précis Interviews Paul Heer

Paul Heer, this year’s Robert E. Wilhelm fellow, is relishing his time away from the beltway. A veteran analyst of China, he spent much of the last three decades rising through the ranks of the US intelligence community, most recently serving as the national intelligence officer for East Asia at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. He discusses with précis: George F. Kennan’s impact on US policy in Asia, the thrill of briefing presidents, and geopolitical dynamics in East Asia today.

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Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine
E. Wood, W.E. Pomeranz, E. Wayne Merry, M. Trudolyubov

The authors in this volume take different perspectives on the crisis in Crimea and Ukraine, addressing both international causes and conditions and domestic factors. Combining expertise in diplomacy, law, history, and journalism, as well as both American and Russian viewpoints, they address a number of core questions.

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Japan’s Dance with the Dragon and the Bear
Mayumi Fukushima

With a lame-duck president in office, the modus operandi for US diplomacy toward Asia this year may be simply to avoid any negative outcomes and expend minimum efforts. Since the crisis in Ukraine flared up, the Obama administration has been pressuring Japan not to pursue a rapprochement with Russia.

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**précis:** What have you enjoyed most about your time at CIS so far?

**PH:** The stress level. After eight years on the National Intelligence Council, it’s nice to have the opportunity to be separated from the pressures of government and policy tasking. I can focus on research.

**précis:** Tell us about that research.

**PH:** The main thing I’m trying to accomplish is to publish my dissertation, which is on George F. Kennan’s influence on East Asia policy. Everyone knows him as a Russia expert, and I first encountered him on Russia. But there’s a lot to talk about in his role on East Asia policy.

In government, I was too busy to stay up on the academic literature. The main thing the fellowship has allowed me to do is to catch up on the archival materials that weren’t available then and to catch up on the secondary literature. I spent the fall revising and updating the manuscript and it is now under peer review.

**précis:** What are the key insights of the book?

**PH:** Kennan was profoundly influential in the direction of Japan and China policy after World War II. This was thanks to secretary of state George Marshall. He largely delegated to Kennan policy formulation not just toward the Soviet Union but to the rest of the world. Kennan was the primary driver of the policy of disengagement from the Chinese civil war. He was even more influential on Japan policy. He was instrumental in the redirection of US occupation policy from demilitarization and punishment toward economic reconstruction.

On the other hand, I criticize Kennan for dismissing the strategic importance of China, which he did for the most of the rest of his life. Kennan was also inconsistent and impractical in his application of the defensive perimeter concept in East Asia.

Kennan basically declared that mainland Asia was strategically irrelevant to us. Even if the Soviets did take Asia, it didn’t matter because it posed no threat to the US.

During the Korea and Indochina conflicts, Kennan was never able to reconcile the conflict between his strategic assessment of the importance of these countries—which he thought was marginal—and his belief that US prestige and credibility could not be compromised.

The most interesting case is Korea. He said we should get out of Korea. But immediately after the invasion in June 1950 he agreed that we had to intervene.

Vietnam was a different case. He excluded it from US interests. He was saying in 1948 and ’49: Whatever you do, don’t inherit this from the French. And 15 years later, he became a very prominent critic of the US involvement in Vietnam.

**précis:** What are the implications for today’s policymakers?

**PH:** Even though some of his assessments and answers were proven wrong, Kennan was always asking the right questions about the limits of our ability to influence East Asia and the resources we can bring to bear about events there.

Even though he denied that containment was applicable on the mainland of Asia, he did pursue a version of containment on its periphery. I think it is still operative in our approach to the region. He didn’t think we needed to contain Soviet influence in China—to him, containment was exclusively about the Soviets—but he eventually wanted to push back against...
“...the regional response to both China and the US rebalance is partly a contest in which the Chinese are trying to exploit the other countries’ uncertainties about the rebalance.”

an extension of Chinese influence in the western Pacific. And that’s what the Chinese today call containment. He was also correct in assessing the challenges of latching ourselves to feckless allies.

Kennan always knew that there would be a dilemma with the Japanese because their interests are not identical to ours and they don’t like to be taken for granted. They’ve got their own agenda. They’re very ambivalent about us.

**précis:** You were national intelligence officer for East Asia during a critical time. What has surprised you most about regional developments there?

**PH:** What surprised me most was the complexity of the impact of the rise of China on the way other countries in the region view the relative importance of China and the United States. The conventional wisdom is that China is pushing the envelope and the rest of the region is aligning with the United States against it. The problem is that the rest of the region is ambivalent about the United States—and there’s a lot of maneuvering and hedging going on. I think that the regional response to both China and the US rebalance is partly a contest in which the Chinese are trying to exploit the other countries’ uncertainties about the rebalance.

I think this is a factor even in the minds of our closest friends and allies in the region.

**précis:** Do you think US policymakers are aware of this?

**PH:** Increasingly. But it’s the fundamental challenge of US policy in East Asia right now—how to recognize shifting views about the balance of power in the region and align ourselves in a practical way.

