Welcome, everyone. I'm Richard Samuels, a professor of political science at MIT, and director of the Center for International Studies. It's barely one week since the inauguration of President Biden and Vice President Harris, as everyone knows, and we're all very well aware that most of our national attention has focused on things domestic in the United States-- COVID, inequality, insurrection, impeachment, a whole raft of critical issues. It's a very full plate. And of course, in the meantime, the world has not stood still, either, and foreign affairs have never stopped being a priority. Climate change, regional conflicts, nuclear proliferation, China's rise-- the list is long, and it's growing, and it's complex. And we're here today to begin to address some of these issues.

Let me just say that, for the past 15 years, thanks to the vision of a generous alumnus, Robert Wilhelm, the Center for International Studies has been able to host distinguished individuals who have held senior positions in public life from the United States and from around the world. And these visitors, retired foreign ministers, one of whom is with us today, a former prime minister, retired US military commanders, other high-ranking government officials, NGO leaders have all engaged with our faculty and with our students for up to a year each, enriching our intellectual community and the world beyond. And I'm delighted that Bob Wilhelm has zoomed in today to hear from a group of Wilhelm alumni, who will share with us their views of President Biden's foreign policy challenges from the perspectives of their own countries or of the regions of their considerable expertise-- India, Israel, Mexico, and China.

So let me introduce to you our speakers in the order in which they'll speak. And then I'll get out of everyone's way. Lourdes Melgar, who is our first speaker, I'm delighted to report is an MIT political science PhD. She was a member of Mexico's Foreign Service from 1997 to 2005, and went on to serve as Mexico's Deputy Secretary of Energy for Hydrocarbons, where she played a key role in Mexico's historic energy reform.
She's a research affiliate at MIT Center for Collective Intelligence, and a non-resident fellow at the Center for Energy Studies at the Baker Institute. She also holds positions on the advisory boards of the National Resource Governance Institute, the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations, and Voz Experta, an organization that promotes women experts. She was a Wilhelm fellow from 2016 to 2017, and twice has been included on the Forbes list of the 100 most powerful women in Mexico.

Naomi Chazan was our very first Wilhelm fellow, in 2004. She arrived at MIT having served as the Deputy Speaker of the Israeli Knesset. As a legislature, she championed the causes of human rights, women's rights, and consumer protection. Later, she served as president of the New Israel Fund. She's currently dean of the School of Government and Society at the Academic College of Tel Aviv-Yaffo, and director of the Center for the Advancement of Women in the Public Sphere at the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem. She earned her BA and MA at Columbia University, and her PhD at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Shivshankar Menon was a Wilhelm fellow in the spring of 2015, having served as national security advisor to the prime minister of India from January 2010 to May of 2014, and previously as India's foreign secretary from October 2006 to August of 2009. A career diplomat, he served as ambassador and high commissioner to Sri Lanka, to China, and to Pakistan, and he was also a member of India's Atomic Energy Commission and served in India's mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency. In 2010, he was chosen by Foreign Policy magazine as one of India's top 100 global thinkers.

And Paul Heer is a distinguished fellow at the Center for the National Interest. He served for 30 years in the US government, having worked as an analytic manager and member of the Central Intelligence Agency's Senior Analytic Service prior to becoming the national intelligence officer for East Asia, a position he held from 2007 to 2015. Dr. Heer received the CIA's distinguished career intelligence medal and the DNI's national intelligence distinguished service medal, as well. He earned his PhD in diplomatic history from the George Washington University, and is the author of an important book in that field, *Mr. X and the Pacific-- George Kennan and American Policy in East Asia*, which was published in 2018 by Cornell University.
Press. Paul was a Wilhelm fellow at the center in 2015 to 2016.

So without further ado, let me turn this back over to Lourdes. And we look forward to everyone's remarks. And welcome back, all of our Wilhelm fellows. Thank you.

LOURDES MELGAR:

Greetings from Mexico. It is an honor to participate in this virtual Starr Forum with other Wilhelm fellows. Thank you very much, Professor Samuels and CSIS for the invitation. And also thank you to Mr. Wilhelm for the opportunity of being a Wilhelm fellow. As a Mexican and a former career diplomat, I am grateful that the era of Mexico bashing and wall-building is over. It is refreshing to see institution, able civil servants, diplomacy back, as well as fact-based, science-based policymaking.

President Biden is most familiar with Central America— I mean, with Latin America and the Caribbean. As vice president during the Obama administration, he established the foundations of cooperation for the hemisphere, built around shared responsibility, respect, and partnership. He headed the high-level economic dialogue between Mexico and the United States, was the architect of a novel approach to address the deeper roots of poverty, violence and corruption in the region, particularly in Central America, oversaw the restoration of diplomatic ties with Cuba, agreed on a global agenda with Brazil. Yet, the Trump administration destroyed most of these foundations. As expressed in President Biden article in the Americas Quarterly in 2018, he is aware of the level of destruction done by the Trump administration, and the need for US leadership to support the region in realizing its full potential.

The task ahead is daunting. President Biden comes to office as the coronavirus pandemic is wreaking havoc. The Americas leads by far in terms of confirmed cases and deaths. The economic impact is setting the region back at least over a decade, with a decline, on average, for Latin America of GDP of around 8%, unemployment rates rising over 10%. 40 million people will join the ranks of poverty, and according to ECLAC, this is the worst crisis the region is facing in 120 years.

In addition, the political landscape has changed since 2016, with the rise of populist governments, the decline of the liberal international world order, and a geopolitical reconfiguration that is redefining the balance of power at the regional level, with a growing presence and influence of China and Russia. Mexico provides a case in
point about how much has changed over the past four years and the challenges ahead for the Biden administration.

The first challenge is the similarities in terms of style, priorities, and values between the two heads of state. President Lopez Obrador, a populist that arrived to power in December 2018, established a great personal relationship with Mr. Trump. He was one of the last world leaders to recognize Biden's victory in the election. And yet, on the second day in office, Biden called both his North American partners, Justin Trudeau, too.

And with Mexico, the conversation centered on migration and on coordination to combat the COVID pandemic, which is out of control in Mexico. It is worth recalling that, since 1990, Mexico and the United States have succeeded in establishing an orderly approach to address the bilateral relations. Each topic was tackled on its own merit, without polluting other issues.

