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DEADLY CLERICS
Blocked Ambition and the Paths to Jihad

FALL 2017
MIT CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
précis: What are the gaps in the study of civil military relations that you think political scientists should be paying attention to?

JB: I think there are three aspects to civil military relations; however, we normally focus on just the first aspect. First, there’s civil-military relations in terms of civilian control of the military. This stems back to George Washington’s pivotal act in 1783 of choos-
One of the things that attracted me to the Center’s Robert E Wilhelm fellowship, in fact, is that it is specifically intended to help bridge the gap between academia and government.

…

précis: A few months ago, President Trump shared intelligence from a Middle Eastern ally with Russia. He was strongly criticized for this behavior, but what does the legal perspective have to say on it?

JB: As a judge, I am not inclined to talk about a specific matter without knowing the facts, so I won’t. But as a general matter, the president as commander in chief and chief executive has control and authority to both classify and declassify national security information as well as to delegate to other people the authority to do so. However, what is lawful isn’t necessarily what is wise or prudent. And, where an official discloses information provided by a foreign government there is risk the foreign government may no longer share information with us, or more likely, delimit the manner in which they do so.

A classic illustration of the president’s authority in this area involves the La Belle Disco bombing in 1986 when the government of Libya bombed a disco in Berlin with the intention of killing American service personnel who were known to frequent the club. The US knew the Libyan regime was behind it because it had signals intelligence between the agents in Berlin and Tripoli. In response, the US engaged in airstrikes against Libya. Despite the fact that the intelligence was from a sensitive source and,
I gather, against the advice of his intelligence community, President Ronald Reagan decided to declassify the information to demonstrate why we were taking military action against Libya. As a matter of law, it was entirely appropriate for the president to do so as it was for the president to weigh the relative costs and benefits of giving up an intelligence source or method in support of diplomacy.

précis: Given your vast experience in both the academic and policy communities, what advice would you give to graduate students who are unsure of whether to pursue careers in academia or government?

JB: Do both if you can; they will reinforce each other. Some of the highest quality public servants I have known have been people who have rotated through both communities—like Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan who was a professor of government at Harvard. Before he was a senator, he was a senior adviser to four presidents—Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford. He was a better academic because of his practical government experience and he was a better government official because of his ability to see the bigger picture. He managed to do both and frankly, he irritated both communities because of it. It’s not risk free or consequence free and, of course, the tenure process does complicate matters.

Knowledge should inform government policy debates and not just academic ones. I’ve taught at law schools for 15 years and I’ve also spent 35 years in the government working on national security issues. When I was working on national security issues, I felt that the academic community wasn’t connecting as well as it might to the policy community and in the way that it should. One of the things that attracted me to the Center’s Robert E Wilhelm fellowship, in fact, is that it is specifically intended to help bridge the gap between academia and government. If you wish to inform the debate as an academic, then you have to figure out how to communicate in a way that is digestible for a government official—in the case of immediate problems—short, clear, statements of the problem presented followed by pros and cons and recommendations. In addition, academics have the time and inclination to address long term trends and strategic challenges that government officials generally do not. Here too, a statement of the problem followed by consideration of the options and implications is essential. And don’t forget that the process is not complete without dissemination.

Let me give you an example. I wrote a National Security Council (NSC) Process Guide in 2016 for “the incoming administration.” It identified key issues the US president should address in running the NSC. The report was non-partisan and objective and intentionally completed before the election. Among other things, it described the importance of having clear rules and guidelines for communicating with the Department of Justice and FBI, with recommendations on good process. I sent the report to the two transition teams and to the Center for Presidential Transition, which was created to advise both candidates. I will leave it to you and your readers to determine whether anyone read the report.
précis: While at CIS, what are the research issues that are on your mind and that you are hoping to work on?

JB: I’m really interested in the intersection of emerging technology and national security law. The advent of artificial intelligence has created new challenges for our national security. The law has always moved much slower than technology. At the same time, AI has huge implications for things like autonomous weapons systems as well as for intelligence purposes and we are facing new legal challenges to adapt to them. In my belief, the best way to approach this is to have process-oriented, rather than just substance-oriented, law. The substance cannot keep pace. However, a requirement for good process and accountable decision-making will ensure the right people are in the room and will bring current substantive knowledge to the issue at hand.

As an example of the law always chasing technology, in 2014, I was on the US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and we were one of the first courts to look at the application of the Fourth Amendment to the iPhone, years after the iPhone came out but also before the Supreme Court started dealing with these issues. Much of the relevant case law just did not align with contemporary technological practice. It felt very “rotary phone.” The search metaphor used by many courts and the case law at the time equated the search of a cell phone incident to arrest as akin to the search of a container, like a suitcase. But even fifty-year old judges like me know that an iPhone is much more than a communications device or container. It is a computer, a photo album, an office, a key to one’s house and life. On a continuum, a search of a phone may be more like the search of a home than a communications device. So our court abandoned old metaphors and returned to process and consideration of what was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Of course, there are drawbacks to a process-oriented reasonableness application of law. You can lose specificity and predictability, and thus stability in the law.

The advent of artificial intelligence has created new challenges for our national security. The law has always moved much slower than technology.
MIT International Policy Lab (IPL) issues third call for proposals to faculty and researchers

Dan Pomeroy/CIS

"We are very pleased with the success of this initiative so far," said faculty director Chappell Lawson, associate professor of political science. “Solving the challenges facing our country and the world is central to MIT’s mission; better connecting MIT researchers and policymakers contributes to that goal.

Engineers, scientists, and other scholars at MIT produce a great deal of research that has direct implications for policy, but it is not always in a form that helps policymakers know what to do tomorrow. We have found that many faculty members here want to have an impact on policy but don’t feel familiar enough with how the process works to do so efficiently. Helping to connect the academic and policy communities is another way MIT can fulfill its mission of helping to solve the world’s great challenges.”

