what are we going to do with all of them and us?

I would say, though, it's not so simple that to abandon the law-- right-- just because there are unintended consequences. I would argue-- and I'm happy to take questions then-- that when you understand this law, its significance, how we got it, and what it has done in this country to change it so deeply, you also can't avoid that it is fundamentally a story, too, about resisting a white supremacist legal regime, which is what the 1920s immigration quotas were.
And so even if many of our families came here and benefited from a law in which
the people who pushed for it did not imagine us to be here, that legacy is still way
important, and says to me that children of immigrants, Black Americans, Indigenous
Americans, all of us are sort of sharing in the same battle which is against an
identity of the US tied to ethnicity and not to ideals. And with that, I'm happy to take
questions.

JUSTIN STEIL: Thank you, Jia Lynn. Really appreciate that presentation and introducing us all to
your research on the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. Please people put
questions in the Question and Answers, and I have an initial question, which is, from
my knowledge of the more recent history, immigration as an issue in the 1980s and
1990s was not as partisan an issue as it is today.

For instance, Ronald Reagan signed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 that simultaneously made it illegal to knowingly hire undocumented
immigrants, but also legalized undocumented immigrants in the country already.
And even in the 2000s, it seemed that the greatest hope for comprehensive
immigration reform may have been under the George W. Bush administration, even
if that hope was not ultimately realized. Could you tell us some about the ebbs and
flows of partisanship around immigration and the efforts leading up to the 1965
Immigration and Nationality Act?

JIA LYNN YANG: What's striking in the history is how bipartisan both support and opposition are. Kind
of like Civil Rights struggles, generally, I'd say. The Democratic Party during this
whole period had a very obviously segregationist Southern coalition against a more
Northern immigrant-heavy constituency. And so the Democratic Party, even though
they were so dominant in Congress for a lot of this period of time, they really
struggled to change the laws.

And so some of the biggest opponents and proponents of a lot of changes were all
Democrats. And in fact, some of them were themselves children or grandchildren of
immigrants, which strikes me in the history, too, and it's something we see, right
now, right? We just can't assume that if someone comes from an immigrant family
in their recent past that they will support immigration. This was very true of the
Democrats.
I think of people like Pat McCarran, who—all of my book has these characters who I didn't get into them in this talk, but they are people who you don't even hear about anymore. But they were extremely powerful in their day. They were running the judiciary committees in the House and the Senate. And one of them was Pat McCarran, which if you ever had flown into the Las Vegas airport, is named after him because he was one most—probably one of the most powerful Nevadans ever in the state's history.

And he was the son of Irish Catholic immigrants, and he was rabidly anti-immigrant, and he was a Democrat. And so he fought other Democrats who were from New York often, often Jewish or Italian-American. And so within the party, there was just a lot of resistance, whereas now you see—on immigration and a host of other issues, a much more kind of partisan division.

**JUSTIN STEIL:** Thanks. There's a few questions here already. So one of them is, can you say more about the political rationale for the 1920s laws that virtually cut off immigration?

**JIA LYNN YANG:** I think the story of the 1920s in the US is one that I certainly feel like I was not taught fully. I think when I was taught the 1920s, it's a lot about the Jazz age, and people wearing glittery dresses. And in fact, if you spend time looking at it, it's an incredibly dark time in American history. So I think there are a couple currents going on.

One is you can't forget that this is very much in the aftermath of World War I. And this is a war that I guess—as I learned more about it beyond what I've been taught in school, I think the closest analogy in my mind that I came to it was a little bit like the Iraq War. A war that felt very kind of sold to the American public, but not in a fully honest way.

And so there was a lot of bitterness and xenophobia after that war because even though the US was technically on the side of the victors, it felt like, why did we even get involved in this pointless war? Why did thousands of Americans die? And we don't want to be involved in such wars and Europe's affairs ever again. This was all a horrible mistake.

And so there was very much, during this period of time, a backlash to the war. Also a lot of Red Scare going on, too, and a lot of violence against anyone who seemed
kind of antithetical to mainstream American culture. So I would count in that, in addition to immigrants and including them, Jews, Catholics, Black Americans, labor activists and radicals, people who seem like they might be communists, all of them kind of bunched together in one big ball of just sort of viewing them as a threat from the inside, and very much like a Red Scare kind of time.

And so all of this plus I would add a third current, at least, which was eugenics was very, very popular at the time. completely mainstream, no one who was probably in sort of an intellectual sphere, an academic, or associated with a museum-- people didn't really question it. And it seemed like the cutting edge of not just science, but of kind of advancing humanity because it seemed, well, if we can study what makes human beings or civilization superior based on their race and genetics, we can improve all of humankind.