Under the Trump administration, this was undone. Two issues dominated the agenda and were negotiated under duress, migration and trade. In terms of migration, the most despicable chapter was written with families being separated at the border and children being caged. Under President Lopez Obrador, to appease Mr. Trump, Mexico became the wall, sending the Mexican National Guard to our borders to stop the flow of Central American caravans, and becoming, in fact, a third safe country.

On his first day in office, President Biden halted the construction of the wall and sent an immigration bill to Congress to modernize the immigration system, providing a pathway to citizenship and strengthening labor protections of migrant workers, prioritizing smart border controls, addressing root causes of migration, and supporting asylum seekers. The bill, of course, needs to become a law in the United States, but the bill touches on central elements of the bilateral relations, migration and the legal venue for 11 million of Mexican hardworking people who contribute to the US economy and society, including, of course, Dreamers, and the development of Central America with the allocation of $4 billion over the next four years conditioned to their ability to reduce endemic corruption, violence, and poverty.

The new approach on migration will restore the respect of human rights and
facilitate the search of joint solutions to a complex problem, which is likely to gain importance as the economic crisis deepens in the region. Although both presidents share the goals of bringing development to Central America Northern Triangle, it is unlikely that President Lopez Obrador will support policies that he views as mingling in the internal affairs of a country. The president is particularly concerned about any US attempt to pressure Mexico on issues related to anti-corruption policies, transparency, or electoral results. President Lopez Obrador's first and only trip abroad was to Washington, DC in the midst of the US electoral process to sign the USMCA, without the presence of Prime Minister Trudeau, by the way.

Yet, the treaty he claims to support and is supposed to be the motor of economic recovery for Mexico and North America could become a major source of contention, as a central element is the rule of law, and the compliance with the treaty shocks with some of his policy redesign. As examples, I would mention first of all the changes in energy policy and the attempts to undermine North American investments, which he has been trying to do a complete overhaul of the energy reform and enacted several decrees that block the deployment of renewable energies, the dispatch of the electricity market, and basically is putting at risk billions of dollars that have been invested in Mexico.

Another example is the compliance with environmental law and regulation. And here, it's noteworthy that the then-senator Vice President Harris opposed the ratification of the agreement because it was not strong enough on environmental issues. The Lopez Obrador administration is not complying even with Mexican regulation, including environmental assessment. In addition to that, I would mention compliance with labor regulation, where USMCA grants oversight to all the other countries. And an implementation of this could generate tensions.

Climate policy, as you know, is central to the Biden presidency. The President Biden signed the return of the US to the Paris Agreement. His economic recovery program is based on a clean energy revolution. This program could be the basis for boosting North America supply chain. Yet, Mr. Lopez Obrador has refined oil production and refining as the motors of economic development.

He's actually building a new refinery in Mexico. He has blocked renewables and increased-- methane emissions are increasing in Mexico. Mexico will not comply
with its national determined contributions under the Paris Agreement. On climate, Mexico will not be a partner, nor will other Latin American countries, such as Brazil. Science and climate deniers are hallmarks of populists in the region.

Bilateral cooperation on organized crime and security is likely to present challenges, as well, as Mexico is taking a more nationalistic, non-interventionist approach in the area, setting limits to corporations gained under the Merida initiative. A close bilateral relationship based on respect, dialogue, and cooperation is most needed, as both countries and the region face the COVID health and economic crisis. The US will host the Summit of the Americas in 2021.

Reshaping a meaningful dialogue will be a first test for the Biden administration in the region, as more countries are leaning towards populist, nationalistic governments-- and there will be 10 elections in the region this year-- facing severe economic crisis, social unrest, and redefining values. A failure to build bridges of understanding and mutual benefit would strengthen the possibilities of a profound geopolitical reconfiguration in the region. The US-Mexico relationship will be key in defining the outcomes. Thank you.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Thanks very much, Lourdes. We go now to Naomi Chazan.

NAOMI CHAZAN: Good evening, everybody, from Jerusalem. It's evening in Jerusalem. I, too, am absolutely delighted to be with you today. I'm especially happy that Robert Wilhelm is with us. I was the first Robert Wilhelm fellow, and I'm eternally grateful to him and to CSIS and to Dick Samuels for having me at the time and keeping me in touch with everyone at MIT.

I will be looking at the issue of President Biden's foreign policy challenges from an Israeli perspective, which obviously also extends to the Middle East, as well. And the problem is very clear. Foreign policy generally, definitely as related to the Middle East, perhaps with the exception of Iran, is not a priority for the current administration at this point in time, on the one hand. On the other hand, I think you're all aware of the fact that Israel specifically and the Middle East in general have a tendency to impinge on US policymaking, even at the most inopportune moments.
And therefore, the question is, what are the key issues that are facing the United States at this time from the direction of Israel and the Middle East, and how can they be handled when the preference is clearly for delaying as much as possible dealing with many of these issues? I will deal with three main issues, all Israel-related, but not always directly Israel-centered, and I will contend very clearly that the Biden administration will deal with caution with everything that has to relate to the area very carefully. It's a balancing act almost, walking on eggs, if you will it, with a great deal of respect on the one hand, but also a wariness built on latter-day experience with the United States. So it's really a very complex set of challenges for the United States at the moment.

Let me start with the first issue. And the first issue is, how does one look at and deal with Israel today, with Israel itself? Now, I think you're all very much aware of the fact that, throughout the four years of the Trump administration, and perhaps even the latter years of the Obama administration, there was almost no daylight between Mr. Netanyahu, the prime minister of Israel, and Mr. Trump.

In a sense, they complemented each other, reinforced each other. In many respects, during the Trump administration, actually, together, they made Israel a partisan political issue within the United States itself. And clearly, even though from an Israeli perspective the United States is its most important strategic asset, in reality there was a greater closeness between the two leaders, and not always a complementarity in the long-term interests of Israel as a state.

So this is the background for the new administration. And Biden himself, like almost all presidents of the United States, is entering office with a very clear record and approach to Israel. For decades, Biden has been a champion of Israel in US politics. He has even referred to himself as an American Zionist. So he has a real and proven record of support for Israel. And that has not waned in any form or way, despite the fact that he has been belittled and offended, sometimes even rudely, by Mr. Netanyahu in the past.

And he finds himself in a very curious position related to Israel today. On the one hand, Jews are very prominent in the incoming administration, and staunch supporters of Israel are extremely prominent. If I mention Chuck Schumer for one, or Kamala Harris. These are just really two examples, and there are many more. On
the other hand, the progressive wing of the Democratic Party is much more critical of Israel and Israel's policies in recent years, and specifically of Mr. Netanyahu.