In its previous call for proposals, the IPL received applications and offered support for projects with faculty members from all five Schools, helping to translate and disseminate their research to policy audiences, soliciting feedback from policymakers, and providing funding for travel to policy-oriented meetings.

Richard Samuels, Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for International Studies, said, “We are delighted to be working with colleagues across the Institute to help extend the reach of their path-breaking ideas to the policy world.”

Projects from faculty spanned a diverse set of topics, including energy and environment, international security and development, health and biology, and privacy issues.

“The IPL provides tremendous support for educating MIT faculty and researchers about how to think about the policy implications of their work,” said Elizabeth Wood, professor of Russian & Soviet history.
“I personally benefited both from the special workshops that IPL held and also from Dan Pomeroy’s expert advice and editing as I was preparing materials to take to Washington and to an international meeting in Berlin,” said Wood.

“With the support of IPL, I have been able to extend the reach of my research findings not only in the context of US policy, but also abroad,” said Elsa Olivetti, Atlantic Richfield Assistant Professor of Energy Studies in the Department of Materials Science and Engineering. “IPL’s prompt, professional, consistent support has been essential to my work, and I find they strike the perfect balance between offering constructive feedback and listening to where I feel the impact of my research will resonate most.”

“The IPL helped connect us to major players in the area of US-Russia nuclear security to discuss the technologies that we are developing here at MIT,” said Areg Danagoulian, Norman C Rasmussen Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering. “Given my non-policy background, the advice I received both directly from IPL and from the experts that the IPL connected me with was crucial to developing a strategic and efficient outreach plan.”

“The support of the IPL program and team has allowed for fantastic opportunities to identify partnerships in public health policy and to facilitate onset of new collaborations and outreach activities,” said Lydia Bourouiba, assistant professor of civil and environmental engineering, who studies respiratory disease transmission. In addition, IPL support has been particularly valuable for receiving feedback early in the process of translating scientific research results into policy recommendations.

“The IPL helped connect us to major players in the area of US-Russia nuclear security to discuss the technologies that we are developing here at MIT,” said Areg Danagoulian, Norman C Rasmussen Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering.
Rising tensions between the US and North Korea have an unsettling chance of escalating, MIT security experts said at a public forum on October 3 — but are also manageable given the right approach by US leaders.
“I think you can get inadvertent war,” said Jim Walsh, a senior research associate in MIT’s Security Studies Program (SSP) and a nuclear security expert who has visited North Korea in the past. “It’s still an unlikely event,” he added. However, he also stated, “I would remind you that improbable events do happen. ... I am more worried than I have been before.”

To keep the situation under control, the panel of three nuclear-security scholars said, the US would do well to seek further diplomatic talks with North Korea. The US should also reconcile itself to the fact that North Korea does have nuclear weapons and, for a variety of reasons, it must not expect China to address the situation decisively.

“We should certainly be talking to them,” said Walsh, who, like others on the panel, believes that North Korea’s nuclear capacity is almost certainly here to stay.

“The bad news is that denuclearization is a fantasy,” said Vipin Narang, an associate professor of political science at MIT, who has written extensively about North Korea’s nuclear program and gave a summary of the country’s current capabilities. “The good news is, deterrence can work.”

Meanwhile China—who some US leaders, including President Donald J Trump, have sometimes cited as a key actor in this scenario, given its political alignment with North Korea—seems unwilling to play a larger role in the current state of affairs.

“I think China believes that the North Koreans are developing nuclear weapons for perfectly [logical] reasons,” said Taylor Fravel, an associate professor of political science at MIT and interim director of MIT’s Center for International Studies (CIS). Fravel, a leading expert on China’s foreign-policy conflicts, added that Chinese leaders, who maintain their own nuclear arsenal, likely view North Korea’s weapons as “an insurance policy, one they [China] can see in their own history.”

The event drew a crowd of at least 225 people, packing a lecture hall in MIT’s Building 34. The three panelists all delivered prepared remarks and responded to a series of audience questions. The discussion was part of the CIS Starr Forum, a series of public discussions on world politics.

**North Korea: New arsenal, familiar strategy**

Narang gave the audience an overview of which types of missiles and nuclear payloads North Korea has developed, based on the best public knowledge available. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has publicly announced a lengthy series of tests over the course of 2017.

“He acquired nuclear weapons to avoid a US-led regime change,” Narang said, adding that the North Korean strategy is “risky, but it’s not irrational.”

Indeed, Narang emphasized, the North Korean nuclear strategy is precisely the same one used by Pakistan and, to a large degree, NATO forces during the Cold War. North Korea has seemingly developed short-range missiles capable of delivering nuclear bombs, and as of this summer, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching North America.
Indeed, Narang emphasized, the North Korean nuclear strategy is precisely the same one used by Pakistan and, to a large degree, NATO forces during the Cold War.

Both types of missiles are necessary for North Korea to achieve a kind of mutual deterrence with the US, Narang pointed out. That is, if North Korea only had shorter-range missiles and used them to deliver a nuclear bomb in, for instance, a conflict with South Korea, then South Korea’s allies—namely, the US—could respond by essentially wiping out North Korea in retaliation.

However, the presence of North Korean ICBMs that could deliver nuclear weapons to North America stands as a deterrent to such a US reply, hypothetically.
Audrey Jiajia Li, a freelance journalist and independent filmmaker based in Guangzhou, China, has been selected as the 2017 International Women’s Media Foundation (IWMF)/Elizabeth Neuffer Fellow.