**précis:** Is there appetite in Washington for policy-relevant scholarship?

**PH:** I think there’s a tremendous appetite for it. I think in order for it to get their attention, it has to be very short and concise. It has to be practical and not theoretical. They’re not going to absorb a lot of international relations theory. It has to be operationally useful. And perhaps most importantly, it can’t just be bad news that tells them that everything is wrong and all the alternatives are not workable either.

I should put it this way: Scholars should replicate what we do in the intelligence community, which is what we call opportunity analysis. Specifically, identify the opportunities Washington has to influence foreign actors and the levers that will do that, rather than just something in the abstract. Policy relevant means immediately operationally useful with a chance of success.

I think SSP and CIS are particularly well equipped to be relevant, because they have such an emphasis on real-world policy challenges. Policymakers don’t have time to sit around theorizing.

**précis:** What is it like to brief the president?

**PH:** It’s both awesome and intimidating. As a personal experience, it’s certainly amazing. But the important thing is that the process occurs because there’s a recognition that people who have expertise can and should be available to the president for conversation and not just written products. The value of it is the interaction.

**précis:** So there’s a give-and-take element to the briefings?

**PH:** Oh, yes. I used to say the best kinds of policymakers can also be the most challenging to deal with because they only ask hard questions.

I briefed Bush once and Obama twice. The differences in their public personalities came through: Bush was more casual and Obama was more intense. Bush immensely valued his morning intelligence briefing. I presume his father told him you should do that every morning. Obama valued it too, but the meetings were structured differently and he was very practically oriented.

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MIT political scientist Taylor Fravel has been named to the Andrew Carnegie Fellows Program for the 2016-17 academic year, a prestigious award he will use to extend his studies of Asia’s ongoing maritime disputes.

Fravel told MIT News he was “thrilled, humbled, and honored” to be receiving the fellowship, which is worth up to $200,000. The award, announced today by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, supports “research and writing aimed at addressing some of the world’s most urgent challenges to U.S. democracy and international order,” and focuses on scholars in the social sciences and humanities.

“It is tremendous to have this opportunity to research and write,” says Fravel, who will be on leave from MIT during the forthcoming year. Fravel is an expert on China’s military strategy and the country’s post-World War II history of conflict resolution. His first book, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes, published by Princeton University Press in 2008, scrutinizes 23 postwar territorial conflicts China has been involved in, and concludes that much of the time—in 17 of those cases—China made territorial concessions in agreements that helped it achieve other goals.


The Carnegie fellowship will enable Fravel to pursue a new project in which he will look in more detail at the maritime disputes that have emerged in Asia over the last several years. China has been at odds with other countries over territorial claims to a series of small islands—including the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, also claimed in whole or in part by Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei.

“Since the first book came out, China’s [maritime] disputes have become much more active,” says Fravel, who adds he will be “trying to put those events in a broader context.”

Modest as the stakes over the islands might seem on the surface, they are intertwined with larger political dynamics in the region. For this reason and others, Fravel’s expertise has been in increasing demand recently, among scholars, policymakers, and other foreign-policy professionals. Fravel says more time for research will enable him to better “survey and examine the various conflict management tools that can help prevent escalation” of these disputes. Those tools potentially include international arbitration, codes of conduct among claimants in the disputes, and arms-control-style agreements among countries to limit activities such as troop deployments.

“The idea is to explore them in more detail,” Fravel says.
MISTI Global Seed Funds

Caroline Knox

Since 2008, the Global Seed Funds Program (GSF) has funded more than 530 faculty-led projects in over 70 countries. From engineering medical diagnostic devices in Mexico to exploring science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education in Israel to building the framework for a self-sustaining community of electricity prosumers in Italy, GSF funds projects that confront worldwide challenges and educate future global leaders.

This January the program awarded $2,006,906 to MIT faculty to cover international travel, meeting, and workshop costs. Managed by MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI), the GSF enables participating MIT teams to partner with international peers with the goal of developing and launching joint projects. Many of the joint projects lead to publications, additional grant awards and the development of valuable long-term relationships between international researchers and MIT faculty and students. Applicants are encouraged to include MIT undergraduate and graduate students in their projects.

In the 2015-2016 grant cycle, 86 projects—out of 214 applications—were awarded funding by MISTI GSF. This cycle’s winning faculty and research scientists represent four MIT schools and 22 departments across the Institute. MISTI GSF consists of a general pool of funds for projects in any country and several country-specific funds. In the latest grant cycle, MISTI supported collaborations in 24 unique countries through 21 individual MISTI seed funds, including the newest funds: MIT-Brazil Lemann Seed Fund for Collaborative Projects, MIT-Germany–University of Stuttgart Seed Fund, MIT-Israel Seed Fund, and MIT-Peru Seed Fund. Click to see this year’s GSF grantees.

The MIT-Imperial College London Seed Fund, administered by MISTI, was also launched this year through a partnership between the MIT Office of the Provost and Imperial College London. The MIT-Imperial College Seed Fund primarily supports travel costs for exchange between teams at MIT and Imperial College London, and grants range between $30,000 and $50,000 for an 18-month project period. Winners will be announced on the MISTI site in mid-March.

