précis Interviews Joel Brenner

Joel Brenner, former inspector general and senior counsel at the National Security Agency, joined CIS as a Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow. During his time at MIT, he is working on intelligence and security issues related to foreign affairs.

He spoke with précis about his work in law and public service, his interest in technology and policy, and upcoming projects.

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Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era
by Vipin Narang

Arguably forgotten in the scholarly and policy obsession with the Cold War and with nuclear acquisition is the fact that regional powers have chosen different nuclear strategies. These differences matter greatly to their ability to deter conflict...why might states select one over the others?

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Chinese Anti-Japan Protests in 2012
by Ketian Zhang

In contrast to the conventional wisdom that treats the Chinese as if they were a unified, equally nationalistic group, my research finds that Chinese citizens participated in anti-Japan protests for drastically different reasons—many of which had little to do with Chinese nationalism.

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OF NOTE

Culture Clash
Immigration policy has been among the most rancorous of U.S. political issues in recent years. What has been fueling America's contentious debates over the topic? John Tirman's new book takes a look.

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Former National Security Advisor to India at CIS
Shivshankar Menon, a former national security advisor of India, was a Robert E. Wilhelm fellow at CIS for one month. He spent his time working on a history of India-China relations and meeting with faculty and students.

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Japan PM Gifts CIS
The gift will support research in Japanese politics and diplomacy at CIS and also create a chaired professorship in the Department of Political Science.

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Interview: How did you get interested in law, and what led you to pursue a PhD as well?

JB: As an undergraduate in the really good history department at the University of Wisconsin in Madison, I thought I might pursue an academic career. I was admitted to the PhD program in American history, but when I received a Marshall scholarship I ended up studying legal and economic history at the London School of Economics, where I wrote a dissertation on changes in English tort law during the Industrial Revolution. After that I decided that—whether I wanted to be an academic or not—I needed a law degree for the legal–historical work I wanted to do. So I went to law school. Then, at the end of ten straight years in university, I was so sick of academia that I decided to leave behind. Courtroom work is brutally hard work and a very tough school, but it’s a thrill. I went to a law firm, and then spent four years as an antitrust prosecutor in the Justice Department. I liked that. I liked dealing with the economists as well as getting into court. And I learned a lot.

But since my student days I’d been interested in international affairs, and so there was always a bit of a gap between the work that I really wanted to do and the mostly commercial law practice I actually was doing. Then, after 9/11, I decided I wanted to go back into public service. At that time, General Michael Hayden, then—Director of the National Security Agency, was looking for a new Inspector General and wanted an outsider. So, I got that job, and it was a real turning point in my career. My previous career as a lawyer very much helped me do that job better, but I was suddenly able to apply the tools that I had sharpened through many years of practicing law in exactly the way I had always wanted to. I loved it. At mid-career, to go into an intelligence agency in a senior position, with the responsibility to keep it clean, that was stunningly good luck and a terrific experience. And again, I learned a lot.

Although I thought I would go back into private practice after that, Ambassador John Negroponte, who was the first Director of National Intelligence, then asked me to run counterintelligence policy and strategy, which I thought was too interesting not to do. Eventually I went back into law and decided to set up my own legal and consulting practice. But, even when I was still in government, I was starting to come up to MIT to speak publicly about cyber vulnerabilities and conflict. So when John Tirman approached me about the Robert E. Wilhelm Fellowship, it was clear it was a great opportunity that would allow my academic work and practical work to really enrich each other.

Interview: What are you working on at CIS and how do you see the MIT community helping your work here?

JB: It has been clear to me for some time that intelligence collection, secrecy, and privacy are emerging as issues in international relations. This was true even before the Snowden revelations, but it was certainly accelerated by them. I think that there is a sense at CIS that these issues are important in the international context, but there is not a lot of understanding of these problems yet. Coming here is an opportunity to explore and write about issues of intelligence, secrecy, and privacy in the international context, and, up until now, I have been mainly (although not entirely) focused on these issues domestically. So, I spent the spring at The Hague and in Paris participating in conferences on these issues, and I’ve had several pieces come out recently about these issues. For example, I recently had a piece on industrial espionage and...
trade policy in the *American Interest* and on critical infrastructure vulnerabilities in *Politico* and the *Washington Post*. I also spend an increasing amount of time with students here at MIT and at the Kennedy school and Harvard Law School, which I really enjoy.