Li began her seven-month fellowship as a research associate in residence at the MIT Center for International Studies (CIS) while also interning at The Boston Globe. In the spring, she will move to New York and intern at The New York Times. Li is pursuing coursework and projects to better understand the use of government propaganda on social media and its impact on the rise of ultra-nationalism in China.

Li covers current affairs in China, with a focus on politics, human rights, social justice, and freedom of speech. She first kicked off her career in journalism as a business news reporter in Shanghai, where she investigated cases of human rights violations resulting from China’s rapid economic growth. She produced and hosted an award-winning, nationally-televised program for nearly two years, where she interviewed guests about sensitive political and human rights issues. Li was also selected by the US Department of State’s Media Co-op Program to create her documentary “LA, Say Goodbye to Smog,” to inform her Chinese audience about the importance of civic engagement.

“In my observation, two real Chinas exist in parallel at the same time. One is a super power with rapid economic growth and a quick rise of living standards, while the other is a vast nation where a sizable number of people still suffer from inequality, injustice, and a lack of individual liberty. Journalists have the obligation to raise awareness about these important yet ignored issues to make my country a better place,” Li said.

The fellowship was created in memory of Elizabeth Neuffer, a correspondent for The Boston Globe and winner of the 1998 IWMF Courage in Journalism Award. Neuffer died while reporting in Iraq on May 9, 2003. In collaboration with Neuffer’s family and friends, the IWMF started this program to honor her legacy, while advancing her work in the fields of human rights and social justice.
In July 2010, the media wing of al-Qaeda interviewed the American-born jihadist\textsuperscript{1} cleric\textsuperscript{2} Anwar al-Awlaki from a secret location in Yemen. One striking element of the resulting video is that throughout, al-Awlaki’s remarks reflect the trappings of academia.
Rather than emphasizing his violent credentials, the introductory frames recount al-Awlaki’s curriculum vitae, including a BA from the University of Colorado and a masters from San Diego State University. After welcoming him, the interviewer asks what al-Awlaki’s role was in inciting Major Nidal Hasan to carry out the Fort Hood shooting in November 2009. His response? “Yes, Nidal Hasan was a student of mine and I am honored by this” (emphasis mine, na am, niḍāl baṣān min ṭuḥābī, wa anā ʿatasharaf bidhalik), revealing that when portraying himself to his fellow jihadists, al-Awlaki defines himself primarily as a scholar and teacher rather than as a fighter or dissident.

Al-Awlaki is not the only jihadist who styles himself an academic. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), has released a curriculum vitae that was vague on details but touted his PhD from the University of Baghdad and his purported reputation as a knowledgeable scholar of Islamic law. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaeda, writes prodigious tomes with scores of academic-style citations. Like any citation-obsessed academic, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one of the most prominent jihadist theoreticians, crowed about being identified in a 2006 RAND study as the most influential living jihadist thinker based on citations by featuring the study on his website. And even Usama Bin Laden, the now-deceased leader of the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, imitated the academic pretension of taking photographs in front of bookshelves to convey learned authority.

This book explores the academic culture of jihadist clerics to illuminate how jihadist ideology is produced and reproduced among the elites of the jihadist movement. Scholars of Islamic law such as Zeghal (1996, 34) understand that Muslim clerics are academics who strive for a life of pious learning, often with professional titles that exactly mirror those of academics in other settings. However, scholarship on political violence has frequently overlooked the academic identities of jihadist clerics, instead conceptualizing them primarily as religious leaders, preachers, writers, extremists, and militants. Clerics can turn to violence for a variety of reasons, but I focus on two major pathways. The first way to become a jihadist cleric is to become a jihadist first, and then a cleric later. As I show below, these jihadists-turned-clerics can be understood through existing models of lay Muslim radicalization.

The second pathway to jihadism that I describe highlights an overlooked aspect of cleric radicalization: a surprisingly mundane set of academic career pressures that can push clerics toward militant jihadist ideas. My core argument is that blocked ambition—the inability of an actor to achieve a substantial, deeply-held goal—nudges clerics toward jihadism. Blocked ambition is a common human experience and has been suggested as a cause of radicalization in other contexts. When the ambition of a cleric to become an academic is blocked by failure on the cleric job market or by state repression, those clerics whose ambitions are blocked are at much greater risk of becoming jihadist. To put the argument colloquially, I offer a disgruntled-graduate-student theory of jihad.

The divide is stark: clerics who find gainful employment in state-dominated academic, religious, and political institutions in the Middle East are extremely unlikely to preach violent jihad, while those who work outside of this system are more likely to end up preaching violence. Of course, it may be the case that some clerics with state-funded jobs secretly endorse jihadism, but secretly held beliefs are not my concern. Instead, I seek to understand those clerics who openly preach and incite political violence.
Modern jihadism is a movement founded around an ideology that claims to hearken back to the founding doctrines of Islam but is in fact a relatively recent phenomenon.

Proving that some clerics become jihadists because their academic ambitions are blocked is not an easy task. In the chapters that follow, I demonstrate that indicators of blocked ambition in the lives of would-be clerics—weak graduate school networks, non-academic jobs, and removal from academic posts—are highly correlated with whether clerics preach jihadist ideas. Of course, there are other plausible explanations for this outcome: some would-be clerics develop jihadist ideas early and never seek a traditional academic career, and even if they do, they may be shut out of traditional academic circles precisely because their ideas are already too radical. Sorting out the various pathways to jihadism is difficult, and even though I provide a substantial amount of new quantitative and qualitative data on jihadist clerics, the evidence I can provide remains circumstantial. However, it represents the outer frontier of what is currently knowable about why some clerics advocate jihadism.

