


# Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence

DIANE E. DAVIS





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## Final Report

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# CONTENTS

<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b> .....	<b>9</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>13</b>
1.1 Urban Violence: From Fragile States to Fragile Cities.....	16
1.2 The State of the Field.....	19
1.2.1 Standard Entry Points for Analysis and Policy Action.....	19
1.2.2 Recognizing the Limitations of Prior Approaches.....	22
1.2.3 Data and Measurement Limitations.....	25
1.3 Matching Research Design to the Scale and Scope of the Problem.....	29
1.4 Urban Resilience: <i>Pragmatism</i> Inspired by <i>Hope</i> .....	31
1.4.1 Measuring Resilience.....	31
1.4.2 Positive, Negative, and Equilibrium Resilience.....	33
1.4.3 Conceptualizing Positive Resilience.....	36
1.4.4 Cases, Methods, and Research Objectives.....	38
<b>CHAPTER 2: PATTERNS OF URBAN RESILIENCE</b> .....	<b>43</b>
2.1 Variations in Types of Resilience: Cross-City Comparisons.....	47
2.1.1 Proactive vs. Reactive Resilience.....	47
2.1.2 Negative vs. Positive vs. Equilibrium Resilience.....	50
2.2 City-level Variations in Resilience.....	53
2.2.1 Central vs. Peripheral Spaces of Resilience.....	53
2.2.2 Residential vs. Commercial Sites of Resilience.....	55
2.2.3 Daytime vs. Nighttime Resilience.....	56
2.3 Urban Development and Resilience.....	57
2.3.1 Urban Renovation and Resilience.....	58
2.3.2 Infrastructure and Resilience.....	59
2.4 Institutional and Relational Foundations of Resilience.....	61
2.4.1 Horizontal vs. Vertical Relations of Resilience.....	61
2.4.2 Police as Enablers and Constrainers of Resilience.....	62
2.5 Individual vs. Community vs. City Resilience.....	65
2.5.1 Neighborhood Solidarity and Resilience.....	65
2.5.2 From Single Agent Actions to Multi-stakeholder Collaborations.....	66
<b>CHAPTER 3: THE ANALYTICS OF RESILIENCE</b> .....	<b>69</b>
3.1 Theorizing and Historicizing Resilience.....	71
3.2 The State in the Slums: Historical Legacies and their Implications for Resilience.....	74
3.2.1 From Spatial Exclusion to Informal Governance.....	75
3.2.2 Informality, Built Environmental Assets, and Diminished State Capacity.....	77
3.3 Community Foundations of Resilience.....	80
3.3.1 Forms of Social Capital, Spatial Context and Community Cohesion.....	81
3.3.2 Urbanization Patterns and Community-based Social Capital.....	84
3.4 The State as Enabler of Relative Community Autonomy.....	86
3.4.1 The Urban Developmental Correlates of Community-State Synergies.....	88
3.4.2 The Co-Production of Security: A Central Building Block of Resilience.....	90
<b>CHAPTER 4: POLICIES FOR BUILDING URBAN RESILIENCE</b> .....	<b>95</b>
4.1 The Role of Urban and Spatial Planning in Fostering Cooperative Autonomy.....	98
4.2 Beyond Community Policing: The Importance of “Legitimate Security” Networks.....	103
4.3 Conclusion: Agents, Spaces, Strategies, and Networks of Resilience.....	109
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS</b> .....	<b>115</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b> .....	<b>127</b>



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

While the sources and forms of social and political violence have been extensively examined, the ways ordinary people along with their neighbors and officials cope with chronic urban violence have earned far less attention. This eight-case study of cities suffering from a history of violence explores this latter phenomenon, which we call *resilience*. We define resilience as those acts intended to restore or create effectively functioning community-level activities, institutions, and spaces in which the perpetrators of violence are marginalized and perhaps even eliminated.

This report identifies the sets of conditions and practices that enhance an individual or a community's capacity to act independently of armed actors. We specify the types of horizontal (e.g., intra-community, or neighborhood-to-neighborhood) and vertical (e.g., state-community) relationships that have been used to sustain this relative autonomy. Violence and responses to it are situated in physical space, and we look for the spatial correlates of resilience, seeking to determine whether and how physical conditions in a neighborhood will affect the nature, degrees, and likelihood of resilience.

Urban resilience can be positive or negative. Positive resilience is a condition of relative stability and even tranquility in areas recently or intermittently beset by violence. Strong and cooperative relationships between the state and community, and between different actors—businesses, civil society, the police, etc.—tend to characterize positive resilience. Negative resilience occurs when violence entrepreneurs have gained effective control of the means of coercion, and impose their own forms of justice, security, and livelihoods. In such situations—most frequently in informal neighborhoods where property rights are vague or contested—the community is fragmented and seized by a sense of powerlessness, and the state is absent or corrupted.

Our findings suggest that resilience appears at the interface of citizen and state action, and is strengthened through cooperation within and between communities and governing authorities. Resilience is robust and positive when ongoing, integrated strategies among the different actors yield tangible and sustainable gains for a particular community: improvement in the physical infrastructure, growing commercial activity, and community-oriented policing, to name three common attributes. When citizens, the private sector, and governing authorities establish institutional networks of accountability that tie them to each other at the level of the community, a dynamic capacity is created to subvert the perpetrators of violence and establish everyday normalcy. The security activities produced through citizen-state networks are most accountable, legitimate, and durable when they are directed and monitored by communities themselves, in a relationship of *cooperative autonomy*.

More broadly, urban resilience benefits from good urban planning—promoting and investing in mixed commercial and residential land use, for example, particularly in areas of the city at-risk for crime, and building infrastructure that enables free movement of people within and between all neighborhoods (via pedestrian corridors; parks; public transport) to promote security and livelihoods. This speaks to the challenge of informality—the communities built up, usually on the city’s periphery, without regard to ownership rights. The legal entanglements of informality can be daunting, but some cities have finessed this to provide services, with substantially positive outcomes. Formal property rights or not, citizens of all income groups need to have the opportunity to live in vibrant areas where social, economic, and residential activities and priorities reinforce each other in ways that bring a community together in the service of protecting and securing those spaces. This process yields good results for the entire metropolitan area.

Finally, this report develops the idea of *legitimate security* as a way to address the vexing interactions of the state and communities in the provision of security and positive resilience. The relationship of at-risk communities with the police is often troubled. Legitimate security addresses this by seeking to ensure democratic and participatory governance in every sense—political, civil, and social. It recognizes needs specific to marginalized and underrepresented populations, including ethnic/racial minorities, women, the poor, and indigenous groups. It is, moreover, a viable alternative to deleterious responses to insecurity—e.g., privatization of security, fortification of urban spaces, and vigilantism, among others. Legitimate security fosters broad participation and initiatives from “below” with an increased focus on multi-sector partnerships to provide more effective, lasting, and accountable ways forward for cities seeking security.





# INTRODUCTION





# INTRODUCTION

Recent trends suggest that the security field is undergoing a slow but steady shift in scale. Although fragile states still command considerable attention in the foreign aid and diplomatic community, cities are emerging as sites for some of the most critical challenges to national economic development, regional security, and political stability, even in countries that have successfully transitioned to democracy. Anyone who has visited the cities of the late developing world in recent years knows that an alarming concern for elected officials and citizens alike is the explosion of violence, both random and targeted (Rotker 2002; Caldeira 2000). Despite the democracy gains that have accompanied the transition from authoritarian rule, problems of violence, crime, and insecurity have emerged with a vengeance across much of the developing world, primarily albeit not exclusively in the cities of Central and Latin America, as well as in significant parts of Africa and South Asia. These developments are particularly evident in rising rates of homicides and accelerating levels of robbery, assault, and kidnapping, as well as an explosion of contraband-related violence (often involving drugs or guns) and even torture.

In some of the most violence-prone cities, unprecedented levels of police corruption and impunity have contributed to public insecurity, helping produce outposts of urban violence in which organized gangs involved in all forms of illegal activities (ranging from drugs and guns to knock-off designer products and CDs) are as powerful as—or in competition with—the police or military. In certain locales, of which cities in Mexico and Brazil have been among the most notorious, organized gangs equipped with a sophisticated cache of arms and advanced technologies for protection and detection against law enforcement raids have blatantly attacked police and military, as well as the citizens who report them to the authorities. Many of these organized crime groups have taken on the functionally equivalent role of mini-states by monopolizing the means of violence and providing protection and territorial governance in exchange for citizen allegiance, whether coerced or freely given. Their capacities to do so derive partly from the state's longstanding absence from these geographical areas, with years of infrastructural and policy neglect of urban settlements having reinforced the problems of poverty in ways that have made residents open to alternative forms of power and authority.

## 1.1 Urban Violence: From Fragile States to Fragile Cities

The larger security and foreign aid community must be prepared to confront and, if possible, reverse these dangerous trends. The failure to stabilize fragile cities will set limits on economic growth and make it more difficult to reduce urban poverty, particularly when non-state armed actors control territory that coincides with urban informality. Together, these dynamics will inevitably weaken national states and empower criminal forces whose blatant disregard for rule of law, democratic governance, and human rights will further destabilize cities, thus driving the vicious cycle. There already is evidence that both local and national authorities are facing significant governance challenges because the acceleration of violence and crime has in certain extreme situations pushed citizens to take justice and governance measures into their own hands through vigilantism. Even in those countries where citizens are not yet turning wholesale to such measures, governments are finding their legitimacy eroding. Larger numbers of armed actors in the most fragile cities of the global south show capacities to marshal weapons and other coercive means that can parallel, if not exceed or undermine, those available to the nation-state, whether democratic or not.

**Fragile Cities**

Urban fragility is a catalyst and an outcome of larger state transformations and spatial organization.

Fragile cities and states lack

- Functional authority to provide basic security within their borders
- Institutional capacity to provide fundamental social services to populations
- Political legitimacy to effectively represent their citizens

*Source: Muggah and Savage (2012)*

All this has meant that local and national officials in countries of the developing world who have failed to quell the violence now find themselves in precarious positions, and not merely because the magnitude of the insecurity that citizens face daily produces high levels of political dissatisfaction. In fact, states also lose legitimacy when the tactics used to combat civilian armed actors—ranging from the deployment of the military to more routine forms of police-deployed violence—further alienate the affected communities from the state.

Complicating this situation is the fact that in many cities of the late developing world, violence stems from illegal or illicit trade involving significant capital transactions. This has made it relatively easy for “violence entrepreneurs” and other non-state armed actors to bribe the state’s own coercive agents, thereby reinforcing networks of impunity and a lack of accountability that further test the state’s legitimacy and its coercive capacity to restore security and order.

That much of the violence revolves around alternative sources of securing an economic livelihood has produced its own problems, primarily because in environments where job opportunities are limited and poverty is on the rise, citizens—particularly unemployed and impressionable youth—are more willing to participate in violent activities where some income generation is possible, thus driving the vicious cycle identified as the poverty-violence trap. As violence accelerates, businesses often look elsewhere for investment, further foreclosing legitimate employment options and driving populations to illicit means. In his classic study of the poverty-conflict trap, Paul Collier (2007) called for close attention to some of the world’s poorest countries and sought to link poverty to violence, particularly as mediated by civil war conditions and other problems of governance that contributed to state weakness. But evidence suggests that these problems may be just as critical for cities in more stable political regimes, including democratic ones, where we see similar dynamics at play at the level of the city. That is, problems of violence may be less linked to partisan politics and the failures of any particular political party, and more to state incapacity and the state’s general neglect of the urban poor.

Governments frequently turn their attention to the housing, employment, or servicing demands of more prosperous urban populations and their neighborhoods, due to limited resources, prevailing political balances of power, or an expressed desire to sustain a thriving city able to compete in an increasingly competitive global economy. Yet many urban residents have held little trust in the state, whether its policy and servicing arms or its administration of justice system. As a result, and especially when faced with chronic violence, socially and spatially disenfranchised citizens sometimes take matters into their own hands—either through vigilante acts or, more commonly, by hiring private security guards who act on behalf of individuals and communities but not the larger public. Either way, state capacity and legitimacy decline even as individual and more privatized forms of protection or coercion become the norm, a situation that serves as a breeding ground for ongoing violence.

When these same patterns of urban violence flower in environments where organized criminal and smuggling activities are on the rise, and when such activities involve

transnational actors, the challenges are even greater because questions of regional security also enter into the picture, whether as cause or effect of urban violence. Actors involved in illicit activities use violence to protect themselves, to monitor or restrain movement in space, or to secure access to capital by controlling commodity chains, networks, and the supply of goods, spaces, and activities for economic survival. Unlike the rebel groups and guerrilla forces whose object of violence is the state, actors involved in smuggling or the trade of illegal goods seek to control or dominate markets, and thus invest a considerable amount of social and political resources into control over neighborhoods, streets, or entire domains of urban activity. That is, they must assert their presence at the level of the city, and they often do so through violence. It is precisely their need to work across multiple territorial scales that drives cartels, mafia, smuggling, or pirating forces to operate in both urban economies and through transnational networks of trade and accumulation (Moser 2004; Hinton and Newburn 2009).

This multilevel activity poses a challenge to conventional domains of authority and sovereignty (Arias 2006; Coletta and Cullen 2000). Violence waged in the service of smuggling and illegal trafficking challenges the capacities of cities and states to govern their territories, to accommodate their citizens, and to police their borders, thus raising problems of governance and stability for all governing authorities, including those in neighboring states. All this holds the potential to destabilize entire regions, particularly when the ever-expanding supply chain violence is associated with drug smugglers, illicit mafias, and other transnational violence entrepreneurs (McDougal 2011; Davis 2009).

One of the objectives of this report is determine how different types of violence affect the city and its residents and to identify policy measures that can help reverse the downward spiral of violence, state weakness, civil society disenfranchisement, and diminishing governance capacity so as to generate greater security at the local, national, and regional levels.

### Research Objectives

- Reveal responses to sources of insecurity and how these proactively or defensively shield populations from violence
- Discover individual or community-level adaptations and their relationships to social, economic and political issues
- Identify key actors, spaces, and strategies for resilience, both positive and negative

## **1.2 The State of the Field**

The foregoing problems of urban violence have already captured significant attention and generated no shortage of studies, surveys, and recommended policy interventions. In the last five years alone, most of the multilaterals and a wide array of community, professional, and development organizations have come to identify the elimination or reduction of violence as a key policy objective. As the scholarly and policy worlds turn their attention to crime and violence, there have been two standard approaches: 1) research on the origins, nature, and extent of violence and why it is increasing across cities of the late developing world; and 2) policy-oriented programmatic actions that hold the potential to reduce crime and violence.

In the first category of approaches, we see studies that focus on structural problems like deeply rooted inequality and reduced economic opportunities. Those taking this perspective often examine the way these structural conditions drive poverty, which in turn creates incentives to participate in crime, particularly when violence entrepreneurs provide alternative sources for employment. Also of concern are the problems of housing scarcity and urban service or infrastructure deficits, problems that make neighborhoods vulnerable to organized criminal gangs who offer servicing in exchange for protection. Those taking a more structural approach also examine the challenges associated with a large and growing youth demographic, particularly with respect to young men who are identified as a key constituency for criminal activity. High levels of youth unemployment are frequently identified as sustaining the proliferation and expansion of gang activity, some of which is linked to transnational smuggling activities including drug trafficking.

In the second category are those reports or studies that seek a well-defined set of policy or programmatic actions that will help reduce violence. In this category there are a significant number of reports commissioned by multilateral organizations, research and policy action divisions of national governments for whom insecurity and chronic violence is a domestic or foreign policy concern, and briefings or monographs from think tanks and other public agencies or private organizations with a mission to diagnose and address security concerns. Because violence affects individuals and communities, and because the scale of its impact can be local, national, or international, the preferred point of departure for policy action can range widely. Likewise, depending on whether violence is seen as a social, political, economic, or even health problem, we see a wide array of methodological and diagnostic tools used in the study of violence and the search for policy solutions.

### ***1.2.1 Standard Entry Points for Analysis and Policy Action***

A brief historiography of the field suggests that the initial entry point for much of the work

on violence began with the individual and the community as the point of departure. This led to the proliferation of policy interventions that emphasized educational programs that encouraged residents to protect themselves and their property against crime. To the extent that the impacts of crime and violence also eroded social capital at the level of the neighborhood, a parallel interest with sustaining and nurturing social capital and collective relationships in the face of continuing violence soon began to dominate the policy-making agenda. However, given that problems of crime and violence were also identified as having negative impacts on the economy as well as governance and a much broader range of societal concerns, many multilateral agencies not initially concerned with violence, such as the World Bank, soon entered the fray. With their involvement, we see more concerted efforts to pursue employment and security sector reform, with the latter objective framed within the context of strengthening law enforcement capacities and good governance.

The following table summarizes some of the approaches to violence reduction and prevention in increasing order of the scale of the agenda of policies:

APPROACH	DESCRIPTION	SIGNIFICANT REPORTS
<b>Crime Prevention Education</b>  <i>Scale: Individuals and Communities</i>	<p>To address the climate of fear from increasing rates of violence and the resultant reduction in the quality of public life, neighborliness, and community cooperation, crime prevention awareness is being conducted at the scale of the individual, the family, and the community. Agencies work at the community level to identify and remove the drivers of violence production.</p>	<p>Rotker (2002); Moser (2004); Concha-Eastman (2002); Boudreau et. al. (2012); Buvinic et. al. (2005); United Nations (2010); Bodson et. al. 2008</p>
<b>Leveraging Social Capital</b>  <i>Scale: Communities and Neighborhoods</i>	<p>Violence and social networks have a reverse causal relationship, but Varshney asks if violence changes social behavior, can social behavior change violence? Using ethnic violence in India as a case study, he determines that civic structures that bridge groups also foster peace. Brass holds a more pessimistic view of violence, claiming that it is orchestrated by “political riot machines” operated by the state. At this level of violence, social networks and social capital are useless, while neighbor kills neighbor.</p>	<p>Ratinoff (1996); Varshney (2003); Brass (2003); Ramos (2006); Cuesta and Lamas (2007); Mockus (2002)</p>
<b>Social Welfare and Livelihood Analysis</b>  <i>Scale: Communities, Neighborhoods, Formal and Informal Economic Spheres</i>	<p>This approach targets the deep-rooted developmental factors of violence, examining the economic conditions that drive people to commit crimes and asking how socioeconomic development policies alter incentives for crime production. It also raises questions about the impact of structural unemployment on unemployed youth and correlations to illicit activities. Preferred policies include education, job-creation, or social (including sports) activities for youth.</p>	<p>World Bank (2010); Buvinic et. al. (1999); Berkman (2007); Moser and McIlwaine (2006)</p>
<b>Urban Design Interventions and Infrastructure Provision</b>  <i>Scale: Communities, Urban Transportation and Servicing Networks</i>	<p>The relationship between violence and the built environment continues to be explored. State-related infrastructure projects in poor areas are tangible, visible evidence of the social contract between the state and the citizens. The process of democratic urban redevelopment paves the way for community participation in a state-led development project and acts as another method of social crime prevention. An example of this is the urban parks in Khayelitsha, Cape Town.</p>	<p>Marcus (2007); World Bank (2010); Maliszewski (2012); Raman (2012); Crowe (1991); Gabor (1990); Moffat (1983); CRISP (2008)</p>
<b>Targeting Good Governance</b>  <i>Scale: State and City Government</i>	<p>Good governance goes hand-in-hand with strengthening the police and the judiciary. This strategy centers on the concept of trust – between the state and the people, between the police officers and the people, and between different levels and arms of the government. With the increasing prevalence of crowd-sourcing technology, we are starting to see more members of the public taking an active role in crime reduction by anonymously calling police with tips.</p>	<p>World Bank (2010), Tierney (2012); Agostini et. al. (2010); United Nations (2010)</p>
<b>Security Sector Reform</b>  <i>Scale: City Government, Judiciary, Police, Army and Nation</i>	<p>This approach focuses on the state capacity, usually at the national level, and emphasizes the creation of an efficient crime-fighting apparatus. Felbab-Brown writes that the physical presence of the state (perhaps through police or urban development projects) can go a long way in calming a restive area. Equally popular are calls for changes to accelerate the arrest capacities or crime-fighting activities of federal agents and local police – pursuit of the so-called “<i>mano dura</i>” or “iron fist” approach. The crafting and advocacy of community-level programs that build local capacities to hold police and governments responsible (e.g., in community policing), that educate citizens about their rights and responsibilities, and that offer new forms of citizen monitoring of criminal behavior have gained widespread policy attention and support. Finally, ensuring a fair and just judicial system that remains depoliticized and accessible to the people is another strategy of violence reduction.</p>	<p>Ungar (2002); Moser (2004); Arias and Rodrigues (2006); Davis (2006); Felbab-Brown (2011); ICPC (2010); Tierney (2012); Ungar (2010); Bailey and Dammert (2006); Fruhling (2009); United Nations (2011)</p>

Table 1. Summary of literature on violence reduction and crime prevention

### *1.2.2 Recognizing the Limitations of Prior Approaches*

The array of studies, approaches, and policy recommendations generated by the last decade of research on violence has produced a foundation for our understanding of violence and how it might be addressed. Yet even with these gains, on-the-ground success has remained elusive in many parts of the world. It is impossible to escape the grim statistics from around the world. In the slums of Rio, for example, between 1978 and 2000, more people were killed than in all of Colombia during this period (49,913 to 39,000) (World Bank 2010). Violence not only claims lives, it also drastically affects economic development in a country. The Mexican government, for instance, estimates that the costs of national urban violence and crime was around \$9.6 billion in 2007 from violence-related decreases in employment and investment (World Bank 2010). Violence, especially chronic violence, affects all spheres of life.

Effective action has been difficult because of the inter-related casualties associated with chronic urban violence, which do not lend themselves to policy action derived from a single sector or scalar point of entry. That is, the problems of urban violence tend to be sectorally inter-connected to problems of unemployment and underemployment, limited state capacity, declining social capital, and a deteriorating quality of urban life. Complicating matters, they often involve actors whose activities and influence span a single territorial scale. Both dimensions of the problem suggest why violence cannot be easily reversed with conventional policy tools (Moser 2004).

The inter-related nature of the problem of violence is clear when one focuses on the current administrative structures and institutions in law enforcement. If a city's police force is corrupt, and if the judicial system is weak, together they will undermine the rule of law in many other cities of the developing world, further fueling violence and insecurity. When one factors into this equation the globalization of illegal trade activities (in guns, drugs, etc.) that foster or sustain new forms of criminality, and a neoliberal environment in which income inequality is on the rise and poverty continues unabated, the deck seems almost completely stacked against tangible progress. Police or juridical reform and effective crime fighting generally entail concerted, labor-intensive actions that involve bureaucratic restructuring, individual retraining, new forms of recruiting, and daily (not to mention costly) vigilance to assess the robustness and permanence of these programs and institutional modifications (Ungar 2002). The observed benefits of police reform have been few and far between, despite concerted efforts to the contrary, and state-led efforts to reform the institutions of policing often end up giving police more (and not less) power.

The complexities of the problems of violence are one reason we see so much cynicism and

hopelessness about the potential of democratic political systems to deal with violence. In the face of limited progress, anxiety about the urban security situation and the state's inability to guarantee order has become so extreme that in certain contexts communities have turned to violence themselves—whether in the form of lynching and other acts of vigilantism, seen as a last-gasp measure for achieving some sense of citizen justice, or whether by self-arming or other forms of protection in order to establish some control over their daily existence (Pratten and Sen 2003; Goldstein 2004). Even if most citizens don't arm themselves, they are quite likely to hire private security guards. Either way, citizens are starting to act offensively as much as defensively in battling insecurity, with many barricading themselves in gated private communities in further isolation from the public. Yet because gating is an option only available to wealthy communities, the informal and the poor often have to inhabit the spaces of the armed actors, thus driving the fragmentation of cities in ways that keep the vicious cycle of violence alive. Thus we see why some of the most violent cities of the developing world have become a mosaic of fortresses, in which families or streets or neighborhoods rely on their own protective armed force, further diminishing their dependence on the state's coercive apparatus to provide security, and thus providing an environment where violent actors seek to locate (Murray 2008; Caldeira 2000).