So how does one begin to approach Israel? The first thing, obviously, is to look at the situation within Israel. And I don't have to remind you that Israel is about to have its fourth round of elections in less than two years. That's amazing, actually. It gives you some indication of the depth of the political crisis in the country. Over the past decade, Israel has undergone a process of democratic erosion. It's accelerated in the past few years. Illiberalism has skyrocketed. Neo-authoritarian tendencies, as well. And clearly, Israel has its unique brand of populism, as well.

But Israel is also undergoing today-- and perhaps this is less well-known-- a multidimensional crisis in the past year since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. It's not only a health crisis. And most of us are getting vaccinated, already had vaccinations, but the pandemic is spiking at the same time. So there's a health crisis. There's a real economic crisis.

No budget for two years in the country. There is great social unrest. And maybe I can concretize that by saying that Israel is a highly polarized country at the moment. I think you're familiar with that. And there are growing signs of problems of governability, inability to make decisions, and perhaps even a weakening of the state.

So Mr. Netanyahu is under duress not only because his trial starts in a couple of weeks during an election period, but also because he hasn't been able to muster a majority in the past two years. On the other hand, his opposition is fragmented. What does this mean? What challenge does this pose for Mr. Biden?

Frankly, the Biden administration is going to have to navigate in the morass of Israeli politics when most Israelis themselves don't know how to do that. So this is issue number one. Issue number two is, very bluntly, Iran, and obviously its offshoots. Now, I think it's well-known that Israel was opposed to the Iran deal of 2015. Trump exited, withdrew the United States from the JCPOA and with the encouragement of Mr. Netanyahu, backed Israel's position against the deal in a very confrontational manner.
Now, Mr Biden is entering the White House when he clearly wants to re-examine the deal. He's aware of the need of making adjustments, and he has at his disposal, in major positions, old Iran hands, people who have real expertise in the ins and outs of one of the most complex deals that was made in recent memory. But he has to, in many respects, think of how to do this within a situation where Trump succeeded in cementing a Sunni conservative, some say authoritarian, alliance with spreads from the Gulf through Saudi Arabia up to North Africa. And because of the Abraham Accords with Israel, also includes Israel within this constellation.

Now, what's the situation today, and where does Israel stand? Frankly, since Biden's election-- and Mr. Netanyahu was very slow in congratulating the incoming president, exceedingly slow-- Netanyahu has made it very well-known that it's important that the position on Iran not include another deal, in a very confrontational manner, which was reinforced yesterday by Israel's chief of staff.

Now, Mr. Biden is going to be forced, also because of European pressure and for other reasons, to deal with this issue. And although some Israeli defense experts would like a different approach, this is one issue, that the path now is very confrontational. It'll be very difficult for Biden to deal with this challenge and to isolate Iran issue from Israel, if at all possible.

The third issue, very quickly, is the Palestinian question. Trump very clearly backed Israel through the deal of the century, bypassed the Palestinians, and upended the sequence of what was considered the road to a solution by shunting aside the Palestinian question. Biden, however, is an avowed two-stater.

He is committed to the cause, and he is going to have to roll back some of the questions that were put on the table by Mr. Trump-- for example, the legality of settlements-- and has already announced yesterday in the UN he will reinstitute Palestinian representation, deal with human rights issues, et cetera. How this will play out, we don't know yet. But let me make it very clear, the Palestinian issue is back on the table. And Mr. Biden may find himself dealing with a new government in Israel without Bibi, which is more right-wing or bibi-ist than Bibi himself.

So if I wrap it up, there are three main issues and very many challenges here. The Middle East is shifting constantly. And therefore, I would like to suggest that the
question is no longer if the Biden administration will have to deal with these issues, but when, under what circumstances, and how. Thank you very much.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Thanks very much, Dr. Chazan. That was a tour de force, and we appreciate it. And we move now from the Middle East on to South Asia and Ambassador Menon.

SHIVSHANKAR MENON: Thank you, Richard. Thank you very much. And thank you for having me. It's a real privilege to be here with the other Robert Wilhelm fellows, and especially when Robert Wilhelm is among us. Thank you for asking me because, you know, who can resist the temptation to give advice to a new US administration? But in this case, we are actually, from Delhi at least, the view is of hope, of broadening relations, of moving away from some of the unpredictability and the pure Trump-- made the transformation of India-US relations pass-- [AUDIO DROPS] both in the Senate, in the Foreign Relations Committee. And as vice president, he visited India.

And from an Indian point of view, as well, everyone's very happy to see old friends who have worked closely to transform India-US relations over the years. And they're now in important roles in the administration, from the very top down. And that celebration of diversity, of professionalism, of articulate expertise in the appointments is something that has been welcomed across the board in India, because the transformation of the relationship over the last two decades has been bipartisan on both sides.

So today, we enter the Biden administration, the Biden era with India-US relations in good shape. And frankly, my expectation, the general expectation here in Delhi is that it will continue to progress. It's true that Prime Minister Modi and President Trump had a relatively close relationship, but it was transactional. And in many ways, the relationship actually narrowed during the last administration. It narrowed to focus primarily on security, on defense. So frankly, in India, everyone's looking forward to the Biden administration's stress on working with allies and partners.

But the issues are not so simple because the strategic environment nation-geopolitics have really changed in the last few years. And the Biden presidency comes into a very different situation. Of course, the rise of China is important, and it's a very important glue in the relationship to having a common view of the rise of China and its consequences. What China has done in the last year on the border has
actually led India-China relations into crisis. And that is something which both sides have actually worked together on. But there is more to India-China, India-US relations than China.

There are a whole host of other issues in the Indo-Pacific, for instance, where the Quad has been resurrected. It was last there in 2007, 2008. And in the maritime space, all the way from the East Coast of Africa to the West Coast of the US, there is a very close congruence of strategic interests. But there are issues which are left over, which I'm not sure how these are going to be dealt with. For instance, Russia is important to India's continental strategy in Asia, just as Iran is, and CAATSA, the Countering America's Adver-- [AUDIO DROPS]

So we have to see how we actually deal with this. On Iran, of-- [AUDIO DROPS] we welcome some calming of the-- [AUDIO DROPS] --tunities with the Biden administration coming in. In energy, climate change, for instance, there are tremendous opportunities in solar and renewables, LNG and so on. Global health is the other area where, frankly, both countries should do much more. From our point of view, of course, vaccines, meds for COVID are clearly a global public good. And I wonder whether we have the moral courage or the spine to actually waive IP rights on the COVID-19 vaccines and medicines, as we did for HIV/AIDS.