And so I think you put all of that together, and you get this really very potent anti-immigration force because you not only have kind of mainstream, I'd argue, xenophobia and fear of change, and anyone who's not white and Protestant-- this is when the KKK is really revived-- the iconography, not the exact same group as after the Civil War, but they are really back in the '20s. You've got that in the mainstream all around the country, not just in the South.

Plus the sort of upper crust, I'd say, like the Upper East Siders of New York, professors, scientists really getting behind eugenics. You put those things together, and that to me explains why they were able to pass such dramatic legislation. I mean, unlike the 1965 law, everyone involved in the 1920s quotas knew exactly what they were doing and exactly what would happen. And it really worked. Overnight immigration fell off and people said things like, well, we're not doing that anymore. That's all in the past. But I think it took sort of extraordinary social and political crosscurrents, but they all kind of met right in that moment in the '20s.

JUSTIN STEIL: Thanks. And so moving-- kind of taking that as a starting point and now moving I guess a decade, two decades, and three decades later, there's a question about efforts and the failure of those efforts to admit refugees from Europe in the 1930s and 1940s. Could you say something about who was admitted, and who pushed for their admission, and who opposed it, and why many of those efforts ultimately failed?
JIA LYNN YANG: This is such an important part of the history that I deal with in my book because they pass these laws in the '20s, and people think, all right, well, we're done with that. And it's really-- and there's not much political opposition, I would add. There's a lot of opposition from Jewish and Italian-American lawmakers from New York and in Chicago, but otherwise people do sort of go along with it.

It's really in the '30s that opposition begins because-- exactly to the point of this question-- there's a massive refugee crisis going on in Europe. And it is especially concentrated in Eastern Europe, which is precisely the region of Europe that the quota is basically-- it didn't entirely cut off emigration from, but very much targeted to reduce emigration from. And so what happens is that there are especially Jewish American leaders who are desperate to change the quotas, desperate to change the laws in any way possible to save people, because without changing the quotas, you basically can't-- you can't do anything, you're stuck.

And really, kind of I think of the moral tragedy of the quotas, which people knew to some degree, only really becomes clear during World War II. And so you see stories of people both trying to sort of intervene on individual cases-- so my book goes through LBJ himself, who is just a Congressman at this time, and sort of getting involved as an individual families pleading for help just to let one or two people into the US somehow.

You also see lawmakers putting forward legislation, but there is still so much resistance to immigration, even when people know that there are Jewish-- there are Jews in Europe being killed. There is even a law that they passed-- they tried to pass that said we will take in orphaned children-- OK-- we're not taking adults, we're just sitting in orphaned children. And even that, if my memory's right, doesn't even get to a vote.

And so throughout the entire war, there is tremendous resistance and frankly, antisemitism that is driving people to say, even though there is this great need, we simply can't take in people. One of the interesting footnotes to this is that it's out of this struggle and crisis that we get of the refugee laws that we have now. So Truman, who becomes president, obviously, the back half of World War II, passes-- signs the 1948 Refugee Act, which basically is the first kind of federal effort to say,
we are going to deal with refugees somehow.

And one sort of detail from that I loved learning is that that law basically said for you to come in as a refugee, you have to find a group that will sponsor you, someone who will take you in. And these were often religious organizations. And so that's how they kind of created a system for taking people in, and it's obviously the one we still have now.

But it was really-- that whole desperation to create a refugee legal system came out of, I'd argue, a feeling that the quotas were just impossible to deal with, so the country had to sort of create a whole new set of laws to kind of work around the quotas. But in very limited, ways still. I mean, these were still-- we were barely admitting people considering the volume of refugees that needed a place to stay.

JUSTIN STEIL: Another question is how and why did these kind of zero sum game perceptions emerge in the immigration debate. For instance, know I feel like we often hear the idea that there's this kind of zero sum competition between immigrants and native-born Americans over jobs, public services, et cetera. So do you have any insights from your historical research into origins of that perception or how it gets mobilized and by whom, and how-- what potential there is for that to get resolved? And if that was resolved in any way in the lead up to the 1965 Immigration Act?

JIA LYNN YANG: I think one of the challenges here generally is that you see a lot of-- not exclusively, but a lot of anti-immigration sentiment comes when people don't feel secure in their place in America, right? So I'm thinking of economic crises, sort of social crises, a sense of kind of instability. And immigrants are often blamed for this. So I think of very much the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act is a response to white laborers in the West feeling like they have direct cheap labor competition. I think also during the Great Depression of the deportation of millions of Mexicans, both Mexican and American-born. I do think immigrants are often-- they're often blamed when things go south for other people, and for native-born Americans.

And I think even now, I mean, coming out of the Trump years, and this pandemic, and the recession that we're in, I think some people are hopeful that's having Trump not in the White House means a different kind of tenor around immigration, but I guess I would sort of caution and say, these conditions-- these political and social
conditions to me feel like ones that sort of reinforce a feeling of scarcity, which leads directly to people feeling like immigrants are the problem.