The Center for International Studies planned a two-day conference on privacy and secrecy in April, and I chaired a panel on the effect of technology and policy because I am quite interested in the ways that technology affects culture and policy. In fact, one reason why having this opportunity at MIT was so interesting to me, was the opportunity to get the technical people and the policy people and even the lawyers into one room to talk about the same issues. If the lawyers and the policymakers do not have an understanding of the technology and where it is going next, they make mistakes. The technical people, on the other hand, are generally not as attuned to the political or legal implications of what they are working on. So the possibility of a really rich dialogue here at MIT is great. There are stove-piping issues in every institution, however, and they are as bad (or worse) in universities as they are in government. Perhaps I can help in a small way to break down some of those pipes.

**précis:** In the conversations that you have across these communities, what are the things that generate the most agreement, and what are the points of contention?

**JB:** I’ve found that many of the suggestions for regulating data are wildly unrealistic, in large part, because we are creating data—exhaust at an astonishing rate and this data is collectible by lots of people. We are living in an era in which secrets are harder than ever to keep, and those things that can be kept secret stay secret for shorter periods of time. Coming to grips with that transparency in our lives is difficult, at all levels—personal, organizational, governmental. And while it may be possible to regulate the secondary trade and data to some extent, I don’t think the fundamental data flood can be regulated effectively except at the margins. It certainly can’t be stopped.

That said, my own proclivities are for much more privacy than those of many people who advocate for more regulation. Privacy involves culture as well as data control. We don’t pay much attention to that, though for whatever it’s worth, I like writing about it. But, by and large, we are not a private culture. Americans share information about themselves in quite an astonishing way. In fact, this is the first time in history when privacy is taken to mean the ability to control the diffusion of information after people have voluntarily provided it to a large number of other people. Benjamin Franklin supposedly said, “Three can keep a secret, if two of them are dead.” Ben knew what he was talking about. When the government puts highly classified information out for sometimes thousands of people to see—and people put information for hundreds of people to see on Facebook—there is some meaningful sense in which that information is not a secret anymore, at least in the way Franklin thought of it. When you do that, the information is regulated, classified, and controlled, but it is not a secret.

**précis:** What have you seen as the contributions of academia on these issues? Where do you wish academics were contributing?

**JB:** We have traditionally created distinctions between scholarship and journalism. I like to do both. That distinction is important, though it was much clearer in people’s minds when I was an undergraduate, and it remains somewhat arbitrary. But to the extent you want to do scholarship about politics it seems to me you have two main options: you can look at problems for which there is a lot information available, or you can bring to bear historical experience to a question of contemporary affairs. Sometimes you can do both at once.

Now, political science has become a lot more quantitative in nature, and history has too. In my graduate education at the London School of Economics, I learned it might actually be a good idea to count things. But it is also important not to confuse counting with wisdom. I follow the late Adda Bozeman in believing that the critical discipline in studying international relations is history. Bringing to bear wisdom based on historical experience is the great contribution of scholarship to policy making. Those who are making decisions either in the private sector or in government are in some sense in the trench, and when you are in the trench it is very hard to see the whole battlefield. Policymakers are dealing with whatever caused the biggest problem the night before, and it is very hard to control the agenda. Scholarship is free of those constraints.

**précis:** With regard to new technologies, how do the domestic and international levels of analysis interact?

**JB:** In most countries the conversation that occurs in Western Europe and the United States about privacy and the limits of governmental power are virtually unheard of. When the police can knock down your door in the middle of the night and there is no independent judiciary, questions about the collection of metadata look pretty small. But what I think is true, is that the issues of transparency are being felt by very different cultures in many of the same ways. We are finding that technology that makes our lives more convenient and that can empower individuals can also empower the state in ways we don’t like. For example, the same technology that a young couple will use in their home to monitor a baby is used in Syria by the government to do really nasty and intrusive spying on the population. It would be nice if we could easily determine what technology is good and what technology is bad, but we can’t. So we control the export of this stuff as well as we can, imperfectly to be sure, but we can’t uninvent it and we can’t keep other countries from inventing their own versions of it.