The next MISTI GSF call for proposals was announced in May 2016 with a proposal deadline in early fall. Additional details are available on the MISTI website.
Russian president Vladimir Putin has insisted that he and a small group of top officials decided spontaneously to invade Crimea after the departure of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych on February 22, 2014. Critics of Russia and those inclined to take a Cold War perspective have claimed, by contrast, that the invasion of Crimea represents an inherently expansionist move on Russia’s part, perhaps one long contemplated. A third explanation proposed by Western observers, including a number of foreign policy experts, suggests that the Russian leadership was essentially forced into taking Crimea and potentially Ukraine because of Western aggression and moves into the buffer zone around Russia. Delving deeply into the sources available on the crisis, the four chapters in this book strive to understand the roots of Russian involvement in a more nuanced way. Ultimately, the four perspectives suggest that all three claims are at best insufficient and at worst deeply flawed.

The authors in this volume take different perspectives on the crisis in Crimea and Ukraine, addressing both international causes and conditions and domestic factors. Combining expertise in diplomacy, law, history, and journalism, as well as both American and Russian viewpoints, they address a number of core questions: What motivated the Russian leadership to send troops into Crimea and then declare that Crimea had formally chosen to “join” Russia? Even before actual violence broke out, what were the sources of conflict with Ukraine over European Union (EU) membership and trade in the preceding months? What domestic challenges inside Russia encouraged the Kremlin to take an expansionist stance toward Crimea? What does that expansionism say about Russian political, economic, and social priorities in this historical moment? And what role did the Russian president’s personal position play in the deepening of the crisis [...]
though there is no evidence of harm to Russians in Crimea from anyone in the Maidan.

In fact, there is evidence that preparations for some kind of action in Crimea began from the start of the Maidan uprising in late November 2013. Russian media immediately began broadcasting extensive anti-Maidan programs, playing on the fears of those in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Pro-Russian groups in the Crimean parliament intensified their insistence that Crimea secede from Ukraine and join Russia. By December 12, pro-Russian forces were claiming that it was time to create “self-defense” units in Crimea and southeastern Ukraine. On December 14, the leaders of two pro-Russian groups, Gennadi Basov of the Russian Bloc and Sergei Aksyonov of Russian Unity, met with Vyacheslav Svitlychny, the Russian consul general in Crimea, and declared that they were preparing an anti-Maidan demonstration to demand Crimea’s secession from Ukraine. In late January 2014, Crimean pro-Russian groups held demonstrations in several cities, burning EU flags and blaming the United States, the EU, and NATO for the crisis. The Night Wolves motorcycle band and local Cossack groups, numbering some 700 to 800, joined forces as the “Slavic shield” (slavianskii shchit), they claimed, to guard key buildings in Sevastopol.

The top Russian elite now became visibly involved. On January 27–29, the chair of the Crimean parliament, Vladimir Konstantinov, met with Putin’s advisor Vladislav Surkov in Moscow. On January 30, Russian Duma deputy Aleksei Zhuravlev, who had revived the nationalist party Rodina (Motherland) in 2012, announced the creation of a new “Slavic Anti-Fascist Front” (Slavianskii anti-fashistskii front). On February 3, Zhuravlev came to Crimea to hold the opening congress of this new group, which claimed to bring together over thirty different organizations, including the ROK, the Congress of Russian Communities, and Ukraine’s Russian Unity political party. They listed their goals as serving as “a counterweight to the anti-constitutional, fascist uprising” in Ukraine, the defense of the interests of the Russian-speaking people of Ukraine, and the formation of public opinion for Ukraine to join the Eurasian Customs Union. In an interview on February 6, Zhuravlev explained that they had had no troubles at their opening meeting because they were already organized in Crimea in strong militias.

On February 4, the Crimean parliament announced that it would seek a referendum on the “status of Crimea” and would appeal to the president of the Russian Federation for “the defense and autonomy” of Crimea. Vladislav Surkov appeared in Crimea again on February 14, and Vladimir Konstantinov traveled to Moscow again on February 19. Although no one knows what they spoke about, the presence of such high-level Russian officials, especially one responsible for policy in this area (Surkov), suggests that the Russian leaders were at a minimum closely monitoring the situation in this region and may have been involved in further agitation.

No sooner had Yanukovych fled on February 22 than pro-Russian Crimeans began to hold demonstrations and form militias. In Sevastopol, a crowd of 20,000 demonstrators demanded a new mayor, Aleksei Chalyi, a Russian citizen known for his outspoken pro-Russian views. Thousands turned out in the streets of both Simferopol and Sevastopol, organized in large measure by the Night Wolves motorcyclists. Night Wolves’ leader Dmitry Sinichkin, dressed in the group’s trademark black leather, announced that in his view, “Bloodshed is inevitable.” Chalyi and pro-Russian crowds in Sevastopol welcomed the Ukrainian secret police, the infamous Berkut, which only recently had been disbanded by the new Ukrainian government for their attacks on the Maidan demonstrators.