And the other thing is there's kind of a push and pull here in the history, where businesses have been traditionally very pro-immigrant. But by pro-immigrant, I mean pro-cheaper, unregulated labor from immigrants. So there is always that going on as well. And one of the pieces that sort of turns the debate in 1965-- and I can't overemphasize enough just how miraculous it is to me that law even got passed, given how hard people had tried.

But one of the things that really turned it and made it possible is that labor unions got behind immigration reform. The entire time before that, the AFL in particular was very anti-immigration. They viewed it as a threat to wages and their ability to have jobs. And by the time you get to '65 AFL has merged with CIO, and they have a much more pro-immigrant feeling because they have themselves many Jewish, and Italian, and Catholic workers. And they thought of the laws as being discriminatory and racist, so they got behind the law.

But usually, the forces that are for immigration are often pro-business or agricultural industries that want to exploit cheap immigrant labor. So I do think some of that-- we know from research that when-- like during the Great Depression, when they did deport all these Mexican and Mexican-American immigrants, it made no difference for the native-born Americans who were still there with their jobs. But it is a thing that businesses often want extremely lax immigration laws that make it easier for them to pay less for work.

**JUSTIN STEIL:** There's another question that builds on that a little bit, which is, in some sense, you referenced the high rate of change in immigration in the period before the 1924 Quota Act, and also subsequent to the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. And I think-- could you say a little more about how the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act-- or what the formulas are, what the caps that it sets? Because I think one of the concerns at that time was also kind of of admitting more immigrants on an not obviously race and ethnicity-based basis, but also controlling that rate of change.

**JIA LYNN YANG:** So there were technically numerical limits. And this part is-- I mean, the other wrinkle that I didn't even get into is how the law deals with the Western hemisphere.
And this for me, is very much tells you just how far we've come in our immigration thinking, that we are so different from what we were a century ago, when we effectively, I'd argue, basically had open borders.

I mean, we didn't have any numerical limit or quotas on Western hemisphere immigration. And so the US-Mexico border was effectively open. I mean, there was a literacy test. There were like-- there were some strings attached, but there weren't visas, there were waiting lists. It just didn't exist. And it was a matter of kind of good foreign policy, that was the thinking that we would not do limitations.

So in 1965 when they pass this law, again, as part of the sort of horse trading going on to bring on the nativists, they also added for the first time a numerical limit to Western hemisphere immigration. The argument being-- by the people who demanded this-- why would we carve up the world and treat the Western hemisphere differently from the rest of the world? We should have everyone under some numerical limit. Within that, we won't do these quotas by race, but we have to have some kind of overall cap.

So the reason why the numerical cap doesn't really work as intended, if you just sort of do the math, many more people are coming in than you would imagine based on the cap, which I'm forgetting the number now, but it's far lower than what was happening-- is that as part of Cold War policy, too, people like LBJ and subsequent presidents keep admitting refugees outside the quotas-- Cuba being a very prominent example, but also Vietnam, and other countries from the former USSR.

And so as they're doing that, they keep creating carve-outs for people. And so these people aren't-- whoever comes in through their families, when they come in, they're not attached to this numerical limit. And so that's how despite effort to sort of keep a lid on it both numerically and racially, it basically-- the family reunification, all these carve-outs with different Cold War-style policies, all of it really busts open the intended system that they were going for.

JUSTIN STEIL: So another question is looking post-1965 and a little bit away from the act itself, but saying that Asian-Americans, as you highlighted, have been the most rapidly
growing proportion of the immigrant population in recent decades. Also, often very professionally successful, though, there's obviously a lot of heterogeneity among Asian-American immigrants. And the person asking the question is suggesting that there hasn't been the same-- the political representation of Asian-Americans that you might expect given the growing population size. Do you have thoughts about that?

**JIA LYNN YANG:** I have a lot of thoughts on that. I mean, I think you can see it-- I find Georgia is a fascinating test case for that electorally-- right-- because it barely went to Joe Biden the other week. And a lot of that success came from the Atlanta suburbs, which are really, really much more Asian than they were before.

And so the question is-- and I think you can see from the early numbers that there was much higher participation from Asian-American voters than there has been in the past. Now I think the trick is that when you've got a population where 2/3 are naturalized citizens, I think of this group, which is-- can't be said enough-- completely heterogeneous-- or however you say-- not monolithic, whatever that word is.

It's very hard to describe kind of what-- I mean, even if I think about my own family-- right-- like I think growing up, we were more likely to identify as Chinese-American versus Asian-American. I think I in a way became Asian-American as an adult. That wasn't necessarily an identity that I had growing up. I think politically there are all these challenges, right? So 2/3 of the Asian-American electorate are naturalized citizens or foreign-born. That means that these people are relatively new to the political process, right?