Understanding the rise of modern jihadism

Few ideologies have influenced international affairs in the 21st century more than militant jihadism. Modern jihadism is a movement founded around an ideology that claims to hearken back to the founding doctrines of Islam but is in fact a relatively recent phenomenon. At its core, jihadism is violent Islamism. It is Islamism because jihadist ideology holds that society should be governed by Islamic doctrines (according to jihadists’ interpretation of Islam). It is inherently violent because jihadists hold that violence is a legitimate means for achieving the society and government they desire. Modern jihadists reach these conclusions by drawing a doctrinal connection between the foundational Islamic concept of God’s sovereignty and the violent imposition of the society and government that jihadists believe God desires. For jihadists, God’s sovereignty requires that only God’s laws be followed, so any form of government that does not take God’s laws as its own should be resisted and replaced, violently if necessary. From this foundational claim, jihadist apologists work to develop interpretations of Islamic law that permit violence in a variety of circumstances to achieve jihadists’ political goals, though jihadists differ about precisely how these goals should be pursued and what form an ideal Islamic government should take.

Modern jihadism has been developing by fits and starts over the past century. Abu al-Ala Mawdudi (1903–1979), Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949), and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) each developed and refined ideas that would come to constitute the framing principles of modern jihadism. Still, modern jihadism did not really come into existence until the intellectual development provided by Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989) and the violent Egyptian Islamism of the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, Hegghammer dates the dawn of the modern jihadist era to as recently as 1979 or 1980 (Hegghammer 2010a, 3).

Observers at the end of the 20th century might be forgiven for overlooking signs that names like “Bin Laden” and “The Islamic State” would become household terms. Data from the Google n-grams project shows that the term “jihad” was relatively infrequent in English-language books until 1950, when its use began to rise dramatically. By the eve of the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and targets in Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania, the term “jihad” was being used seven times as often as in 1950. Usama bin Laden’s name does not register until 1998, the year in which he directed attacks against the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and came to the attention of the American public for the first time. Even then, Flagg Miller writes that, “Bin Laden’s role in global affairs was not immediately apparent to Muslim audiences familiar with his career” (Miller 2015, 9). Then, in 2001, the September 11th attack
Today, militant jihadism is perhaps the most widely influential revolutionary ideology in the international system, having shaped world events over the last twenty years and still posing a remarkably durable challenge to the existing international order.

Nationalist strains of jihadism have fueled tenacious territorial conflicts in Palestine, Chechnya, and elsewhere. Transnational jihadists have called for the complete overthrow of the existing international system and virtually all of the norms which undergird it (Mendelsohn 2009), and have followed through with dramatic acts of political violence. As a result, US foreign policy has been dominated by the specter of jihadism in a way that few anticipated even during the tense weeks following the September 11 attacks. By October of 2001, the US military was striking targets in Afghanistan in a war that would officially last thirteen years. In 2003, the United States launched a second war against Iraq, lasting almost nine years. Although the initial impetus for war was not to root out jihadists, the administration of President George W Bush consistently referred to Iraq as a front in the “war on terror” and the power vacuum that ensued after American forces toppled the government of Saddam Hussein was filled, in part, by a tenacious jihadist insurgency aimed at both ousting American forces and settling scores with Shia militias.

Even after the official end of the Iraq war, the remnants of this insurgency haunt US foreign policy interests in the Middle East. After apparent defeat in 2007, an insurgent group named the Islamic State of Iraq grasped the opportunities offered by the neighboring Syrian civil war, reinvented itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and has declared itself a jihadist state under Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. A 2014 RAND corporation study reports that “beginning in 2010, there was a rise in the number of salafi-jihadist groups and fighters, particularly in Syria and North Africa. There was also an increase in the number of attacks perpetrated by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates” (Jones 2014, x). Despite US efforts to pivot away from the Middle East after fifteen years of fighting jihadists, the next decade of American foreign policy is likely to be as dominated by counter-jihadism as the last.

What explains the rise and persistence of modern jihadism? Broadly speaking, scholars have taken two approaches to answering this question. The first approach attempts to develop general theories to explain rebellion and then applies these theories to understand jihadist movements (see, for example Della Porta 2013). A key debate in this scholarship is whether rebellion is primarily caused by the grievances of those who rebel or by structural conditions that provide opportunities for violent collective action. This approach results in parsimonious theories of rebellion, but these explanations sometimes struggle to explain specific aspects of jihadist violence. A second approach starts from the specific circumstances and details of jihadist movements and traces the apparent causes of their rise using the tools of history, sociology, and anthropology. This work is especially well-attuned to the nuance and texture of jihadists and their social movements, but these explanations are often contextually specific and refer to unique historical moments and the idiosyncrasies of individuals.
My argument in this book draws on both of these approaches. I explain the choices of some Muslim clerics to preach jihad using a theory of blocked ambition that hearkens back to general theories of grievance and rebellion, but I highlight particular forms of blocked ambition that are specific to the context of modern jihadism.

Despite US efforts to pivot away from the Middle East after fifteen years of fighting jihadists, the next decade of American foreign policy is likely to be as dominated by counter-jihadism as the last.
NOTES

1 Jihadist ideology is a set of ideas organized around the central claim that Islam should be the organizing principle of human affairs and that violence is an acceptable means for pursuing this goal. I use the terms “jihadi” and “jihadist” to denote a person, thing, or organization that is associated with jihadist ideology. These are the most common terms for these individuals and organizations in academic literature, and are literal translations of the term that these actors prefer. Hegghammer (2009) and Hegghammer (2010a) propose alternative terms based on the variety of jihadists goals and methods.

2 There is no uncontested definition of the term “cleric” when applied to Muslim religious elites. For my purposes, a cleric is a person who produces Islamic literature and who may or may not claim a lineage of scholarly authority. I defend my definition in detail in Chapter 2.