On February 27, armed men without any evident insignia seized the buildings of the Crimean government and parliament, raising the Russian flag. A new prime minister, Sergei Aksyonov, was “elected” by the deputies who were in the occupied building.
With a lame-duck president in office, the modus operandi for US diplomacy toward Asia this year may be simply to avoid any negative outcomes and expend minimum effort. Since the crisis in Ukraine flared up, the Obama administration has been pressuring Japan not to pursue a rapprochement with Russia. Yet Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had a summit meeting with President Putin in Sochi, a resort town in southwestern Russia, in early May. Abe has been encouraging Putin to visit Japan before the end of this year in order for the two leaders to resolve long-pending territorial disputes between their countries once and for all. Doing so, Abe hopes, should improve security environments in the northern area of Japan and allow Tokyo to concentrate its military resources on patrolling the East and South China Seas. As Figure 1 shows, Russian forces have accounted for more than half of foreign aircraft against which Japanese Air Self-Defense Force scrambled because they were threatening or violating Japanese airspace. More importantly, Russian military aircraft have recently become increasingly active, as China grows more assertive in areas surrounding Japan. And as is clear in Figure 2, Russian military aircraft appear to be threatening Japanese airspace from all directions.

Under such circumstances, it is understandable that Japan wants to do something to improve its security environments. In the meantime, Russia is growing increasingly close to and dependent on China. Indeed, the familiar Sino-Russian relationship of decades ago has been turned on its head. The single state most affected by this change is perhaps Japan. At least for the time being, Russia’s weakness vis-à-vis China actually renders a comprehensive territorial agreement between Tokyo and Moscow extremely unlikely for reasons I will discuss below. Japan therefore should shelve its territorial disputes and instead strike a more limited bargain with Russia, so that it can focus on the main threat of China.

Sino-Russian political and military relations
Journalists often call Russia and China “frenemies.” On the one hand, their political and military relationships have appeared to grow closer than ever. Chinese President Xi Jinping chose Russia as the first country to visit on becoming president in 2013. All of their territorial disputes had been resolved by 2015. The two countries conducted
large-scale joint naval exercises dubbed “Joint Sea 2015” in the Mediterranean Sea and off Vladivostok. Moscow and Beijing seem to have shared interests in undermining the U.S. military presence in Asia: just recently the two countries simultaneously opposed a planned deployment of the anti-ballistic missile system called Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea.

On the other hand, their vast common land border is a constant source of mistrust, as the Russian side is sparsely populated and rich with raw materials, the Chinese side full of people. Many of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons are pointed at China. It is true that China and Russia are still tussling for influence, especially in Central Asia and the Arctic Ocean. Russia warily watches China’s “One Belt, One Road” policy, which seeks to consolidate Beijing’s influence over Central Asia. China's maritime expansion into the Arctic Ocean seems to be another source of concern for Russia, as China develops a new route for seaborne transportation going through Russian territorial or contiguous waters in the Arctic Ocean.

**Sino-Russian economic relations**

The concept of “frenemies” is at odds with Sino-Russian economic relations, however. The two countries’ trade volume quadrupled between 2004 and 2014, with a record of $95 billion in 2014. While it dropped by 27.8% to $64 billion in 2015 due to a worldwide economic disruption, it is still three times their trade volume in 2004. Russia exports far more oil to China than ever before through a recently constructed ESPO pipeline, which goes from Eastern Siberia toward the Pacific Ocean. China and Russia struck a gas deal worth $400 billion in May 2014 for Russia’s Gazprom to supply Siberian gas to China through a pipeline between 2018 and 2048.

But looking at their respective lists of other important trade partners gives us a different picture of their economic relations. From the Russian perspective, China is by far its biggest trading partner in the world, followed by the Netherlands and Germany, whereas from the Chinese perspective Russia is just the ninth largest trading partner. China’s most important trading partners are the United States, Hong Kong, and Japan. Most of China’s fuel supplies come from Australia and the Middle East, and Russia’s share in the Northeast Asian gas market is unlikely to exceed 3% in the next decade and by 2030 will be no more than 9%. As long as Russia remains a resource-based economy with its underdeveloped service sector, we should expect its dependence on China to continue. This is why China squeezed such a favorable gas deal out of Russia’s Gazprom in 2014.
Overall Sino-Russian relations
How do we understand overall Sino-Russian relations, then? Russian economic dependence on China seems to largely override any tendency of “frenemies” competing for larger influence in Central Asia and the Arctic Ocean.

Russia’s economic problems, especially those in Russia’s Far East, are far more serious than the problem of Russia’s declining status as a military power. In 2014, as the price of oil collapsed, the countries of central and eastern Europe continued to wean themselves off Russian gas. Slow global growth further reduced the appetite for Russian natural resources, and the West imposed sanctions on Moscow in the aftermath of Crimea. The ruble lost nearly half of its value against the U.S. dollar since 2014, and the Russian economy was shrinking by nearly four percent in 2015.

As Russia’s economic problems run deep, President Putin seems increasingly concerned about the Russian Far East, where its population dropped by more than 20% since 1990 and is holding the Russian economy back. In addition, economic stagnation in regions far from Russia’s center could have politically destabilizing effects, which President Putin fears most. All of these problems leave President Putin with few options other than to rely on China. As long as record-low oil prices and the West’s economic sanctions against Russia persist, Moscow cannot afford to lose the Chinese market.