So I think in this recent election, the race for the White House was such a national cultural event, that I think a lot of people participated who usually don't. But they're not obviously Democrats. And they are in some ways more natural fits for Republicans. So I just think of this group as like very much still being formed, and different generations have different ways of looking at it.

So I mean, even if you look at Chinese-Americans, just to take off one subslice of the population, there is a big difference politically and culturally in a way between people like my family, which came-- we came through Taiwan-- people sort of our
ilk, I think, came through Taiwan, Hong Kong, in the ’70s and ’80s.

And the more recent immigrants are coming from mainland China. They have completely different political histories, really, even though our families are closely tied together. They have a different experience of government. They have different feelings about democracy and whether it works. And so I think the challenge for representation politically for Asian-Americans is so much about how these different ethnic groups, even within them, have all these very distinct experiences of politics and what they want from it.

And so I think it's just very different from, for instance, Black Americans, where there's a lot of political history. There's a lot of political heritage, right? It's like your parents voted a certain way, your grandparents voted a certain way. You kind of—there's a script that you can at least either accept or reject, but there's something to work with. Whereas I think if you're a newer immigrant, that can often be harder.

My book in a way is trying to create a script, right? It's trying a create a way of saying, you did just show up. Maybe your parents showed up in the last 10, 20 years, but there is something that precedes their arrival that I would offer as one way to think of, what is your political inheritance, right? You're in this country, you're relatively new to it, but there's so much that happened before your family came that your family is still a part of.

JUSTIN STEIL: There's another question that's asking you to venture a little bit outside of the United States, which I know is not the focus of your book or of much of your reporting, but I'll put it out there anyway and see what you can do. Given the current conflicts in the world right now, there's obviously a tremendous amount of migration, especially from Syria, also from Iraq.

And so the majority of displaced people and refugees-- you may have better numbers on this-- but are in that region, in Turkey, in Jordan, et cetera. And so what—do you have any kind of parallels or thoughts about how those experiences-- the experiences of refugees to nearby countries there and host countries there might resonate with some of what you have written about in the history here?

JIA LYNN YANG: I mean, I think it's impossible not to see the parallels. For me, there was a really memorable moment in my research. So I'm based in New York-- well, it's a
complicated story. I'm in Virginia now, but I'm usually based in New York.

But when I was writing the book and doing research, I was living in DC working for *The Washington Post*. And a lot of the materials for my research were at the Library of Congress. So I would spend a lot of my weekends there. And there was one Saturday, I was editing at the time a lot of stories that had to do with US foreign policy in places like Syria, very much. That was a huge story in 2015, especially, and early 2016.

And there was one Saturday where I was going through the papers of Emanuel Celler, who's a really major figure in my book, a Brooklyn Jewish Congressman, who's totally pivotal to this whole thing happening. He's in Congress from the '20s through the '70s. And there were people writing him about the refugee crisis during and after the war, and what to do with all these immigrants. And as I was going through these papers, I had to jump off to edit a story about Syria and a military strike there.

And it just struck me that very much we are in a similar kind of historic-- just completely stunning numbers of people who have been displaced. And I guess to me, what struck me reading this and the parallels with-- I think a lot about what happened to the German Jews during the Holocaust, and what really preceded the Holocaust-- right-- which was sort of a stripping away of rights and citizenship.

And that I think with refugee crises, it's very easy-- I don't know if this answers the question directly, but I'm just riffing on it. It's very easy to imagine refugees as being kind of those other people. Those people who somehow lost their way and just don't have a place to go, and like somehow they're sort of responsible. I think it's often like kind of-- it's a very Trumpy way of looking at it, but this sort of like, well, we don't want those people. Something happened to them that's not right, and we don't really want them here.

But what strikes you when you look at the history is how easily people can become stateless. They very easily can be stripped of their papers, because part of what I learned from my book, too, is that this is a history of papers. It's a history of paperwork. It's not a history of who is worthy and who's not, which is I think often how we describe immigration. It's really just like how do we-- in this very nitty-gritty
way, how do we decide who gets papers and who doesn't?

And so many refugees are people who had their papers taken away, or their papers meant nothing all of a sudden, or they've been politically persecuted. There's something happened that has really dislocated somebody, such that they don't have a state to attach to. And I think there's a way in which it really helps to think of that extreme-- the extreme of not having papers, the extreme of being stateless, to understand what it means to have a state and be a naturalized citizen, or to not.