3 It appears that al-Awlaki is inflating his credentials. He started, but never finished a degree at San Diego State University.


6 The Google n-grams project tracks the frequency of words in approximately 15 percent of all English-language books ever published. I obtain data on the use of the word “jihad” from this url: https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?direct_url=t1%3B%2Cjihad%3B%2C0, archived.

7 Google search trends for “bin laden” show a dramatic spike on the day of his death: https://www.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&q=bin%20laden, archived.


REFERENCES


briefings

New initiative supported by $3.7 million in grants

Resource Development

The MIT Security Studies Program at the Center for International Studies in the School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences, and Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs launched today a collaborative program to mentor the next generation of foreign policy scholars.
The Project on Grand Strategy, Security, and Statecraft is made possible with support from the Charles Koch Foundation: a $1,846,200 grant to MIT and one for $1,853,900 to Harvard Kennedy School (HKS).

The Security Studies Program and the Belfer Center have a long-standing commitment to training security experts and publishing relevant research. Fellows in the Project on Grand Strategy, Security, and Statecraft will each spend one year at MIT and one year at Harvard—providing an introduction to the senior security scholars, visitors, and graduate students at both institutions. A joint speaker series will further cement the cooperation between the two programs. MIT will also host visiting scholars from the policy community to better connect scholarship to statecraft.

“So long as there is no world government to protect states from each other,” explains Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of the MIT Security Studies Program, “conflicts of interest will occur and governments will compete for power and influence. Military force is one tool of this competition. In this environment, the United States and other major powers must mobilize different capabilities and devise effective strategies to protect their home territory and other vital interests, but without jeopardizing their long-term prosperity or compromising core political values.”

“The fellows program will build a community of scholars dedicated to fundamental research on the most critical security problems of our time, and to bringing the fruits of that research to public policy,” Posen continues. “We greatly appreciate the contribution of the Charles Koch Foundation to this important endeavor, and the foundation’s recognition of the enduring importance of security scholarship.”

According to Stephen Walt, Harvard Kennedy School’s Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs Kennedy School, “States are more likely to make sound strategic choices and learn from past mistakes if there is a well-informed and wide-ranging debate on these issues. A healthy democracy therefore requires a diverse and well-trained community of independent experts who understand strategy, security, and statecraft and whose work can inform elites and public debates on foreign policy, and especially decisions to use force. Military force and other instruments of national power may be essential to preserving national security, but understanding the limits of armed force and the complex consequences that accompany its use is equally important.”

“The country is in a critical period of self-reflection about its proper role in the world and how the US can best meet its security needs going forward,” said Charles Koch Foundation Vice President William Ruger. “We are excited to support Harvard and MIT’s world-class vision for engaging the next generation of foreign policy scholars as they develop the research and ideas that will inform this discussion.”

In addition, the foundation grants will support the research of graduate students in security studies at both institutions. Taken together, these features of the Project on
Grand Strategy, Security, and Statecraft will significantly enhance the connection of the academy to foreign and security policy, and broaden the national security debate to include a more diverse set of views. The Charles Koch Foundation has made similar grants or awards to schools including Notre Dame, Tufts University, the University of California at San Diego, and other prestigious institutions.

“So long as there is no world government to protect states from each other,” explains Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of the MIT Security Studies Program, “conflicts of interest will occur and governments will compete for power and influence. Military force is one tool of this competition. ey can about the event.
In this new era of American politics, discussion of the civil-military relations of the Trump administration remains relatively absent from public discourse, relegated instead to a handful of specialists raising the alarm.
The mainstream perspective on President Trump’s treatment of the military highlights Trump’s penchant to venerate the troops and “his” generals while simultaneously praising those very military men for being the “adults in the room.” Given these proclivities, Trump-era civil-military relations deserves a more comprehensive scholarly diagnosis.

The Trump administration has exhibited at least four distinct civil-military patterns—relying on men in uniform for advice, receiving some notable pushback from active-duty and ex-military men, delegating military decision-making to the military, and relying on the military as the main tool of foreign policy. These behaviors raise red flags about the health of our foreign policy, security-making, military effectiveness, and democracy. In the subsequent sections, I leverage the political science literature on civil-military relations to explain if and why we should be worried.

**Appointing military men to civilian roles**

Perhaps the most obvious pattern is Trump’s preference for military experience in his top political appointments. Since his inauguration, Trump has surrounded himself with a cabal of generals: he appointed ex-Marine General James Mattis for the position of Secretary of Defense, pegged ex-Marine general John Kelly to head the Department of Homeland Security before moving him closer to the White House as his Chief of Staff, and plucked active-duty Army general HR McMaster to be his National Security Advisor, replacing notorious ex-three-star Michael Flynn.

The concern regarding this cabal of generals that may be the most alarming (and most sensationalist) is the possibility of a coup, which is still quite unlikely, considering America’s robust norms of democratic civilian control. Instead, the real danger lies in the dominance of the military viewpoint to the detriment of other perspectives in crafting national security and domestic policy.

Numerous studies have posited how military experience can develop biases or worldviews that influence individuals’ recommendations and policy preferences. Most classically, civil-military relations as a line of study has long grappled with the concept of the “military mind.” The father of modern military thought, Carl Clausewitz, derived a set of qualities that most military men, who are exposed to the special circumstances of war, must have or develop out of necessity: a “military genius.”¹ The famed Samuel Huntington similarly claimed that military professionals were likely to share preferences resulting from their profession, such as a preference for rigidity and conservativeness.²

More recent empirical work has outlined two main reasons why the overrepresentation of a military perspective in the top levels of the government should give us pause.