Another area where there's actually tremen-- [AUDIO DROPS] --open internet to actually work on digital architecture together. But this is an unstable area, and we have to see how we progress this. And when I look down the road, the most uncertainty, in my mind, attaches to the economic relationship, both the bilateral and the multi-- [AUDIO DROPS] Protectionist sentiment in both countries has been rising since the economic shock of the pandemic, and even from before, when the economy was undergoing a slowdown.

The stress in India has been increasingly on self-reliance. And this is true not only of India it's true of China, it's true of the US, the stress on building the domestic economy, and in fact a fundamental rebalancing of the domestic political economy in all our countries. And I'm not clear at all where this will end, how far the Biden administration will get back into the WTO, for instance. There could be clouds on the horizon. It is actually-- [AUDIO DROPS] --was barely discussed, even.
It seems to me that both societies are challenged in this respect today, and both have a lot of work to do at home, and actually should be working together to strengthen democracy and deal with differences democratically. But that might be just my optimism speaking. So where do I think, when you broaden the lens a bit, where do I think we might be going?

It seems to me that, you know, we've seen some shift in terminology on the Indo-Pacific, for instance, from a free and open to secure and prosperous. For me, frankly, the terminology is less important than actually creating a Quad plus, getting others, like Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, others, to actually work on a secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific. Maritime Asia is the heart of India-US convergence, and I think we need to build that.

But it does worry me that we cannot run an active political, military, security cooperation without an economic leg to stand on. And for both of us to turn inwards eco-- [AUDIO DROPS] COVID has accelerated-- [AUDIO DROPS] So today, we actually have a new situation that requires a new strategy and a new strategic logic.

So I think I would await the policy reviews. The world is between orders, and the temptation to restore the so-called liberal international order would be a mistake, to my mind, because you can't rewind the clock at a time when, frankly, Great Power rivalry is higher than it ever was. I think Paul will probably speak about China-US relations.

I have a slightly broader concern also. We are watching a restoration, and with all that that means. And-- [AUDIO DROPS] vengeance, revenge, dividing people. And fortunately-- [AUDIO DROPS] --has avoided the trap of letting their predecessors set the agenda. And I do hope that this goes on not just domestically, but externally, as well.

So two last quick points. China is significant, but not the answer to all the problems and priorities, because even a China-US G2 cannot solve the political and security issues in Asia, whether it's the Senkakus, whether it's-- [AUDIO DROPS] Sea. Other powers do matter-- [AUDIO DROPS] administration in the US will work in order to improve our future from the purely transactional dog-eat-dog world that we were promised before. I'll stop that and give you back the floor. Thank you.
RICHARD SAMUELS: Thank you very much. It's clear to me that we should have scheduled four separate Starr forums, because each one of these presentations deserves further digging and attention and engagement. Perhaps we'll take a rain check with each of you on that. Paul, Paul Heer is going to talk to us about US-China relations under the Biden administration, and what to expect.

PAUL HEER: Yes, thank you, Dick. Well, like the other panelists, I'm delighted to have been invited to participate here. I'm certainly immensely grateful to Robert Wilhelm for his original sponsorship, for the fellowship, and to you, Dick, for the invitation to join the team five or six years ago. So it's a great thrill to be here with my fellow fellows.

With regard to East Asia, I think that President Biden has a lot of repair and restoration work to do in that region. And I think this has been alluded to by some of the other panelists, as well. This is because, in my view, the Trump presidency has seriously degraded the US role in the region. Although Beijing shares a lot of the responsibility here, I think Trump helped Beijing to escalate the most hostile and confrontational US-China relationship we've seen in nearly 50 years. And I think more importantly, or as importantly, he did so while undermining confidence in the reliability and credibility of the United States among our allies and partners, the same allies and partners that Biden is going to need to rely on in dealing with China.

And I would note that this trend predated the Trump administration. There were a lot of countries in the region that had already started to reassess their policies in the wake of shifts in the regional balance of power, and frankly because of their concerns about the substance and sustainability of Washington's attention to the region and commitment to the region. But Trump, I think, exacerbated this with what others have called his race to the bottom with Beijing, and his inconsistent and, I think, frankly, sometimes reckless approach to US allies.

I think that Biden is going to revive a more pragmatic, a more attentive and more realistic posture toward the Asia-Pacific. Biden himself and many of the members of his foreign policy team, especially Secretary of State, confirmed yesterday, Tony Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and East Asia, or I guess Indo-Pacific Policy Coordinator, Kurt Campbell, who's assuming a new position, all of these people have long experience and familiarity with the region from their work in the Obama administration and earlier in their careers. But I think they also know that
they can't simply revert to Obama era or Obama administration policies, that the region has changed dramatically in the past four years, in ways that-- and Ambassador Menon just mentioned this-- in ways that will require new strategies and tactics, and I think, frankly, probably some reassessment of US interests and goals and aspirations in the region.

But this is going to take time, primarily because Biden is obviously going to need to focus on really urgent domestic priorities, like reining in the COVID pandemic here and dealing with the deep political divisions that fueled the events, the constitutional crisis, really, of the 6th of January. At the same time, I think we should not expect that Biden is going to immediately reverse all of Trump's East Asian policy initiatives, nor is that necessarily going to be his instinct. I think, for example, domestic politics are bound to influence how quickly he's going to be able to diffuse the trade war with China and lift the tariffs, just as one example.

And I think before the Biden administration starts making any concessions to China, he's going to be looking for indications of what reciprocal concessions might be forthcoming from the Chinese side. One question I have is how constrained Biden is going to feel by domestic politics from moving toward a more constructive relationship with China, which we clearly would like to see on both sides. He's certainly going to be under pressure not to appear weak, given the political context of the China policy debate over the last couple of years, and he's going to be looking for bipartisan support on Capitol Hill, which I think is going to set the parameters of the way he approaches China and the region.