The spatial distribution of violence and its concentration in certain urban spaces has implications for the social capital and urban design approaches to violence reduction. First, to the extent that public and community spaces in a city are dominated by the actions of violent actors, and are less accessible both physically and psychologically to residents, they continue to invite violence. In cities like Karachi and Nairobi, public spaces are often transformed into theaters of violence against civilians and become no-go areas for the residents. The changing nature of public space dictates residents' everyday choices – when riots broke out in Karachi and Nairobi, for example, citizens rarely ventured out of their neighborhoods or even homes until curfew was called. The lack of viable community spaces and the impact of violence on everyday life emphasize the importance of focusing on the urban form of the city. But this is a focus that necessitates a larger understanding of how spaces are used by violent actors, and how citizens' capacities to enter into or move through them are a reflection of the intensity of violence. These are problems that a mere re-design of street lighting or a commitment to better garbage collection or the construction of straighter pathways will be able to change. Likewise, while one can develop programs to build social capital or employment capacity by engaging citizens in a variety of new activities and networks, if the recipients of these programs are prevented from the free movement in space necessary for acting upon their new connections, the development and utilization of social capital can only go so far.

Bryson's (2012) research on women's capacity building programs in a migrant neighborhood outside Bogotá, Colombia highlights the importance of secure mobility for poor women. In this area, called Soacha, the poorest and more recent migrants were located furthest away from center of the city, on top of hills. While downtown Soacha has adequate transportation links, many of which connect to Bogotá, the peripheral communities have undependable access to transportation and to key sites of employment. Bryson writes that for many of the women living in peripheral areas, getting back and forth from work safely was an arduous and often-dangerous commute. They spent so much time commuting to their place of work that they did not have the time to build social ties at home. Once again, this reminds us that a social capital approach is necessary to target the social underpinnings of violence, but policies need to identify and foster social capital building mechanisms, like effective community spaces and improved mobility.

In addition to the complex inter-relationships between violence and a range of social, economic, and spatial dynamics in the city, there is also the problem of scale. Evidence suggests that violence as an activity usually extends across a variety of territorial scales – from neighborhoods to cities to transnational spaces beyond the borders of a given nation. This means that policies focused on a very small scale of action, such as programs targeted for individuals or even a given community, may have very little impact on the root sources of violence. Sometimes such actions merely displace the violence to another part of the city. Moreover, policies that may make some headway in eliminating violence at the national scale, such as the use of military forces to tackle organized crime or transnational cooperation to eliminate arms trafficking, may have very little impact at the local scale. The point here is that there are limits inherent to intervening at only one end of a complex scalar continuum or to developing policies geared toward one or the other set of aspects of the problems of violence, because of the inter-connection of causalities.

Finally, the issue of time also must be considered. Evidence suggests that even in those situations where high-profile policy interventions have been universally recognized as relatively successful in eliminating the sources of violence and insecurity, they more often than not have had a short shelf life. In El Salvador, for example, which was for years considered a model case of police reform because it was actively coordinated and overseen by the UN and a bevy of international NGOs all working toward the same aims, initial gains pretty much disappeared within three years of completion, with insecurity and impunity returning to pre-reform levels (Call 2003).

### 1.2.3 *Data and Measurement Limitations*

The discussion about time underscores perhaps the most significant challenge to effective policy work on violence: the problem of how to measure policy success. Without good metrics, it is difficult to know whether targeted violence reduction policies are achieving their aims. Limitations owe not only to the time frame for measuring impact, but also to the problems and inconsistencies in data on violence, particularly in cities. Indeed, it is not entirely clear what is the best temporal framework for assessing gains or reversals in fighting violence. Taking a monthly or yearly snapshot of violence may not be the best indicator of success or failure. Likewise, there are questions about the scale of data collection. If homicide rates decrease in a particular area, this does not necessarily mean that the sources or perpetrators of violence have been eliminated or defeated. It could also imply that criminals have won domination over an area, a form of intimidation that could result in a lull in violence. The scale of the data (usually national, but also citywide) is also not helpful when violence appears to be concentrated in a single community of a city. Even if more localized homicide rates were calculated, such metrics would not shed light on the fact that successes in one area might be directly linked to failures in another, particularly if violence migrates geographically because of successful interventions.

Problems associated with conventional violence statistics include the fact that:

- *Reduced crime rates can be a result of the persistence of criminal influence and power structures instead of reduced violence.*
- *Crime is territorially mobile. Successes in reducing violence may just mean that crime migrates elsewhere. Out of sight, out of mind.*
- *Formal changes in state capacity or legal context sometimes empower those already involved in criminal networks, and outcomes will depend on a functioning criminal justice system.*

The data on violence itself can be deceiving or fraught with interpretive complexities. The most reliable and precise measures are homicides, although the reasons for homicide are often ambiguous and difficult to capture. In countries where violence is connected to the drug trade or politics, knowing which homicides are linked to what conditions is critical, particularly if one wants to measure the successes of interventions targeted towards these problems. However, there are many other forms of violence, including extortion, that do not appear in statistics but that also may be linked to these activities. Either way, there is pressure on governments to distort or interpret crime statistics as shedding light on the success or failure of efforts to reduce violence, something that itself leads to conceptual over-reach.

For example, recent efforts in Mexico to uniformly classify certain homicides as gang-related or mafia-related suggest that authorities often use questionable categorizations for data collection that may themselves be biased by assumptions about where organized crime is already operating. Such responses end up reinforcing the image of insecurity in certain areas, independent of the facts. Such distortions can be further affected by police or government manipulation of data, in part because of pressures to show progress. And then there is the problem of reporting. In many countries with high levels of violence, the police are not considered trustworthy, and thus all crime victims do not necessarily report crime. So too in situations of criminal extortion or intimidation, victims may be reluctant to inform the authorities. Both tendencies cast doubts on the validity of most statistical measures of violence and criminality.

Many of the limitations of data also stem from the language used to describe and categorize the problems of greatest concern. Crime, violence, and insecurity are not synonymous, and they pose different types of challenge for different actors and institutions. Violence is not only outright bodily harm but also a variety of coercive, and thus structurally violent, practices and measures. Furthermore, these problems may or may not be inter-related. Crime can occur with or without violence, and violence can be harmful but not fatal, or vice-versa. Yet neither are good indicators of insecurity because citizens can fear some types of crime over others, or the context may mediate perceptions of both fear and crime. This means that even when formal levels of crime are low, insecurity might be very high.

## Data and Measurement Issues

### Challenges with Interpreting Quantitative Indicators

- *Rising crime rates* can mean a winning strategy or a failed “war”.
- *Falling crime rates* can imply a re-establishment of criminal hegemony rather than its defeat.
- Citizens are influenced by *subjective framings* instead of objective facts.
- Policing and legal systems may be complicit in the violence, making *reporting rates* suspect.

### Strategies to Complement Quantitative Analyses

- Understand the biases and agendas of organizations collecting and interpreting statistics.
- Identify relevant surveys and statistics for the particular area after gaining an understanding of the texture and history of violence.
- Engage in qualitative research (cognitive maps, ethnographic accounts, grounded field research) and evolve quantitative indicators for everyday urbanism and violence.

Finally, one of the most popular sources of data on violence is surveys. While valuable, this method is also problematic because of the bias in people's perceptions. While perceptions are important to policymaking, they should be balanced with both objective measures and a good grasp of the local dynamics of violence. The latter can be hard to collect and systematize in ways that provide a good picture of general trends. The data and qualitative accounts presented in the field reports offer an interesting example of how different metrics and perceptions need to be triangulated with ethnographic evidence in order to understand trends in urban violence. Organizations and institutions working to combat violence have their own agenda both in collecting specific sets of data and in analyzing the data and targeting certain communities. In order to best understand the nature of violence in a city, and for effective policy-making, one must be aware of the agendas of the agencies providing statistics to researchers, and acknowledge (or perhaps attempt to correct) the biases in the data. A variety of sources—both international and local—is needed in order to best elicit a comprehensive and objective view of urban violence in an area.

The question of who collects data on violence, and for what purposes, is also relevant here. Sometimes a city gets identified as violent even when data may suggest otherwise, while at other times a city's relative standing to other violent places is the metric for its classification. A good example is the case of Mexico City. Public perception based on a few high profile incidents in certain sites (particularly along the border but also in the capital city) have pushed many to identify Mexico as extremely violent. Yet rates in Mexico as a nation, and Mexico City in particular, do not reach the rates of violence in Colombia generally or Medellín in particular, including after the great successes in reducing violence starting in the late 1990s (see the Medellín country report).

Data ambiguities and lack of clarity about which cities should be considered violent help inspire the project's focus on resilience, as well as the decision to conduct field work rather than rely on the available statistical data for identifying trends in crime reduction. This of course did not eliminate all ambiguity. In some of our cities, on-the-ground views of violence matched the larger statistical indicators, whereas in others it did not. And in some cities, both were a far cry from the secondary literature or preconceived notions about the nature and locations of violence. Managua was a good example of the latter. With initial scholarship identifying Managua as a violent city (Rodgers 2004), it was selected for further study despite the fact that other Central American countries are now seen as much more violent. Subsequent field research suggested that violence in Managua has actually been on the decline, and may not have been as high as original reporting, at least if citizens' perceptions are any indicator. Such findings underscore the importance of moving beyond general statistics, they also can be put into context: and when combined with recent

regional trends they suggest that violence in Central America may be quite variable, with (Tegucigalpa) Honduras now taking center stage over both Guatemala and El Salvador. Some of these shifts may have to do with real trends; but they also may have a lot to do with who is identifying a country or city as more or less violent, and in comparison to what (e.g. other neighboring countries or with respect to a city's own violent past).

Whatever the source, this friction between perceptions of violence, available data, and shifting conditions emphasizes the importance of taking a more grounded approach, one which allows for deep interpretation of both the facts and the perceptions of violence as seen from the vantage points of those who experience or try to manage it as part of their everyday urban experience.

Given all these limitations, this project starts from the premise that violence needs to be understood qualitatively as much as quantitatively, particularly if we are interested in how citizens respond to it. Over-reliance on statistics is problematic because numbers can be manipulated or misunderstood. A qualitative exploration of violence at the sub-city level can provide new insight into whether and how citizens feel that conditions are bettering or worsening. Such views should ideally be complemented by salient statistics, but the latter cannot give the complete picture. For example, instead of only looking at homicide rates or the number of street crimes, our ethnographers used primary and secondary documents and interviews to identify the main sources of violence in each city. They then examined the daily interactions and relationships between citizens, the state, and violent actors in order to understand what drove views of insecurity and violence.

In the Karachi case study in Raman (2012), a quantitative method used for mapping violence in the city served as the first stage for asking new questions that required qualitative documentation of the nature and texture of violence in Karachi. This methodology led the author to conclude that violence is perceived by citizens to be a socioeconomic phenomenon that cannot be understood only through numeric representation. Moreover, with this qualitative understanding, it became easier to identify the drivers of violence as well as of the spatiality and interactional nature of conflict at the level of the community. Likewise, in the Johannesburg case study, the authors solicited cognitive maps of individuals' views of which areas of the city were safe or not. A map drawn without a pre-conceived instructions about what to identify as salient (see Premo 2012 for discussion of the methodology of cognitive mapping) allows citizens to give their uncensored views of what concerns them, without being forced to frame their perceptions of violence through the lens of metrics or categories provided by others with different definitions or views of violence and security.

These and other forms of data collection suggest that qualitative approaches to the study of chronic urban violence can help counter-balance or overcome the weaknesses and limitations associated with quantitative measures of violence.

### **1.3 Matching Research Design to the Scale and Scope of the Problem**

This project does not only seek to avoid many of the data limitations associated with the study of violence. It also seeks an alternative way of generating knowledge about violence and its impacts on citizens, with the hope that these insights can be used to generate new types of policies for enhancing security and reducing violence. To accomplish both, it seeks a spatial rather than sectoral entry point; and it starts from the premise that while the root causes of violence may be impossible to eliminate, there are still opportunities to fight back against it. The focus on a given location in the city is a reaction to the limitations inherent in addressing violence through a single sector lens, whether by focusing on employment versus prevention or seeking security sector reform or community strengthening, or some other such policy domain. By focusing ethnographically on particular areas in the city, we are able to engage multiple constituents and policy entry points simultaneously. In this way, we overcome the limits of a single sectoral dimension of the problem of violence. Likewise, rather than identifying the wholesale elimination of the forces and conditions of violence as primary aim, there is value in taking a more pragmatic approach. Such an approach identifies and builds on the modest gains made by individuals and institutions in the face of chronic violence, and then uses these innovations as a starting point for building a more comprehensive set of policies that can enable greater security at the level of the city.

Our conceptual starting point for achieving these aims is through a focus on *resilience*, or *the ways that actors and institutions at the level of the community actually cope with or adapt to chronic urban violence*. By looking for acts or strategies of resilience in situations of chronic violence, we take a more qualitative path towards policy innovation, building on the assumption that there is much to learn from the ways that citizens in real communities are responding and changing their everyday behavior in the face of violence. That is, rather than seeking new programmatic actions to eliminate the structural causes of rising crime and violence, or rather than focusing on the economic or institutional conditions in the city as a whole and trying to change them, or rather than targeting the administration of justice systems and seeking policies to reform them, we suggest turning attention to the ways individuals and institutions at the level of the community carve out spaces for action even in the most dire of circumstances. With a focus on individual and community resilience, it is possible to generate knowledge about what is working and what is not, in terms of

reducing violence or even just establishing a partial return to normalcy, then turning this grounded knowledge into the basis for policy action.

Such a strategy for knowledge generation and policy action not only reduces dependency on the far too elusive, ambiguous, or inexact quantitative measures normally used to chart policy success in the field of security. It also acknowledges a fundamental insight that is often ignored by professional experts: no one knows better than a person who is embedded in a world of everyday violence what is possible and what is not possible, who to trust and who not to trust, what behavior can be changed and what cannot, or what degree of change in local conditions might be most likely to change attitudes and behavior sufficiently enough to set a path back to normalcy. In conceptual terms, this strategy also becomes the analytical equivalent of a magician's sleight of hand to some degree: it redirects policy attention away from crime and violence per se, and toward the ways that citizens, business firms, and the city itself have actually responded to them. To focus on individual and community-level innovations that come from local actors and institutions is not to give up on the range of employment, crime prevention, educational, capacity-building, and security reform programs introduced by governments, multilaterals, and other formal development and aid agencies whose goal is to strengthen civil society and promote good governance. But it is to recognize that cities and their citizens can and have shown homegrown resilience even in the absence of external support and in the face of stunning levels of violence and poverty. Their pragmatism in this regard can help lay the foundation for positive urban change—if not directly in the area of insecurity, then perhaps in other significant dimensions of urban life that can compensate, lay the foundation for, or diminish the magnitude of the problems of chronic violence.

This grounded, more qualitative approach has several methodological advantages. One, it situates knowledge about violence in the everyday-life world of urban residents and other local actors, recognizing that every neighborhood may have its own social, spatial, political, and economic peculiarities that make it easier or harder to comply with conventional or standard policy recommendations for violence reduction. Second, by focusing on actions already undertaken in a given urban setting, it affords an opportunity to understand how residents or local officials subjectively understand the possibilities and limits associated with confronting violence in their own communities. Such information will be helpful in understanding whether and why policy priorities generated from outside may or may not be recognized as relevant or actionable at the community level, even as it gives new insights into alternative possibilities that have been innovated by residents themselves. Third, by assessing the coping or adaptation strategies undertaken by actors and institutions, we can determine which conditions are tolerated and which have been so

insufferable as to inspire action, information that can help policymakers make priorities for immediate attention. Finally, we are able to assess whether and how coping or adaptation strategies generated from below are better able to deal with the inter-sector and multiple scales of violence in ways preferable or perhaps even complementary to the standard repertoire of policy actions that remain tied to a single sector or scalar entry point.

**Qualitative Approach to Research:**



**Go Local:** Situate the research about violence in the everyday world of the local actors with their specific social, spatial, political and economic realities.



**Assess Capacity:** Understand how residents perceive their own possibilities and limitations in confronting violence. Use this knowledge to identify why certain policies may be more effective than others.



**Understand Tolerance:** Identify coping and adaptation strategies to determine which conditions are tolerated and which inspire response.



**Identify Effectiveness:** Learn in what ways inter-sector and multi-scaled adaptation strategies are preferable or even complementary to the broad-based and institutional policy measures.

## 1.4 Urban Resilience: *Pragmatism Inspired by Hope*

A focus on resilience and how to nurture it will allow a respite from the Sisyphean task of seeking to fully eliminate the root causes of chronic violence, providing instead a more modest set of strategies that can lay the foundation for concerted policy actions built on principles and priorities that have already shown promise. The assumption here is that it is possible to draw an array of policy recommendations by better understanding the small but promising victories already being waged and won in the struggle to survive or restore urban livability in situations of violence. This is what we call *resilience*. Such strategies cannot replace but will complement the larger objective of eliminating the root causes of chronic violence.

### 1.4.1 *Measuring Resilience*

In operational terms, resilient acts are those that seek to establish pre-violence “normalcy” in everyday life. Some people think of resilience as a return to the *status quo ante*. But

because the *status quo ante* may have helped generate the problems of urban violence in the first place, the definition of resilience must be tweaked a bit more. In this study we define resilience as those acts intended to restore or create effectively functioning community-level activities, institutions, and spaces in which the perpetrators of violence are marginalized and perhaps even eliminated. As stated in the Managua report, resilience is evident when “residents [are able] to cope with and adapt to violence, such that their lives are able to absorb it without being in consistent disruption.”

Still, it is important to emphasize that the idea of resilience comes from the “stability sciences,” and thus there are multiple issues of conceptual translation that must be addressed when applying this notion to cities. Using the concept of stability when studying chronic violence as the subject can be problematic because the steady-state/equilibrium for a chronically violent city may in fact involve a certain degree of continuity in violence (Raman 2012). As such, when using the concept of resilience in the study of violent cities one should be aware that a resilient urban system has multiple steady states, both positive and negative. For example, poverty is a stable steady state, but is undesirable.

Because resilience is hard to define in the context of examining a sociological phenomenon like violence, it is useful here to consider how different disciplines have adapted and modified the idea, from its mathematical and engineering roots to its more recent deployment in the fields of climate change.

For most of the mathematical, engineering, and environmental sciences, *resilience* is understood as the capacity to bounce back to equilibrium from a shock. A definition of resilience in *The World Disasters Report 2010* is the ability to deal with environmental, social, psychological risk and to survive and thrive. Yet the social psychology literature defines resilience as the “attainment of desirable social outcomes and emotional adjustment, despite exposure to considerable risk” which implies that resilience is the response to psychosocial adversity or events considered stressing enough to hinder normal function (Luthar 1993, Rutter 1995, and Masten 1994). For all these disciplines, resilience is a dynamic process, produced through a variety of resilient actions and reactions in the face of chronic violence; it is not a fixed characteristic of people or place. If nurtured and institutionalized, patterns and strategies of urban resilience can lay the foundation for sustained “non-violent” struggle against and potential defeat of the forces and conditions of violence.

Other interesting concepts in the study of resilience include the idea of robustness – the capacity to absorb shocks *without* changing—and the concept of mathematical complexity.

In the study of complex adaptive systems, complexity is defined as the number of variables in a system and the interactions between variables. The greater the complexity the more fragile the system. This idea of thinking about the city as a complex, adaptive system does however suggest certain questions that could be attached to the study of urban resilience. Would a city with more agents or sites of violence—e.g., a more complex system—suffer from more chronic or more intense violence compared with a city with fewer sources or agents or sites of violence? Would certain places in the city—perhaps those that served as key nodes in the urban system—be much more vulnerable to violence than others in terms of system collapse; or, conversely, would resilience or the maintenance of security in strategic urban locations help inoculate the entire system against violence, thus scaling up resilience to the city as a system (Raman 2012)?

Not only are these useful questions to think about when examining how to nurture the most durable patterns of resilience in a chronically violent city. They also remind us that resilience is grounded in space, and not just time. This is primarily because processes and acts of adaptation and coping are usually generated by tangible concerns with the everyday lived experience of the city, not by abstract principles about urban systems, even though local patterns of resilience in response to everyday conditions may have implications for who or what keeps an entire urban system functioning. All this suggests that resilience in a given location may have positive implications for the resilience of the entire system, with the equilibrium or dynamic functioning of the city contingent on what happens in its sub-parts.

#### Urban Resilience Approach to Chronic Violence

Resilience: How do actors and institutions cope with and adapt to everyday violence?

This approach does not focus on completely eliminating the deep roots of violence. Instead, it seeks to leverage and scale up small victories won in a violent city.

### ***1.4.2 Positive, Negative, and Equilibrium Resilience***

In identifying or measuring resilience, it is important to move beyond the superficial assumption that all forms of adaptation are equivalent in terms of system-reinforcing dynamics. After all, that individuals and institutions cope and adapt in the face of violence goes practically without saying. Very few cities implode, moreover, even if their survival comes at great individual or institutional cost. Thus what also needs to be investigated and


assessed is the outcomes associated with certain patterns of coping or adaptation. Which strategies will generate the greatest likelihood that life for citizens who face violence daily will actually improve in the future? And which might keep them locked in a vicious cycle of violence? Owing to the flaws in most standard measurements, figuring out the answers to such questions will require a more nuanced way of conceptualizing resilience that does not rely purely on quantitative metrics of violence, and that does not assume that reduced violence rates implies resilience, or a return to normalcy. For example, violence may go down when armed actors have been able to develop greater control over a given space or territory, with such outcomes often produced by extortion, threats, or special deals with the state or the community that do not get to the root source of violence. In such settings, it would be much harder to say that reduced violence is a result of individual or community successes in returning to the pre-violence status quo. Rather, it may in fact be a better indicator of armed actors' own resilience in the face of efforts to eliminate them.

Further complicating our understanding of resilience, some adaptations that seem to indicate progress or pushback against the forces of violence can in the long run actually harm some citizens while it helps others. At the level of the city, such adaptations can be seen in the form of gating, or displacement coming from gentrification, or harassment from private police—all of which may produce gains for a small number of residents, thus making unprotected citizens even more vulnerable. This raises the importance of thinking about trade-offs among forms and patterns of resilience, not just among different residents in the same city but also in terms of immediate versus long-term gains in livability. Stated differently, in seeking measures or evidence of urban resilience, it is important to identify more than just those strategies that seem to provide a temporary return to normalcy. One must also try to assess which adaptations or coping strategies will create a sense of security that scales over time and space, and that is most likely to be sustainable or self-reinforcing. As another counter example, if a community's preferred way of coping is to let armed actors control key activities or locations in their neighborhoods, then such adaptive mechanisms may bring negative outcomes in the long run, particularly with respect to sustained or chronic violence, even if it might look like a relatively strategic adaptation in the short term.

As such, resilience can be impermanent, porous, and unevenly distributed, as in a case of citizen vigilantism imposing order or civil society organizations (CSOs) providing basic social services for only particular neighborhoods. Worse yet, resilience could even be achieved through the takeover of security and justice functions by a criminal syndicate, an adaptation that could reduce rates of violence but would eat into the capacity of the state to guarantee security and establish social or political order.

All these examples suggest that resilience may be neither “progressive” nor inherently positive (Davis 2005), at least if the main point of departure for identifying it is merely coping or adapting. Certain citizen or state responses to violence can at times strengthen the forces and conditions responsible for violence, leading to setbacks. Likewise, some strategies of resilience can perpetuate the same framework of power or activity that led to violence in the first place, thus preventing new “openings” in the struggle against of chronic violence. In such instances of resilience, it is clear that a “return to normalcy” would not in fact be the desired state.