And to even imagine-- one thought that just haunted me the whole time I worked in this book was I'm a citizen because of birthright citizenship. That's not a given. There are many countries without birthright citizenship. And so I could just-- all it takes is somebody coming into office saying, if you were born between 1980 and 1985 and US citizenship through birthright, we nullify it-- it's gone. I would be a refugee. I would suddenly be a person without a state.

And so this is just a roundabout way of saying it, but I think that like we often think of refugees, again, as sort of others. They're like those other people who had those other problems. And I hope my book invites people to think about the ways in which it could easily be one of us-- right-- because we're talking about-- we're not talking about inherent worth about a person, we're talking about papers.

JUSTIN STEIL: I really appreciate the idea of the book is a history of papers and paperwork, and how artificial so many of these categories are. Just to clarify, I mean, I think that the point you're making about our citizenship and status being more fragile than we might think is such an important one, and how easy it is to become stateless. But in the United States, I think it would take a constitutional Amendment-- no-- because the 14th Amendment guarantees that. So thankfully, it's not-- nonrevocable by federal legislation and requires a full constitutional Amendment.

JIA LYNN YANG: Although there are conservatives trying to challenge political representation based on how you're here, right? So we would count you-- and this is sort of far out, but there are efforts to do this. That if you are here from birthright citizenship, you won't be counted electorally for different reasons, and carving up districts. Like there is an effort to get into who you are and how you come to be here, to think about your political rights, that I think is really, really dangerous.
JUSTIN STEIL: Well, and particularly whether we count everyone as part of the population. Obviously, as the Constitution suggests, we should— all persons or not. Another question, we've talked some about kind of white supremacist origins of the 1924 act, and the complicated dynamics about race leading up to the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. There's a question here asking about class dynamics shaping the dynamics of immigration debate kind of within and among different ethnic and racial groups in the United States.

JIA LYNN YANG: Yeah. I think it's really— I mean, even just among Asian-Americans, it's so striking that if you think about the ugly stereotyping. Somehow this group went from being—if you look at the first wave of anti-Asian immigration laws from 1882, these were kind of dirty laborers who were diseased and very, very much a stereotype about working class people, lower class people. And now the stereotype is around professional class people— right— professional class doctors and engineers.

And the other thing, too, is the way the immigration laws are written shape how we perceive these different groups. So if you have laws that select for people with advanced degrees in science, and medicine, and engineering, and that's who comes, I do think that the way that that law is written, it makes people think that Asian-Americans are somehow inherently like scientific people, right? That like that's what we do because that's who we are, when in fact, that's very much a thing that our immigration laws have selected for.

And it also, I would add, completely erases the presence of people like Hmong refugees, or Vietnamese refugees, or people with a completely different experience and a different— completely different class status. And for me, this is also— sends you down a road of asking questions about the future of Asian-American identity, and if it really is a professional class thing, which is, again, the stereotype, and there are people for whom that is the dream, right? The dream is to be professional class.

That kind of assimilation is around income and education status. It's assimilation into white elite culture, essentially. And so that doesn't account for the number of Asian-Americans who are living in total poverty, especially in places like New York, where— I don't have the numbers right in my hand, but I think— there's some statistic about how the poverty rate among Asian-Americans is shockingly high, maybe even higher than any other racial group— I'm extending out there, but it's
something very surprising, and very much cuts against the idea that all Asian-Americans come with these graduates degrees.

But our laws really select for these people, right? Like if you think about Facebook and Silicon Valley companies using H-1B visas for people from India and China, they are selecting for those people to come as sort of the face of the Asian-American immigrant. So I think we kind of can't lose sight of how much our laws shape who is here. And we have to be so careful that we don't sort of just assume that people are inherently a certain way rather than something that we have actually selected for.

JUSTIN STEIL: I think you may have actually just answered this exact question in your description, but there's a second question here about how the histories of H and O visa classes fit into your narrative. And H obviously being skilled workers and O being individuals with extraordinary ability or achievement. Is there anything you want to add on top of what you've already said about this topic?

JIA LYNN YANG: I would only add that I think when we talk about what our system should look like, one thing-- I think the Trump years very much-- I think I've seen there's a lot of support for immigrants, right? There is actually kind of this incredible outpouring of this kind of nationalist idea of America as a nation of immigrants, which my book also describes is really kind of a mythology, like an ideal that only emerges-- it emerges from this immigration fight that I'm talking about to get to 1965. And it only comes about really in the 1950s.

But when you think about the system, I think we have to ask ourselves, so if we-- do we want an open border system like the way we used to have? If we don't, who do we want here? And I think the traditional answer from both Democrats and Republicans currently is we want the high-skilled people. And I think candidates, to my understanding, very much is of this ilk. We want the people with advanced degrees. They have the technical skills we want. Those are the ones we want.