**précis:** What does your next project look like?

**JB:** I am doing some work now on critical infrastructure protection. I think the notion of strategic cyber war is a little over the top, and I say that as someone who also thinks we have very serious vulner
Culture Clash: New Book Explores Fierce Debates Over Immigration

by Peter Dizikes, MIT News Office

Immigration policy has been among the most rancorous of U.S. political issues in recent years. What has been fueling America’s contentious debates over the topic?

Security, according to many people: In the time since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, keeping borders secure has been a main justification for tightly controlled immigration. But underneath those concerns lies a simmering cultural clash, according to one MIT scholar who has been studying the topic in depth recently.

“It’s about some larger loss of U.S. identity,” says John Tirman, executive director of MIT’s Center for International Studies. Opponents of immigration, he adds, “say they’re not concerned about culture, use of language, and changing norms, but I think it really does come down to those kinds of issues.”

And in the last two decades, Tirman thinks, that has specifically meant a fight about the relationship between U.S. identity and Latin American culture, in light of the large numbers of Latino immigrants who have come to the country. Disputes about language use, school curricula, and other cultural issues have made this evident, Tirman says.

“The way the reaction to illegal immigration has manifested indicates most clearly that the resistance is mainly one of cultural difference and exclusion … rather than economics or politics,” writes Tirman in his new book on the subject, *Dream Chasers*, just published by the MIT Press.

Class conflict
While Tirman says there are many places to find these cultural clashes over immigration, his book focuses on a few case studies, such as an educational dispute that spilled into the state legislature in Arizona. In Tucson, some schools adopted a Mexican-American Studies (MAS) program teaching the region’s history from an alternate point of view, with a much greater emphasis on the historic presence of Mexicans in the area, and a more critical interpretation of U.S. actions.

The MAS program seemed to have a beneficial effect on Latino students, keeping them engaged and helping their academic standing. But by 2010, the state’s superintendent of schools and legislators effectively shot down the program, introducing new policies eliminating the curriculum from schools, despite its apparent success.

The Tucson schools controversy had nothing to do with security matters, Tirman observes. Instead it showed, he writes in the book, “the fissures in Arizona’s political culture when it came to the sensitive issues immigration brought to the fore — race and ethnicity, language, jobs, education, and, at root, what it means to be an American.”

It also indicates that a greater immigrant presence is accompanied by a greater backlash against those new residents; Arizona is now 30 percent Latino, but, as Tirman notes, has become “the leading anti-immigration-reform state,” as well.
To be sure, Tirman allows, clashes over “culture” are often heightened by difficult economic circumstances; as middle-class wages have stagnated in recent decades, immigration has become more of a hot-button issue. In all, 45 states have passed immigration restrictions (on top of federal law) in the last two decades.

“I think there’s no question that the resistance to immigration grows more voluble during times of economic stress,” says Tirman, while noting that the current debate is “more contentious” than it was in the more rosy economic circumstances of the 1990s. More recently, he notes, “George W. Bush’s reform package of 2006-2007 was shot down at a time when the economy was beginning to weaken. And the economy has been rocky ever since, so it’s no surprise there’s been opposition to the more recent reform efforts.”

**The long march**

*Dream Chasers* has received praise from other scholars. Derek Shearer, a professor of diplomacy at Occidental College, calls it “an essential primer that explains immigration in the context of American politics and the global economy.”

Tirman, for his part, believes the future holds both wider tolerance of immigrants from Latin America among most U.S. citizens, but a continued resistance to loosening immigration law on the policy level.

Polling, he notes, shows that a majority of Americans seem amenable to reforms such as the ones both Bush and President Barack Obama have proposed, even as Congress prefers not to take action on the matter.

“The public has moved a long way in the last 20 or 30 years toward acceptance, and I think that’s based on a kind of recognition that we’ve had all these people here, 11 million [undocumented immigrants], not really doing much harm,” says Tirman, who himself favors a more open set of immigration laws.