For all these reasons, in order to enhance its conceptual use as a foundation for constructive policy-making, resilience as a concept must be disaggregated into more precise, finely tuned categories. We thus suggest the importance of distinguishing between positive, negative, and equilibrium resilience, depending on whether coping or adaptation strategies will strengthen, weaken, or stabilize the existent forces and conditions of violence.



It is worth reiterating here that equilibrium resilience can be transformed into positive or negative resilience through disruption, and thus as a focus of policy action it is particularly critical. One way that equilibrium resilience can be de-stabilized, either positively or negatively, is through “tipping points” that can be specified temporally or with a closer examination of the spatial aspects of system dynamics noted above. A better understanding of equilibrium resilience and the forces that stabilize or de-stabilize it may also explain whether a transition from chronic to episodic violence occurs, or vice-versa. In conditions where there appears to be a precarious steady state or truce (however long-lasting) between the state, the agents of violence, and the community, violence may only occur in short bursts. Conversely, in an environment where citizens, the state, and violent actors are locked in ongoing battle over who is to dominate, chronic violence may be the result. The point here is that it is imperative to understand that equilibrium resilience can be both positive in some cases (when violence reduction policies have targeted the agents of chronic violence) and negative in others (gangs and the police are temporarily regrouping to fight later with greater intensity). The field reports will highlight the vulnerable nature of equilibrium resilience.

### ***1.4.3 Conceptualizing Positive Resilience***

Probably the most dramatic form of resilience is that evidenced by concerted or proactive efforts on the part of communities to actively wrest control of their daily situation in ways that could be considered a form of resistance to the power and influence of armed actors. This, in fact, is a way of moving from a situation of equilibrium to positive resilience. Using this ideal type situation as the high-bar of measurement for the most positive forms of resilience, we also have elected to conceptualize resilience as *individual or communities’ capacities to resist against the perpetrators of violence through strategies that help them establish relatively autonomous control over the activities, spaces, and social or economic forces and conditions that comprise their daily lives*. Having said this, it is important to recognize that no community is ever free from all constraints and in situations of violence, armed actors are usually powerful and threatening enough that they cannot be completely sidelined or ignored let alone controlled or eliminated. As such, we understand that a community’s ability to act autonomously from armed actors is relative at best, and that capacities to generate autonomy are also relational. That is, in order to keep violence and armed actors at bay, or to protect themselves from total capture or colonization by such forces, residents may need to create either horizontal relationships among themselves (i.e. new fortified relations among social, political, spatial, and economic stakeholders in a given spatially defined community) or vertical relationships with forces residing outside the physical confines of the community (including other armed actors, or even the state, plus also international actors and institutions). In many instances, community residents may have to manage both sets of relationships at the same time – precisely because these relationships allow them the political, social, spatial and economic resources that will enable them to protect and strengthen their own relative autonomy vis-à-vis armed actors.

With this definition in hand, our objective has been to identify the sets of conditions and practices that enhance an individual or a community's capacity to act independently of armed actors, and to specify the types of horizontal and vertical relationships that have been used to sustain this relative autonomy. To the extent that violence and responses to it are situated in physical space, we also look for the spatial correlates of resilience, seeking to determine whether and how physical conditions in a neighborhood will affect the nature, degrees, and likelihood of resilience. Such a task will lead us to consider whether future policy actions in the fields of crime prevention, security reform, or violence reduction will require an understanding of the spatial foundations of resilience. To the extent that violence in a particular city may be related to spatial patterns—including the creation of underserved or spatially excluded communities in which social, political, and economic marginality can pave the way to chronic violence—we also must be prepared to consider that urban spatial policies and practices may affect capacities for resilience.

The originating premise of this project is that it is important to see how actors and institutions have comported themselves *socially and spatially* in the face of chronic violence, and that through this knowledge we can create the basis for more sustainable, effective, and multi-faceted policy action. By designing policy interventions around knowledge of how and in what ways people have mobilized to successfully confront problems of chronic violence, policymakers will encourage and reinforce existent forces and conditions of urban resilience while also investing in city-building strategies and social relationships that will make such patterns more self-sustaining.

### Objective

Fragile cities suffer from violence enacted on multiple scales concentrated in a single metropolitan space. How, then, do the spatial characteristics of the city shape violence? Are urban interventions successful in transcending sectoral approaches to violence by focusing on the greater community and city?

Using 8 case studies of cities suffering from long histories of chronic violence, this report examines how citizens have evolved coping mechanisms (strategies of resilience) at various scales. Insights from field research in these cities are combined with theoretical approaches to security, violence, and resilience in order to develop a systemic, multi-sectoral approach to chronic violence.

#### ***1.4.4 Cases, Methods, and Research Objectives***

The findings presented in this report are based on case study research conducted in eight cities around the world that have experiencing distinct political and socio-economic typologies of violence with divergent temporal, spatial, regional, national, identity, and severity characteristics. Particular attention has been paid to Latin America and Africa respectively, because of the pervasiveness of the development-insecurity nexus and challenges of rapid urbanization in these regions, although a single South Asian case is used for comparison. Cities were selected to examine a combination of violence types and characteristics, including the pervasiveness of political versus economic violence, as well as city-size and urban economic complexity. The cases include large urban locales with strong commercial and industrial sectors (São Paulo, Mexico City, Karachi, Johannesburg, Nairobi); cities that have experienced or are in the midst of political conflict (Managua, Johannesburg, Kigali, Medellín), some of it related to ethno-national or tribal tensions; and cities that have a longer (Medellín) versus shorter (Managua) history of violence.

Teams of researchers spent six weeks in each city over the summer of 2011 identifying the general conditions of violence and exploring urban systems with particular regard for how actors and institutions at the level of the city experienced and reacted to different forms of chronic violence.<sup>2</sup> Although residents and leaders in each city identified violence as a key concern, its scope and scale differed, with some cities having more extreme violence and/or widely distributed as opposed to concentrated violence. In order to maximize the comparative utility of the fieldwork, rather than trying to assess conditions for each city as a whole, we identified two specific sites for focused consideration: one in the central city and one in the periphery, in order to tap spatial dynamics. Prior research has suggested that both urban centers and peripheries are frequently the sites of violence, and our aim was to test whether patterns of resilience may have a spatial component because of the way residents relate to space, institutions, and each other, or because of demographic differences usually associated with such locations that offer different opportunities or constraints on resilience. For each city, researchers sought a detailed mapping of formal and informal institutions at the heart of security questions. Mainly using interviews, as well as official and media accounts, among other sources, researchers sought an overall assessment of the sources of violence and how actors and institutions in each neighborhood, as well as city-wide, responded to urban insecurity.

<sup>2</sup> Researchers were unable to travel to Karachi due to the security situation but this report draws on research and surveys conducted by Raman (2012), Maliszewski (2012), and Chung (2011).

Among the formal institutions examined were police and local government officials as well as established NGOs and business organizations; informal institutions included neighborhood “watch” groups and other social networks, news media, or armed vigilantes or militias. The number and character of interviewees varied by case, owing to the histories of violence and governance as well as the degrees and extent of civil society organization.

The main research objective was to establish how these institutional adaptations interact: e.g., if state security institutions are failing to provide acceptable levels of security, do informal groups rise in prominence (numbers, resources, visibility) and mode of action (individual vs. collective organization, leveraging of other organizations, use of armed activity)? If such informal institutions do become more salient, how then does the state react to them? How do the sources of the chronic violence react? With such questions as a starting point, researchers described and analyzed the city’s repertoire of adaptations and counter-adaptations in order to provide a topography of resilience.

Given the wide range of cases, purposefully selected so as to provide a basis for assessing whether common strategies of resilience emerged despite divergent dynamics of violence (e.g., economic versus political), researchers pursued slightly divergent data collection strategies, tailoring interview settings and subjects to the specific dynamics of each city. Both formal interviewing and participant observation were used in all cities. But the situation in some cities made it easier (or harder) to draw information from the perpetrators of violence. Likewise, in some locations state officials were more or less willing to discuss the security situation. In all cities, civil society organizations and random individuals served as a key source of information about resilience. In some cities, where individual mobility was a key concern, researchers solicited cognitive maps that reflected how citizens negotiated violent city streets, a form of resilience; in other cities where violence was linked to interruptions in service provision, researchers used surveys to probe citizens views of access to key urban services, a measure intended to reflect the return to normalcy. Overall, each team developed their final report with an eye to documenting, probing, and interpreting the most visible and widely recognized strategies of resilience for their particular city.

Despite different methods and approaches, as well as variations in the patterns of violence, the teams found commonalities as well as unexpected differences in the spaces, agents, and strategies of resilience. Because our intent in the remainder of this report is to draw out policy priorities that can be used in a variety of conflict settings, in what follows we present

a summary of the overall findings. We then use our summary reflections to build a larger analytical and policy framework for identifying and incentivizing forms of resilience, leaving the more detailed city-specific findings for the case studies, all of which (except Karachi) are available as a separate document.<sup>3</sup>




Figure 1. **Sectoral Roots of Violence:** Map of research cities and associated sectors of violence

<sup>3</sup> Many of these themes were addressed in theses produced by MIT by students who were directly or indirectly involved in an urban resilience working group that ran in tandem with this project. Although each approaches their topic through different analytical vantage points, they all address cities with chronic violence (Johannesburg, Karachi, Rio de Janeiro) and each thesis examines one or another form of adaptation to violence in the city, ranging from mobility patterns (Premo on Johannesburg), to infrastructure (Maliszewski on Karachi), to social capital formation (Raman on Karachi) to police reform and urban governance (Tierney on Rio de Janeiro). They will also be posted on the Urban Resilience website at MIT's Center for International Studies: [web.mit.edu/cis/urban\\_resilience.html](http://web.mit.edu/cis/urban_resilience.html)





# PATTERNS OF URBAN RESILIENCE





## PATTERNS OF URBAN RESILIENCE

Taking a step back from the specific challenges faced by each of our cities, we begin with an overview of which cities seem to be doing better than others in terms of coping with violence, after which we disaggregate the locations and mechanics of resilience within and between them. Even so, it is important to set the stage. Several of the cities under study here should be classified as highly fragile, with both officials and citizens alike concerned that violence is continuing with little hope in sight for immediate reversal. Among those we include Karachi and Nairobi, where random and targeted political violence and organized criminality continue relatively unabated, and where citizen trust in governance and security institutions remains minimal. In what has been termed a “seismic failure in urban governance,” more than two-thirds of the population of Nairobi lives in informal settlements unrecognized by the state (see Nairobi country report). Informal providers of pirated electricity and potable water perform essential services where the state has overtly refused and/or tacitly neglected to supply these services; yet in some cases they have become drivers of violence, as is the case in violent disputes between landlords and tenants as well as the informal transportation system, which has been taken over by gangs, constraining the after-hours movement of the urban poor.

On the other end of the spectrum, Mexico City and Medellín can be considered relative success stories, having made significant progress in reducing random and organized criminal violence while also generating a sense of citizen optimism about an improving security situation. In Mexico City, the city government in partnership with civil society and the private sector restored parts of the historical downtown from sites of insecurity to their original landmark status where commerce is once again vibrant. By enhancing the built environment, engaging with local actors, improving street lighting and increasing police presence, the public authorities used urban redevelopment as a strategy to combat insecurity. This reclaiming of public space has resulted in zones of resilience inside a city that is increasingly becoming more resilient in spite of a difficult security situation in the rest of the country.

Examples of urban resilience in Medellín even more directly arise from the most insecure and informal spaces. Although rates of violence in Medellín are still much higher than other cities in our sample, with violence rising again in the last year or so after a fairly steep decline, there are still significant neighborhood-level gains that, when juxtaposed against the fact that Medellín was once the most violent city in the world, make this city exemplary in terms of its capacities for resilience. In recent years Medellín has been remarkably successful in connecting its informal settlements (where about 40 percent of the urban

population resides) to the formal structures of governance. The state-owned *Empresas Publicas de Medellín* provides water, sewer and electricity services to almost 99 percent of the city, a feat almost unheard of for most cities in the developing world. The most interesting initiatives are those connecting the urban poor with the state, from innovative urban upgrading program and emblematic architectural projects to more everyday connections through participatory budgeting, which brings community organizations into conversation with the state.

Johannesburg is somewhat harder to categorize. It falls nearer to Karachi and Nairobi in terms of ongoing violence and insecurity, but it also counts on a more stable political situation and strong local government and citizen commitment to violence reduction that parallels Mexico City and Medellín. While there have been numerous successful instances of resilience in Johannesburg, the majority are community-led, without building strong connections between the state and city residents. Much like Nairobi where the deficiencies in service provision call upon informal responses, reactions to trends of crime and violence tend fall to the residents of the informal settlements where the state's presence has been tenuous, resulting in violent and coercive actors becoming prominent to fill in the void of a legitimate security presence of the state.

There are similarities between Johannesburg and São Paulo, where the spaces of insecurity tend to converge on places of informality, or at least at times when the state is less present than others. Violence in São Paulo has fallen dramatically over the past decade. This is true of the downtown, where the city has recently embarked on a large urban revitalization program similar to Mexico City but with less successful results thus far, and of the outskirts, where the urban poor have been concentrated in informal settlements. What is most disturbing are indications that one of the reasons behind the decline in violence in the once very dangerous periphery is the territorial control by an armed criminal group with an unwritten accord with the state security forces.

Finally, both the Managua and Kigali cases enjoy relatively modest rates of criminality and violence, particularly when compared with other major cities in their respective regions (Central America and East Africa), although the reasons for this may be traced to unique political histories and, in the case of Kigali, the heavy-handed coercive control of the post-conflict Rwandan state. Due to the strongly centralized nature of governance in Rwanda, the security situation derives more from the lack of sufficient infrastructure and affordable housing—both of which are due in no small part to the topography of Kigali, than the actual statistics of violence, which remain relatively low. The state has led numerous projects to address issues of security, infrastructure, and housing, often leveraging local

community capacities for implementation, and it is this integration of central state and local governance that is a main contributing factor to the low rates of criminality and violence.

In contrast, Managua is a city where political upheavals and natural disasters have made connections within geographically bound neighborhoods more important than broader ties to the central state. While until recently this local solidarity has kept insecurity at bay, there are questions whether this situation will be sustainable in the face of violence spiraling almost out of control across much of the Central American region.

Each context lays the foundation for the patterns of resilience identified in the next sections.

## **2.1 Variations in Types of Resilience: Cross-City Comparisons**

It is tempting to start from the assumption that the cities where violence has seen the greatest drop in the shortest amount of time are in fact the most resilient. But the larger context of violence, as well as the degrees to which citizens and the state have showed themselves capable of pushing back against the perpetrators of violence in their struggles to cope and adapt, make it difficult to draw a one-to-one correspondence between violence reduction and resilience. In fact, as noted above, sometimes drops in violence are associated with either the political ascendance of violence entrepreneurs or the coercive power of the state. As such, before identifying the mechanisms that produce resilience it is important to categorize contexts of resilience, or the ways that the power of the state or criminal organizations enable different coping or adaptation strategies, which in turn produce different types of resilience.

### ***2.1.1 Proactive vs. Reactive Resilience***

Resilience can be framed in a number of different ways. One is the temporal context for resilience. The spectrum that emerges from the case studies is one that includes cities where resilience is *proactive*, that is, initiated to lay a foundation against crime and violence expected in the future; to cities where resilience is *reactive*, that is, adaptations are responses to crime and violence that has already occurred. Where cities fall in this spectrum is largely based in their individual history of urbanization, insecurity and demographic divisions.

Two cities that exhibit strong proactive resilience are Managua and Kigali. The resilience seen in both is a tool used to keep future violence at bay, resulting in rates of violence

much lower than those of other countries in their respective regions. The reasons for this proactivity of course differ in the two cities according to their own histories and contexts.

Resilience in Managua stems from strong neighborhood identities that generate community solidarities that allow residents to push back against the actors of violence. Much of this sense of community comes from the legacy of the Sandinista Revolution, although more recent migrants to Managua as well as opposition to the Sandinista government have created local level fissures that impede a stronger community-led resilience. The example of the Citizen Power Councils is illustrative. The Sandinista government created these local institutions to foster social and political organization at the neighborhood level, and in neighborhoods where they have been accepted (which often translates into support of the Sandinista project), they have been instrumental in soliciting investment in much needed infrastructure improvements and support for community-led initiatives, of which violence prevention figure prominently. Yet the councils are divisive in certain neighborhood. Since the councils have the power of the purse strings in communities that are not organized or that oppose what they perceive as community co-optation by the Sandinista government, solidarity is impinged upon and resilience impeded.

Resilience in Kigali has become strongly proactive given the country's extreme history of violence and the legacies of genocide. The state has imposed a strong "never again" mentality that has served as the impetus for the very proactive resilience seen in Kigali today. The powerful community solidarities are demonstrated by the importance of community-based work, or what is locally termed *umuganda*, which bridges state decisions and neighborhood actions. The *umuganda* involve regular meetings, local leadership, improved services, even those provided informally, and other instances of proactive resilience. The state's involvement in and relationship with neighborhoods is essential to the sustainability of these mechanisms, but local communities are also resilient towards (or against) coercive state practices, such as forced evictions. The idea of fluid solidarities is also important to proactive resilience in Kigali as firmly established intra-communal bonds were disrupted by the migration from rural Rwanda to the capital. The state also considers perpetrators of violence to be political enemies. In the absence of formal communal policing but proactive against rising reports of unrest, the state was able to take advantage of this state of flux to force citizens to organize their own police forces. Although these local defense forces were disbanded after they stirred up anger and dissatisfaction due to regular abuse of authority, they were the first of several steps towards the building of a national police force. Efforts to strengthen community policing were paralleled with the introduction of compulsory community service that are a way of bringing the community

together to gather local-level information and disseminate public policies.

Mexico City is more an example of reactive resilience. The city government reacted to rising crime and insecurity with a series of measures that included police reforms and the urban redevelopment of downtown, a key site of violence in the late 1990s. The latter project was conceived explicitly to restore a high degree of vibrancy to center city districts that decades before the spikes in violence had been one of the most highly visited parts of the city. The redesign of pedestrian shopping streets like Regina and Alhondiga, as well as the new investments in the historical mariachi neighborhood of Plaza Garibaldi, came in reaction to their decline as a result of violence. Both sites have experienced a resurgence of popularity as well as restored perceptions of security as evidenced by the increasing number of visitors both day and night. In contrast, the gains have been less durable in the more peripheral and residential area of Iztapalapa, perhaps because of the circumstances under which locals called upon the city government to renovate a plaza that had long been recognized as the territory of a gang. Policies were justified more as an effort to change the prior history and character of the area than to return it to a state of normalcy. Although proactive on the part of the residents, it only was undertaken as a reaction by the state, and the connections forged between the community and the public authorities only lasted as long as the project. As soon as the plaza was restored, the state retreated. In another example, the Nuevo Aztlán housing complex took the initiative to secure their building with gates and identification-only access to the compound, which in some ways was proactive, but in other ways was reactive to the violence. Instead of pushing against the actors of violence, the residents were choosing to protect themselves from them.

Medellín is somewhere in the middle of the spectrum as a city that exhibits both proactive and reactive resilience. Its hillside informal settlements have become famous for innovative interventions, such as the cable car connecting the hillside communities with the subway system below and the architectural marvel of the *Biblioteca España* (library) at the summit of what was once one of the most dangerous communities. These efforts were undertaken to integrate a city that was divided along lines of violence; yet they were also reactions to a long history of violence emanating from the slums. What is more interesting are the proactive efforts that community organizations have made to confront the everyday insecurity in their neighborhoods, such as human rights forums and support groups led by former actors in the armed conflict who know best how to extricate current members from the cycle of violence.

This framing of resilience implies that proactivity and reactivity are at two ends of the same spectrum, and there are definite implications from the case studies that there are elements that could push cities in one direction or the other. From the cases of Managua and Kigali,

it appears that a common element in cities where proactive resilience has addressed crime and violence with some effectiveness is community solidarity. Having a unifying goal, vision, or hope greatly increases the horizontal ties that exist within a community, and networks of people are essential to creating proactive resilience with significant scope, scale and longevity. Moreover, Medellín and Mexico City also imply that vertical connections between communities and the state significantly impact resilience, with the implication that the absence of such a relationship confounds a community's attempts to be resilient in the face of insecurity.

Finally, a history of prior success also appears to strengthen both proactive and reactive resilience, although in different ways. In the case of Mexico, initial progress by local governing officials who reacted against violence by fighting back against organized mafias in downtown Mexico City gave citizens hope that if they were to proactively take on a similar battle, there might be progress and there might be loyal support from the government. In the case of Medellín, in contrast, the prior history of state successes in demobilizing paramilitaries, organized criminal groups, and other agents of violence was a form of reactive resilience that brought gains in violence reduction. However, as time passed and new criminal groups pushed into the void, citizens began to see violence emerging once again. Faced with the knowledge that the root sources of violence were much more difficult to eliminate, citizens learned that it was important to organize proactively and on their own, in order to fight against the perpetrators of violence. And it was this learning process – built on the knowledge that both states and violent actors may come and go despite the best of intentions – that ultimately motivated citizens to rely on each other and to seek to control their own community responses to violence.

### *2.1.2 Negative vs. Positive vs. Equilibrium Resilience*

Resilience in our cases can also be categorized in terms of whether community adaptations strengthened, weakened, or stabilized the existent forces and conditions of violence. When the collective capacities of urban institutions are invigorated, when urban violence is tangibly reduced, or when citizens push back against the actors and institutions of violence, then resilience is termed positive. On the opposite extreme, when state institutions fail to thwart the perpetrators of violence despite aggressively attempting to, or when community adaptations create an environment in which violent actors nonetheless dominate citizens and the state through coercion, then resilience is defined as negative. Equilibrium resilience is more managed and in between, where the capacities of only certain institutions are strengthened, or the key institutions merely cope with ongoing violence but the situation is relatively stable and violence is less chronic.

One city that exhibits positive resilience is Medellín. There are several programs in the informal settlements designed by local residents and financed by the state that have confronted actors of violence, or at least pulled individuals from criminal organizations. The Human Rights Board is a convening space where citizens can voice their concerns about abuses by armed actors - state and non-state - in their community. These meetings are important channels of communication between the police and residents about the violence affecting their community. There are other smaller community projects that interact with the Human Rights Board, several of which work with at-risk youth or even current gang members to extricate them from the conflict. These organizations are run by former actors of violence who themselves have left the conflict. While these activities integrate citizens across communities, another strategy to physically integrate divided spaces is performance events in spaces that are known as territories of rival factions. These have been termed performances at invisible borders because these unmapped borders cutting across communities were defined by the fragmentation of paramilitary groups unable to reintegrate back into society after the national demobilization process, with their control over physical territory corresponding to the economic subsistence of small entrepreneurs of violence. One of the most pronounced effects of this geographic distribution of armed criminality is the impossibility of crossing invisible borders. The performance events are attempts to break down the borders that map the most conflictive parts of the community. They are sponsored by the Human Rights Board as well as government agencies and attended by the community as well as the national police. They are attempts to regain control of the neighborhood from the armed actors.