Shared formative experiences, such as shared combat theaters, could consciously or unconsciously color a military officer’s perception of threats and preferences for doctrine.³ As a hypothetical example, all three main appointees still in the government all came through the ranks roughly at the same time, and all deployed to Iraq, sharing experiences such as witnessing their fellow soldiers being violently targeted by Iranian-backed proxies. It would be understandable for these experiences to develop a firm bias against Iran; it would be difficult to believe that these men are not reminded of their personal experiences when contemplating what to recommend to Trump about priorities for military strategy in the Middle East. And indeed, a coalition has

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Sara Plana is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science focusing on the balancing act between military effectiveness and abuse of power.
formed among Trump’s inner circle of (ex-) military men supporting a more hawkish stance towards Iran.\(^4\)

Not only do these men share combat experiences, but they also share a lifetime of exposure to military organizational interests and biases. A well-established explanation for the start of World War I argues that many European militaries at the time had organizational interests in pursuing an offensive strategy, which led to a spiral of insecurity that only needed a spark to develop into the full conflagration that followed.\(^5\) Scholars have disputed whether military leaders are organizationally predisposed to prefer using force,\(^6\) but at the very least these works reveal how military assumptions and recommendations, when left unchallenged by alternative perspectives from civilian leaders,\(^7\) can sometimes lead to terrible outcomes.

Kelly’s movement from his predominantly security-oriented role as DHS Secretary to a position with a much broader political portfolio as chief of staff highlights another emerging danger: normalizing the military’s involvement in areas that are not usually within its professional purview. An ex-officer who has spent insufficient time as a civilian—like Kelly—may carry over cultural preferences specific to his military experience, which may be ill suited for civilian policymaking. Empowering such a man perpetuates a recent pattern in American politics wherein military leaders are entrusted with policymaking more so than civilian leaders.\(^8\) This evokes Harold Lasswell’s warnings at the beginning of the Cold War that a garrison state may be forming, in which the military is seen as the most dominant actor in society. In his seminal article in 1941, he argued that more dominance of military matters over economic and political life would sow the seeds of our own democracy’s peril.\(^9\)

Resistance from active-duty and ex-military officers

Since the Trump administration took office, the press periodically fixates on instances in which current or former military officers challenge or outright contradict rhetoric from the White House or the President. For instance, in August, Mattis claimed the US military would still consider transgender candidates until his office finished his assessment on the issue, undermining Trump’s tweets announcing a ban on transgender service in the military.\(^10\) In another series of high profile examples, when asked about options to tackle the North Korea crisis, Mattis and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joe Dunford have on numerous occasions claimed military options take a backseat to diplomacy, despite Trump’s multiple tweets and statements indicating otherwise.\(^11\)

In the past, the appropriateness of openly ignoring or defying the president has been fiercely debated, from General Douglas MacArthur’s notorious obstinacy to the Revolt of the Generals in 2006, when retired generals coalesced and called for then-Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s resignation over the mishandling of the Iraq war. In this case, however, the dominant perspective of this behavior has been a positive one: most observers have acquiesced to or in some cases even praised such challenges.\(^12\)

Both perspectives are misleading. It does not necessarily matter whether military officers resist or contradict their civilian leaders—which has happened to varying degrees in every administration—but rather in what ways and concerning which issues. Some scholars argue that resistance throughout the chain of command, either through appealing to the public or Congress or through more active defiance within
The military bureaucracy, can undermine an administration’s strategic effectiveness by hampering the implementation of foreign policies that require a military arm. Others argue that too frequent resistance of any kind can undermine the professionalism of the military and, therefore, its own effectiveness in the long-term by normalizing challenges to civilian control of policymaking.

However, despite occasional rhetorical opposition to presidential statements, there is no indication yet that these officers have actively resisted implementing an official policy—dampening the possibility that these concerns apply to the Trump case. In many ways, the situation is quite to the contrary: Mattis, Kelly, and McMaster have been paraded out to actively defend administration policies. In this way, the administration betrays another potentially dangerous habit: it borrows the legitimacy of the military to sell its political policies.

Delegating military decisions to the military

Trump’s habit of handing most security decision-making to the military is, in some ways, a welcome change. One of the main criticisms of the Obama administration was that it micro-managed security policy. Unlike Obama, Trump quickly allowed the military to manage and expand its drone strike program and opened up its rules of engagement in multiple theaters, without the same White House-level approvals that his predecessor required. However, experts still differ on which of the two approaches (military-dominant or civilian-dominant) best serves American security policy.

First, this loosening of the military’s reigns may give us pause for many of the same reasons that appointing military men to civilian positions in the administration should. So-called civilian supremacists from Clausewitz to Eliot Cohen argue that careful civilian oversight is necessary to connect military means with strategic aims, especially given the military’s aforementioned organizational and experience-based biases.

The Soldier and the State embodies the counter-argument: military supremacists (a term coined by Peter Feaver) from Huntington to Michael Desch believe that a country’s security policy would be best served by allowing the military, as a professional manager of violence, to formulate its own strategies. Indeed, they argue that undue civilian interference in military matters shortchanges military expertise and risks military ineffectiveness. This viewpoint has two major shortcomings. It falsely assumes that the line between what is political and what is military is clear in all cases. For example, the US’s recent counterinsurgency experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan—which rely on careful rules of engagement at a tactical level—illustrate the ways that seemingly purely military matters can affect strategic success. It also assumes, contrary to civilian supremacists, that the military will perceive these political aims correctly, ignoring the vast evidence that military men may be clouded by biases and organizational interests when crafting recommendations for how to implement a certain policy directive.