At the same time, he notes, the generally sluggish global economy, particularly in Mexico and some part of Latin America, may only provide more impetus for people to migrate to the U.S. without documented status. And that heightened presence could also fortify resistance to immigration among the Americans already set against it.

“We are going to be having these issues for a long, long time,” Tirman says, “so we had better understand their origins.”
Largely forgotten in the scholarly and policy obsession with the Cold War and with nuclear acquisition is the fact that regional powers have chosen different nuclear strategies. These differences matter greatly to their ability to deter conflict. I take these issues in turn. The first part of the book asks: which nuclear postures have regional powers adopted, and why? I begin in chapter 2 by identifying the diverse nuclear postures adopted by the regional powers, using original data collected from the field, and then develop a new theory for their selection. I classify and characterize three possible regional power nuclear postures, arrayed across a spectrum of capabilities and deployment options.

A **catalytic posture**, which consists of only a handful of nuclear weapons, threatens the explicit breakout of nuclear weapons in the event the state’s survival is threatened in order to compel—or catalyze—third party intervention on the state’s behalf. For example, Israel and South Africa adopted this posture for a significant portion of their nuclear histories.

An **assured retaliation posture** involves the development of secure second strike capabilities that enable a state to threaten certain nuclear retaliation should it suffer primarily a nuclear attack. This posture has been adopted by India and China.

An **asymmetric escalation posture** develops capabilities and procedures that credibly enable the rapid and first use of nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional attack. France and Pakistan have each, at some point, adopted this posture.

Given these three alternative nuclear postures, why might states select one over the others? Current alternative theories in international relations that may explain a state’s nuclear posture—security environment, technological determinism, and strategic culture—are unsatisfactory and often indeterminate. Therefore, I propose a novel theory of the sources of nuclear posture: Posture Optimization Theory, or optimization theory for short. Taking inspiration from the neoclassical realist school of international relations theory, it explains how and why a regional power might select and optimize its nuclear posture in response to external security and internal domestic political and financial constraints. It offers a determinate prediction for a state’s nuclear posture based on several clearly identifiable and sequential variables. A state’s security environment—the availability of powerful allies and the severity of its immediate threats—is critical and, indeed, the primary variable responsible for nuclear postures. But where that security environment is permissive, as is often the case, states have a range of choice in nuclear postures. Other considerations at the domestic level, such as civil–military relations and resource constraints, regulate a state’s choice of nuclear posture. For example, the asymmetric escalation posture is not only financially and organizationally demanding, but it forces a state’s leadership to be prepared to devolve nuclear assets and authority to military end users in order to maintain the credibility of first use options. This increases the risk of unauthorized and accidental use of nuclear weapons and can impose tremendous strain on a state’s civil–military organs. As such, states with permissive security environments that can opt out of an asymmetric escalation posture may find it rational to do so if adopting this posture is incompatible with other unit–level preferences and constraints—especially those imposed by the configuration of the state’s civil–military relations.

This theory provides the most valid available framework for why states select the nuclear postures they do, providing testable and falsifiable predictions for the nuclear postures
emerging and those that future regional nuclear powers might select in the future, and specifying when and under what conditions existing regional nuclear powers might shift postures. It is important to note that this theory attempts to predict and explain posture outcomes, not necessarily the process or efficiency by which a state adopts a particular posture (which is a separate question demanding a different theory and study).

Chapters 3 through 8 focus in detail on the nuclear postures of each regional power: Pakistan, India, China, France, Israel, and South Africa. For each, I describe the specific nuclear strategy that the regional nuclear power has adopted over time. From an empirical perspective, this discussion on the actual nuclear postures of all the regional powers over time provides the first comparative treatment of all six regional nuclear powers. I then test each state’s choice of nuclear posture against my theory and the three alternative explanations: structural realism, technological determinism, and strategic culture. I analyze whether the form and rationale for each state’s selection is consistent with each of these four theories. For example, I show that Pakistan has shifted from catalytic posture to an asymmetric escalation posture and deploy my theory to explain these choices. Similarly, I offer an explanation for why India, China, and now Israel have all opted for small but secure assured retaliation postures, even though they have the capability to adopt more aggressive strategies.