There are elements of negative resilience in the informal settlements of Nairobi and Johannesburg. The state's failure to recognize, much less to provide services to the slums, forced the community to innovate its own solutions. While in many ways, the urban informal poor have done remarkably well, some service providers have become drivers of violence, especially those that have become private providers of security that often impose their own order over the community. Informal hybrid arrangements between state and non-state security actors have become so embedded and normalized, and progressively institutionalized, that there seems almost no space for communities to connect with the state in terms of legalizing and urbanizing their infrastructurally deficient neighborhoods. Specifically in Johannesburg, the failure of the criminal justice and policing systems to protect the population of the informal settlements, as well as the more general dearth of effective formal security mechanisms to effectively deal with criminal or violent acts, has resulted in the widespread belief that communities should simply "take matters into their own hands." Rather than wait hours for the police to show up, only to see the perpetrator of the crime back on the streets in a matter of hours given the corruption rampant within

the police forces, residents have decided to be the arbiters of justice. Mob justice, or what locals have termed policing for oneself, has been cited the only way to send the message that enough is enough, although inevitably its instigation is arbitrary and explosive with little recourse for those caught up in its aftermath, especially vulnerable populations such as the foreigners who have been targeted in xenophobic attacks.

This is not to imply that most acts of resilience in Nairobi and Johannesburg are negative. The very same lack of official security response has also catalyzed a positive source of resilience in communities looking to address issues of crime and violence proactively. One example is the Community Policing Forums in Johannesburg, which are a state-supported initiative that complement and partner with the South African Police Service. The community members of the forums help the police identify local crime patterns and priorities and monitor the police for their effectiveness and accountability. City residents consistently cited the community police as more trustworthy than their counterparts in the official forces (though corruption is still present). Community policing also lacks the resources it requires to be more effective, including more comprehensive training for its members. Overall, Johannesburg could be categorized as an example of equilibrium resilience. Despite its reputation for high rates of crime and violence, there have been few instances where the city was unstable or out of control. Throughout apartheid, during the radical shift in political and administrative structures, and now in the post-apartheid era, violence and crime have been major issues, but the rates have remained relatively constant, albeit much higher than desired.

The outskirts of São Paulo, where most of the low-income population concentrates, are another space of equilibrium resilience. Recent declines in violence have coincided with the growing strength of an armed criminal and drug trafficking group that is now the *de facto* law and order across much of the periphery. The state is still very much present in the informal settlements but in different ways from in the rest of the city. This disparity is most evident in the realm of insecurity, as the police are present on the main roads, but are deeply corrupt in the eyes of the residents who only see them enter the community to take bribes from the drug traffickers in return for letting them carry out their illicit activities unhindered. There is deeply rooted wariness of the police because of its history of violence in the community. While many residents are fearful of the armed criminals that control their community, they despise the police even more. This leads to an ambiguous situation whereby violence is under control but only because of an unwritten truce between the police and the traffickers that is of course threatened all the time when discord arises between the two.

## 2.2 City-level Variations in Resilience

Certain spaces have certain histories. Historical patterns of urbanization have been important in influencing variations in resilience across different spaces within the same city. Our cases show that parts of a city hold more potential to generate resilience than others. Often this has to do with the ways that certain parts of the city are identified as worthy of protection, either because they reflect larger cultural or national patrimony or because they are where the private sector flourishes, and often because they are where the wealthy reside. In contrast to the formally planned, commercially abundant and state-protected parts of the city, all of the cities in our case studies, like most in the developing world, are confronting the challenges of urban informality. This informality exists as a form of housing delivery, a mode of economic production, and a method of service delivery. The context of insecurity and interactions with the state are varied across the case studies, but one element common to all is the uneven distribution of violence and resilience within the city itself, often dependent on the different history of urbanization and variations in state presence.

### 2.2.1 *Central vs. Peripheral Spaces of Resilience*

Within cities there are variations in resilience across space, with differences between central and peripheral spaces often mapping differences between spaces where the state is almost always present and spaces where its presence has been selective, if not absent for many years. It is important to note that when defining central versus peripheral places that we are not only referring to location within the city center or on its outskirts, though this is sometimes the case. Very often what is termed the periphery is actually physically located in the city but symbolically distant from the power relations that structure it. Thus, squatter settlements can be located far into the physical periphery, as is the case in Johannesburg and São Paulo, on the hillsides overlooking the city, as is the case in Medellín, or even entangled in the city itself as is the case in Nairobi. Because location in the city cannot always distinguish central versus peripheral spaces of resilience, a better marker would be their relationship to the state. The central spaces of resilience are those where the commercial sector is present and where connections to the state are the strongest. The peripheral spaces, which most often include the squatter settlements, are where informality in housing and economic production is the most prevalent and connections with the state are the most fragile. What is so interesting about the examples of resilience in peripheral spaces is that these communities all have the potential to forge new connections with the state in layered and complex ways.

São Paulo, Medellín, and Johannesburg are all examples of squatter settlements being spaces of concentrated insecurity. The root of much of this insecurity stems from their poverty, and armed actors have taken advantage of the absence of the state from many of these spaces to control informal economies and sometimes impose their own social order. Medellín and São Paulo are examples where competing armed groups have controlled informal spaces for much of their recent history. But whereas resilience is evident in Medellín in that the community has organized subtle and overt means to challenge armed actors' control over territory, resilience in São Paulo is much less proactive, much more a managed equilibrium between maintaining autonomy from criminal actors without resisting their authority. Resilience in Medellín has witnessed the creation of myriad community-led organizations to protect human rights, bridge borders between different spaces and reintegrate former armed actors back into the community. Resilience in São Paulo is more of a standoff between the state and the criminals that control the squatter settlements with the community caught in between. It is not that they support the drug traffickers who hold sway over the spaces where they live, but the residents have such distrust for the police that they are reluctant to call upon the state to remove the parallel powers.

**Urban Location and Resilience: Center vs. Periphery**

**Common Characteristics of Central City Spaces**

- Mixed land-uses
- Multiple economic functions and opportunities
- Pedestrian activity and mobility
- Strong state presence
- Police-community cooperation or negotiation
- Positive or proactive resilience

**Common Characteristics of the Urban Periphery**

- Newly settled
- Precarious land tenure
- Limited employment options
- Relative state absence
- Police-community estrangement
- Negative, reactive, or equilibrium resilience

Resilience in squatter settlements in Johannesburg is far from uniform, with its nature and scale differing depending in large part on the physical distance from the city center. In the townships located on the periphery, resilience is almost entirely reactive. Communities and individuals do as much as is necessary to survive the constant condition of crime and violence, but do little to combat it, as there is a lack of solidarity among residents who view the settlements as temporary places to live until they can move elsewhere. For example, in the township of Diepsloot, there is very little in the way of a common identity for the residents, which is in stark contrast to the residents in the inner-city squatter community of Hillbrow. Resilience in the downtown is moving from reactive to proactive, with residents beginning to band together to reestablish the area as an economic hub. Locals are uniting in a push towards rebranding the community and rewriting its reputation as a blighted area.

### *2.2.2 Residential vs. Commercial Sites of Resilience*

Another differentiation of space is based on use. The two most prevalent uses of space within cities are residential and commercial, with the opportunities for resilience often divergent between them, and the possibilities for building connections with the state sometimes more sustainable in spaces where there are connections between the state and the commercial sector.

Mexico City and São Paulo reveal the different possibilities for resilience in commercial versus residential spaces. The historical centers of both cities overlaid commercial hubs and overlapped sites of insecurity, mostly from street crime and drug use. They were both revitalized with an eye towards increasing commercial and cultural traffic. Resilience in the historical center of Mexico City is appearing to be sustainable, especially the case on redeveloped pedestrian-only streets lined by commercial businesses in the downtown. The state can sustain its presence on the streets in these commercial areas because this is where people expect to see the police. In contrast, resilience in the residential area of Iztapalapa has been more ambiguous, especially as connections between this more peripheral area and the state are more difficult to maintain over time. Whereas in the historical center connections were fostered vertically with the state and horizontally among local stakeholders, these connections have been harder to form in Iztapalapa perhaps because the state is still unsure about forging connections to community-level organizations, or because the incentive of the private sector is not there to catalyze state involvement.

São Paulo is another interesting example of state-sponsored resilience in the downtown. There is an ongoing project to transform what was once the cultural and commercial center from the degraded and insecure area it had become back to realizing its economic

and artistic possibilities. Much like Mexico City, the state is highly present on the streets during the day, with police on almost every street corner, and the sources of insecurity (the drug addicts) pushed out of the area, but at night the drug addicts reclaim the streets. It is difficult for state-sponsored resilience to be sustainable in the after-hours when the state and the private sector retreats, thus opening up spaces for insecurity to return. It is even more difficult to sustain resilience in the low-income residential periphery where the state's presence has long been selective. The sources of insecurity return to downtown São Paulo at night after the police leave and the businesses close, while in the periphery, insecurity is present almost all the time with the control over space by criminal actors.

Johannesburg is interesting in that its commercial center is fairly new. Prior to the 1990s, the central business district was the city's economic hub, but white flight following the end of apartheid meant disinvestment in the downtown and relocation of many companies to Sandton, an area a few kilometers to the north that remains separated from the rest of Johannesburg. The disconnection between the commercial center and the rest of the city only underlines the difficulty of extending state-sponsored resilience into the more residential and peripheral parts of the city, especially where the poor reside. While obvious, it needs to be said that state-sponsored resilience is more likely in areas where it is needed, or areas that enjoy affluence. The commercial centers that feature in the day-to-day life of most city residents are often where resilience is the strongest because there exist both the state resources and state pressure for steps in the direction of enhancing security.

### *2.2.3 Daytime vs. Nighttime Resilience*

Large cities such as Mexico City and São Paulo never sleep, but it is not surprising that the central parts of both are considered more insecure at night when the commercial businesses close and the presence of the police is more intermittent. Until recently this was especially true in Plaza Garibaldi in downtown Mexico City. Although there was much activity in the Plaza at night, and it was linked in national imagination as the hub of mariachi music, it had become increasingly unsafe as its reputation degraded into a venue to buy hard drugs. Several high-profile crimes pressured the city authorities to implement a redevelopment project that returned security, especially at night. This reclaiming of the public plaza as a nighttime location and tourist attraction included the building of a new museum and mariachi school, the renovation of alleyways, increased investment in the facades of buildings, more police patrols and better street lighting. It appears that the project is working as people are returning to the plaza to listen to the mariachi, even visiting at different times of day, and while drugs are reputedly still available, it is far from the widespread and open attitude that prevailed before.

As alluded to above, urban redevelopment in São Paulo has so far been less successful in terms of making the neighborhood more secure at night. The project is less advanced than the interventions in Mexico City, but it has proven immensely more controversial. Whereas in Mexico City the planning authorities partnered with local businesses and civil society, in São Paulo the relationship between the state and the private sector has been complicated because of plans to demolish many existing buildings. Moreover, São Paulo has succeeded in displacing the sources of insecurity from the commercial center during the day, but as one store owner closing down at the end of the day said about why he did not remain at after the sun set, “the streets return to the crack addicts”.

It is also the case in Nairobi and Johannesburg that insecurity is much higher at night, but due to a lack of any particular control of the spaces, rather than due to a shift in control from state actors to actors that perpetuate insecurity. Night brings uncertainty and with it instability. Invariably, residents cite specific areas as being unsafe during the day, but the entire city as being unsafe at night. While state, city and community police are all on patrol during the night, their resources and numbers are too small to be able to be an all-pervasive presence in the city, and the fewer the eyes on the street, the more dangerous that street tends to be.

### **2.3 Urban Development and Resilience**

The traditional response to insecurity is often to send the police into the slums. But there are other ways to impose order in cities. Urban planning is an unconventional means of changing social and spatial relations in ways that increase security in cities in conflict. As such, its importance is increasingly coming to be recognized through iconic projects and emblematic initiatives from cities such as Medellín. Examples of the ways that urban planning measures can enhance resilience go way beyond investments in more streetlights, or more police on the streets, to include more ambitious initiatives that bring people back into the downtown at night or introduce new infrastructure capable of integrating informal settlements with the rest of the city. Such measures are inspired by a desire to build connections among people, as much as designing space. Projects of urban renewal, for example, hold great potential when they engage a wide range of stakeholders in ways that strengthen community connections and foster community autonomy from the sources of insecurity. This involves both vertical connections with the public authorities that direct the urban revitalization (sometimes in partnership with the private sector) as well as horizontal connections across the various stakeholders.

But all urban renewal projects are not alike. In particular, those where physical areas are destroyed may be less able to forge connections with local stakeholders who see their homes or businesses as threatened. Another type of urban planning involves infrastructure provision, especially in the squatter settlements, or peripheral spaces of resilience. Urban upgrading is also an opportunity for the urban informal poor to forge connections with the state, especially if investment in their communities is implemented in a participatory manner in ways that foster connections within communities that concurrently become better connected physically and better serviced infrastructurally. In fact, investing in essential urban services in the informal settlements may be one means for the state to foster resilience.

### Building Resilience through Urban Redevelopment

Well-conceived urban renewal projects help forge vertical and horizontal connections in the community.

- Urban projects that preserve and foster local interactions through infrastructure and public space improvements will strengthen cooperation between citizens, businesses, and the state (e.g. Medellín, Hillbrow, Mexico City)
- Massive projects intended to fundamentally transform urban space are riskier because they displace or threaten longstanding residents and undermine local commerce (e.g. São Paulo).

#### *2.3.1 Urban Renovation and Resilience*

Urban renovation is a common occurrence within cities, and is understood to be the rehabilitation or renewal of an area. Two major categories into which urban renovation projects fall are those that are expansionist and those that are reductionist. Expansionist urban renovation creates more public space, housing, economic opportunities, and other spaces, and is often accomplished through a combination of construction and investment. Conversely, reductionist urban renovation destroys what are perceived to be harmful or blighted spaces.

The differing examples of urban redevelopment in downtown Mexico City and São Paulo were already discussed above. Urban renovation has been more successful in Mexico City, perhaps because the state has made itself more present even into the evening hours,

or maybe because of its partnerships with private businesses. Although there is also commercial activity in downtown São Paulo, the businesses close sharply at six o'clock in the evening when most shoppers depart, leaving the streets to the crack addicts and the mostly low-income population that resides in the area. There are cultural attractions in this part of the city, but clearly not enough to widen zones of resilience to broader areas. Urban renovation in São Paulo is largely reductionist, focusing on physical degradation as a reflection of insecurity rather than the source of insecurity itself coming from the presence of the crack addicts. These urban renovation projects are focused on removing blight, rather than on introducing a more constructive use of the space to fundamentally change the source of its insecurity. Because the sources of violence in downtown São Paulo are of a public health nature rather than merely a question of law and order or a matter of physical design, it seems that urban renovation needs to be complemented with social interventions. The displacement of the crack addicts to another neighborhood during the day does not prevent them from returning in the evening.

The inner-city neighborhood of Hillbrow in Johannesburg provides an example of expansionist urban renovation. The projects are community-led, meaning there is an understanding of the forces at work within the area, with fundamental issues of security, spatial dynamics and service provision are addressed through the renovations. One such project was the creation of a well-designed, well-maintained playground in a space that was previously connected to crime, violence, and drug trafficking, paired with a program to get children involved in activities off the streets.

### ***2.3.2 Infrastructure and Resilience***

Infrastructure provision is an important factor in resilience because it integrates cities and raises the standard of living. It also affirms state recognition of an area, deeming it legitimate and within the scope of its protection and sphere of governance. Two places where infrastructure has been a driver of resilience are the informal settlements of Medellín and São Paulo. These have long been spaces outside the realm of the state, separated not only by their illegal land tenure but also their dearth of infrastructure. Unlike cities such as Nairobi or Johannesburg where there has been more resistance to legally recognizing the informal settlements through the provision of infrastructure, most of the urban poor in Medellín and São Paulo have access to essential urban services such as electricity, water and sanitation, drainage, public transportation, public schools and health centers and more. Quality is still inadequate, but there is no question that urban upgrading projects have been one means to better integrate these cities.

One celebrated example in Medellín is the cable car connecting the informal settlements to the subway below. Beyond enhancing physical access, it has facilitated the integration of the city as a whole, because while far from complete, there are now more opportunities for interaction with residents of other parts of the city who visit the informal settlements to see the cable car as well as the famous library built in what was once one of the most dangerous parts of the city.

Less emblematic but of everyday importance is the urbanization of the periphery of São Paulo. Walking around the periphery today, visitors are invariably surprised to learn that they are in a slum. There are almost none of the iconic shacks that one often associates with urban informality. Instead of dilapidated housing without infrastructure and services, there are brick houses, tiled floors, constant electricity, piped water, cable television and Internet, among others. The main streets are paved, have stoplights, and are serviced by numerous buses that travel to the subway and all the way downtown. The urbanization of the periphery has not equaled resilience, but infrastructure provision has physically connected these peripheral spaces to the city and symbolically connected them to the state. There are several public schools and one public health center inside the community. There are also trucks from various utilities, with their workers extending services or maintaining existing lines on the streets. This contrasts strongly with informal settlements in other parts of the world where the state has refused to recognize them because of their illegal land tenure or ignored because many are made up of recent migrants to the city.

One example would be Nairobi, where the state does not recognize the informal settlements, making formalized service provision impossible. Instead, residents of these settlements are forced to fill the urban governance gap through a reconfiguration of existing systems. This reconfiguration takes on a number of different forms, including paying off authorities to redirect services and pirating services meant for formal neighborhoods. Because of their legislated informality, formal agreements about land tenure are almost non-existent, resulting in incredible instability in housing situations. Since these areas are not zoned nor formally planned there is no minimum standard of quality for the limited services that are informally provided and many residences are in poor condition.

The South African state has recognized its responsibilities to the informal settlements and has established a Free Basic Services policy that ensures each citizen access to electricity, water and sanitation, but until now, it has not enforced. Steps have also been made towards formalizing housing in the townships, but residents have largely been opposed to such measures as they consider the informal settlements to be largely temporary and

would rather see resources invested in providing economic opportunities and in increasing accessibility to enable them to move out of the townships more quickly.

## **2.4 Institutional and Relational Foundations of Resilience**

### ***2.4.1 Horizontal vs. Vertical Relations of Resilience***

While resilience is partly community autonomy from actors of violence, it is also about forging connections with the state and within the community. There are two main types of connections that can be fostered: horizontal relationships among community members or neighborhood stakeholders and vertical relationship with forces residing outside the physical confines of the community, including the state and armed actors and all the way up to international actors and institutions.

Horizontal and vertical relations are often forged together. With urban redevelopment pursued in the historical center of Mexico City, sustainable channels of communication were opened between the public planning authorities and the local actors, including civil society and commercial businesses. Medellín is also an example of the fostering of these multiple relations. Its participatory budgeting exercises are most known for enhancing vertical integration between communities and the state, but they are also interesting for fostering horizontal connections within communities. Community organizations that never before worked together are now collaborating on participatory budgeting because of much-needed financing from the city budget. Participatory budgeting is also reducing horizontal tensions inside the community because local actors can take their own initiatives about what is most needed and can call upon the state for financing.

There is no participatory budgeting in Managua. Instead there are Citizen Power Councils (CPCs) that are meant to enhance citizen participation and accountability with respect to public authorities, but in practice are treated as partisan actors. Unified CPCs can access significant funding and can impact local decision-making when they are strong enough to influence Sandinista party candidates for municipal office. In parts of the city where the opposition is in charge, however, there is often a refusal to recognize or cooperate with the CPC on the grounds that it is an illegitimate actor. This shows that fostering vertical ties to the state is difficult in cities that are politically polarized, which in turn contributes to horizontal fissures between communities that are seen as tied to different political actors.

Horizontal and vertical ties exist in Johannesburg and Nairobi but rarely together. In Nairobi, it has been difficult for the informal settlements to build vertical relations with a

state that is unable or unwilling to legally recognize these areas. In Johannesburg, vertical ties more common in areas of economic potential and horizontal ties are strongest in areas that are most removed from the state. Horizontal relationships in informal settlements develop from common visions for what their community can become as well as common identities, which are often difficult to establish in the peripheral townships where residence is seen as temporary.

Kigali is an example of a city with very strong horizontal and vertical ties. It is also a city that enjoys reduced rates of crime and violence as well as a well-defined relationship between communities and the state, though these relationships are somewhat restrictive given the centralization of the state and its extension into the daily lives of most communities, blurring the boundary between public and private spheres, potentially infringing on civil liberties. For this reason, the case of Kigali is also cautionary, in that it hints at the potentially restrictive ramifications on citizens of imposing vertical ties that are too strong.

#### ***2.4.2 Police as Enablers and Constrainers of Resilience***

An overview of the perceptions of police across the eight cities studied in this project suggests that there is still considerable progress to be made in security sector reform, particularly with respect to the police. Whether due to a lack of resources, a lack of accountability, or a lack of trustworthiness, the roles of the police are often outsourced to private security firms hired by private companies, communities, and in some cases, the police forces themselves. There is no getting around the fact that the police are often one of the main actors contributing to insecurity.

On the periphery of São Paulo, the history of police violence is one reason why the urban informal poor are more accepting of an alternative social order imposed by armed criminals. Although the police are present on the main street, they are almost universally despised, and they are said to only enter the community to collect their bribes from the drug traffickers. This is despite a long history of attempted police reform in São Paulo in the past several decades since the transition to democracy.

Police reform is a theme that is common to many cities. The security forces of Medellín have the longest community-policing program in Latin America, though the Human Rights Board is still inundated with reports of police abuses. In Johannesburg, much of the ineffectiveness of the police is due to overlaps between city and national security forces. The South Africa Police Service and the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department

work in some of the same areas without coordination and omit service to other areas altogether. There is also a dearth of training and resources. Because reliance on the police is so uncertain and ill-defined, private security firms are often hired to ensure safety in formal neighborhoods, but where they do not operate outside of the city center, such as in the informal settlements, mob justice has emerged as a primary means of enforcing justice and addressing matters of crime and violence.

The situation is similar in Nairobi's informal settlements, where most residents feel that the police should respond to violent crime, but a growing number of vigilantes are emerging to do the job. The police are not only disparaged because they are seen as failing to tackle criminality, but also despised because they are regarded as among the most corrupt institutions in many of these countries. The urban poor often bear the brunt of police repression because their communities are threatened by forced removal, often carried out by the police. In other cases, vigilantes are hired by slumlords and landholders to enforce rent increases and removal from units, and it is this practice of hired violence to enforce the alternative norms of informal settlements that typifies these ungoverned spaces.

As the most recently constituted police force among the cities studied, the Rwandan National Police provide an interesting case. The police have been consolidated into one unit as well as broadened to more parts of the country. They have received considerable training and they follow a strict anti-corruption practice so that those who take bribes have been tried in public and dismissed. Although the reform efforts have focused on changing people's perception of the security forces, especially important in the post-conflict and post-genocide context, they have achieved only limited success. A form of community-based policing has been rolled out in the urban areas, but because the security apparatus remains extremely centralized and tightly controlled by the central government, security sector reform has not led to an increased presence of the police in the communities or increased the autonomy of the police to prevent crime in these communities. In many cases, local communities shoulder the burden of crime control themselves, with local councils appointing representatives to monitor the security situation. Neighborhood watches have been systematized and community members instructed to report to the local security representative on suspicious persons in the area. Essentially, the police system has been reformed in a way that relies heavily on local participation. The core of the reform program places the emphasis on community policing capacities that are actually implemented and enforced informally—in other words, outside of the public authorities. This reliance on intense community policing has also served to reduce the barrier between the public and private. Since community members are largely charged with the task of reporting on suspicious or potentially harmful persons or activities, it is often the case that

private matters end up discussed in a community forum. Conversely, if an issue of crime or violence is sensitive, residents often feel that they cannot bring it to the community police for fear of this same practice of discussing issues of security in a public setting.

It seems the most trusted police force among the case studies is in Managua. The Somoza-era National Guard was totally reformed after the Sandinista victory into what are now the National Police. While they are under-resourced and confronting an increasingly volatile situation with the escalation of drug and gang-related violence emanating from its Central American neighbors, they still appear to have the trust of many citizens who see the police as partners rather than as enemies. The police are seen as the mediator in the relationship between citizens, security challenges and the state. Along with Costa Rica, the Nicaraguan police have rejected the regional trend towards hard-handed (*mano dura*) policies to combat narco-trafficking and organized crime. There are also efforts at community policing in Managua as a means of enhancing community power in partnerships with the Citizen Power Councils. Their role is mainly to coordinate local security strategies with actors on the ground, and they have been relatively successful in unified neighborhoods, while they are seen with distrust in places that are suspicious of government initiatives.