Implications of the current Sino-Russian Relations for Japan
Unfortunately, the single state most affected by recent changes in Sino-Russian relations is perhaps Japan. Since the Cold War ended, Japanese leaders have consistently sought to resolve territorial disputes with Russia regarding the so-called Northern Territories (hopporyodo) in order to conclude a Russian-Japanese peace treaty. In particular, the current prime minister, Abe, appears much more determined than his predecessors to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough with Russia.

What explains Abe’s determination? First, he seems to assume that given Russia’s isolation after the crisis of Crimea, President Putin is currently more willing than he would be otherwise to make significant concessions in order to find reliable friends. Second, Abe believes that improved bilateral relations between Russia and Japan would have restraining effects on China’s ever-increasing maritime adventurism. Indeed, in the face of President Obama’s concerns, Tokyo justifies its high-level contacts with Moscow in the midst of the crisis in Ukraine with the logic of balancing: Better relations between Moscow and Tokyo could prevent Russia from getting too close to China. Finally, Abe sees a window of opportunity opening in Japanese politics. Since Abe came to power in 2012, political opposition has been weak. As any peaceful resolution of the territorial disputes with Russia would require significant concessions from the Japanese side, powerful opposition parties would make it more difficult even for someone labeled a nationalist, such as Abe, to justify concessions. With the same rationale, Tokyo also hopes that President Putin’s high approval ratings in Russia equip him to make big concessions.

Perhaps Abe is right to assume that President Putin covets closer relations with Japan. From the Russian perspective, this could improve Moscow’s bargaining position vis-à-vis China as Russia grows uncomfortably dependent on the Chinese market. However, Tokyo seems to turn a blind eye to the inconvenient truth that, given Moscow’s economic dependence on Beijing and its understandable desire to somehow restore its diplomatic standing vis-à-vis Beijing, the strategic value for Russia of the Northern Territories is actually increasing. This is especially true given China’s maritime expansion into the Arctic Ocean. It is therefore unlikely that Japan could resolve the territorial disputes on its terms anytime soon. No matter how popular President Putin has been in Russia, Tokyo should not expect him to make big concessions over the territorial disputes.
This, however, does not mean the chance of success will be nil for Japan’s bid to take any part of the Northern Territories back. Russia might offer the return of two small southern islands, Habomai and Shikotan, that account for less than 10% of the total geographic area under dispute, just like Moscow did sixty years ago. In fact, while the two countries normalized diplomatic relations in 1956, they failed to sign a peace treaty because Japan was not satisfied with Moscow’s paltry offer.

Would Abe be able to convince the Japanese public that the return of the two small islands was the best the Japanese could hope for? If not, Japan would be wise to let sleeping dogs lie. Considering the growing threat from China, however, it still makes sense for Japan to reach some sort of agreement with Russia to stabilize the security environment in the northern area as soon as possible. That way, Tokyo can allocate more military resources in the East and South China Seas. By doing so, it could bide its time on the territorial disputes, waiting for a moment when Russia becomes less dependent on China economically.
Posen Receives Lifetime Achievement Award

Each year the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association recognizes a distinguished scholar in International Security Studies with an award for lifetime achievement in International Security Studies. Prior recipients of the award have included Thomas Schelling, Kenneth Waltz, Samuel Huntington, Robert Jervis, and John Mearsheimer. The 2017 Distinguished Scholar Award recipient—our own Barry Posen—will be honored at a special panel at the ISA conference in Baltimore in February 2017. The Center congratulates him on being recognized by the profession for his many contributions to scholarship and teaching.

IPL Helps Fund 13 MIT Projects

The International Policy Lab (IPL) concluded its first institute wide call for proposals this past January. The IPL awarded six fully supported projects ($10,000 plus staff assistance) and seven partially supported projects. Roughly half of these projects address energy and environmental policy, while the rest are equally distributed among international security, biology and health, and big data and privacy policy issues.

MIT-Imperial College London Seed Fund Winners

The MIT-Imperial College London Seed Fund awarded $60,565 to three MIT faculty pursuing joint projects with peers at Imperial College London. The grant primarily supports travel costs for exchange between teams at MIT and Imperial College London with priority given to projects that are new or entering a new phase; that reflect a balanced collaboration between participants; and that involve undergraduate and graduate students as well as early-career scientists. An initiative of the MIT Office of the Associate Provost for International Activities and Imperial College London, the seed fund is administered by MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI).

Myron Weiner Seminar on International Migration

CIS Awards 23 Summer Study Grants

The Center is pleased to announce the recipients of its summer study grants. The grants have been awarded to twenty-three doctoral students in international affairs at MIT. Each will receive up to $3,000 for summer studies, which may be used for fieldwork, archival research, or home-based research and write-up. Criteria for the awards include the importance of the research question, the quality of the research proposal, and strong letters of support.