From a theoretical standpoint, these chapters provide the first broad explanation for why these states have adopted the nuclear postures that they have. They provide a framework that helps theorists and policy makers alike think about the variables that might drive regional powers to adopt a specific nuclear strategy, and understand the conditions under which states might shift strategies. The empirical tests establish the validity of the theory, thereby providing testable predictions for the postures that possible future nuclear states, such as Japan or Iran, might adopt.

The variation in regional power nuclear strategies is only important, however, if there are consequences to the different choices these powers make. Thus, the second part of the book focuses on the ramifications of these choices about nuclear posture for international security. It asks the critical question posed earlier: what kind of nuclear strategy is required to deter conflict? Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, I find that the mere possession of nuclear weapons fails to systematically deter conventional attacks. Chapter 9 and 10 demonstrate that there are very real differences in the deterrence consequences of these various nuclear strategies: some nuclear postures fail to deliver on their promise to deter conflict. In fact, only those states that adopt an asymmetric escalation posture enjoy significant deterrent success against conventional attacks. The catalytic and assured retaliation postures fail to do so because the risk of nuclear use even in intense conventional conflicts is so low that it does not deter opponents from attacking these nuclear powers—sometimes resulting in conflicts of very high intensity.

Chapter 9 conducts a large–n analysis to isolate the average effects of these nuclear postures in reducing armed attacks at various levels of intensity. This analysis illuminates the general deterrence effects of each nuclear posture, providing an estimate of how many fewer attacks a state can expect to experience after adopting a particular nuclear posture. It shows that the asymmetric escalation posture is uniquely “deterrence optimal,” reducing conflict at each level of armed intensity against both nuclear and non–nuclear powers. Contrary to conventional wisdom about the deterrence power of possessing any nuclear weapons, states adopting assured retaliation and catalytic postures have experienced serious deterrence failures even at high levels of conventional conflict intensity. The implication is that even secure second–strike nuclear forces may not be sufficient to deter the initiation of full wars against a regional nuclear power. Certainly, nuclear weapons alone are insufficient to reap any significant deterrent effect. These findings fundamentally challenge the assumption that the mere possession of nuclear weapons provides substantial deterrent benefits.

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Chapter 10 focuses on the effects of nuclear postures in particular crises. These crises, selected in part based on the large-n analysis in the previous chapter, tease out the mechanisms that connect nuclear posture to deterrence success and failure. I examine a series of crises in enduring rivalries between India and Pakistan, and between Israel and the various Arab states over time. Examining crises in enduring rivalries has the benefit of holding many variables constant in crises where many moving parts would otherwise make it difficult to isolate the effect of nuclear postures. In this chapter, I probe how different nuclear postures have affected states’ decisions to escalate or de-escalate a crisis, measuring differential deterrence effects of postures on both the outbreak and the course of the crisis. I augment the empirical richness of the data on these crises with interviews with key national security decision makers, especially in the India–Pakistan cases. This chapter confirms the findings from the large-n analysis, showing that not only does the asymmetric escalation posture uniquely reduce armed attacks, but decision makers are deterred from attacking an asymmetric escalator because of the fear of nuclear first use. Catalytic postures have resulted in high-intensity wars being waged against states, and even assured retaliation postures have been unable to deter high-intensity wars, such as the 1999 Kargil War launched by Pakistan against India. On the other hand, when Pakistan shifted from a catalytic to an asymmetric escalation posture, it enjoyed a marked increase in deterrence success against India.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom—indeed contrary to a bedrock article of faith in the canon of nuclear deterrence—the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not produce a uniform deterrent effect against opponents. Despite the arguments of scholars including Kenneth Waltz, Robert Jervis, and John Mearsheimer, the possession of nuclear weapons by itself, and even the adoption of secure second-strike forces, is insufficient to systematically deter conventional conflict. This finding overturns a central belief of modern deterrence theory, held for more than half a century, in the efficacy of nuclear weapons possession. Nuclear weapons may deter, but they deter unequally. States that wish to deter conventional attack with nuclear weapons must explicitly orient their forces to do so.