Finally, note the differences in the perceptions of the police in central versus peripheral areas. The police are often accepted and are called upon to provide security in the downtown area, where their presence on the street corners provides indications of security. Indeed, in downtown Mexico City the police were called upon to keep the city safe. However, among the urban poor, who are most often the victims of police violence, the presence of the police is much more controversial. Making the police more present, through community policing and participation at community meetings, is an important first step, but it is far from sufficient when the police themselves are seen as one of the main sources of insecurity.

Overall, police in almost every city were known for being corrupt and ineffective. Efforts to reform police that met with some amount of success tended to include more rigorous training of the police forces, coordination among different policing forces, and better definition of roles and responsibilities of the police forces. Large discrepancies existed in police service to central versus peripheral and formal versus informal areas, although police service was not necessarily always desirable. Increasing the potential for police to be enablers of resilience therefore is dependent on their establishment as a trustworthy and dependable force, for without that perception communities will continue to look elsewhere for enforcement of justice.

## **2.5 Individual vs. Community vs. City Resilience**

Within each city, resilience occurs at different scales. There is resilience that occurs at the level of the individual, most often comprised of day-to-day modifications of mobility and usage of the spaces of the city. There is also resilience that occurs at the level of the community, usually rooted in some form of neighborhood solidarity. The final scale of resilience is at the level of the city, and this resilience can only be truly accomplished through a combination of horizontal and vertical ties at the level of the community that are networked across urban space and aggregated to the scale of the city as a whole.

### ***2.5.1 Neighborhood Solidarity and Resilience***

Resilience is often forged at the community level through strong neighborhood identities, in spaces where organizing efforts, often led by key individual actors but successful at bringing diversity, have resulted in a sense of community solidarity and strength. In many cases, however, resilience at the community level is catalyzed by the state, originating both from a lack of state support or in response to state encouragement to engage the community in solving issues of violence. Resilience reaching at least the level of the neighborhood is essential, for if it remains at the level of the individual it is constrained in both scale and scope. While individual resilience paired with neighborhood resilience can have tremendous impact, individual resilience on its own has significant limitations and cannot influence the larger spatial dynamics necessary to push back against agents of violence.

In Managua, when asked why some neighborhoods have higher crime rates and more security challenges than others, the answer is frequently that the more dangerous spaces are also the least organized. These common identities have allowed communities to claim or reclaim a sense of security in their immediate surroundings, often with the support of the police and other state actors. The neighborhoods that are better organized are seen by residents as well as outsiders as less prone to gang activity and other types of criminality. One important means of forging community solidarity, especially in politically contentious Nicaragua, is by political party affiliation. The Citizen Power Councils are the primary means that the Sandinistas have fostered social and political organization at the neighborhood level. Those who actively oppose the Sandinistas often see the councils as signs of President Ortega's designs on dictatorship, intended to create networks of party operatives at the neighborhood level tasked with doling out patronage while maintaining community surveillance. Consider the case of the Los Laureles Norte district. Although not necessarily an opposition stronghold, is less unified because many of its residents are migrants from other parts of the country. Because it is not well-established, its access to urban services is minimal and infrastructure remains less developed than in other parts of

the city. The local council is highly politicized, making the implementation of infrastructure projects difficult to realize. Instead of using political challenges to confront local problems such as rising crime, the Residents' Association has dealt directly with the police to increase their presence in the community. There have also been efforts to focus on at-risk populations, namely young people and women (as domestic violence is extremely high). While these small-scale initiatives have produced small signs of success, they are hindered by the politicization of government spending. Managua underlines how community solidarity can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, a more unified neighborhood has more autonomy to resist the actors of violence; on the other hand, community solidarity is often influenced by outside forces such as the politicians in power. Often the state is an essential component of forging community partnerships or increasing intra-communal tensions.

In Johannesburg, neighborhood solidarity varies between the inner-city neighborhood of Hillbrow and the peripheral township of Diepsloot. Though very diverse, Hillbrow residents share a common vision that their community could reemerge as the economic and cultural hub that it was prior to the white flight of the mid to late 1990s. Many residents are from families whose residence went back multiple generations, and their common identity is well-established. Conversely, Diepsloot is a relatively new community, having been established less than twenty years prior, and therefore lacking the history and identity. It is also perceived as a transitive community, a place where people live until they can improve their situation by moving out. There is no common goal of improving the neighborhood and no impetus to unify its residents. The difference in resilience between the two neighborhoods is stark, with individual and community-based resilience in Hillbrow, while individuals in Diepsloot simply do enough to survive long enough to leave.

### ***2.5.2 From Single Agent Actions to Multi-stakeholder Collaborations***

The translation from single agent actions to multi-stakeholder collaborations is perhaps the most important process to understand of all. The first step in this process is the translation from individual to community resilience, and it must be understood what individual actions enable this translation and which constrain it. From the cases studied in this report, it is important that individuals that share a common identity strive towards a common goal are able to create horizontal ties within their community that enable resilience at a higher level. Individuals that act purely out of self-preservation and lack hope to function at a level beyond the day-to day, as seen in the township of Diepsloot in Johannesburg, are unable to translate their strategies of resilience to the level of the community, and instead only reinforce fragmentation of the neighborhood.

The next step in this process is from community resilience to city resilience, which speaks to the creation of vertical ties. Neighborhoods in Managua and Johannesburg that are unified are able to command a certain level of autonomy that they can leverage to either act with or against the state. It is thus necessary to align the goals of the community and the state to allow for the movement of resilience along this axis, and this translation can only be accomplished through a sort of symbiosis in which both communities and the state benefit from such a relationship. The state should provide necessary services and resources to communities, while the communities should aid the state in managing and interacting with residents of the city. Through this process of translating individual resilience to community resilience and community resilience to city resilience, individual actions and multi-stakeholder collaborations are able to operate within the same continuum and are able to benefit each other.




Figure 2. **Resilience Matrix:** Categories of resilience as a function of individual vs. collective efficacy and state linkages



# THE ANALYTICS OF RESILIENCE





## THE ANALYTICS OF RESILIENCE

Evidence drawn from our case studies and summarized in the preceding chapter leads to several conclusions:

- Certain *mixed land-use locations* in a city seem to host more successful strategies for containing or reducing violence; *falling crime rates* can mean a re-establishment of criminal hegemony rather than its defeat.
- *Strong social relations at the level of the neighborhood* strengthen a community's coping capacities.
- Although private sector allies are often critical in strengthening citizen's adaptations to violence, the locations where this is possible are limited and thus *public sector support is also central to positive resilience*.
- The larger *urban spatial and political context* can set serious limits on both citizen and state capacities in these regards.

Together, these findings suggest that as a concept and a goal, resilience is less widespread and more multi-faceted than is frequently recognized. It can entail a variety of strategies and scales of action, involving different combinations of actors, and it is highly contingent on certain locations or land-use conditions.

### 3.1. Theorizing and Historicizing Resilience

All of the cities studied for this report have evidenced some degree of resilience in the face of violence, with a wide range of actors and institutions managing to cope even in the most fragile conditions. For example, despite the terrible urban conditions in Nairobi—a city with extreme violence, an ineffective public sector, limited urban servicing, a high degree of social exclusion, and deep mistrust in governing institutions—residents manage to survive and adapt. In São Paulo as well, even citizens in drug-lord dominated neighborhoods have made some headway in normalizing daily life, although not to the same degrees in the center and periphery of the city and not yet in a fully sustainable way. Given the sheer tenacity of citizens in dire violence-dominated situations like these, it is tempting to think of resilience in relatively simple terms: as a property of individuals who thus would only need more personal or family support, capacity building, crime prevention knowledge, or government investment in urban renovations so as to provide them with new conditions, skills, and/or resources to strengthen their resolve.

Our research suggests, however, that individual and community adaptations in such fragile environments can make conditions worse, if their adaptive responses fuel violence. This is most likely to occur if citizens do not have institutional allies in their efforts or

because the larger urban and political context works against constructive community actions undertaken by citizens in tandem with both the private sector and the state. After all, individuals have little alternative but to cope with chronic violence—sometimes on their own, sometimes with government assistance, and sometimes by allying with the perpetrators of violence. But the outcomes are not always the same. The extent to which their coping strategies have created spaces of relative safety and sustainable security appears to have been contingent on the peculiarities of urban context, with certain types of neighborhoods, certain forms of collective organization, and certain land-use conditions serving as enablers or constrainers of positive forms of resilience. The question is: what are these conditions, and how might a better understanding of histories of urbanization help us theorize the likelihood of resilience?

In Chapter 2, where the patterns of resilience were discussed, evidence suggests that positive resilience depends on simultaneous, strong horizontal and vertical relations that tie citizens to each other and the state. Also significant was the fact that such multifaceted connections were more likely in centrally located areas drawing steady flows of visitors where residential and commercial activities were mixed. But above and beyond these structural conditions, resilience was informed by the extent to which citizens and communities were inspired by *hope* in a potentially better future. This is where Nairobi stood apart even from Johannesburg, not to mention Medellín, with the latter's prior successes in confronting violence inspiring further citizen optimism.

Accordingly, as the analytic focus moves from individuals to communities, and then to the social and spatial conditions under which they enable resilience, one other important element has been added to the mix: the role that *community views of the police* have played in sustaining local capacities for urban resilience.

Our case studies have shown that police are quite often seen as part of the problem of violence, with perhaps the main exceptions being Mexico City, where a new police force working with local entrepreneurs and citizens has generated a sense of solidarity, and Managua, where good police-community relations led citizens to feel empowered and relatively resilient in the face or the threat of violence. Of course, in Mexico City these views of the police do not transcend the local neighborhood for a variety of institutional reasons; and in Managua there are historical reasons for why the Managua police have been seen in a better light, owing to the demise of the Somoza-allied security apparatus and the emergence of a new people's police. But whatever the peculiarities of Nicaraguan history, the fact that in both Managua and Mexico City we see citizens embracing the police, even if only in limited areas of the city, is a key finding that should inspire creative

thinking about actions that could help enable similar outcomes in other places, even those where relationships with the police come with much greater baggage.

In each of our cases, views of the police were central, whether as a potentially positive agent who might partner with individuals and communities against other violent actors or as the enemy. There is also the case of Kigali, which in a way straddles the two types. There, the relative absence of the police from daily community activities forced citizens to develop strategies of self-policing that formed the basis for a certain proactive resilience. Yet at the same time the fact that state police were not active in local communities on an everyday basis may have helped limit overt feelings of state distrust, thus making citizens more willing to cooperate with the state in larger security matters. Thus the concept of *trust*, as applied to police and even the state, is as important as the concept of hope in understanding capacities for resilience. Indeed, while in Johannesburg it was sheer hope that the new South African police might be able to help communities confront violence that was empowering enough to have sustained a degree of individual resilience, in Nairobi it was precisely the opposite—a deep distrust in the state and its coercive apparatus—that squelched both individual and community optimism and drove citizens to embrace of negative adaptation strategies driving the cycle of violence. Much of this owed to citizens’ desires to take security matters into their own hands, often through vigilantism and other destructive acts, which seemed a likely adaptive recourse in environments where the security and administration of justice systems were seen to be flawed or untrustworthy.

If trust in the police is a key pre-requisite for enabling positive resilience, it becomes important to know what enables or constrains such views. Some will argue that trust in the police is essentially a function of state legitimacy, and that transforming citizens’ views of the police involves good governance or public education, and this may be partly true. But our case studies and research more generally suggests that citizens’ views of the police are deeply tied to histories of urbanization, particularly to patterns of uneven urban development and the history of the state’s involvement in the slums, factors that have interacted with other local conditions to affect patterns of resilience. If we want to have a better understanding of why certain cities or sites within them are prone to certain patterns of resilience, and if we want to strategically identify those conditions that may constrain positive resilience, then policymakers need a better understanding of the *history of the state’s involvement in a neighborhood and/or city*, and how and why such activities have laid the foundation for distrust, as well as for the emergence of particular forms and adaptations to violence.

### **3.2 The State in the Slums: Historical Legacies and their Implications for Resilience**

In most cities of the developing world, government actions were informed by the assumption that development occurred through the conquest and re-shaping of “untamed” space in the service of social and spatial integration. At the level of the city, such aims were manifest in the development of urban plans with a strict spatial order. Different parts of the city were not only preserved for different social and economic functions, but there was also little programmatic room for any “pre-modern” mixing of land uses or informal activities in those areas designated as sites for a modern economic and political order. Such dictates often re-directed citizens to distant areas of the city where informality was tolerated and marginality flourished. Planners frequently responded to the problems of social and spatial exclusion by extending modern services to ever more populations and neighborhoods – usually through state investments in workers’ housing, transport, and services.

Yet fiscal constraints usually meant that such goods could not be provided for all urban residents. This was particularly the case in cities with rapid urbanization rates. When steady rural-urban migration combined with explosive demographic growth to create a city that spilled beyond its existent infrastructure, large swathes of the urban population began to live relatively informally, often in “no man’s lands” outside the social, spatial, and political bounds of the more formal parts of the city, where major investments in infrastructure and leading economic activities were located. Whether seen as marginal or informal, residents of these areas were ignored because the local government’s concerns with building a modern and more prosperous city meant that peripheral neighborhoods became invisible to city officials. Their failure to recognize these areas as part of the formal city further justified the explosion of neighborhoods without services, without formal property rights, lacking in political recognition, and with only minimal access to the goods and services of the modern or formal city. To the extent that these were the areas where new migrants tended to locate, it also meant that these peripheral neighborhoods were often divided on the basis of political, ethnic, or even cultural proclivities. These patterns not only set the basis for social and spatial separation rather than integration; they also reinforced the view that those who lived in the informal city or marginal neighborhoods were second-class citizens not morally worthy of inclusion or recognition, whose urban lifestyles and practices both stained and challenged the larger aims of modern urban progress.

This description well captures the history of all our cities, but it has made its greatest and most lasting mark on Nairobi, São Paulo, Karachi, and Johannesburg, our four most

violent and least positively resilient cities. The cities of Medellín and Managua also share a similar past, but currently their situations have been mediated by active urban policies to break down the distinction between the formal and informal city, and in Managua almost complete urban neglect, which has meant that even the formal city has not been well-developed or privileged. Of our cases, Mexico City has departed most from this history, with both political and geographical conditions linked to its status as capital city that have insured a large array of investments in real estate and commerce even in the urban periphery. Accordingly, our cities have brought distinctive urban developmental histories to the table that have helped establish the land-use foundations for resilience in some but not others.

### ***3.2.1 From Spatial Exclusion to Informal Governance***

The local state's failure to formally recognize the social and economic value of peripheral areas, along with its unwillingness to embrace the growth of informal neighborhoods as a justifiable response to hardship, often led to repression, if not flat-out destruction of entire neighborhoods by police and other arms of the state. Even without actual bulldozing, the constant threat of displacement fueled community instability and new forms of clientelism that brought citizens to politically depend on informal community leaders to mediate between them and the state. In addition to calling into question the strong horizontal networks among community residents, dependency on local strongmen also reinforced vertical networks of authority, whether formal or informal, built around the power of those who could protect and or accommodate residents in marginal areas. All this reinforced the power of informal and illicit "leaders" who grounded their legitimacy and reinforced their authority by controlling informal territories and activities within them for their own gain.

Whether through direct protection of citizens and physical territory, or through cooptation and extortion, these local strongmen built their power by offering an alternative version of informal governance that, paradoxically, further limited the power and capacity of the formal state to integrate these spaces of informal urbanism into the plans and projects associated with the rest of the city. It was precisely such dynamics that created spaces for drug lords and other illicit actors to increase their political authority and economic power. This led to forms of informal governance that often stood in opposition to that imposed by elected state officials on the formal areas of the city, which were not implemented or enforced in areas of informality. With purely local leaders controlling activities in informal settlements, many peripheral areas of the city remained under-developed and under-invested and without standardized access to employment and livelihood prospects.

This took many forms. One, as planners sought to build the modern city, they concentrated attention on infrastructure and services, leaving questions of jobs and employment to the market. This was particularly the case with the array of physical interventions that were intended to lay the foundation for citizens' entry into the world of work through the provision of shelter for new laboring classes coming from the countryside and /or building roads that could facilitate urban labor mobility. And although planning interventions prioritized the formal city, a similar logic also dominated the infrastructural development of informal areas, where priority was given to housing (in order to ensure formal property rights) and transport. Concerns about what type of employment opportunities would be offered within informal areas were almost completely absent, including efforts to develop and foster a thriving commercial sector in these same locations – mainly because commercial activities and growth were considered to be principal activities for downtown areas and other well-differentiated zones in the formal city. This meant that even when informal areas received infrastructural investments that paralleled or linked them to the formal city, the local economies of informal settlements remained highly under-developed or under-invested, at least in terms of state programs and policies, thus laying the foundation for continued poverty and dependence on non-state actors.

In such an environment, the government's failure to achieve full employment goals for the working poor and extend social services beyond the formal sector (particularly as mediated by the demands from organized labor), meant that for those living in informal settlements the built environment or physical infrastructure of these neighborhoods became the site of self-employment and economic production. This was best seen in the buying and selling of access to physical services (housing, water, electricity) as a means of reproduction. Paradoxically then, given the neglect of informal areas, it was the un- and under- employed poor residents of informal neighborhoods who actually were in the best position to use built environmental assets as a source of reproducing or generating their economic livelihoods. But because such activities and exchanges were always conducted outside the law, these same practices reinforced and strengthened the illegal market for urban services, thus laying the foundation for the emergence of illicit and illegal actors. To the extent that informal political leaders based their local legitimacy on their capacities to protect illegal or illicit markets, both residents and informal leaders needed each other, further tying them together in alternative reciprocities that distanced them from the formal city and from the rule of law.

In the context of these developments, violence flowered, as did the political power of violence perpetrators. This dynamic not only pushed the state to impose military and /or coercive actions on these neighborhoods, which served to further diminish local

citizen views of and trust in the police. It also drove citizens more into the hands of local strongmen, a situation that put a cap on citizen capacities to act independently from them. Both sets of developments limited citizen resilience. Among our cases, these dynamics continue to dominate key neighborhoods in Nairobi and São Paulo, thus explaining the negative and equilibrium forms of resilience seen respectively in those cities. They also dominated Medellín for years, until more recent efforts by the state to simultaneously pacify the drug lords and work independently with community organizations through new urban programs began to break this cycle of citizen-drug lord complicity and overall distrust in the state and police. In contrast, citizen organizations in Managua and Mexico City have been able to build some social, political, or economic distance from violence perpetrators, either through direct connections with the police or by allying with the private sector to sustain other forms of livelihood.

### ***3.2.2 Informality, Built Environmental Assets, and Diminished State Capacity***

The existence of built environmental assets and alternative sources of economic livelihood in informal neighborhoods not only produced new forms of political allegiance between citizens and perpetrators of violence, but also limited the local state from establishing a rule of law that could be effectively used to keep violence under control. Some of this owed to the ways illicit actors at the community level cemented their authority by mediating relations between citizens and the state, thus bringing the state into complicity with informal governance arrangements. Yet diminished state capacity was also owed to the fragmentation of state authority, with certain arms of the state focused on building the formal city, others engaged with the management of scarcity in the informal city, and still others eluding the physical aspects of urbanization and prioritizing employment and social policy more generally. In most instances, local authorities took care of the physical aspects of urbanization by building housing, roads, and offering services in formal areas of the city, ceding control over most social and economic initiatives to national authorities, and sending in the police – both local and national – to isolate and manage populations in the informal city.

This division of labor undermined capacities for more coordinated urban development that might have contributed to a better social, spatial, and economic integration of cities. With little coordination between the programs and priorities of the state at the level of the city, or between local and national authorities, informal community leaders had even more leeway to play off different arms of the state. For example, local authorities may have sought to provide housing to informal areas, but without control over employment or macroeconomic policy, they were not in a position to ensure that residents had the

income potential to afford home ownership, nor were city finances sufficient to pick up the slack by offering full subsidies to the unemployed or under-employed. As a result, most governments further tolerated high degrees of informality out of necessity. Such developments not only served as the basis for empowering police to intervene as the regulators of this informal negotiation between residents, local strongmen, and their patronage allies in the state, but also provided the basis for rent-seeking, impunity, and other activities that limited citizen trust in police as the guarantors of security and the rule of law. The existence of patronage relations in which local strongmen mediated between citizens and the state also undermined the horizontal relations among the community, thus increasing citizens' dependence on political leaders who could broker service provision and divergent community claims and weakening their ability to act independently.

Local police also reinforced informal authority at the local level, mediating between formal and the informal politics. Police's involvement in many low income or informal neighborhoods may initially have owed to the state's interests in controlling populations and space, as well as their desire to impose spatial order and social values on marginal populations. But once inside the physical confines of these informal spaces, police tended to accommodate and reinforce the informal order. Indeed, police frequently worked with, negotiated, and extorted vulnerable residents—particularly those who needed protection in the face of urban regulations associated with formal dictates of urban governance and ended up in competition with informal leaders over who would control local protection rackets. Over time, this led to longstanding networks between police and local leaders, including those involved in illicit activities, with these relationships growing stronger and more nefarious as the ranks of the informal economy expanded and the commodities traded became more illicit. This was especially the case when the markets for extortion and protection involved goods traded across metropolitan, national, and transnational supply chains, primarily because movement in space was more costly to insure and difficult to protect.

In those environments where police protected criminals more than residents, and where the scale of illicit trade expanded beyond the community's boundaries, violence was much more likely. Police complicity in illegal activities meant that the rule of law was all but non-existent and such an environment produced high resident mistrust of police, thus leaving local informal authorities more scope to control social and spatial dynamics. The more the networks of protection, extortion, and trade spread beyond the community (itself a function of the local state's incapacity to keep the informal city isolated and controlled) the greater the sums of money exchanged and the more diffuse the networks of exchange. This in turn provided a range of new opportunities for rent seeking in which violence was often

a means for asserting authority. Out of this complex system of determinations, chronic urban violence was born. So too were the urban conditions that made it difficult for citizens to work independently from or against the perpetrators of violence, whether in the form of local strongmen or in the form of police and other arms of the state who tolerated – and at times benefited from – these historical relations of complicity.

Again, given this history, it is not difficult to understand why certain of our cities – and certain neighborhoods within them – have been thwarted in their efforts to break the vicious cycle of illicit or informal complicities that generate violence, and thus innovate more positive resilience. Those cities where the formal/informal divide is most clearly manifested in physical space, where the urban built environment becomes the principal asset for informal income generation and non-state forms of local political power, and where police or state toleration of such conditions continues are the cities that have been hard pressed to break out of the cycle of violence, a state of affairs most evidenced by the cases of Nairobi, São Paulo, and Karachi. Those cities where there are conscious efforts to break down the formal/informal divide through urban and social policies, where low-income neighborhoods generate resources through formal and licit more than informal and illicit activities, and where police abuse of power is less tolerated have been able to pursue strategies of resilience. Here we see the cases of Mexico City and Medellín, as well as Managua, although in the latter instance the lack of urban investments for the city as a whole – rather than proactive social and urban policy – may be partly responsible for this outcome.

Likewise, in cities where we see varied patterns of resilience associated with different neighborhoods, as with the case of Johannesburg, the pattern still holds. The neglected, peripheral areas of the city—with new and vulnerable migrants like Diepsloot, where informal activities sustain a strong illicit economy, and where police have not yet shown themselves to be capable of upholding social and spatial order in the face of organized crime—forms of negative resilience such as vigilantism and replacement of community activism with individualized strategies of resilience are more likely to prevail. In contrast, the social and built environmental changes in Hillbrow that have afforded more formal investments in the urban economy, coupled with the area's physical centrality in the city, and the development of new citizen-police interactions to monitor the activities there and in surrounding areas have helped promote a form of resilience that holds the potential to generate optimism and sustained community engagement against the forces and conditions of violence.