Regardless about where in this debate you land, Trump is running the ultimate Huntingtonian experiment and we may soon see whether we are indeed better off with a fully autonomous military.
Privileging military means

Time and again, Trump has shown a preference for military means in both foreign and domestic policy. From authorizing increased troop numbers in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, to continued insistence on “military options” to counter North Korea, to the rumors of an increase in our nuclear arsenal, Trump has clearly shown an avid interest in the use of firepower over other foreign policy tools. Domestically, he reversed an Obama-era ban on military-grade weapons to the police.

There are several drawbacks to a military-dominated governance style. First, leading with the pointy end may not always be the right strategy. In fact, a prominent school of thought in international relations argues that, under certain conditions, relying on aggressive signals can backfire, leading to a security dilemma between actors who by pursuing their own security can inadvertently threaten each other’s security. Trump’s preference for perpetually signaling aggression may create more enemies than it deters.

Second, the President’s dismissal of non-military means as illegitimate removes a key pillar of the US’s ability to secure itself and keep other actors in the world away from the brink of war. Trump’s disdain for diplomatic options—as manifested by his downsizing of the US foreign service and reduction of the State Department’s budget—will handicap US efforts to prevent crisis escalation. What effects are Trump’s statements dismissing diplomacy having on the probability of escalation in the standoff over North Korea? The next time India and Pakistan come close to the nuclear cliff, will the US be empowered to step in, mediate, and deftly deescalate as it has done many times before?

Which of these developments is the most worrying? The answer depends on the outcome you most care about: the health of our democracy, the strength of military professionalism, or the US’s security.

Trump’s civil-military relations challenges the health of our democracy in one important, underappreciated way: the highest echelons of decision-making are dominated by a single unelected viewpoint. Although civil-military scholars may still not agree on the exact nature of the cultural differences between civilians and the military, no one believes there is no difference. Therefore, the military monopoly over the formulation of foreign policy, security strategy, and even, on occasion, domestic policy could lead to patterns of policy output that do not match the popular will.

Observers who have previously sounded the alarm about military resistance to civilian directives can sleep easy, but worries about eroding military professionalism may persist given the administration’s habit of using military men as mouthpieces, exploiting a popular respect for the uniform for political gain.

Finally, and most worryingly, Trump’s civil-military style threatens US and global security in a few meaningful ways. The under-management of the military’s behavior can at the least put soldiers in danger for ill-defined or politically irrelevant goals and at the worst lead to strategic failures and a deterioration of US security. The administration’s penchant for military solutions most directly threatens the US’s ability to peacefully navigate crises that threaten it directly as well as the stability of the world.
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13 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen And Leadership In Wartime (Simon and Schuster, 2002).


IPL sends delegation to UN’s Minamata convention

The MIT International Policy Lab (IPL) sent representatives to participate as observers to the first Conference of Parties (COP-1) to the Minamata Convention on Mercury, through a delegation led by Noelle Selin, associate professor in the MIT Institute for Data, Systems and Society and the Department of Earth, Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences. The first conference of the convention, sponsored by the United Nations Environment Programme, was held in Geneva, Switzerland, in September. Selin’s research focuses on understanding of how mercury, a toxic pollutant, travels and cycles in the environment, under various policy scenarios. The delegation from the MIT International Policy Lab consisted of Noelle Selin; and Amanda Giang, Helene Angot, and Sae Yun Kwon, all postdoctoral associates at MIT.

Thirty years of Seminar XXI

For more than three decades, Seminar XXI has offered an educational program for senior military officers, government officials, and executives in nongovernmental organizations in the national security policy community. In 1985, MIT became involved with the project under the direction of MIT professor Suzanne Berger and in 1986 Seminar XXI officially began as an educational experiment. The program is hosted in the Washington, DC, region, and is designed to provide a unique educational perspective and to afford an opportunity for frank and challenging exchanges of ideas between policymakers, university scholars, and Seminar XXI Fellows. This year’s sessions covered a range of topics that included: Religion, Identity Politics and Civil Wars; Iran, Turkey, and Israel; Realism, Liberalism, and US-China Relations; National Economies in a Globalized World.

Starr Forums

The Center hosted a series of public talks including: The Trump-Putin Phenomenon, with guest speakers Garry Kasparov (Human Rights Foundation) and Julia Ioffe (The Atlantic); North Korea: MIT Experts Consider the Options, with MIT experts Taylor Fravel, Vipin Narang, and Jim Walsh; Syria: Which Way Forward?, with Steven Simon (Amherst College) and Robert Ford (former ambassador to Syria), moderated by Steve Van Evera (MIT); Warnings, a book about the future of national security, threatening technologies, the US economy, and possibly the fate of civilization, with author Richard Clark SM ’79 (former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism for the United States) and Joel Brenner (MIT); Rebel Power: Why National Movements Compete, Fight, and Win, with author Peter Krause ’11 (Boston College) and Roger Petersen (MIT). All Starr Forums are available to view in their entirety on the Center’s YouTube channel.
CIS mourns death of Harvard professor Calestous Juma

World-renowned Kenyan author and Harvard Kennedy School professor Calestous Juma died on Friday, December 15, 2017. Juma was a MIT DUSP MLK Visiting Professor for 2014-2015. His latest book: *Innovation and Its Enemies: Why People Resist New Technologies*, was published by Oxford University Press in 2016. “Calestous was that rarest of intellectuals—one who put his ideas into practice, and did so with a big, generous heart, filled with warmth and laughter. We enjoyed working with him immensely. His work and ideals will be a strong legacy for Africa and the developing world,” said CIS executive director and principal research scientist John Tirman.

MISTI media contest

The MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI)—MIT’s pioneering international education program —asked the 700-plus students who studied and worked abroad this summer to submit photos and short videos showcasing the ways in which MIT is making the world a better place through the MISTI program. From Chile to China, current MISTI students submitted one-minute videos and photographs focusing on their international projects and their experiences with different cultures. MISTI announced the contest winners via social media. Video winners received $300 and photo winners received $50.