Gomez, Saraf Receive Infinite Mile Awards

Griselda Gomez and Joli Divon Saraf each received a SHASS Infinite Mile Award. Gomez, the managing director of the MIT-Mexico Program at MISTI, received the award in the category “Great Ideas.” Gomez spearheaded the initiative to include a health and safety information session for students going to Latin America. The model was so well received and helpful that it was replicated for all MISTI country programs and is now a core requirement for all MISTI students. Saraf, the assistant director of the Security Studies Program, received the award in the category “Inclusion.” Saraf has implemented a number of events that promote workplace community. These events range from informal, impromptu happy hours to the signature formal dinners and award ceremonies that the program runs annually. A nominator noted, “Joli understands that a truly collegiate and inclusive workplace is built on a bit of fun, comfort, friendship and encouragement, which she works tirelessly to provide.”

SSP Wednesday Seminar

The Security Studies Program’s lunchtime series included: Sarwar Kashmeri, Foreign Policy Association, on “NATO 2.0: Reboot or Delete;” Elizabeth Wood, MIT, on “Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine: Symbolic Politics and their Implications for Russia’s Geopolitical Stance in the World;” Andrew Gawthorpe, Harvard University, on “The American Experience of Nation-Building in South Vietnam;” Paul Heer, CIS Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow, on “George F. Kennan and (the Limits of) American Foreign Policy in East Asia;” and Benjamin Valentino, Dartmouth, on “American Public Opinion on Just War Theory.”

Starr Forums

The Center hosted multiple Starr Forums this spring including: “With Friends Like These: U.S. Allies and ISIS,” featuring Barry Posen (MIT), Sarah Leah Whitson (Human Rights Watch), and Kristin Fabbe (Harvard); “Confronting the China Cyber Challenge,” featuring James Mulvenon (Defense Group, Inc.) and Joel Brenner (MIT); “3.11: Five Years After the Triple Disaster in Northeastern Japan,” featuring Richard Samuels (MIT), Tatsujiro Suzuki (Japan Atomic Energy Commission of the Cabinet Office), Kenneth Oye (MIT), Miho Mazereeuw (MIT), and Akinobu Murakami (University of Tsukuba); “Bitcoin and the Global Economy,” featuring Michael Casey (MIT) and Cristina Dolan (TradingScreen); and “Human Rights and Technology,” with Jay Aronson (Carnegie Mellon University), Christopher McNaboe (The Carter Center), Bradley Samuels (SITU Research) and Sucharita Varanasi (formerly with Physicians for Human Rights).
People


Professor of Political Science Nazli Choucri was honored by the International Studies Association (ISA) at a panel discussion and reception at their annual conference in Atlanta on Friday, March 18. The Political and Geography section of the ISA sponsored a Political Demography and Geography Distinguished Scholar Panel in Honor of Nazli Choucri. The panel’s topic was “The Co-Evolution Dilemma: Cyberspace and International Relations.” The following panelists focused on different phases and facets of Professor Choucri’s research and contribution: Birol A. Yesilada (Portland State University), Peter M. Haas (University of Massachusetts Amherst), Urs Luterbacher (Graduate Institute of International Studies), Brandon Valeriano (Cardiff University) and Jon Lindsay (University of Toronto). Later that evening, three ISA sections hosted a “Poster Session and Distinguished Scholars Reception Honoring Cameron Thies and Nazli Choucri.” Professor Thies is a member of the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) Section and Professor Choucri is a member of the Political Demography and Geography (PDG) Section. The Scientific Studies of International Processes Section of the ISA also hosted the reception at which the PDG awarded Professor Choucri the fourth annual Myron Weiner Distinguished Scholar Award.

PhD candidate Fiona Cunningham was awarded a 2016 World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship by the Smith Richardson Foundation. In January she participated in the German Marshall Fund of the United States Young Strategists Forum in Tokyo.

Associate Professor of Political Science M. Taylor Fravel has been named a 2016 Andrew Carnegie Fellow by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The highly competitive fellowship selected just 33 scholars in the social science and humanities for the prestigious award.

PhD candidate Mayumi Fukushima presented “China-Russia Relations and Their Implications for Japan’s Diplomacy” as an invited speaker at a symposium organized by the World Affairs Council of Atlanta and sponsored by the Consulate General of Japan in Atlanta in March.

Stanton Junior Faculty Fellow Brendan Green presented his research on “clandestine coercion” at RAND, in Santa Monica, California in January, and USSTRATCOM, in Omaha, Nebraska in March. The presentations were part of a grant funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, on which he works with SSP alumni Austin Long and Daryl Press. In May, he presented his chapter (co-authored with Austin Long) in the Stimson Center’s new edited volume, “The Lure and Pitfall of MIRVs,” at its Washington launch conference.

In January, SSP Senior Adviser Jeanne Guillemin taught a seminar on “Biosecurity and Bioterrorism” at the University of Oklahoma, Norman, as part of the Oklahoma Scholar-Leadership Enrichment Program, a series for academically gifted students sponsored by the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education.

EndNotes
PhD students **Andrew Halterman** and **Sara Plana** were both awarded the National Science Foundation (NSF) Graduate Research Fellowship Program (GRFP) Fellowship for the 2016-2017 year. The NSF GRFP recognizes and supports PhD students who show exceptional potential to contribute to scientific knowledge. Andy and Sara were two of only 16 PhD students in political science departments across the country to receive a fellowship this year.