### 3.3 Community Foundations of Resilience

Despite the role that histories of the urban built environment, informality, and policing play in enabling or constraining resilience, there is still the question about citizens themselves. What makes it possible for residents to respond assertively, or to push back against these forces and conditions? This is also part of the story of resilience. In many of our cities there exist communities where a strong sense of solidarity has been forged, partly because families have lived together for generations organizing around precisely the conditions that have brought violence, including service scarcities, police corruption, and organized crime. All this suggests the importance of recognizing the value of community organization and the conditions under which the development of strong horizontal bonds at the level of the community can tie residents together in ways that can enable forms of resilience.

Yet the role of community bonds and other forms of social capital in the production of resilience is complex. Strong social relations at the level of the locality do not always bring positive results, as we have seen in the case of São Paulo, where the strong linkages between residents and drug traffickers forged over decades of state neglect helped sustain more negative forms of resilience. That is, sometimes the history of strong community connections leads to a situation where citizens support illicit leaders; sometimes out of fear and sometimes out of rational self-interest; but in ways that make it difficult for the police and the state to eliminate the perpetrators of violence in a certain neighborhood. For example, one of the reasons that state-led efforts to reduce violence by commercial upgrading in Cracolândia were not as successful as the local government would have liked, and as we saw in the Mexico City case, owed not just to mistrust in the state. Strong community bonds built on citizen cooperation forged during years of state neglect were so strong that this particular redevelopment project met with strong opposition from original residents and longstanding businesses – both formal and informal but not necessarily illicit – who were concerned about displacement. Given their strong connections and interdependences built over years as state neglect forced them to rely on each other for problem solving, local businesses and some community residents pushed back against any revitalization project that might evict them from their homes.

Even so, one cannot assume that living in an informal settlement or neglected part of the city will automatically translate into the creation of strong community bonds. In many parts of Johannesburg, Karachi, and Nairobi, where a much larger number of informal settlements contain new residents or migrants, the same bonds of community solidarity are not as evident. Some of this owes to their recent arrival, but ethnic and political tensions within the community also have prevented a sense of communal solidarity.

To the extent that a certain degree of community volition to fight against the perpetrators of violence has been shown to be key aspect of resilience, it is critical to understand how *urban settlement histories, current political, ethnic or social relations, and other relevant local conditions have enabled or constrained community capacities to unite and work together* in the face of chronic violence. Along with attitudes toward the police and the state, the capacity to develop strong community connections at the level of the neighborhood is a third critical factor that emerges as analytically significant in enabling citizens to push positively adapt to situations of chronic violence and strengthen resilience.

### ***3.3.1 Forms of Social Capital, Spatial Context, and Community Cohesion***

Both the research here and general experience suggest that there are many ways to develop strong social bonds among citizens, with the activities of multilateral organizations and NGOs who build local community capacity through targeted local projects high on the list of such tried and true actions. But the persistence of chronic violence is often contingent on the capacity of violent actors to control and/or enter into a community, meaning that in order to push back against violence, community cohesion is essential. That is, a community's capacity to mount an offensive or defensive stance against the perpetrators of violence will be affected by how divided or united its residents are, not just in political, ethnic, or social terms, but also in spatial terms. This realization, plus the findings from our case studies, does far more than underscore the importance of identifying bonds of community solidarity, a finding that is far from unusual in the study of community capacity. It also suggests that one must understand whether and how community members connect to each other in physical space and on scales larger than their own street or individual residence.

One way to frame this is through the concepts of “bonding and bridging capital,” ideas discussed in recent work by Robert Putnam and Xavier de Souza Briggs (2004). Our research shows that those cities with the best examples of positive resilience—Medellín, Managua, the Historic Centre in Mexico City and Orangi Township in Karachi—not only counted on strong community organizations capable of pushback against violence, but that their capacities to do so derived partly from the fact that the programs they pursued (urban renovation, participatory budgeting, community-led reconstruction, collectively administered water and sanitation projects, etc.) fostered strong horizontal linkages among a number of constituencies extended in physical space. The logic here partly parallels the work of economic sociologist Mark Granovetter (1973), whose argument about “the strength of weak ties” suggests that a diversification and multiplicity of social connections can provide the basis for more effective mobilization and action. The more

“bridging” social connections in an area, the easier it is for wider swathes of citizens to be united against other local-level perpetrators of violence, such as drug lords in the case of São Paulo, whose scale of operation usually transcend a single street or neighborhood site. When widely extended bridging connections also build on bonding connections by counting on the involvement of citizen or community groups with a deep history in a given location, there is strengthened social and spatial scope for citizens to push back against violent actors.

The sheer existence of a wide array of civil society organizations in a given locale does not necessarily translate into the bridging and bonding connections we are highlighting here, precisely because it can just as easily lead to fragmentation and lack of coordination among citizens as it can unite residents behind a common purpose. In fact, in situations of chronic violence there may be a paradox at work: those places with the most egregious violence and/or vulnerable urban conditions may host the largest number of active NGOs and multilateral organizations. But the over-involvement of too many aid or capacity building institutions at a local scale may actually fragment the citizenry in spatial or organizational terms, thus reducing horizontal or bridging relations across community spaces and in turn weakening autonomous community capacities for resilience. One way to counteract this possibility is to buttress horizontal connections both socially and spatially. Such an objective may not always mesh well with the more sectoral approach that is often taken with capacity building or program development, seen in both the cases of Nairobi and Johannesburg, in which organizations tend to focus on social or economic or governance issues without tying these objectives to creating horizontal relations among various citizen constituencies in an extended by identifiable physical space. But any headway on building community connections is positive, and extending them in space may be a way to strengthen their utility.

Indeed, what also is significant about the cases of Mexico City, Medellín, Managua, and Orangi Town in Karachi is the fact that the bridging and bonding connections that enabled positive resilience were built around a common concern with their neighborhood as a territorially identifiable physical environment, a posture suggesting that community was being defined as much in spatial as in social terms, and that horizontal connections between multiple actors who lived in the same physical area would be necessary, no matter their social, political, or economic identity and status. This stands in contrast to the situation in Johannesburg, where citizens in Diepsloot had almost no allegiance to their given territorial location and physical environment, expressing a sense that it was a temporary site of residence to be abandoned as soon as time would permit. Of course, the poverty and neglect of the area, coupled with its reputation as a way station for new

migrants, did not help foster a sense of community solidarity. Even so, the relationship between community as a physical and a social construct is a complicated one and it can enable as well as constrain the emergence of social capital.

In the cases of Nairobi and Lyari in Karachi, ethnic and political divisions made it difficult to build horizontal relationships among all residents at the scale of the community as a physical site. In the absence of these bridging connections, however, bonding connections among the different ethnic groups strengthened even more. The result was a more socially divided community, built on deep bonds of ethnic allegiance but without strong horizontal networks of solidarity that could be mobilized in a constructive way to fight back against the perpetrators of violence. In this environment, citizens were more readily pulled into direct “bonding” relations with the violence perpetrators, particularly when they used ethnic identity or political allegiance as a source of unity, thus further dividing the community.

Yet, what can often divide communities could also bring them together. The legacy of the Sandinista revolution is actually the basis for resilience in many neighborhoods in Managua. While current political loyalties are contentious, there remains a certain “collective efficacy” of community cohesion, trust, and shared expectations for action. Collective efficacy is manifest in the concepts of *poder ciudadano* (citizen power) and *poder del pueblo* (community power), both ideas with strong roots in the revolution, but today illustrated in the slogans displayed on numerous posters and billboards around the city as well as in radio and television. It is echoed in discussions with residents, even those frustrated with the contemporary politicization of community organizing efforts, because they drew a distinction between current government rhetoric about citizen power and “*el verdadero Sandinismo*” (true Sandinismo), which they describe as an ideology of community cooperation irrespective of political loyalties.

One way to summarize these findings in an operational statement about the bonds of community solidarity and resilience is to suggest that *strong horizontal relationships that bridge multiple constituencies in physical space can help explain the extent to which the community has sufficient relative autonomy from the perpetrators of violence to undertake sustainable and positive strategies of resilience*. Of course, no community is fully united. But some have shown greater capacity for “bridging and bonding capital” at the level of the neighborhood, built on an array of horizontal connections between residents and local organizations, as well as among local organizations.

### *3.3.2 Urbanization Patterns and Community-based Social Capital*

How and whether this bridging and bonding becomes possible depends on many factors, but most relate again to the history of urbanization. When faced with a burgeoning metropolis with a growing informal sector, authorities in cities of the developing world have turned to an array of urban planning projects and arrangements (including sites and services; squatter upgrading; land regularization) that, because of the rapidly growing demand, rarely served more than a fraction of the population. When implemented slowly albeit steadily, even the most successful programs tended to fragment informal settlements into multiple “housing classes,” e.g., those with and without government-supported housing or land-tenure programs. Imposition of property rights, without view to larger social or economic consequences of home ownership or its large impact on solidarity within the community, led to social divisions within the community between those with and without title. It also pushed those without title to become more dependent on local power brokers, even as those with title became more linked to formal governing institutions. The existence of multiple housing classes in the ever-expanding under-serviced fringes of the city, itself built on the uneven patterns of land tenure and property rights, further empowered those local community leaders who wielded the capacity to mediate between the informal and informal systems of service provision. This fragmented the capacity for bridging capital at the level of the community as a whole while deepening bonding social capital between citizens and local strongmen.

The ability or inability to build bridging relationships also has to do with the social, political, and class heterogeneity of a place. Evidence suggests that in addition to a community’s history of urbanization, there are other clearly identifiable urban factors, including the degree of land use heterogeneity, that interact with other historical and social conditions common to violence-prone cities to serve as a starting point for understanding the potential for bonding and bridging relationships. A residential area with little land use heterogeneity may have more class homogeneity, thus supporting strong bonding capital but less bridging capital. In contrast, a downtown area with more land use heterogeneity may host a more class heterogeneous population and a multiplicity of activities, thus having more possibilities for bridging capital but not bonding capital if such activities prevent longstanding residential settlement. Ultimately, our cases suggest that it is the combination of both that seems to bring most resilience, as evidenced in the case of Mexico City’s historical center, where both bridging and bonding relationships build on each other in an ever-widening physical space to strengthen and expand the actors and institutions involved in local crime-fighting activities, and by so doing sustain a degree of resilience.

Ultimately, the question of how to create or strengthen a strong and united community

capable of positive action is an extraordinarily complex one, with our cases showing many different paths to this outcome. In the high-crime Iztapalapa neighborhood of Mexico, a residence-based social organization (*Unidad Habitacional Nuevo Atzlan*) used shared political sensibilities to foster strong horizontal networks among its residents, helping establish a self-policed physical environment that was quite secure. Social networking allowed for collective vigilance and sustained monitoring of residential property, with collective trust so great that residents felt free to leave their doors unlocked. Absolutely key to these successes was the fact that a social, spatial, and political sense of community united residents. However, because the site for these overlaps was so small—a single housing project—it did not directly translate to all residents of Iztapalapa. This contrasts with the case of Managua, where we saw a similarly strong set of overlapping social and spatial identities, but at a more scaled up neighborhood level, thus providing an effective basis for enhancing community security.

The Iztapalapa case is interesting because it is one of the few in our study where partisan political connections played a role in generating positive resilience. This was true particularly in the UHNA housing project, where residents formed part of a political movement (*Frente Zapatista*) with much larger goals. Such objectives helped strengthen the horizontal connections among residents, but to a certain degree they would also be considered a form of bonding rather than bridging capital if they were to remain confined to this very circumscribed residential site. The fact that this project was situated in a larger electoral district dominated by a political party with a similar ideological orientation ensured that residents of the UHNA were in a position to connect to the rest of the neighborhood, thus creating the potential for strong horizontal relations and united community action with respect to security.

The issue here is not so much that shared political sensibilities will always strengthen a community's capacities for positive resilience, but that certain forms of allegiance or loyalty—political and otherwise—can be very helpful in producing a combination of both bridging and bonding capital, thus strengthening community unity and the capacity for resilience. In his work on violence in Brazil, Arias (2006) has shown the usefulness of networks built on various allegiances in overcoming the complicated entrenchment of urban violence. Rather than hierarchies, “networks are voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal [though not exclusively equal] patterns of communication and exchange...” As institutions, networks are based on flexible links among component parts that work to achieve mutual interests. Groups work together collaboratively to accomplish what they would not be able to accomplish in either closed formal organizations or in diffuse market relations. In other words, when groups need to maintain trust and cultivate enduring

stable contacts but where it is impossible or inconvenient to form strict hierarchical structures, networks will provide an effective alternative form of organization” (Ibid: 39-40). While informal networks are central components of the perpetuation of violence, namely through lucrative connections between criminal groups and the state, the effectiveness of alternative networks coalescing at the level of the neighborhood can also serve as an important point of departure from the regular, violent coercion.

As a basis for network coalescence, political ideology certainly can play this role, but does not always do so, suggesting that to better understand the role of political loyalties in strengthening bonds within communities, one also must take into account the governance context in which horizontal community relationships unfold. That is, that although positive resilience is partly grounded in a community’s capacity to act relatively autonomously from perpetrators of violence, this capacity is often generated as much from *without* as within. And this would include through strong connections with the state, whose actions can unite a community through programmatic efforts and/or help provide the tools battle against the perpetrators of violence. In fact, this is exactly what we found in Medellín and downtown Mexico City, where it was precisely those neighborhoods that had good connections with local government that were able to forge some of the strongest horizontal ties among community members, in part because the local government channeled resources into collective or neighborhood-based activities that provided incentives for horizontal cooperation among different local constituencies. The possibility thus emerges that those neighborhood or community-based organizations that work with the state, thus developing vertical bonds with local authorities, may have an increased likelihood of strengthening both bridging and bonding capital, and in turn enhancing resilience through the formation of both *horizontal and vertical* ties.

### **3.4 The State as Enabler of Relative Community Autonomy**

We noted earlier that the history of state involvement in the slums had frequently served to divide communities and empower local strongmen in ways that often sustain violence. The foregoing discussion also suggests that states can strengthen community bonds and by so doing, play a potentially positive role in enabling community push back against the perpetrators of violence. The state’s capacity in this regard rests in the many different roles and functions that local authorities have at their hands when it comes to servicing and governing the city, activities that can be used to generate connections among citizens themselves. Such aims are probably best evidenced through participatory budgeting programs implemented by states, which by their very nature entail collaboration among citizens about how to invest resources locally. In our cases, particularly in Medellín but

also in Mexico City, participatory budgeting programs did play a role in bringing citizens together into dialogue about investments and priorities that could be constructively tailored toward creating greater security, either directly through crime prevention activities or indirectly, through transformation of social and spatial conditions that invited or facilitated crime. If we consider that the mere act of making these decisions also brought a wide range of citizens together to deliberate about the larger urban environment, one can see how they would also contribute to the creating of bridging capital and stronger horizontal linkages at the level of the community.

### Factors Affecting Social Capital

The creation of both bridging and bonding social capital in a community is key to its resilience.

- Neighborhood and community-based organizations can strengthen both bridging and bonding capital (e.g. Medellín, downtown Mexico City).
- Shared socioeconomic and political identities can increase bonding capital but can negatively affect bridging capital (e.g. Lyari in Karachi, Nairobi).
- Spatial allegiance is key to creating a sense of community. If residents do not identify with a neighborhood and view it as a temporary home, it makes it difficult to create meaningful social networks (e.g. Diepsloot in Johannesburg).

Historically, however, the ways that states have operated have not always strengthened horizontal linkages, instead fostering dependencies between citizens and the state with respect to service provision. Whether we look at the implementation of urban social policies – ranging from housing to education to poverty alleviation programs – or at the logic of policy-making in the first place, the state frequently made decisions from within its own bureaucratic ranks and applied them to the city without much interaction or input from below. To the extent that many policies were directed toward individual citizens, rather than the community *per se* as a social or spatial construct, there also existed few opportunities to enable community cohesion through urban policy actions. Only recently, with the advent of greater decentralization and the experimentation with participatory models of governance, do we begin to see more active community involvement in the implementation of state policies. However, such experiments are not widespread

among our cases. Structures of urban governance in Kigali and Nairobi are still relatively centralized (see Kigali and Nairobi reports), participatory governance experiments are working unevenly in Managua and Johannesburg, both São Paulo and Karachi are known more for decentralization than participatory policymaking, and only Medellín and Mexico City have made considerable headway on both counts.

Moreover, even these moves towards the inclusion of citizens in urban policy implementation at the level of the locality have a tendency to reinforce vertical relations with the state more than horizontal relations among citizens, partly because the resources, programmatic contours, and targets for policies are often set from above. In the absence of any scope for reformulation “from below” once a state policy directive gets to the level of the community, there is little incentive for citizens to engage with each other around urban policies unless such mandates are purposefully cast within the framework of a participatory budgeting exercise. Even participatory budgeting exercises are frequently structured around major infrastructural investments or other issues that require trade-offs between costs and benefits among different constituencies at the level of the locality – sometimes in ways that can reduce rather than enhance community ties of solidarity, and thus strain the potential of bridging social capital in these exercises.

What all this means is that the state’s role in enabling community resilience by strengthening horizontal relations at the level of the locality more often than not remains unfulfilled. When it does happen, careful attention must go into understanding how and why. Our cases suggesting at least two areas have already shown considerable promise in this regard: urban renovation and security reform. These are two domains of urban policy action that have historically been developed and coordinated with an eye to the city as a whole. When such programs are brought down to the level of the local community, and when residents are both willing and able to connect to the state around such programs and concerns for their own locality, we begin to see the possibilities for strengthening horizontal and vertical connections among a range of citizens and constituencies, thus strengthening capacities for resilience.

### ***3.4.1 The Urban Developmental Correlates of Community-State Synergies***

Yet such outcomes are by no means guaranteed merely by bringing the state into the picture. In earlier sections of this report we discussed the ways in which urban redevelopment projects laid the foundations for strong horizontal and vertical connections that helped make the area much more secure, using the Mexico City and Medellín cases as examples, and highlighting the still untapped potential of such projects in Cracolândia

and Hillbrow. From this comparison we are able to identify a few key contextual factors that explain when and why state-initiated programs in urban renovation are embraced by local communities in ways that produced both horizontal and vertical solidarities in the service of crime reduction. Among key factors is the extent to which urban redevelopment initiatives are embraced by resident populations, which in turn is dependent on a variety of other elements ranging from spatial location of the project to the involvement of the private sector.

Location matters because certain areas for re-development by their very nature have a wider range of citizen constituencies, and when urban redevelopment projects are sited in areas where both residents and commerce have incentives to work together around those plans, as in Mexico City, bridging connections will be more extensive. In São Paulo, the imposition of an urban renewal project that would also displace longstanding residents and promised a new type of commercial activity intended to fundamentally transform prior land uses in the name of better security, alienated local residents who rejected rather than embraced the state-led initiative. In these two divergent outcomes, the role of the private sector was absolutely central as was the state's role in mediating the concerns of the private sector and local citizens. In São Paulo, the state's re-development project involved major infrastructural investments that had a fundamentally transformative impact on land use and that were intended to facilitate substantial monetary gains to the private developers who partnered with the government on the project. In Mexico, private sector investors also had a lot to gain from a more secure environment, but the renovations introduced to achieve this overall objective were small and strategically cited minor improvements targeted toward creating more active street life and securing a larger number of public spaces. That is, the program was intended to enliven and enhance rather than transform land use, whether commercial or residential. The same could be said for the urban redevelopment programs in Medellín that have sparked so much community resilience and generated identifiably positive gains for that city.

In Mexico, Medellín, and São Paulo, private sector support was central to the state's willingness and capacity to push for certain urban redevelopment projects, and in Medellín, the successes of this partnership brought visibility and recognition to the redeveloped site in ways that encouraged citizens to embrace further state involvement in their community around issues of crime reduction. But only in Mexico were local citizens considered a co-partner for the project. Some of this owed to the conscientious posture of the local government and was not unrelated to questions of decentralization and a commitment to participatory government, noted above. But the Mexico City authorities' willingness and capacity to bring citizens and the private sector together behind this

project was also made much more likely—and less costly to the state—by the nature of the location, which also invited private sector interest. In Mexico, the successfully resilient downtown areas had a history of mixed land use and a longstanding cultural identity that made re-investment in this area a desirable goal for citizens, the state, and the private sector alike. The project was also seen as jumpstarting more active use of an area that already had a vibrant history of commerce and residential mixing, a combination that was assumed to lay the foundation for more private sector developmental gains in the future. In São Paulo, in contrast, the upscale development project was sited in an area that was dominated by residential complexes, with only minimal commercial activity, and where the gains for the developer came primarily from housing or rental markets. There were few market spillovers from this project in the longer term, thus meaning that investment returns needed to accrue immediately. This raised the bar for both developers and the state, and in the process the concerns of local residents were sidelined.

The role of the private sector in supporting projects that help bring the state into communities is itself sometimes limited by the extent of chronic violence, which also can enlarge the disadvantages of certain locations. In São Paulo, for example, the heavy stigmatization of entire neighborhoods as sites of insecurity, despite the fact only a small number of families may have been involved in organized criminal activities, reduced private sector interest in investing in these areas. This in turn meant it was harder for the state to find partners for redevelopment, thus serving as a double-edged sword with respect to the development of strong horizontal community bonds that could be used to push back against violence actors. This is in some ways the problem facing Hillbrow. Given its strong commercial history and prior heritage of prosperity, there is some effort to move forward with state-private sector partnerships for redevelopment. What is holding its rebirth back, however, is stigmatization associated both with violence and race, the latter of which comes in the context of the post-apartheid transition. But even Hillbrow holds greater potential to exit from this dilemma than Diepsloot and other peripheral settlements in Nairobi and São Paulo, precisely because of the advantages that mixed commercial and residential land use gives it in terms of potential investment gains through re-development, which in turn can be more readily leveraged to build horizontal and vertical connections that will strengthen community resilience.

### ***3.4.2 The Co-Production of Security: A Central Building Block of Resilience***

Implicit in the successes (and failures) cited above is not merely their potential to link citizens to the private sector and the state through urban development projects, but also the fact that the horizontal and vertical connections produced through such projects enabled

a certain degree of resilience, or push back, against the forces and conditions of chronic violence. Yet just as central to the success of this cycle of activities is the issue of security, or at least the feeling that spaces were becoming safe enough to be used and visited by citizens. Introducing new commercial activities and constructing new public spaces is part of this, but so too is the question of policing.

The constructive role that police played in strengthening connections between residents, private investors, and the state is an important dimension of Mexico City's successes, while in São Paulo and Hillbrow the involvement of police in the project of redevelopment was less clear if not entirely absent. In Cracolândia, their presence was only partial, associated with protecting the new redevelopments during the day, and then when criminals returned at night, crime rose and trust in the police as a community ally dropped. Likewise, even in those areas where urban redevelopment projects were not introduced, whether police are present or not, how they act, and whether citizens view them as legitimate impacted the relationships between communities and the state. In Managua, even in the absence of any serious urban development initiatives, the police's close involvement with communities to provide security made strong community connections possible while also sustaining a degree of citizen openness to the government that paralleled the state-citizen connections forged through urban redevelopment projects elsewhere. The Umuganda system in Kigali served a similar function. In contrast, most citizens of Diepsloot, Santa Marta, and Nairobi saw the police as the enemy of the community, thereby giving rise to more negative forms of resilience via vigilantism or the turn to private security forces. They also tended to further estrange citizens from the state, or at least from the larger project of establishing order and a rule of law that the state represents; and sometimes even from each other. Accordingly, whether or not the police become connected to communities behind a common project of creating order, as we saw in the Mexico City case, goes a long way in explaining whether strong horizontal or vertical relations will develop across a variety of actors and institutions sufficiently to generate a certain degree of positive resilience.