I do think when you go down that road, you do end up with a like good skilled immigrant versus bad unskilled immigrant dichotomy. It also doesn't account for refugees. And I myself am-- I've said before, too, like I wrote this book, but I'm not-- I'm grateful my family is here. But if I weren't in my family, it's not obvious to me that my family should have had priority over many other families to be here
because of having special skills.

And so I think that's a-- I think both parties sort of fly by that assumption. But I would kind of bring us back to the point where people had to actually codify that as a choice-- right-- as a choice of who would be here, who is considered not just desirable, but sort of more American, right? Like who's more likely-- a lot of this is around who's more likely to assimilate in the ways that we want them to. Who is good for our democracy?

That's-- if you go back to those earlier debates, what it's often about. I think, again, now it's sort of paperwork. It's like, do you have the right papers or not? But in a way, the 1920s, as ugly as those laws were, they were really talking about what would make our whole political system work. And they came to a very racist answer, but it's not obvious to me either, though, that having-- if that's your goal, to have-- you're going to have closed borders to some degree, and you want a really flourishing society and democracy, how does having high skills kind of fit into that, right? Who does that serve exactly? Why does that person make a better American?

And I just think to return to kind of those basic questions, and very moral questions, which I think all immigration law to me is just a set of moral questions. And we sort of reduce them, in my mind, to sort of like counting heads, and like, again, paperwork, and skilled/unskilled. But it gets at very core moral questions about what this country is.

**JUSTIN STEIL:** You keep answering questions that have been asked but I haven't even asked you yet. So there's another question about-- that really ties into what you were just saying about the economic side of this, and research by economists about the ways that immigrants to the United States are important complements to the native-born labor force.

They're making the labor force more productive while at the same time-- and that's maybe often describing more lower skilled immigrants, kind of actually complementing lower skilled native-born workers, and then also high-skilled immigrants-- obviously the question of skill is a category that could be unpacked-- are contributing to important innovation in the economy and in science and technology.
And so how does that research fit into these questions that you said you feel like are fundamentally moral questions? I guess is making the country richer an important criterion for who is admitted? And how do these different impacts of different sets of immigrants on different sets of native-born individuals fit into this?

**JIA LYNN YANG:** Yeah. I think that's why getting at the open border question is so important. And I know it sounds sort of provocative to talk about open borders because I think that's viewed generally as a very extreme take. And I myself frankly don't really have a strong opinion on this because I think it's so-- and these are such morally tough questions that I'd also feel like it's something that I would want us sort of talk about collectively with people about what we want.

But I think once you decide we're not doing open borders, which politically, to me, is sort of a fait accompli that's where we would end up. When you start talking about these kind of skilled innovators, they're taking a slot that a refugee isn't taking. So you kind of have to ask yourself, what is-- does our immigration system, is it supposed to have kind of a moral function around people who are stateless, people who need asylum, people who need a place?

Because if you're going to have a cap, and it's not open, then that person is taking-- you're saying that there's only a certain number of slots that we can accommodate. And you have to, at some point, I think, if that's true, choose between the refugee and the person who's quote-unquote, the "skilled innovator." I just feel like we often weave and dodge around that. We want to talk about immigrants as the sort of big group, but we don't want to talk about the decisions get made about who comes in and who doesn't.

So I guess I'm sort of weaving and dodging here, too, but I just don't think you can ask a question about the high-skilled innovators without dealing with who's not coming as a result, right? Like if you're taking in that engineer, who aren't you taking? There are people who argue we should just dramatically expand. We're not going to do open borders, but we should dramatically expand the number of immigrants who come here, in which case I think those trade-offs become less acute.

But the rate we're at now, I mean, it's very acute, right? Like we-- I think Trump the
entire month of October, we did not admit a single refugee. And so right now we have a system that very much prioritizes the prototypical Silicon Valley engineer who's going to found a company, and employ people, and all those things, and we do not prioritize refugees. So I just think when you go down this road again, you have to establish morally, like what is the system for? Who is it for and who is serving?

JUSTIN STEIL: The next question takes us a little back in time into the details of Senator McCarran. But that also brings up the present as well. The questioner writes, doesn't your explanation in response to the earlier zero sum game question in terms of perceived competition between immigrants and nonimmigrants in general also explain politics such as Senator McCarran's, whose position was symptomatic of a rivalry between 19th century Irish and early 20th century Italian and Polish waves of immigration? And moving to the current day, the same mechanism seems to be at work in second generation politicians such as Priti Patel in the UK.

JIA LYNN YANG: Yeah. I think part of-- when you begin to unpack why there are-- why children of immigrants or immigrants themselves become anti-immigrant, one thing-- my book has a lot of biographical sketches of people. It's really, I would argue, told through the people because you kind of have to understand people's personal stories to understand how they arrive at their immigration policy preferences.