In memoriam: Raymond Frankel, MIT ’43

The Security Studies Program announced the passing of Raymond Frankel, MIT ’43. Frankel was a supporter, counselor, and friend of the program for many years. He conceived of and funded the Frankel MIT Global Policy Fund, which underwrites the program’s efforts to bring its research to policy audiences, including the biennial Congressional Staff Seminar. As an undergraduate, Frankel was elected President of the Debating Society in 1941. He served in the US Navy in the Pacific in World War II, contributed to the birth of the State of Israel, became an early venture capitalist at the dawn of solid state electronics, and then moved into a successful career in asset management. He was an inveterate and intrepid traveler: when he wanted to know more about another country, he visited it, regardless of its politics.

Joint Seminar on South Asian Politics

The Joint Seminar on South Asian Politics, co-sponsored by MIT, Brown University, and Harvard University, explores the region with leading experts. Fall events included: Arjun Subramaniam (Visiting Fellow, Harvard Asia Center) on *War and Conflict in Contemporary India*; Tara Beteille (World Bank) on *The Contentious Politics of Teacher Transfers in India: A Way Forward*; and Soledad Artiz Prillaman (Harvard University) on *When Women Mobilize: Dissecting India’s Gender Gap in Political Representation*.
PhD candidate Marsin Alshamary presented “Tilly goes to Baghdad: How the War with Da’esh can create a Shi’a State” at the Project on Middle East Political Science’s Shi’a Politics in a Changing Middle East workshop in October. Forthcoming paper in Project on Middle East Political Science series.

Associate Professor of Political Science Taylor Fravel (with PhD candidate Fiona Cunningham) presented “Chinese Views of Nuclear Escalation” at the George Washington University in September. He also presented “Life on the Great Power Frontier” (with David Edelstein) at the American Political Science Association Annual Conference in September.

SSP Senior Adviser Jeanne Guillemin’s book Hidden Atrocities: Japanese Germ Warfare and American Obstruction was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize. On September 13, she presented her book at the New York University School of Medicine Division of Medical Ethics Colloquium. In September, she was an invited participant in Washington DC at the National Academy of Sciences Symposium of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Programs for the Next Twenty Years. On December 12th, she gave a presentation based on material from the book in a Spotlight Seminar at the National Defense University (NDU). On December 13, she gave one of four presentations on Japanese CBW during World War II and Allied post-war intelligence responses at a workshop on Chemical and Biological weapons, co-sponsored by the Monterey Institute’s James Martin Center and the NDU Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

PhD candidate **Andrew Miller** was named a National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Graduate Research Fellow. He also received a grant from J-PAL’s Crime and Violence Initiative for research on citizen-police cooperation in Lagos, Nigeria.

PhD candidate **Kacie Miura** was awarded a Joint PhD Research Fellowship by the China Confucius Studies Program to do research for her dissertation at Peking University’s School of International Studies for the 2017-2018 academic year.

PhD candidate **Cullen Nutt** won the ISA Intelligence Studies Section Best Student Paper Prize for his work, “Seek, And Ye Shall Find: The Dynamic Effects of Previous Failure on Detecting Nuclear Programs,” which he presented at the annual ISA conference in Baltimore in February. He will receive the award and a monetary prize at the next ISA conference in April 2018.

In November, PhD candidate **Rachel Esplin Odell** was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies at Waseda University in Tokyo, Japan, where she conducted research for her dissertation case study on Japan’s maritime jurisdictional claims and interpretations of the law of the sea. In October, she presented “US Freedom of Navigation Operations as Strategic Norm-Shaping: Theory Development and Preliminary Empirical Analysis,” at the annual conference jointly sponsored by ISA’s International Security Studies Section (ISSS) and APSA’s International Security and Arms Control Section (ISAC), held at American University.

PhD candidate **Sara Plana** presented her work “Loyalty Can’t be Bought: Explaining Military Defections during Civilian Uprisings” to faculty and graduate students from the US and Europe at the Olympia Summer Academy and graduated from the Academy’s Conflict and Political Violence course in Nafplio, Greece, in July.

Ford International Professor of Political Science **Barry Posen** spoke at the seminar on US Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations at the Center for Transatlantic Studies at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies in Oslo, Norway on October 9. In June, he was a panelist at “Allies, Partners and Rivals—And European Strategic Autonomy,” at the Egmont Institute in Brussels, Belgium. In November, he appeared on bigthink.com presenting “America is Preventing Nuclear Attacks in All the Wrong Ways” which can be viewed here. On August 29, he was quoted in WBUR’s Cognoscenti “On Afghanistan, Trump Should Have Gone With His Gut.” He also made an appearance on WBUR’s Radio Open Source on September 14 talking about “Mutually Assured Madness: Rethinking our Nuclear Nightmare.”
Ford International Professor of Political Science Ben Ross Schneider presented “Coalitions and Contention in the Politics of Education Reform,” at the Lemann Dialogue at the University of Illinois in November. He also presented “Politics, Institutions, and Diversified Business Groups: Comparisons across Developed Countries,” at the Harvard Business School. In June, he presented “Productivity and the Puzzle of Education Politics,” at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow.

Associate Professor of Political Science David Singer presented “Attitudes Toward Internal and Foreign Migration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in China” to the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto in November.

Ford Professor of Political Science Kathy Thelen has been awarded an honorary doctorate (honoris causa) by the London School of Economics in December.

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précis  n. a concise summary of essential points, statements, or facts.

précis is published twice each academic year in order to familiarize readers with the work of the Center for International Studies at MIT.

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