States will always argue that it is in the interests of citizens to allow police into their communities. They also will argue that it is the state and not the citizens' job to fight criminality and establish social order. But our cases suggest that the most resilient communities were those where citizens were involved as relatively equal partners in providing security – whether through sharing information, monitoring the streets, or working directly with the police themselves. In those instances where police activities were imposed without community input or invitation, police were much less legitimate as security forces, and thus ties between the community and the state were much more tenuous. Just as with the urban redevelopment initiatives, when security objectives were

imposed by police without a sense that the community sought their involvement, or in ways that contravened local patterns of authority and decision-making, we saw more tensions at the level of the community and rifts between the community and the state. All this suggest that in the search for ways to better enable community resilience, co-security arrangements can go a long way. Whether in the case of Managua or Medellín or Mexico City, when citizens feel they are working with rather than on the behest of the police, they are better partners in producing local conditions for security. And given the fact that local knowledge is critical for fighting crime, this arrangement also is good for the state, thus fueling the cycle of state-community connections that enable positive resilience.





**POLICIES FOR BUILDING  
URBAN RESILIENCE:  
FROM COOPERATIVE AUTONOMY  
TO NEW SECURITY NETWORKS**





## POLICIES FOR BUILDING URBAN RESILIENCE: FROM COOPERATIVE AUTONOMY TO NEW SECURITY NETWORKS

The findings in this report lead to the conclusion that *resilience materializes at the interface of citizen and state action, and is strengthened through relations of cooperation within and between communities and governing authorities*. When citizens, the private sector, and governing authorities establish institutional networks of accountability that tie them to each other at the level of the community, there is much greater capacity for push back against the perpetrators of violence, and thus greater likelihood of establishing normalcy in everyday life. When citizens and the state work together, we are more likely to see a productive mix of professional expertise, citizen oversight, and local knowledge in the establishment and monitoring of everyday security. Just as important to note is that the security activities produced through citizen-state networks of cooperation are most accountable, legitimate, and durable when they are directed and monitored by communities themselves, in a relationship of *cooperative autonomy* (Sanyal 1994).

The direction of causality is critical here, particularly as a starting point for policy action. At present, much of the work on the state's role in confronting urban violence assumes that the state is and should be leading the strategies for violence reduction. Such an approach is best reflected in a recent report for Brookings Institution's Latin America Initiative by Vanda Felbab-Brown (2011), whose sheer language alone lays out the logic for how and why the state should be "brought to the slum." The preferred approach is a step-wise, multi-tiered strategy that begins with the state imposing concerted force against criminal groups, followed by a series of steps where it brings the local community into the picture as an ally, either through measures to build community trust in police and thus facilitate the exchange of intelligence information about criminality, by establishing oversight mechanisms which respond to citizen concerns about expanded police powers, or by re-inserting police to eliminate or manage street crime that is likely to re-emerge in the aftermath of the state's successes in displacing or defeating the organized criminal groups responsible for violence. But even in the best of circumstances, the state's role in leading the fight against violence can generate citizen distrust, particularly in those environments where the state or police have a long history of corruption or impunity. As such, supporting the community's own autonomous actions by building on security adaptations already underway will help legitimize the cooperative relations between citizens and the state in ways that bode well for strengthening resilience in the long run.

This is easier said than done. In situations of chronic violence where the power exerted by armed actors is often matched by a repressive *mano dura* approach to security by the police or military, citizens can feel trapped between the competing forces of violence, often preferring to go it alone. In such an environment, it can be difficult for citizens to find maneuvering room without alienating these coercive forces. The adaptive response is all too frequently a negative one, in which citizens either accommodate the forces of violence or react defensively. The challenge is to find entry points of action that can initiate or sustain relationships of cooperative autonomy between citizens and the state, thus avoiding the recourse to extra-legality or the persistence of the status quo.

The findings in this report suggest that one effective way to generate resilience is to focus *less on the perpetrators of violence and more on the spaces in which violence thrives*, turning attention to transforming spaces as the starting point for nurturing resilience. To the extent that territorial control – be it armed, political, social or economic – has been shown to be central to violence, re-ordering space can be a first step in countering the power of violent actors. Yet such changes can also be the basis for new horizontal and vertical relationships between citizens and the state. This is where urban and spatial planning enters the picture. Architects and urban planners who work in violent cities agree that the nature of violence is often tied to the nature of urban form, and that by changing the nature of urban form, one can change (or perhaps even reduce) violence.

Cities with spaces that are violent and poorly built can begin by making infrastructure adjustments in informal areas in ways that can reduce incidents of violence caused by non-state armed actors. In what follows, we identify several ways that new urban sensibilities, more spatially sensitive policies, and alternative land uses can positively affect security while also producing or strengthening cooperative relations between communities and the state, thus building the foundations for sustainable resilience.

$$\text{Urban Resilience} = \begin{array}{c} \text{Good Governance} \\ + \\ \text{Good City Planning} \\ + \\ \text{Security Sector Reform} \end{array}$$

#### 4.1 The Role of Urban and Spatial Planning in Fostering Cooperative Autonomy

The most striking examples of positive resilience identified in this study have shown that, to a certain degree, urban resilience is enabled by good urban planning. Building resilient cities—or resilient urban spaces—means creating vibrant social and economic activities

that join different actors and institutions together in the oversight and management of a place. We saw that citizens in areas of the city without vibrant economic activities drawing multiple classes of consumers, without 24 hour-a-day vibrancy, and without a mix of residential and commercial activities were less likely to join together in strong relationships with each other and the state in the fight against violence. Good urban planning to achieve such aims can reinforce the ways and context in which multiple actors become socially and spatially committed to each other. When such connections are leveraged to protect the physical spaces and a return to normalcy in their daily lives, citizens are adapting in positively resilient ways. All this suggests that building capacities for resilience means promoting and investing in mixed commercial and residential land use, particularly in areas of the city at risk for crime; building infrastructure that enables free movement of people within and between all neighborhoods (via pedestrian corridors, parks, public transport), and prioritizing strategic urban investments that will help establish self-sustaining or self-reinforcing government-community reciprocities for guaranteeing such activities in every neighborhood.

Good urban planning also means rejecting conventional approaches to servicing rapidly growing cities, which have isolated the disadvantaged in single-land use residential tracts in peripheries far away from the commercial and infrastructural amenities necessary to build vibrant neighborhoods spaces. Formal property rights or not, citizens of all income groups need to have the opportunity to live in vibrant areas where social, economic, and residential activities and priorities reinforce each other in ways that bring a community together in the service of protecting and securing those spaces.

One way to understand how and why connections in space make a difference is through the lens of network theory, a recent variant of which argues for the importance of using city spaces to link “a variety of people with a variety of shared interests” so as to overturn “historical processes through which a dominant culture has secured a disproportionate share of...power” (Grams 2010). Although the work cited is focused on cultural rather than coercive power associated with violence, the parallels are manifold – with the operative terms used in both approaches being networks and shared interests. In classical network theory, it is generally understood that there are two types of connections that operate in social and physical space, built either on shared knowledge or shared acquaintances respectively. Scholars of network theory argue that is the overlapping of these two types of networks that creates the best conditions for trust and cooperation (Ibid.). In situations of chronic violence, one can conceive of urban planning or design interventions built on daily interaction in space that maximize networks of shared knowledge and shared acquaintance to increase the opportunities for residents both to physically connect to each

other and share information about violence and how to minimize it. Only those who confront violence in their everyday lives have the knowledge to know how it imposes itself, where there is room for maneuver, and what the greatest obstacles will be in carving out both defensive and offensive space.

In addition to creating spaces for sharing knowledge and information among networks of those most affected by violence, there are several planning principles that should be kept in mind in order to minimize the likelihood that a violent city remains marked by informal, poor, and fragmented spaces where citizens are disconnected from each other in ways that drive isolation and violence. The first is a purposeful rethinking of the formal-informal divide in planning practice, with an eye to integrating new and old neighborhoods of various income levels through a more integrative and equitable distribution of services, investments, and opportunities for interaction in urban spaces.

A second is the acceptance of a wide range of community urban projects and priorities generated from networks of those who live in the situations of violence. By soliciting knowledge from those living in neighborhoods where violence has routinely brought stigmatization and estrangement, planners offer a form of recognition to citizens whose views of what makes a livable neighborhood have not been accommodated in more formal planning for the modern city. Formal recognition of their local knowledge will not only strengthen relations of cooperative autonomy between citizens and the state, but will also give planners action-ready allies in their quest to find new projects that make some headway in the fight against violence. Often it is hard for planners or arms of the state to enter into violent territories, which suggests the importance of letting local citizens guide the process of changing their communities from within. Such an idea is not new in urban planning circles, but often such principles have been sacrificed because of the state's desire to win the battle against violent actors. Such a stance is at best penny-wise and at worst pound-foolish. Inserting a strong state whose aim is to conquer and control space may produce ephemeral gains by displacing the perpetrators of violence, but it will neither change the physical and social conditions that allowed them to flourish in the first place, nor will it enable the remaining members of the community to step into the vacuum. Good planning practice built on the embrace of local knowledge in which communities are given the autonomy to set the agenda for next steps is one of the few ways to generate sustainable resilience in situations of chronic violence.

Such aims do not always have to be directed towards security *per se*. Many urban development projects can create horizontal and vertical connections within and between the community and the state in ways that strengthen cooperative autonomy. Our cases

showed that a wide range of activities, ranging from youth sports programs to community development activities to crime prevention courses to public space reclamation projects to new tourist-seeking initiatives, all generate degrees of trust between citizens and the state that foment cooperative autonomy. But again, the key is for the community to have an opportunity to drive the process. Some of the most successful ways this occurs is through community development programs or local actions that strengthen or demand feedback loops: everyday struggles against violent actors at a neighborhood level, for example, could be identified as complementing broader public policies designed by the city government. More open recognition of the initiatives and contributions made locally will help embed public policies within the discourses and identities of a community, thus cementing the legitimacy of the state and making its public policies more sustainable while aligning state and community actions and objectives. Conversely, responsive and locally attentive public policies give a larger framing for citizen strategies that make them more legitimate and sustainable. While participatory budgeting has been a key program that develops such feedback loops, there are many others that could achieve similar effects, thus sustaining cooperative autonomy.

When the state works responsively and interactively with localities—even poor,




Figure 3. **Structure of Cooperative Autonomy:** *Understanding the confluence of horizontal and vertical social capital*

stigmatized, and violent ones—government planners have new opportunities to learn from the trenches. Still, it is important to recognize that enabling resilience at the community level has its limits. Even local successes may not scale up or out to other parts or activities in the city if efforts are not made to connect strategic interventions and networks of actors to larger urban dynamics. Stated differently, while autonomy, or agency, at the community level is imperative, it cannot achieve the necessary scales of process and change without simultaneous and collaborative action by the state, whose organization, resources, reach, and technical expertise provide the needed capacity to implement, manage and sustain legitimate laws and security policies. What is needed, then, is a twofold approach that consists of the construction of community autonomy, making the local the primary sphere of security intervention, and the mobilization of state expertise and resources to put power behind policies that respect that and build upon autonomy.

The importance of a larger territorial integration of planning practices that will respond to the concerns of given localities and at the same time pay more attention to the creation of networks of activities and allegiances that transcend the individual neighborhoods of the city is a serious challenge for the profession of planning, even in non-conflict cities. Such an approach stands in contrast to much conventional planning practice in contemporary democratic societies, where the local community is the starting and ending point for participation and planning action. Yet given the fact that in conflict settings division and fragmentation have helped drive the cycle of violence, efforts should be made to transcend such divisions without necessarily eliminating the social and spatial basis for connections and solidarity at the level of the community. One should conceptualize this as a form of “separation with connection,” with policymakers working more to understand the array of infrastructural, social, and economic policies that support this end. The building of new participatory institutions that allow citizens to act independently from authorities, as noted above, could also be linked to the development of new urban policies to lay the material foundation for the enhancement and relative autonomy of the community—perhaps through new investments and economic projects that bring prosperity to informal areas in ways that strengthen their connectivity with the formal city.

Finally, planners need to rethink overall metropolitan planning goals for conflict cities in ways that can take into account the servicing, governance, and economic relationship of the parts and whole of the city, paying special attention to the locations where violence and exclusion have prevented integration and thinking of new ways to achieve such synergies. Such initiatives will not only help establish the framework for new connections among activities and locations, as noted above, but also serve as a basis for linking local communities into a larger urban governance project—and thus the state—in ways that will

mitigate against further fragmentation of the metropolitan landscape. Such developments could set the basis for new forms of metropolitan allegiance in which urban priorities and activities become the basis for legitimate governance and political authority, subsequently strengthening relations of cooperative autonomy.

In situations of chronic violence it is easy for citizens to become less connected to both the local and the national state because the rule of law does not seem to be working for them. If those engaged in violent activities become the principal source of employment, citizens may also be tied into alternative loyalty networks of social and economic production and reproduction, including the illegal and the illicit. When these are allowed to flower and fragment the urban domain, violence is likely and the search for order becomes so urgent that it becomes tempting for the state to revert to modernist techniques of social and spatial control that may have fueled violence and conflict in the first place. In the face of such possibilities, an alternative scaling of allegiances, built around new forms of planning action that connect the territorial parts and the whole while creating new social and spatial synergies between the franchised and the disenfranchised, may ultimately be the best course of action. Its success, however, depends on if it helps renew a sense of loyalty to a larger guiding authority, even as it lays the material foundation for less socio-spatial exclusion and a positively shared urban experience.

## **4.2 Beyond Community Policing: The Importance of “Legitimate Security” Networks**

In the prior section we noted that good urban planning is about participation and not just design. This may also mean that to build resilience urban policymakers must devise new participation strategies that empower residents’ capacities to both *negotiate with and create autonomy from the agents of violence*, whether local informal leaders or the police themselves. Coincident with this aim would be support for generating security strategies “from below,” such that citizens are not forced to rely on state or market actors, be they private security or violence entrepreneurs, for protection, but are empowered to make their own decisions about what must be secured and how the security should be accomplished in their neighborhoods. Without enhancing the “agency” or relative autonomy of residents from the institutions and practices that drive violence, or without liberating them from their relegation to marginal social and political spaces between the formal and informal authority, violence will be very hard to reduce.

Nonetheless, for the state to play the role of partner in confronting violence without

distorting or dominating a community's own security agenda is perhaps the biggest challenge to be confronted in the effort to nurture cooperative autonomy in the service of urban resilience. Most current governance structures in cities with chronic violence are not set up to let a community independently guide – rather than react – to urban policy-making, particularly when it comes to security measures, which usually require a degree of policing equipment, legal knowledge, and professional expertise that are not always available to citizens. The absence of such democratic institutions is in fact one of the reasons violence flowers. Yet for obvious reasons, even in democratic contexts government officials who are confronted with chronic violence are particularly wary of giving localities free reign to arrest, persecute, or battle local criminals. Such a position does not always sit well with citizens. Because of the contested or ambiguous historical relationship between communities and the state in cities where violence is high, localities often insist that if local officials are to be involved in community security activities, their engagement must be framed within the context of what is desired by the community itself.

Such a trade-off is very difficult to manage when it comes to policing, particularly when police themselves are seen as coercive forces whose heavy hand with community members in the fight against crime is itself a source of controversy. One way to accomplish this is to bring police into the community as social partners, not merely as coercive actors. Many forms of community policing try to achieve these goals, although most fail to convince citizens that police are truly cooperative partners. This is particularly the case when communities see themselves in opposition to the current government, or in the context of chronic violence where state legitimacy and political authority, not to mention the police, themselves, are seen as the main purveyors of violence. For precisely these reasons, along with the adoption of better urban planning principles, concerted policy attention must be paid to innovating new security practices that also follow the principles of cooperative autonomy.

Our case study research shows that cities and neighborhoods where police and the state were both under challenge generated few examples of either cooperative autonomy or positive resilience. Conversely, those locations with the greatest cooperative autonomy and positive resilience were also those where police worked in cooperation with the community and where local concerns drove police's everyday involvement in the neighborhoods more than any larger security mandate set by the government. Although the direction of causality may be complex or as yet unspecified when it comes to disentangling the relationship between the state's overall legitimacy and citizens willingness to work with police local, what is clear is that *relations of reciprocity between citizens and the police characterize all our instances of positive resilience*. Where police, residents,

and the local state worked together, the greatest gains were achieved. Where only one or the other force sought to establish security, we saw limited progress—equilibrium resilience—or even negative resilience

The latter results make clear why the resilience gains accruing to cooperative autonomy depend on *inter-connections* between state *and* civil society. Indeed, a community with strong bridging and bonding capital might have considerable social power to effectively push back against the perpetrators of violence. But without some state involvement or police cooperation to keep such efforts within the bounds of the law, these same autonomous community capacities could readily sustain vigilantism, lynching, or other extra-judicial actions that constitute forms of negative resilience. Likewise, in situations of chronic violence where the police or the state are involved in organized crime or are themselves perpetrators of violence, they are less likely to cooperate with citizens in fighting crime, thus perpetuating its existence. Strong community capacity is not going to make much headway in reducing violence either, at least not if the state is part of the problem. Accordingly, in order to avoid either equilibrium or negative adaptations to violence, urban policymakers must be able to develop new security programs that mandate police and community *cooperation*, with the nature and direction of efforts set by the community itself. We suggest that the development of new programs and policies to strengthen *legitimate security* is the way to achieve such aims.

Legitimate security is not the same as community policing, as popular and important as the latter concept might be. Nor does legitimate security automatically emerge from police reform *per se*. As we define it here, legitimate security allows for and supports citizen and community autonomy from violent coercion and/or the co-optation of interests by both state and non-state actors. While the centerpiece of any effective security arrangement should be the prevention of violence and coercion and the guarantee of safety, legitimate security networks or arrangements can be formulated in a way that actively supports and engenders resilience, defined earlier as “individual and communities’ capacities to resist against the perpetrators of violence by generating relatively autonomous control over the activities, spaces, social or economic forces, and conditions that comprise their daily lives.” Such an aim would include an array of social objectives that might either link security directly to violence reduction or that, on their own, would help strengthen the horizontal and vertical relations within and between communities and the state, thus linking legitimate security to community autonomy to resilience.




Figure 4. **Inter-connections between State & Civil Society:** *When police, states and citizens work together, the greatest gains can be achieved*

We suggest the following definitional principles can serve as a road map for establishing legitimate security (LS), by virtue of their capacity to strengthen networks between state and civil-society actors around a shared project of building sustainable urban resilience.

1. **LS is underpinned by legitimate justice systems that ensure accountability.** LS is not only about creating more just security policies, but also about ensuring democratic and participatory paradigms of governance in every sense – political, civil, and social. To do so, LS must function in tandem with a reliable and accessible judiciary, as this intersection is key to ensuring both accountability (with the assurance that security measures are lawful and not marred by impunity) and sustainability (since actions by security providers will be supported under a structure of governance and outcomes can in some manner be formalized).
2. **LS situates itself within a discursive sphere based on “rights.”** When dealing with diverse publics in a fragmented urban environment, the utilization of a rights discourse helps to connect different groups to each other, as well as to the state and the rule of law. This represents a unifying phenomenon that transcends the city’s spatial divisions and distinct sovereignties. Furthermore, understanding LS as a right rather than a need places accountability on the state, embedding it in law rather than in policy that can be easily overturned by subsequent governments, and as a result, provides more incentive to invest in mobilization to access those rights (Joshi 2010).
3. **LS addresses security needs specific to marginalized and underrepresented populations, including ethnic/racial minorities, women, the poor, and indigenous**

**groups.** If we consider security a universal desire (Iveson 2007), it remains crucial to acknowledge that different publics will have different interests when it comes to security. As one example, women will have distinct needs and require certain investments by public security providers to ensure that the city is safe for them—especially with respect to mobility at night and prevention of sexual assault, among others. While security interests for publics who do not seek to profit from activities creating insecurity are distinct, they are not inherently in competition. LS arrangements will address these diverse needs through inclusionary and participatory means.

4. **LS does not provide security for some at the expense of others.** Increasingly, manifestations of “security” take on perverse forms (McIlwaine and Moser 2001), such as the privatization of security and proliferation of fortified urban space (Caldeira 2000; Rodgers 2004), vigilantism/lynching as forms of popular justice (Goldstein 2004; Godoy 2002) and policing directed towards protecting the interests and property of the elite. While several authors have argued that with the absence of alternatives, citizens cannot be blamed for taking security into their own hands (Davis 2006), violent responses to insecurity may increase perceptions of safety for some, but are carried out at the expense of others – usually the city’s most vulnerable populations. A security arrangement is not legitimate if aspects of its approach to secure the city for some propagate insecurity for others.
5. **LS is a public good to which all urban residents have a right; it cannot be commoditized nor function with systems of clientelism.** When security provision is linked to a market logic, available for purchase, or representing a means to profit, its public availability becomes restricted and its quality becomes diminished. If we seek standardized security provision that constitutes a resource intended to serve the interests of all publics (with the exception of those seeking to profit from the production of insecurity for others), it cannot favor those with the financial means to afford it. Similarly, if we consider clientelism a transaction of financial or built capital for political support when convenient for those in the position of power, an agenda that addresses root structural inequalities that propagate insecurity and serve long-term interests that will span different governments cannot bloom. Where clientelism has characterized politics, the construction of autonomy through initiatives such as participatory budgeting has proven especially difficult (Postigo 2011).
6. **LS is not administered in a top-down or bottom-up fashion, but rather through institutional arrangements between sectors that serve as routes for mediation,**

**collaboration, and checks-and-balances.** With widespread failure or unwillingness of the state to provide adequate security to its citizens and dissatisfaction with top-down security measures often utilize excessive brutality or exclude already-vulnerable segments of the population, there has been an emerging attempt to identify new solutions in security provision *from below* (Colak & Pearce 2009). Despite emerging from the initiative of citizens, security *from below* is often highly privatized, beneficial only for specific actors or bounded communities, and unsustainable without formal linkages to or collaboration with the state's public security apparatus. Participation and origins from below continue to be critical pieces of successful initiatives, but an increased focus on multi-sector partnerships provide more effective, lasting, and accountable ways forward for cities seeking security.

7. **LS does not perpetuate spatial segregation or reinforce the formal-informal divide.** While specific territories in the city may have variable security needs, LS planning takes an integrative, spatial approach to security provision. Security plans and providers cannot be held to different standards in different spatial contexts and because violence is not spatially bounded, but can migrate when repressed in one area, a holistic vision must be utilized. Approaches may include those that pay attention to the creation of networks or activities and allegiances that transcend the individual neighborhoods (Davis 2011). LS does not create "islands" of security, but rather archipelagos that extend their reach across diverse spaces in the city.
8. **LS seeks alternative social and spatial arrangements for the provision of security when faced with diverse cultural norms of security and justice.** When certain publics, most notably indigenous groups or ethnic minorities, have cultural notions of security and justice that conflict with the dominant approach (e.g., traditions of restorative justice), LS arrangements must find distinct and responsible ways to integrate and accommodate these variations. This could entail the creation of a special response commission that addresses needs of the population in an inclusive way or the use of neutral organizations such as a university or NGO to mediate between the cultural norms of the community and the legal code of the state. Such alternative arrangements do not undermine the rule of law through exemptions, but find channels of mediation that respect community autonomy while ensuring the safety of the many publics in the city. A promising example might be found in Arauca, Colombia, where "equality mediators" are trained through the university, an institution seen as legitimate by both state and community, despite distrust between those two groups, to resolve community conflicts, with the outcomes carrying legal weight in places where access to the justice system remains difficult (Dominguez

2011). Rather than a strict legal code defined by the ruling or ideological elite that can be exclusionary for certain publics, several authors have promoted the strengthening of integration between formal and informal routes of conflict prevention and mediation (Faundez 2003).