And what I saw again and again from people like Pat McCarran, who again, was Irish Catholic, others who were Welsh, people who came from-- yes, to this questioner's point-- earlier waves, is that they felt like they could hack it, and they were made of really tough stuff. And that's how they made it in America. And the people coming in now aren't the same as them. They aren't up to snuff.

And in a way, they kind of had higher standards, in a funny way. Like they just felt like-- I don't know it's zero-- it's zero sum, but it also is just a feeling of, it was really hard for my family to be here, and we did everything the hard way. And we make great Americans.

And these new people who are showing up, who-- by the way, like what does Pat McCarran have in common with a Russian Jewish refugee? In his mind, absolutely nothing. There's no conception of like we are one and together, sort of among
children of immigrants. Like he thinks of them is completely alien to his family.

And so you see in a lot of the writing of these people who are anti-immigrant not only a sense of no solidarity with other children of immigrants or immigrants themselves, but also a feeling of superiority, that like they really had to hack it. I'm thinking of the labor secretary, Davis, in the '20s who was very anti-immigrant, very much pushing the quotas.

He was essentially a child laborer in steel mills in Pennsylvania. And he has a memoir where he writes about how hard it was, and that he was-- the Welsh people were these great Americans. They were great immigrants because they had the right stuff. And stuff here is a little bit biological, right? It's like we are just-- we have the right kind of temperament, we work hard. We're made of tough stuff. And these new people, they're not right for this project. And

I think also there is a way in which immigrants, because they-- I'm painting with a broad brush, but I think with these individual stories, what I found is they are so fiercely patriotic, too, right? They are people who chose to be here or their parents chose to be here. And so they feel very protective of what the country is and what its national identity is.

And they're very eager to kind of yoke themselves to it and to prove-- and one way to prove that you've assimilated is to name who is outside of that. To say, I'm part of the mainstream, that person is not. And it really kind of-- it enforces that you have assimilated. You are part of the American dream. Those people are not.

So I'd say in that case, I don't know that even Pat McCarran had-- he would complain about immigrants taking up housing and jobs, but I think for him-- to psychoanalyze a person I've never met, who's been dead for many years, it was also a sense of protectiveness of American identity. He was also very, very, very anti-communist. He feared Jewish radicals. And I think he embraced that kind of dark American nationalism even harder perhaps very much because he was the son of immigrants.

JUSTIN STEIL: So we've spoken some about the-- particularly about the effect of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act on Asian-American immigrants, immigrants from Asia. Could you say something about the impact of the act on immigrants from African countries, also with a particular interest in countries like Liberia and Sierra
Leone, where immigrants were descendants often of returnee slaves that the United States kind of encouraged to colonize Liberia to leave the United States. So those are another question.

**JIA LYNN YANG:** Yeah. I am less familiar, I'd say, with sort of the modern history of that, only to say that the dramatic rise in immigration from Africa is very much also a legacy of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. There was one really interesting footnote to me in the history that's also in my book, but I would mention it because I think it's very much about Black immigration and how people dealt with it during all these debates, which is that-- so after the 1924 laws passed, the next big watershed moment before '65 was in 1952 around a law called the McCarran-Walter Act-- and Pat McCarran again.

So he's really leading the charge of being anti-immigrant. And as part of this, there are all these sort of newer groups entering the fray, right? So it's not just Jewish American lawmakers, it's also Japanese-American activists who are trying to basically-- they come out of the horrible legacy of the internment camps during the war. They were trying to win naturalization rights for their parents who were born in Japan.

And then you also see a fight over Black Caribbean immigrants, too. And part of what is happening in that law, to the degree that it kind of helps shed light on how we've dealt with African immigration before, is that there were a lot of-- because as I was saying before, there were no limits on Western hemisphere immigration. And so there were many, many, many Black immigrants coming from the Caribbean to the US all through this time.

So when there's a lot of limitations outside, through the Caribbean, there's actually a decent amount of Black immigration. And during the 1952 debate, there's kind of a nasty point at which there are people who've taken notice of this-- the nativists-- and they say, well, we need to cut this off because we do not want Black immigrants. And so they create this kind of ridiculous quota, even though the Western hemisphere is supposed to be quotaless, to basically say, we don't want-- we specifically do not want Black immigrants from these Caribbean-- they don't quite say it that way, but they write it in such a way that it's very much targeted to these people.
And an interesting part of the history is that there are some who argue that after this passes in 1952, to the horror of a lot of African-American lawmakers and leaders at the time, and the NAACP, lot of the immigration ends up going to England, which helps explain why there actually are so many Caribbean immigrants in England from the '60s '70s. It's because, again, these streams are changed through the laws. And so while there was a lot coming to places like New York before 1952, that all basically gets cut off after.