I think in any event, Biden is definitely not going to be retreating to a posture of complacency about China, not that we ever had one, or simply a return to engagement, which has been much debated. There's been way too much water under the bridge for that. During his presidential campaign, as many candidates often do, President Biden, then candidate Biden, wrote an article in Foreign Affairs in which he acknowledged that the United States does need to get tough with China because of Beijing's competitive challenge to the United States and its allies, because of the many aggressive and coercive and covert elements of that challenge, and because of China's efforts to internationally promote and legitimize its model of governance and development, its authoritarian, socialist model. And
Tony Blinken just last week, I think, during his confirmation hearings said similar things. In fact, he specifically said that he agreed with the Trump administration that China merits a strong US response, although he did quite clearly specify that he disagreed with a lot of the tactics that the Trump administration had used.

So I think that Biden and his team have made it clear that they recognize the need for, and will pursue, cooperation with Beijing on global issues, transnational issues of concern, like climate change and global health and global economic crises. They're not going to do so at the expense of confronting China on many other issues. And in fact, Jake Sullivan and Kurt Campbell, in their own article in Foreign Affairs shortly before Biden's own, wrote that they thought that the best approach to Beijing would be-- quoting here-- will be to lead with competition and follow with offers of cooperation.

I think, and interestingly, in terms of the bottom line, in the same article Campbell and Sullivan, as an indicator of where they're going to be coming from, outlined what they call a policy of managed coexistence and sustained competition with China. And they base this in part on an acknowledgment that China and the United States-- quoting here-- each will need to be prepared to live with the other as a major power. And they also acknowledged the need for what they called humility about-- just [? trying to record again-- ?] humility about the capacity of decisions made in Washington to determine the direction of long-term developments in Beijing.

Now, I think this was a very positive indication of the Biden team's recognition of the need for a reciprocal approach to China that doesn't overestimate US leverage over China. But Campbell and Sullivan also framed the goal, their goal as coexistence with China on terms favorable to US interests and values. Now, this obviously makes sense, too. US interests and values, and the interests and values of our allies. But the key challenge here, I think, is going to be competing with what will inevitably be Beijing's pursuit of terms favorable to Chinese interests and values, without letting this contest devolve into a zero-sum struggle for regional supremacy.

I think the best news for the region is that Biden and his team-- and Ambassador Mennon particularly mentioned this-- and I've also been emphatic and consistent about their determination to reinvigorate and reinvest in America's alliances and
partnerships in the region. And I think this is, frankly, going to be vital to mending the damage that has been done by Trump's inattention and neglect and even abuse of the allies in the region.

And Biden and Sullivan and Campbell have all written and spoken about this, starting in the articles they published last year, and in [? the common sense. ?] They talked a lot about the importance of renewing attention to coalition, alliance politics. Biden had written that this would give us substantial leverage to shape the rules of the road. And in the article that Campbell and Sullivan wrote, they thought that this would help shape China's choices.

And I find this, and I think a lot of allies do, very reassuring. But it's not going to be easy because there's a lot of ground to recover, I think, even before that ground can be reinforced, partly because, in addition to eroding the region's confidence in the United States, I think the Trump presidency, unfortunately, has eroded the example of American democracy that has always been a core element of Washington's pursuit of shared values and goals with its allies and partners in the region. And Biden has already acknowledged about the need to what he said, salvage our reputation.

But kind of returning to where I started, I think this is only the first step toward rebuilding confidence in Washington's attention to East Asian commitment there. Because unfortunately, I think the cumulative impact of the past several years is there's also been greater uncertainty in the region about our reliability, about our economic competitiveness, and even our military preparedness there. And I guess my last thought, I think that addressing these concerns among allies and partners is going to require Washington to have a more accurate and up-to-date understanding of the varying interests and priorities and threat perceptions of those allies, which is one of the other things I believe that's eroded over the past four years.

The United States needs to avoid the risks of taking the allies for granted, presuming that their ideas on how best to deal with China are always going to be the same as Washington's, or obliging them to choose sides between Beijing and Washington, which we keep hearing they don't want to do. And this is because, I guess my perspective as a historian, over the past four years, many of our friends in East Asia have adapted-- and again, Ambassador Menon referred to this-- to a new
regional security dynamic, and an economic and even military balance of power.

So I don't think that Washington and the Biden administration are going to be able to just catch up where we left off four years ago. Washington needs to work closely with its allies and its partners to fully understand where the United States now fits in this new balance of power, and to use that foundation of understanding for a renewal of American leadership in the region. The good news, I guess-- and I'll end with this-- is that I think the Biden team is fully aware of the nature and scope of this challenge, and they're ready to confront it. So I'll just conclude by saying, at this point, I'm optimistic. So thanks.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Thanks very much, Paul. What a terrific array of presentations we've had. And we can turn now to the questions. I want to seize the prerogative of the chair, though, before we turn to the questions. And there are a number of interesting ones that have already been submitted. But this being MIT, I suspect that many in our audience have a special interest in hearing from each of you what you think the prospects are for technological cooperation between these countries and the United States, and how that may or may not be a change from the Trump years.

That question was sort of stimulated by something that Paul just said, quoting from-- I guess it was the Campbell and Sullivan piece, lead with competition, follow with cooperation in the case of our relations with China. But each one of these countries-- Mexico, Israel, India, and China-- have a complex technological relationship with the United States. I wonder if you could speak to how that might or might not change going forward in the country with which you're most familiar. Who wants to start?

PAUL HEER: I can start with one comment. I think the technological, the S&T issue is a central-- in fact, arguably, one of the central-- challenges facing the US-China competition. China is not the Soviet Union. It poses a much more broad-based and comprehensive and profound challenge to the United States than the Soviet Union ever did. And I think that's partly because-- and I think the main thrust of that challenge is in the economic and S&T sphere.

So I think that what the Biden administration is going to have to confront-- and the Trump administration started to confront this-- is this tension between the win-win
potential for science and technological cooperation and the national security implications, because the Chinese are highly competitive in this regard. And I think that the move for decoupling that emerged out of the Trump administration, to kind of decouple the United States economically and technologically, to the extent that it's possible or feasible or advisable, from China will move forward because there are legitimate national security concerns about how China wields power technology, and how it uses technological mechanisms for-- well, to pursue its national interests, which are highly competitive against ours.