9. **LS strengthens networks that crosscut divergent spatial and social communities, employing “trust-brokers” to reconcile antagonistic relationships and diverse interests.** While informal networks often perpetuate violence through lucrative connections between criminal groups and the state (Arias 2006), the effectiveness of networks crossing social and spatial sovereignties also serves as an important point of departure from the regularization of violent coercion. In situations of chronic violence where trust between citizens and the state may be lacking, “third party” institutions that are viewed as legitimate by both can serve as trust-brokers to mediate security arrangements that would not be possible through formal channels and in situations of suspicion. This could take the form of a university that consults for state agencies, but has built strong relationships at the grassroots level, or a citywide NGO that manages conflict resolution programs where the state is inaccessible and non-state armed actors usually serve as arbiters of conflict. Their neutral nature provides a degree of separation from clientelistic structures or the tangled nature of local politics. The coalescence of a broad network of actors from across urban divisions not only amasses intellectual capital with varying areas of expertise, but can also serve as a creator of new space and possibilities for mobilization around issues of security that could not emerge under traditional institutional frameworks and arrangements.

### **4.3 Conclusion: Agents, Spaces, Strategies, and Networks of Resilience**

Our case studies have suggested that resilience is as much a property of certain places and locations, as it is of individuals, communities, and institutions. Certain cities or sites in cities host social and spatial conditions that help citizens and communities remain resilient. Resilience is also relational. The most positive adaptations to violence are generated in and through strong relations within and between citizens and the state. In this dimension of resilience space also matters, precisely because certain types of cities or neighborhoods host denser and more durable horizontal and vertical relations. Yet so does time. Horizontal and vertical relations within and between citizens and the state can change, being disrupted if trust is breached or networks of loyalty are severed by violence, intimidation, or betrayal. These and other key findings delineate five claims about resilience and how best to achieve and nurture it.

- The **first** is the idea that resilience—defined as the degree of social, spatial, political, and economic autonomy sufficient to allow a community to independently negotiate with or protect itself from different armed actors, whether they are state or non-state—is a temporal logic. It can come and go in the same community over time, and this variation can unfold over years, in a single year, or even in a single day.
- The **second** is that resilience, or degrees of autonomy that allow a community or neighborhood to get back to “normalcy,” may be more likely in certain spatial locations of a city (i.e., particularly in places where it is possible to engage a large and diverse number of stakeholders in a project of community support or redevelopment). In particular, commercial areas may hold greater potential than residential areas for generating sufficiently strong engagement to sustain community autonomy versus armed/violent actors.
- The **third** is that projects of urban renewal and urban renovation may hold great potential to engage a wide range of stakeholders in ways that strengthen community connection and autonomy—the foundations for resilience—but all urban renewal projects are not alike. In particular, those where physical areas are destroyed or aggressively rebuilt may be less able to maintain the social, political and economic capital or connections to link stakeholders to each other as easily as those where less disruptive forms of rehabilitation or upgrading are the means of renewal.
- The **fourth** is that there may be some kind of aggregated spatial logic to renewal-based urban resilience: gains focused on circumscribed sites or small “islands of resilience” that produce demonstrable effects that can generate optimism and hope in other parts of the city are desirable, but limited unless there is a spatial strategy to extend or strategically reproduce these experiments so that islands of resilience become “zones of resilience” and ultimately “cities of resilience.”
- The **fifth** is that both cooperative autonomy and legitimate security serve as the glue that links actors together at the local level and that allows a scaling of state-civil society connections to the city level. A human rights discourse may be absolutely central, and it may have more power than discourses of order to generate relationships of cooperative autonomy. When citizens turned to an alternative discourse that united them both with their neighbors and the police, they were able to embrace a strategic approach toward security that did not challenge the state’s power or presence in the community through the police occupation. Instead, they made it clear that through an appreciation of human rights, the community and the police force were educated about the limits and possibilities of action against perpetrators of violence. Independent

of how deeply such lessons or principles were absorbed, the mere effort to open dialogue about rights created new space for participation between the community and the police. Through the discourse of rights, citizens were able to argue how and why they *do* want a police presence in their community, but one that conducts its work with respect for residents. Ultimately, a rights discourse has been an effective way to legitimize citizen action in the eyes of multiple stakeholders.



# RECOMMENDATIONS





## RECOMMENDATIONS

Because the root sources of urban violence are difficult to eliminate and require massive resources and coordination across multiple scales of the economy and institutions of governance, the policy world must be prepared to find alternative and more pragmatic – albeit complementary – goals that can be achieved alongside larger military and diplomatic campaigns to establish security in situations of chronic violence, particularly when national and regional security concerns are also at stake. *Cities and local communities stand at the frontlines of these efforts, as does the concept of resilience, which recognizes that small gains can be achieved by building on the positive adaptations of city residents who have already found ways to cope with chronic urban violence in their everyday lives.*

The challenge however is to identify the sources and strategies of resilience that will produce the greatest positive effect, and to identify where in the city this is most likely. Chronic urban violence destroys the social, economic, and political fabric of cities and communities by generating fear and distrust, by disrupting daily activities, and by undermining the legitimacy of governing institutions. All these factors place limits on the resilience of actors and institutions as they struggle to restore normal functioning to their neighborhoods and the city as a whole. In order to cope and survive, residents are often forced to straddle divergent loyalties with respect to their immediate neighbors, the agents of violence, or the police and other local security forces. Caught between competing pressures and allegiances, citizens sometimes find it easier to turn to individual-level adaptations -- like altering mobility patterns, avoiding certain areas, or relying on private security measures like gating that cut them off from the rest of the city while also reinforcing deep apprehension about venturing freely into the streets. Yet fragmented and inaccessible urban environments peopled by disengaged citizens can limit the development of strong social connections among the range of actors and institutions that must work together in order to return a community or city to manageable levels of security. *This in turn suggests that resilience is a collective as much as an individual endeavor and it must be incentivized accordingly.*

In identifying which forms of collective efficacy might best enable this type of resilience, one must also recognize that conditions vary locality by locality. Certain city-spaces (or cities for that matter) host social and spatial resources that can be more easily leveraged to build both community cohesion and strong connections with public and private sector partners. In other areas of the city, social and spatial characteristics will form barriers and disincentives that make this type of collective efficacy -- and thus resilience -- a much more elusive goal. Given such constraints, the primary aspiration of policymakers should be to *develop spatially-sensitive urban policies* that target city sites with the most favorable

social and spatial conditions for generating positive resilience; then introducing similar policies in other strategic locations; and eventually expanding the scale of these successes into a series of networked city-spaces that hold the potential to scale positive resilience *from sites to zones to the city as a whole*.

In this formulation, policy action must be framed within an explicitly spatial and integrated logic, with the aim being to both *synergize diverse urban functions and leverage the interests of multiple social and economic actors and activities for the common goal of bettering a given urban location* in ways that can produce or reinforce strategies and spaces of resilience. The initial gains of such a strategy will themselves be spatially-bounded, thus requiring locally-targeted metrics for measuring success, at least at initial stages. However, once such programs are expanded territorially, spillover gains will hopefully intersect with the cumulative territorial effects to produce more sustainable urban resilience at the level of the city.




Figure 5. **Spillover Gains:** *Initial gains of locally targeted interventions can expand to produce more sustainable urban resilience at the city scale*

## OVERARCHING POLICY GUIDELINES

- Reducing chronic violence through positive resilience requires an integrated urban policy approach built on a closer understanding of the potential social and spatial synergies produced by bringing together citizens, the private sector, and authorities in delimited urban spaces. Urban policies that strengthen horizontal and vertical relations among multiple actors in a given locality, whether formulated for addressing security or other local service or development concerns, will lay a strong foundation for resilience.

*As a principle, integrated urban policy programs should prioritize projects that create strong and self-sustaining bonds of connection within and between citizens and the state at a given locality, assessing a policy's successes in terms of its capacities to tie multiple interests together in the promotion or protection of the given locality's social and economic vibrancy.*

- In situations of chronic violence, community residents have the most privileged access to knowledge of local conditions and are better able to determine which adaptations can be accommodated or promoted without engendering conflict or opposition from neighbors, authorities, or agents of violence. Without their involvement, strategic missteps and coercive over-reach are likely. As such, urban policies intended to foster resilience should keep a strong and united community at the center of all policy decisions, better enabling citizen outreach to the state and other partners whose cooperation will further strengthen the resolve, commitment, and cohesiveness of resilient communities.

*Strengthening the cooperative autonomy of communities facing chronic violence is the first step in generating resilience, and it can be accomplished by funding or incentivizing community-level activities that strengthen citizen capacities to communicate knowledge of local conditions to relevant policymakers and officials, thus placing communities at the center of problem-solving action.*

- As a guiding aim for policy action, cooperative autonomy should be the goal of all citizen-government-private sector interactions regardless of sectoral domain, but it is particularly critical in the area of local security policy. Given the historical role that police have played in many cities with chronic violence, they are often seen as interlopers and exploiters of citizen vulnerabilities. The lack of trust between citizens and police will limit the gains associated with even the most positive of security measures, thus reducing or capping the benefits of other complementary activities targeted towards enabling resilience.

*Policing practices or security measures that are designed by and solicited from communities, rather than imposed upon them, will have the most legitimacy; thus security policy must also be subject to the principle of cooperative autonomy. Doing so will also help strengthen horizontal connections between citizens and the police, allowing a freer exchange of critical information about crime or violence and moving a locality one step further towards a state of positive resilience.*

- Certain locations in a city will lay a stronger foundation for cooperative autonomy, for the establishment of legitimate security practices, and thus for resilience. In particular, urban locations with mixed land use patterns that bring together small and large scale businesses with residents, and whose co-existence fuels vibrant consumer markets and dense foot traffic, are fertile sites for both policy prioritization and demonstration project investments.

*Policymakers must disaggregate and tailor their action approaches so as to take into account the divergent social and spatial practices in different locations of a city. Such assessments should be used to identify the “resilient ready” neighborhoods that might be prioritized for initial investment, with policymakers then expanding their efforts to create a network of hospitable sites. These small but targeted successes should then be scaled out by spatially leveraging resilience effects to ever larger zones in the city.*

- Although neighborhoods with mixed land use may have social and infrastructural advantages that favor resilience, such attributes are much less likely in peripheral and newly settled areas of a city. Limited infrastructure, ambiguous property rights, high degrees of informality, and a history of hosting migrants, refugees, or other seasonal populations with limited ties to other citizens and authorities can put such settlements “at-risk.” Coping mechanisms in these areas are more likely to empower the agents of violence, even as structural limits to collective efficacy can make resilience less robust. When resilience does flourish, it may be more likely to take an individual rather than collective form.

*“At risk” areas are of high priority, but will require a different set of investment strategies and resources than the sites that are by their very social and spatial nature much more favorable to resilience. Policymakers must be strategic about when and how to invest in those areas where a more comprehensive and costly approach will be necessary, and how to balance investments in these more problematic areas of the city with the “low hanging fruit” areas where payoff will be immediate and visible.*

*Depending on the levels of violence and political will, the targeting of “at risk” areas that are not yet hospitable to resilience may come at a later stage, after the scaling out of successful sites eliminates the territorial options for displaced violent actors from such high risk areas.*

## GUIDELINES FOR STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURAL INVESTMENTS

- Building resilience depends on good city planning, with infrastructural investments absolutely key to laying the foundation for well-functioning cities in which mobility, housing, and services are distributed in an integrated and equitable fashion. Most cities in the developing world are anything but integrated, with an array of single-function land uses distributed in a territorial hierarchy that reinforces the social and spatial exclusion of the most disadvantaged populations. Commercial and financial activities tend to be concentrated in centralized locations or in areas easily accessible to high income populations, while residential areas tend to be isolated from each other and lacking commercial or industrial activities that might promote continuous activity and non-stop vibrancy of street life. Owing to the high costs of land associated with this territorial division of labor, low income populations tend to be relegated to the periphery or stuck in under-serviced and inaccessible areas where informality in land tenure sets further barriers to public and private investment. It is these latter areas that are most likely to suffer from chronic violence and least likely to contain the social capital and economic resources necessary for positive resilience.

*Policymakers must begin to question this territorial logic, and work actively to target or incentivize investments that strengthen or generate more integrated land uses, with the aim of using such investments to help local officials minimize or eliminate the social and spatial exclusion that characterizes cities with chronic violence. Such an approach also means shifting from a sectoral to a spatial strategy of policymaking, where strengthening synergies between commercial, residential, and employment activities in every locality of the city should take priority over targeted sectoral investments like provision of housing or commercial renovation alone.*

- An integrated and comprehensive approach to building urban spaces is well served by multi-faceted urban renovation projects in which strengthening synergies between the production and consumption functions of urban space are principal goals. It is important, however, to distinguish between traditional urban redevelopment projects and those with the aim of strengthening urban localities in ways that investments in renovation have spillover effects for all local residents, and not merely the developers or even the users of the new investments. Urban redevelopment is often undertaken as part of a large scale initiative that involves displacement or resettlement, and that assumes a complete recasting of an area's profile to attract higher-end consumers and new populations. The larger the project, the more the pressure for a return on profits, the greater the tendency

for developers to come from outside the targeted investment area, and the less the involvement of local communities in project design. All three tendencies will limit the community's willingness to embrace urban renovation projects, thus eliminating the positive horizontal and vertical connections necessary for building cooperative autonomy and resilience capacities, independent of the positive security outcomes such projects promise to generate.

*When promoting integrated urban renovation projects, policymakers should prioritize smaller-scale and low-cost projects, focusing on value-added but readily implementable initiatives like improving street lighting, expanding pedestrian mobility, supporting public space, and incentivizing vibrant commercial presence, because such programs can involve community residents and will put their embrace of such projects at the center of community life, thus strengthening horizontal and vertical social relations while also improving urban livability. Small-scale or value-added projects are also less likely to produce displacement and gentrification pressures that might generate citizen opposition. Likewise, the reliance on local contractors for procurement and local citizens for project development will generate more community buy-in, thus spreading "ownership" and responsibility for protecting these investments across the multiple constituencies that reside in the locality.*

- In "high risk" areas on the urban periphery and in low-income neighborhoods with single-function land use patterns, comprehensive urban renovation may be a longer-term objective, requiring massive investments in integrated urban projects. Fostering the conditions for positive resilience in such sites will involve much greater investments in infrastructure and urban redevelopment. It will also require sufficient community buy-in to keep residents actively engaged as urban transformation occurs around them. In such areas, the ambiguity of property rights can further complicate commitments – from public or private sector developers -- to undertaking large scale urban renewal. One way to advance integrated urban aims is to prioritize infrastructure investments that break down previous barriers of social and spatial exclusion from the rest of the city. To achieve this objective, collective infrastructure provision is more urgent than individual property rights and housing tenure. Such investments must come with visible state presence and considerable state legitimacy, in part because the state's absence in infrastructure and service provision created an environment where violence flourished.

*To lay the groundwork for integrated urban development in high risk areas, particularly those where mafias and other violent actors strengthened their*

*authority through service provision, policymakers should both prioritize infrastructural investments and involve community residents in decisions about transportation, electricity, water, and other critical infrastructural services that link neighbors to each other and to other parts of the city. Community involvement in infrastructure policymaking can help generate the conditions for positive resilience by strengthening both collective efficacy and commitment to the locality as a physical space, thus bringing neighbors together to determine how such collective needs should be adjudicated in ways that might produce a different urban future and that may lay the foundation for larger, more ambitious integrated urban projects further down the road once an area's infrastructure becomes upgraded.*

## **GUIDELINES FOR STRENGTHENING COOPERATIVE AUTONOMY**

- Beyond their physical consequences, urban infrastructural upgrading as determined through community deliberation is a way to improve dialogue between the state and citizens, thus linking them to each other in ways that allow increased community autonomy from the agents of violence. When community dialogue with authorities is ongoing rather than unfolding through a single instance of participation over a given project, the connections within and between citizens and the state are strengthened. Thus, although there may be a multiplicity of ways to generate the horizontal and vertical reciprocities that comprise what we have termed cooperative autonomy and that lay the foundation for positive resilience, engagement around certain issues and in certain formats may be preferable. In particular, “one-off” rounds of invited community participation on a single urban project may not generate the same kinds of loyalties within and between citizens and the state as do urban programs that require constant management, oversight, communication, and maintenance. Likewise, participation exercises that unfold coincident with extant political jurisdictions are subject to distortion through patron-client networks or party domination.

*In order to strengthen the bonds of cooperative autonomy, communities should be delegated greater responsibility for management, assessment, and decision-making about daily urban conditions in their immediate localities. In this regard, programs focused on the care and management of public spaces or other shared community infrastructures can go a long way in keeping sustained connections within and between citizens and governing authorities in ways that generate positive resilience. Such bonds can also serve as the basis for accountability between citizens and the state, thus making the project of good governance a two-*

*way avenue of reciprocities in which citizens are as responsible as authorities for conditions in their neighborhoods. Such bonds should be fostered at scales smaller than those provided by formal governance arrangements, so as to enable the greatest degree of community autonomy.*

- Coordinating citizen involvement in the care and management of urban spaces is easier said than done. This is particularly the case when a given locality is divided socially, economically, politically, or ethnically. The smaller the territorial scale of community oversight, the less likely such divisions. But defining a community on too large a scale can lead to fragmentation and problems of coordination. When multiple aid and assistance organizations operate in a given locality, as is often the case in high risk areas of cities facing chronic violence, the proliferation of organizations with divergent objectives can get in the way of community cohesion. As such, part of the challenge is identifying the boundaries around a given community, an appropriate scale for programmatic action, and a common agenda for a single locale.

*Mitigating against undue fragmentation and fostering greater community interaction requires a spatial rather than a sectoral approach to community bonding. This means that special attention must be paid to the existence of NGOs and government programs in localities and the extent to which they divide a community either sectorally or spatially. If resilience via community autonomy is the aim, both citizens and authorities should make concerted efforts to foster linkages among existent advocacy and aid programs at the level of the locality. Policymakers and funders should themselves prioritize the needs of a spatially-defined community over their own organization's sectoral or advocacy interests.*

- Among policies that reinforce cooperative autonomy, those related to security are among the most critical but also the most problematic to develop. Authorities will understandably be reluctant to leave security matters entirely in the hands of citizens, and will prefer community policy programs and other initiatives that solicit citizen input in security matters while keeping larger security operations and goals in state hands. The objectives of national and regional security make state coordination of security policies at these large scales reasonable. Yet conditions at the level of the community are entirely different, in part because of the limited trust in police and the military. In many communities citizens are reluctant to let states set the security agenda because the state's criterion for successful battle against agents of violence may not match that of a given locality. Likewise, the

inordinate power granted state security forces, particularly when the target includes political enemies and organized crime, can easily run up against the quotidian and pragmatic strategies of resilience deployed in areas where informal and illicit activities form part of daily life. It may be a matter of trading off the principle of state coordination of security operations for greater security at the level of the locality, although one must recognize allowing communities take security into their own hands is a slippery slope that must be monitored.

*Policymakers and authorities must work to develop and fund community-led security strategies. Such actions will provide more legitimacy for the state at the level of the community, thus generating the social capital and trust in governance institutions that will be needed to sustain resilience and fight against violence in other domains of community life. Security policies that enable decentralized and shared policing practices dictated by communities with a sense of their own needs will be more legitimate in the eyes of residents, thus feeding back on the cooperative autonomy necessary for resilience. In the service of these aims, new ways to involve the police in activities other than security must be identified so as to improve relationships with residents that have long distrusted the police. Encouraging the community's role in resisting against the actors of violence will require a commitment to the co-production of security, as an objective to be shared between citizens and the state.*

## **TRAINING WORKSHOP PROPOSALS**

- If positive resilience can lay the foundation for greater security and successful community push-back against violence, and if building better cities enhances the aims of positive resilience, then development agencies and governments must do a better job of educating security and governance professionals about cities and how to build them in ways that enhance urban resilience capacities. Such an objective not only involves a re-thinking of the sector-specific approach to both development and violence mitigation, it also entails an appreciation of a more integrated approach to the study of cities, communities, and development. To do so requires a better understanding of urban spatial dynamics, urban design principles, and urban planning processes. We recommend a series of training workshops that bring together security experts, development officials, and urban planners who can engage with each other and with selected city mayors in the discussion of how to strengthen resilience in cities facing chronic violence. In addition to discussing the recommendations above, such workshops would provide a format for bringing in security and development

officials who work at other scales than the city, thus providing the basis for new conversations about scaling up urban resilience strategies from cities to nations to regions.

- Given our findings about the importance of starting at a small, more manageable spatial scale to identify strategies, sites, and agents of resilience, and given the limitations of many current quantitative measures for assessing violence reduction, it is important to develop new metrics and methodologies that can be used to assess and evaluate both the potential for resilience in a given city, and the impacts of any policy investments or programs developed in order to strengthen resilience and/or reduce violence. Such metrics and methodologies would not only involve ethnography, they also would build network theories, spatial dynamics, and other qualitative measures and indicators. We recommend a series of methodology workshops that expose community residents, local officials, and security or development policymakers to new techniques and methodologies for the study of resilience. Such workshops would discuss how to identify, measure, and assess resilience as well as how to link metric of resilience to the larger aims of eliminating or violence and establishing security.





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## **APPENDIX: Interview Protocol**

### Questions asked during individual interviews:

- 1) How do conditions of insecurity affect your daily life?
  - a. Have you seen changes in the provision of key urban goods (i.e. water, electricity, transportation, education, housing, food) because of the security situation?
  - b. Are you forced to change your daily routine? How?
  - c. Has the security situation in your neighborhood changed in the last several years? For better or worse? How or why?
  - d. How about in the city as a whole? Are conditions better or worse than 1 year ago? What about 5 years ago?
  - e. Do you consider the level of violence in your community to be acceptable or tolerable (or unacceptable and unbearable)? Why or why not?
  
- 2) Would you say that you or anyone in your community has been particularly successful in helping to create a more security environment? How and why?
  - a. Which actors, organizations, or institutions (including the police, the government, or elected officials) have most contributed to positively changing the security situation in your neighborhood? What about in the city as a whole?
  - b. Have any of these actors, organizations, or institutions made the security problem worse, either in your neighborhood or other parts of the city?
  - c. Are there any actors who should NOT be given responsibilities to establish security? Why?
  
- 3) Are there certain locations in your neighborhood where you feel more insecure than others?
  - a. In which places in your community do you feel most safe? Why? Describe those places.
  - b. In which places in your community do you feel more unsafe than others? Describe what makes them feel unsafe.
  - c. What about in the city as a whole? Which places are more secure? Which are less secure? Why?
  - d. When you travel to and from your home to other places (work, school, etc.) do you feel safe? What makes you feel unsafe when you are outside your home?
  - e. Even if you are in a place you consider unsafe, can you modify your behavior or rely on others to help you in order to be secure? Can you give examples? Are their limits to your abilities to create security when the larger environment is unsafe?
  
- 4) What can you do to create greater security for you and your family? For your neighborhood? For your city?
  - a. What strategies or actions on your part will contribute most to producing a more secure environment over time? Can you give examples?
  - b. Who or what makes it possible to develop and implement successful strategies and actions?
  - c. Can individuals solve the security problem on their own, or do they need collective or organizational support to be most successful? Who or what organizations will help most?
  - d. Who is most likely to create obstacles to bettering the security situation?

- 5) Do you think conditions in your neighborhood (or this city) will ever return to “normal”? Why or why not? What would that look like?
- a. Do you think that it is possible to live relatively “normally” in situations of chronic violence?
  - b. Would you say that your or your community has been *resilient* in the face of violence?
  - c. How would you define resilience?
  - d. Define what security means to you.