PhD candidate **Andrew Miller** presented on the effectiveness of the International Criminal Court in deterring violence against civilians at the Judith Reppy Institute’s Interdisciplinary Graduate Workshop on Peace and Conflict, Cornell University in April.

PhD candidate **Cullen Nutt** was selected to be a 2016 Tobin Project fellow, which includes monetary support for research and participation in the project’s graduate student workshop in the fall.

In March, PhD student **Rachel Esplin Odell** presented “Civilian Control, Civilian Nationalism: Differences in Chinese Military and Diplomatic Press Statements” with Tyler Jost of Harvard University at the International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Conference in Atlanta, GA. In her capacity as a resident tutor at Harvard College, she was also nominated for a 2016 Star Family Prize for Excellence in Advising in the sophomore advising category.

In January 2016, a delegation from the **CIS Program on Emerging Technologies** (PoET) working group on Synthetic Biology Policy was invited to meet with representatives of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), the US Trade Representative and the Council on Environmental Quality at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. PoET wrote a white paper to treat issues of immediate concern regarding the White House’s desire to update the 1986 “Coordinated Framework on Regulation of Biotechnology.” Six workshops on synthetic biology applications with regulators, firms, NGOs, scientists, biological engineers informed the white paper. PoET also responded to a request for comment on the scope of inquiry for review of US biotechnology policy. The white paper recommend a strategy of planned adaptation, with research designed to provide a scientific basis for public policy and with tools, procedures and schedules to foster systematic reevaluation of policies in light of changing understandings of benefits, risks, and social/economic context. At the request of the White House, the delegation included UROP **Jane Maunsell**, a first year undergraduate who had prepared the analysis of public comments along with assorted attorneys, faculty, postdocs from MIT, Harvard and the Woodrow Wilson Center. In March 2016, Associate Professor of Political Science and Engineering Systems **Kenneth Oye** presented PoET’s white paper at a hearing conducted at the University of California at Davis.

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In March, PhD candidates Reid Pauly and Philip Martin attended the Bridging the Gap New Era Foreign Policy Conference. The conference gives graduate students the skills to “bridge the gap” between academia and policy.

Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the MIT Security Studies Program Barry Posen was a participant at the RAND Corporation in Arlington, Virginia, for the “Workshop on International Order” in January. In February, he was quoted in “The Gulf War Victory That Never Was,” by James A. Warren, in The Daily Beast. Also in February, Professor Posen was the moderator of a Starr Forum “With Friends Like These: America’s Allies and the Fight Against ISIS.” In March, he was a participant in “American Restraint, European Responsibility,” at the ISA Annual Meeting in Atlanta. At the end of March, Professor Posen chaired a panel entitled “Political Struggles in the Greater Middle East: The Organization and Sustainment of Violence” at the Pentagon. Later the same day, he chaired a similar panel at a special SSP seminar at the Ritz Carlton, Pentagon City. This event preceded the SSP alumni reception, which is held in Washington, DC, once every two years. In April, Professor Posen presented his work, Restraint, to the staff of the US Senate Republican Steering Committee. A week later, he presented his work to the command group in J5, Plans and Policy, of the Joint Staff of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the end of April, Posen attended the senior conference at the US Military Academy at West Point. The theme of the conference was “National Security Reform for a New Era: Reassessing the National Security Act of 1947.” He presented a paper on the changing security environment and the organization of the national security establishment. It was just announced that he received the 2017 Distinguished Scholar Award for Lifetime Achievement from the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association.

PhD candidate Amanda Rothschild received a National Fellowship from UVA’s Miller Center and was reappointed as a Belfer Center International Security Program Fellow for 2016-2017. In March, she was the invited speaker at the Pine Crest School Holocaust Awareness Symposium in Fort Lauderdale, Florida (March 2-3); she presented “Courage First and Intelligence Second: US Responsiveness to Mass Killing” at the ISA Annual Convention; and she was quoted in “BU Experts: Labeling Attacks as Genocide May Not Spur Change,” BU News Service.

Professor of Political Science Ben Ross Schneider presented “Corrosive Politics: State-Owned Enterprises and Industrial Policy in Brazil” in February at the University of Chicago and Harvard University. Also in February, he presented “Easy and Hard Redistribution: The Political Economy of Welfare States in Latin America” at King’s College London. In March, he gave a plenary presentation entitled “Managing the Politics of Education Reform: Lessons from Global Experience” at the annual conference of the Global Development Network in Lima, Peru.

Published

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Reid Pauly, PhD Candidate


Amanda Rothschild, PhD candidatee


Rohan Mukherjee, Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow


“Meet India’s New Nationalists,” The Indian Express, October 19, 2015.

Carol Saivetz, SSP Senior Advisor


Harvey Sapolsky, Political Science Emeritus Professor


Ben Ross Schneider, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the MIT Brazil Program

précis: How do leaders differ in the way they consume intelligence?