But I think that we're still trying to figure out how to array that defense without going overboard, because as you know, there's been several-- there's been a lot of side effects of that in terms of hampering of academic cooperation. I mean, MIT is a very recent recipient of some of the tensions that this has been generating. So I think that I guess I would just reaffirm your point, that technology is going to be a huge element of the strategic competition we see now, but there are costs and benefits. And I think it's going to be a particularly difficult challenge to see how we can address the national security implications of that competition without letting it lead to a bifurcation of the global economy and the global S&T sector, which obviously has the potential for mutual benefits for all the countries in the world, including the United States and China together.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Thanks, Paul. Ambassador Menon?

SHIVSHANKAR MENON: Yeah, just to add to that that technology has always been a big driver of the India-US relationship. Even when it was politically complicated, right from the Green Revolution in the '60s, I mean, India is able to feed herself because of US technology and agriculture. And today, there's huge opportunities, it seems to me, in the digital space and cyberspace. The problem here is that, increasingly, governments have looked at cyberspace as a national security issue, rather than as a pure technology issue.

And the last thing, from an Indian point of view, that we would like to see is a decoupling or a fragmentation of these open spaces of cyberspace, well, of new domains, frankly, whether it's maritime or cyber or any of these domains. And I think that's already happened in the internet. It's the assertions of sovereignty, the
great firewall, et cetera. But as far as India-US cooperation in technology is concerned, I think that's been a consistent driver of the relationship right through.

And at the level of people, but also much more systematically, systemically, as well, in terms of our approach to designing a multi-stakeholder global web, basically. But we are going to deal with what happens between the US and China on technology. I mean, for me, this is an area where the US and China are co-dependent, as well as being rivals. So some rebalancing, I think, is necessary from maybe the Trump administration approach. But I think it's something that India will watch very, very closely.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Thank you very much. Lourdes, did I see your hand go up?

LOURDES MELGAR: Yeah, I was thinking how to answer this question because I think it's obvious that, through the period of NAFTA and up to 2018, there was a convergence in terms of technology, and not only the technology that is used in Mexico, but in terms of the training of people and the work together that we have with US national labs and all of that. The issue right now is that President Lopez Obrador has been questioning what he calls neoliberal science and neoliberal technology.

And so there has been an effort to undermine a lot of the work and the agreements that have been done in the past. He has basically defunded many of the research projects that were being undertaken in Mexico, including modifying policy so that research centers cannot receive funds from other sources from abroad. And so this is really sort of a red flag that I think perhaps most people in the US are not seeing yet. I mean, the private sector, of course, works closely and is focused more on that US technology, but it is an issue.

And it is an issue also because there is greater interest on behalf of China and Russia of having a presence here in Mexico. And we are seeing this-- it's not exactly technology, but it's the vaccine issue. We were supposed to be getting the Moderna vaccine, the Pfizer vaccine, everything. And in the end, this Monday, President Lopez Obrador spoke with Vladimir Putin, and they agreed that Mexico is going to buy 24 million of the Sputnik vaccine, which this is creating a lot of debate here in Mexico. But it's a clear sign that he's turning his back to what have been our traditional
solutions or alliances of cooperation, and looking for new ones.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Dr. Chazan, Israel is the high-tech nation, we're told. How do you respond to the question?

NAOMI CHAZAN: We're a mixture of very high tech and very low tech. Three points. Number one, Israeli high tech and technology and technological relations with the United States are longstanding, cutting-edge in a lot of areas, but lately very strongly in the areas of cyber, cybersecurity, and military matters, as well. That's going to continue. I don't see any signs of a change or shift in that area. And that's point number one.

Point number two-- and I think, in one way or another, all the panelists alluded to it--is that what has changed is that the direct US and, in my case, Israel connection is no longer exclusive. And I think it's worthwhile to look at the relations, for example, between Israel and other countries and China. China is heavily invested in Israel at the moment, is invested, by the way, throughout the Middle East.

Russia, which was not mentioned once almost, except perhaps by Paul, is also heavily invested, and Israel has direct relations with Russia, as well, mostly a tactical military level, but they are not unimportant. So even though the relationship with the United States I anticipate to be strong and continue to be strong, it's no longer exclusive. And I think that's the big shift that has occurred in the past few years.

And the third point, I'd like to bring in one other topic. Technology and technological cooperation, in the case of the Biden administration, comes together with a resurrection of human rights on the global level, as well. And therefore, it'll be intriguing to see what the connection is between technological cooperation and human rights.

RICHARD SAMUELS: That takes us-- thank you very much, and it's a perfect segue to a question that Professor Oye has posted up here. It says that the question has been answered live, but I'm not sure if it's been shared with the entire audience. So let me ask it. I'll read it. It speaks to exactly this point. He says, "the COVID vaccine access is now high politics. Israel's domestic vaccines program is the best in the world, but Palestinians on the West Bank complain that Israel has cut off access to vaccines."

"The Serum Institute of India is playing a major role in meeting the needs of India
and neighboring nations, except Pakistan. So the question he asks is, should Israel and India balance humanitarian— or how should Israel and India balance humanitarian and ethical concerns with other interests, with respect to the West Bank and Pakistan?" Not an easy question, but a smart one. Thanks, Ken.

[INTERPOSING VOICES]

NAOMI Mr. Menon?
CHAZAN: Shivshankar After you.
MENON:

NAOMI Let me say that I really appreciate Ken Oye's question, in regards to him, as well. I appreciate it because he has refocused attention on something very important. If Trump tried, and Netanyahu, to push the Palestinian off the table, I think it's very important to state that the Palestinian issue is back on the table, and it's going to have to be dealt with.

And even though it's correct, on inoculations against the COVID pandemic, Israel is way ahead of everybody else, but I want to stress also that the number of cases is spiking, as well. So we're caught somewhere in a dilemma. It's not very clear how long we will be able to balance this, and when we'll be able to emerge from the problem.

Direct answer to Ken's question, it is absolutely absurd, in my opinion, to think that one could or should withhold vaccinations from the Palestinians. If there's one thing we've all learned during the past year, it's that if you're next to each other, you're going to, in one way or another, pass on the virus to each other. And it shows the proximity between Israelis and Palestinians.

There is a big movement in Israel now to make sure that Israel does provide the vaccinations, first for health reasons of everybody involved, and secondly for pure humanitarian reasons. This can create a basis for perhaps more positive engagement between Israel and Palestine, as well. So the assumption behind the question is something that I personally totally support, but many Israelis do, for perhaps other reasons, as well.
RICHARD SAMUELS: Ambassador Menon?