So I can't quite answer your question of exactly how to understand the demographics and the migration streams from Africa post-'65, but I would say that there is this kind of nasty history of singling out black immigrants for exclusion, even in a situation in '52, where the Western hemisphere should have been very open.

JUSTIN STEIL: And it seems like potentially the last question or, unless other people want to add more questions, is a question about if you feel that current immigration system needs reform, and any thoughts on what type of reform you would like to see?

JIA LYNN YANG: I don't have-- I don't mean to dodge it, but I feel like it's such a-- as I've said before, it's such a moral question. It's not really a technocrat question. I think we often treated as a technocratic one. What levers do we pull and push? And what buttons do we hit to sort of fix the system?

But I think, again, we'd have to go all the way back to, why are we not an open system? We used to do that. We decided not to. We decided to add this huge, elaborate system of visas-- also that came in the 1920s. We have all these passports. We have, again, all this legal paperwork and legal categories established. Do we want to keep doing that?

And I think that's a very rich vein to explore. Like how many people can we take? Is there such a number as too many immigrants? And again, I don't know the answer to this. But to me, to talk about reform, you have to go-- you have to unwind yourself back to kind of how we started this whole thing to begin with-- right-- which is very much an open border system with some exceptions, obviously, the Chinese Exclusion Act being one of them. But until you get to the '20s, fairly open.
And then everything now is really a legacy of the ‘20s and that idea of having very real numerical limits. And then the ‘60s, which opened us back up, but we're kind of-as much as we've gone away from these eugenics-based race and ethnic quotas, we are still kind of having a fundamental premise that we can only take in so many. We're not going to do open borders the way we had before. And so everything kind of follows from that.

So I would say to answer that, we would kind of collectively as a country have to unwind us back in theory to that idea to establish, OK, if we don't want open borders, then who do we want here? And again, I think the answers to those questions are not ones that like one expert or historian could tell you. They're things that we have to kind of work out together, right? Like do we want refugees here? Is that important as part of our kind of moral presence in the world? Do we need more engineers and doctors? And do we feel like this is the way to do that? Like all of these things feel so much bigger than any one expert could answer.

And so I kind of don't answer it because I don't-- I mean, I'm even telling you, I don't know if my own family should have been admitted after '65. Like I'm that open to what the possibilities are. So and I just think these are too big of questions to be left to like a few technocrats. It's not a thing that I would ever ask a think tank to solve. It's just much too fundamental about who we are, who we want to be, what we want to stand for. And those are things that all of us should feel some ownership in having a say in.

JUSTIN STEIL: I feel like you've raised so many really thought-provoking points about the history and about the present. And I feel like your very beautiful response to that question, though, leaves me wondering, well, what form does that collective conversation take? Understandably, not some technocrats, and not a think tank-- how do we have this collective conversation?

JIA LYNN YANG: Yeah. I mean, I think you have to start with how many undocumented people we have. I mean, it's at least 13 million. That doesn't seem sustainable to me. We're trying to have a democracy where we are trying to account for everyone. And if that many people can't participate in the democracy, then I think that really-- to me, that's like the first major, major roadblock that you would want to deal with as a
democracy.

I mean, I think getting immigrants involved and their children in politics. I was saying before, Asian-Americans, there are millions of us, but many people are not voting. And it's not because-- it's not because they're bad people. I mean, a lot of people just showed up. A lot of them don't speak English or they don't understand sort of American political history. So I think it really has to do with grassroots work of engaging these populations that I think both political parties traditionally ignore or take for granted.

And I think what you see in 2020 from the results is that the parties cannot do that. They cannot afford to do that. The demographic future of the country says you have to deal with these voters. You have to speak to them, you have to draw them into the process.

And so I think it's through that that we can kind of figure out what system we want. I think we can only avoid these questions for so much longer, too. I mean, reform takes-- my book shows, and I think we've seen, it only comes but once a couple of decades. Even by that slow standard, we are way overdue, if you just look at the history and how often we do an overhaul.

And I just think at a certain point, the center can't hold. You have all these new immigrants, you have all these people who don't have the right papers, you have their children here, they're becoming a bigger and bigger part of the electorate. At a certain point, we all have to deal with what to do with the system, which isn't working for a lot of people.

JUSTIN STEIL: Thank you so much, Jia Lynn. Thank you for spending this time with us and sharing your book. And I encourage everyone to go out and get it. It's a very, very pleasurable and informative read, and we really appreciate your spending time with us. Thank you. And thanks to everyone for coming.

JIA LYNN YANG: Thanks for having me.

JUSTIN STEIL: And I think this is the last of these for the fall, and we'll start with a whole new series of events like this in the new year. All right. Thank you, again, Jia Lynn.

JIA LYNN YANG: Thank you. Take care, everyone.
JUSTIN STEIL: Take care.