PH: Some policymakers are very focused on their operational objectives. Others are more intellectually curious. It’s not as driven by their inbox as it is to others.

précis: Do you miss your work on the inside of the intelligence community?

PH: I often miss being in the loop. And I certainly miss the professionalism and substance of my former colleagues there. What I don’t miss is the pressure to read hundreds of pages of intelligence every day and to be conversant in all of it in case anybody called.

I thought I would go through withdrawal not having access to all the classified sources. But I was surprised at how quickly that seemed like a relief!

précis: What are the most common myths about the US intelligence community? How do you dispel them?

PH: I think the most common popular myth is that the purpose of intelligence is to be omniscient. And that’s not achievable—any more than absolute security is. And people equate the two.

I think there are a lot of myths that come out of the Snowden episode. There’s a myth that the intelligence community is this secretive, autocratic, Big Brother, and that it is trying to listen to all of your phone conversations. I would dispel that by saying that we’re not interested and we don’t have the time. I’m more worried about what online vendors know about me than what the government knows about me. If you’re not doing anything—like breaking laws—that would merit the attention of the intelligence community, you shouldn’t be afraid.

The analytical community within the intelligence community is not that different from the character of an organization like CIS or SSP. The Directorate of Intelligence at the CIA and the National Intelligence Council often function like think tanks. And I think they’re the two best think tanks in the world, because of the direct input they have on policy deliberation. Outside academics sometimes go to brief the president. But we do it every day.

précis: Do you have any advice to students at MIT who are considering a career in the U.S. intelligence community?

PH: Go for it. I stumbled into it. When I applied to the CIA, I didn’t know exactly what they did. A friend of mine and I said: Who hires people like us?

I would enthusiastically encourage anybody to pursue it. It’s a tremendous combination of immense intellectual stimulation and the gratification of working with high caliber people who are having a major impact on policymakers who are making big decisions. You can’t ask for more impact than that.
Blockades were also put in place on the Isthmus of Perekop. Russian armed forces rapidly moved in, using a wide range of groups from naval infantry (marines) to paratroopers and special operations. They came from all different parts of Russia and descended on the peninsula in a coordinated fashion. On February 24, President Putin called snap military exercises that were ostensibly in the northern and central districts of Russia, but not the southern, where Crimea is located. This was almost surely a diversion, since airborne divisions soon began traveling from Pskov to Rostov-on-Don (in the south), to set up a staging ground for shifting planes and transport helicopters for Crimea. The Syrian Express amphibious ship was diverted from its normal route to Syria to deliver 300 special forces, including the newly minted special forces that Putin had ordered in 2012, to Crimea’s capital. Road blocks were set up, and transport and gunship helicopters flew in from Rostov to Crimea. In Kerch, jamming equipment was set up so the Ukrainian forces on the peninsula were unable to receive any orders from the new government in Kyiv, which in any event was barely operational after the flight of Yanukovych. By February 28, the main military actions had all been taken with barely a shot being fired.

How was the takeover so bloodless? First, the pro-Russian militias and other paramilitary groups posted checkpoints and supported the work of the military, making the invading force overwhelming for the local Ukrainian forces. Second, the Russian military displayed their own high level of professionalism and training, a result perhaps of the six snap exercises Putin had called in the previous year. Thirdly, while the Ukrainian troops and Ukrainian government had expected trouble from the pro-Russian militias, they had no idea that a full-fledged invasion was imminent. Finally, under the existing agreements concerning the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, Russia was permitted to station a maximum of 25,000 troops, 132 armored combat vehicles, and 24 pieces of artillery at its military facilities in Crimea. The Ukrainian forces serving there had no reason to be surprised to see Russian troops, though they certainly did not expect that those troops would proceed to take over the government of the peninsula.

The question of why the Russian government soon moved from the mostly bloodless military intervention in Crimea to the more complicated and secretive support for the “separatists” in eastern Ukraine is moot. The main theories are that (a) the success of the operation in Crimea led Putin and the Kremlin to keep going, as it were, in the hope that the population of eastern Ukraine would support military intervention because of their pro-Russian sentiments, and (b) that Russian strategists had planned this as another “frozen conflict,” perhaps to punish Ukraine for its EU ambitions or to keep it from joining the EU or NATO, since countries with unresolved conflicts are not allowed to join.
The Emile Bustani Middle East Seminar at MIT celebrated its 30th anniversary this academic year. For the spring semester, the seminar included two lectures on contemporary Middle East affairs.

The Bustani Seminar is funded by Myrna Bustani of Beirut, Lebanon, in memory of her father, Emile M. Bustani, who received an SB in civil engineering from MIT in 1933. Emile Bustani headed the leading engineering and contracting firm in the Arab world and was a prominent Lebanese statesman until his untimely death in 1963.

Ford International Professor of History and associate provost Philip S. Khoury has chaired the Bustani Seminar for three decades. “We are so grateful to Myrna Bustani and her family for enabling us to host at MIT some of the world’s leading scholars and commentators on the contemporary Middle East,” Khoury says. “It has become one of the leading university forums in the US for discussion and debate on the politics and culture of that conflicted region.”