SHIVSHANKAR MENON: With Pakistan, the initial signs were good that the pandemic would actually force us into working together. Prime Minister Modi called a summit with all the other South Asian countries online, and they did agree on some steps that would be taken. On the vaccinations, yes, India has supplied vaccines to all the other neighbors, except China, which didn't want them, said they had their own, and to Pakistan.

Pakistan can still access them, but I do think that politics in both countries—internal politics—actually prevents this. Today, we're in a situation where some control level of hostility seems to suit both regimes, or at least the power holders in both countries, for their own reasons. And so it's unlikely. But Pakistan could access vaccines made in India through the WHO, if she wanted to. And there is an open offer, which is open to everyone, actually, for the vaccines. But now, of course, she'd have to join the line. And the line is just growing longer and longer, unfortunately.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Thank you. Well, here's a question about US interventions and US diplomacy. It's been touched upon bits and pieces in the commentary so forth. The US role in Central America is something that Dr. Melgar spoke to. She's already addressed that. And Dr. Chazan addressed the strategic role of the Biden administration in the broader Middle East, but she focused on Iran. For Ambassador Menon and Dr. Heer, there's something to ask about that really didn't come up in the discussion, which is that India and China have a simmering confrontation along a 2,000-mile long disputed border in the Himalayas.

So the question is what, if any, is the role each country would like the Biden administration—or, put differently, would expect the Biden administration to play, if any, presumably to help deescalate tensions? And specifically, would a US role that comes packaged inside a strengthening of the Quad that includes Australia and Japan, along with other countries that Ambassador Menon mentioned, along with India, of course, would that make things better or worse?

SHIVSHANKAR Menon: Well, it seems to me that neither India or China has actually asked other countries...
MENON: President Trump's immediate reaction was to offer-- [AUDIO DROPS] This was in spring this year, and the Chinese immediately rejected it. We just kept quiet. So it's hard to say that there's a direct American role in trying to settle the crisis. This isn't a world crisis. This problem on the border has gone on for a long time. In a sense, too proud.

But the other problem is, of course, that the US is cutting down on her engagement in mainland Asia, has less and less of a commercial presence in Eurasia. And it's in the maritime sphere that we've worked together. Now, the US has helped to strengthen India, both in terms of our capability to know what's happening on the land borders, but also in terms of our military reforms, which are still going on right now. So that, I think, will be strengthened, and will continue. But the diplomatic role, I find that hard to anticipate. And also I'm not sure, given the state of China-US relations, that could be a very helpful or positive development.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Thank you. Paul, did you want to weigh in?

PAUL HEER: Well, sure. I mean, just taking off of Ambassador Menon's final point, I mean, I think it goes without saying that Beijing doesn't believe that the United States has any role to play in its border dispute with India. And I think he was right to emphasize that an offer for us to mediate would not necessarily be welcomed by either party. It might be problematic. And I think Washington is obviously more sympathetic to the Indian perspective because we, frankly, see China as the more assertive and more expansionist, if you will, party. But the facts on the ground are always going to be confusing and subject to debate, which is a persistent part of the equation. So I think even though we're sympathetic to the pressures that the Indians face from China in that regard, it's not one where I think that we could usefully play a diplomatic role.

I mean, you asked about where this fits into the greater context of the Quad. And I think there was another question maybe that was related to that. I think one of the constraints on the Quad, especially in terms of expanding its membership, is that one of the things that has kind of slowed the pace and scope of cooperation of the existing Quad is I think two things.
It's not clear that there is a firm consensus on what the threat perceptions are and how best to deal with it because, particularly when you talk about expanding its membership, there is a range of views as to how confrontational the Quad and any expanded version of it should be in terms of dealing with China, whether it should be explicitly viewed as-- or implicitly viewed as targeting China.

And I think, frankly, one of the other constraints has been, even under the original four members, there is a range of levels of mutual confidence in each other and their diplomatic assertiveness. And I think that expanding the membership is only going to add to that issue. I mean, I think the concept is a good one, but the challenge is how to pursue without making it look to the Chinese like it's a containment alliance.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Thanks. I had thought that we had covered an enormously wide swath of the globe, but I see a very interesting question that raises an issue for us to consider that hadn't come up, or it had come up only marginally. And that's from an anonymous attendee who asks, "how will the new Silk Road--" I presume that's the BRI, the Belt and Road Initiative-- "how will the new Silk Road and the Russian access in the Arctic for maritime access alter how we normally-- our normal global balance, economy, climate, technology, and so forth?" In other words-- well, I don't have to put it in other words. What do you think of that? This is an area that we haven't addressed, but is an important one for us to consider, it seems to me.

PAUL HEER: Well, I think-- well, I'll just interject a couple of thoughts here. I mean, there's two different issues here. And I guess they're related. I mean, the Belt and Road Initiative is one part of it, but the Arctic goes off on a somewhat different tangent. There's a couple overlapping issues there. But I guess the one point I would make about the Belt and Road Initiative is that I think it is generally seen, and I think accurately, by most of the rest of the world as an effort by Beijing to extend and expand its geoeconomic and geostrategic influence.

I don't think it adds up to a pursuit of global hegemony. That's a separate issue we can get to. But I think that the biggest challenge that, certainly from the US perspective, that we faced is how to deal with it. I think we have to make sure that we have an accurate understanding of what its intentions are. But I guess my bottom line-- and Evan Feigenbaum and others have written about this-- is that I
think the response, certainly to whatever extent the United States is going to provide leadership in a response, is to compete and not just complain.

A lot of the countries that China is targeting for investment in infrastructure projects and loans and such are not seeing viable or substantial alternatives being offered by other countries, including the United States. So I think it's just part of this broader geostrategic competition. And I think we need to get back on the playing field, rather than-- I mean, and there are certainly faults to be found about the way the Chinese conduct business, with their transparency and different elements of the deals that they make, but that's the point I would make about the Belt and Road Initiative.

The Arctic is another issue. And I'm not sure exactly how the question framed it as similar to that, but the one observation I would make is that that is one of the areas where there is a fault line between Beijing and Moscow. I mean, there's a lot of commentary and analysis and presumptions about the challenge that the US and-- well, and the rest of the world, and the US and its allies and partners face from the new Sino-Russian axis.

And there are a lot of challenges there because they share some strategic goals that are in competition with those of the US and its allies. But I think it's easy to overlook and underestimate the potential fault lines there in terms of they're really-- they have competing spheres of influence in Central Asia, and I think they have, potentially, competing spheres of influence or interest in the Arctic, as well.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Thanks.

[INTERPOSING VOICES]

Please.

SHIVSHANKAR MENON: I think Paul is absolutely right. You know, Belt and Road I think is very different from the Arctic. I think Belt and Road, especially in Central Asia, is an attempt to consolidate the Eurasian heartland, as it were. But it has a whole series of challenges-- whether it will make money and pay for itself, goes through some of the most unstable regions, both in terms of security and politics, and it is an area
where there are regional powers, Iran and the others, who ultimately are not going to take kindly to a dilution of their influence in what they see as their traditional backyards, including the Russians.

But I think in order to deal with it, it's not enough for the US to just compete. I think the US should also stop pushing the Russians into the Chinese arms. That's something I've never really understood, because the consequences of what happens in Europe in today's geopolitics, and given the Belt and Road and so on, actually are felt at the other end of the continent, of the Asian continent.

So I think there is a case there for actually a serious review of how to deal with Russia if the US is interested in a role on mainland Asia. But I'm not sure how much stomach there is for that politically. And that's true of all of us. It's true of India. There's much less interested in being involved in the rest of the world after these triple shocks of the pandemic, the economic crash, and, well, domestic politics, which are increasingly polarized and fractious.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Thank you. Lourdes.

LOURDES MELGAR: Yeah, thank you. I would like to make a comment from the view from Latin America because I think it is really important that the US doesn't continue to look at Latin America as basically its backyard. The world has become much smaller, and I think China and Russia are really becoming very active in the region. China is doing important investments in different countries. They've been able to switch around support from countries that have bilateral relationships with Taiwan now having them just with China. And they are really eager to get the mineral resources that are in the region.

And on the other hand, there is this big ideological divide right now. Our societies are divided, just as any other, where people are looking at other ideologies, and they are leaning very much towards more authoritarian, populist regimes, where the countries such as Russia is being attractive. So it seems to me that there is an urgent need to not think that, because there has been a close relationship with Latin America and a presence, that this will basically prevail. China and Russia are being very aggressive in their approach and very supportive of the populist regimes
in the region.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Thanks. Naomi.

NAOMI CHAZAN: Just three very short points. Number one, I think that is a very close correlation between the areas of confrontation or competition between China, Russia, the United States-- by the way, Turkey in certain areas, as well, some regional powers-- and domestic fragility in particular countries in the region. And the domestic fragility is very important because most of the states involved are authoritarian states with very active publics that do not always accept the authorities in charge. So the fragility of the state is a key contributor to what's going on. That's point number one.

Point number two, what we're talking about without saying it is a global reordering. But what's missing in this global reordering is what the linking concept is. In the post World War II order, it was very clear what the principles are. Today, it's not yet explicit. And I think that's a major challenge for everybody involved.

And the final point is that, in one way or another, certain areas of activity do form a possible focus for consolidation. I saw Robert Wilhelm ask a very important question on climate change, which affects, in one way or another, everybody. And if principles around that can achieve some kind of global consensus, it can be a trigger for the kind of rebalancing that we're talking about. So some thoughts on the basis of the discussion.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Thanks. And thanks for calling my attention to Bob's question, which I hadn't seen, and for which I apologize. We've run out of time, but let's take this, for those of you who want to respond-- and I'm guessing that Lourdes would want to respond for sure-- the question is, a key element of Biden's campaign was major emphasis on climate change. China, India, and Mexico seem to be on a different path, on different paths, with increasing hydrocarbon use and production. How will those countries react to US policies on climate change?

[INTERPOSING VOICES]

SHIVSHANKAR Go ahead.
RICHARD SAMUELS: Lourdes, why don't you do it, and then we'll shift to Ambassador Menon?

LOURDES MELGAR: Great. I think it's a great question, because what we have seen is that, even though there is a general agreement about the need to address climate change, there is a significant backlash in terms of advancing the energy transition, with particularly populist governments supporting the development of fossil fuels and coal. And so I think there will be a need to find a much more creative way of linking climate policy with the development in the region and the opportunities for people, job creation, and how the losers of the transition are going to be made up.

And I think this is a very important challenge that, in the specific case of Mexico, it's very difficult to find a level of conversation because oil is linked to nationalism, to national sovereignty, and it's sort of trying to have a discussion on this issue is basically a non-starter. And I think a similar thing happens, for instance, in Poland, where it's not oil, but it's coal. And you start going one on one, Brazil has a sovereignty issue regarding the Amazon. And it's really a new type of discussion that we have to begin. A lot of creativity will be needed.

RICHARD SAMUELS: Ambassador Menon, I'll give you the final word.

SHIVSHANKAR MENON: I'm not sure I want that. No, on climate change, it's interesting because the Modi government has actually set much more ambitious targets than any previous Indian government. That doesn't mean that we're going to abandon coal right away, because that's one thing we have. Everything else is imported-- gas, oil, et cetera. And nuclear still has to step up and fill the breach. But on renewables, on solar, especially, wind, actually we have very ambitious targets. And it seems to me this is an opportunity for India to actually work with the US, to try and do something.

But the key here is technology, whether it's in terms of mobility, on transport, whether it's in terms of battery storage, all of which has actually brought the cost of renewables in India down to remarkable levels. And they're actually competitive with fossil fuels. But there is an element, I think, of creative accounting, perhaps, in some of that.
But I do think that this is a huge opportunity. And I'm so glad you asked that question because, as Lourdes said, we have to think about this differently. And if we do apply and actually spread the technologies, I think there's so much more we can do. The reason I'm an optimist on India is because, frankly, we are now facing really bad air, water, soil. And it's starting to affect people's health in the cities. Delhi is one of the most polluted, in terms of air pollution. And that middle-class discontent is going to drive the government, whether through the courts or through various other ways. Or elections. It's going to drive the government to start to do much more. So we are at a good moment, actually, for US activism on climate change.

**RICHARD SAMUELS:** Thank you. Well, this conversation could continue on into the night. I'm not just talking about the night in Delhi and the night in Jerusalem, but our night, as well. And it would be very productive and a lot of fun, but we can't do that. So I want to thank, again, our Wilhelm fellows for coming back to MIT, at least virtually-- you're always welcome to come back to MIT in reality-- and for producing such a stimulating conversation. Thank you all very much. And thanks, everyone, for attending.

[MUSIC PLAYING]