I conclude in chapter 11 with some implications for our understanding of nuclear deterrence and nuclear proliferation in a world where an increasing number of regional powers are pursuing nuclear weapons. The most important finding for theory is that nuclear weapons do not produce a uniform deterrent effect. Not only have limited nuclear arsenals had significant deterrence failures, but so have nuclear forces that have attained secure second-strike capabilities. This significantly revises the conventional understanding of what it takes to deter conflict with nuclear weapons. The key variable in generating deterrent power against conventional conflict is not simply nuclear weapons, but nuclear posture. While the acquisition of nuclear weapons is an important step for regional powers, what comes afterward, and the pressures regional powers face in adopting nuclear strategies, are more important to the texture of international politics. Nuclear posture is the variable that produces differential deterrent effects, the factor that affects the frequency and the intensity of international conflict.
Shivshankar Menon, a former national security advisor of India, was a Robert E. Wilhelm fellow at CIS for one month beginning February 3, 2015.

Menon’s career with the Indian Foreign Service began in 1972. He served the Department of Atomic Energy as advisor to the Atomic Energy Commission. He continued this work after being posted in Vienna. Then he held three posts in Beijing. The final position in China he served as ambassador. He has also served as ambassador to Israel and high commissioner to Sri Lanka and Pakistan. He was appointed foreign secretary in 2006, and was the national security adviser to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. His term as national security adviser ended in May 2014.

During his time at MIT, Menon worked on a history of India-China relations. He also meet with faculty and students to discuss regional issues.

CIS director Richard Samuels welcomed Menon: “My colleagues and I are thrilled that the former national security advisor of India accepted our invitation to MIT.”

A generous gift from Robert E. Wilhelm supports the Center’s Wilhelm fellowship. The fellowship is awarded to individuals who have held senior positions in public life and is open, for example, to heads of non-profit agencies, senior officials at the State Department or other government agencies, including ambassadors, or senior officials from the UN or other multilateral agencies. Previous Wilhelm fellows include: Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Ambassador Frances Deng, Admiral William Fallon, and Yukio Okamoto, a former special advisor to the prime minister of Japan. ■

Interview with Joel Brenner

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abilities. But there are real issues in the cyber realm that need to be examined. For example, after what appeared to have been a Russian breach of J.P. Morgan, it was reported in the New York Times that President Obama was trying to determine if President Putin was sending him a message, and nobody could tell him. Vulnerabilities like that have policy implications short of open conflict because they constrain a leader’s ability to make decisions. We have to think about what happens if an American action in Ukraine could lead to the take-down of a major American bank or part of our grid, because that kind of constraint is much more plausible than all-out cyber war. ■
3 Qs: Kenneth Oye on Regulating Drugs

by Peter Dizikes, MIT News Office

Writing in the journal *Nature Chemical Biology*, researchers at the University of California at Berkeley have announced a new method that could make it easier to produce drugs such as morphine. The publication has focused attention on the eventual possibility that such substances could be manufactured illicitly in small-scale labs. Political scientists Kenneth Oye and Chappell Lawson of MIT, along with Tania Bubela of Concordia University in Montreal, authored an accompanying commentary about the regulatory issues involved. Oye answered questions on the subject for MIT News.

Q. What is this significant new advance?

A. All of the steps needed to create a pathway in yeast capable of producing morphine from glucose have now been realized. Specifically, on May 18, the Dueber lab at the University of California at Berkeley published an article in *Nature Chemical Biology* on a pathway from glucose through norcoclaurine / norlaudanosoline to (S)-reticuline. The Faccini lab at the University of Calgary has worked on epimerization of (S)-reticuline to (R)-reticuline. Last month, the Martin lab at Concordia University published an article in *PLoS One* on a pathway from (R)-reticuline through thebaine to morphine. Independently of these efforts, the Smolke lab at Stanford University has been developing yeast-based pathways for opiate production for over eight years.

In short, an integrated glucose-to-morphine pathway in yeast is now feasible, with substantial potential benefits. Drug developers are testing novel analgesics that may be safer and less addictive than traditional opiates. Because yeast-based opiate-production pathways may be altered more easily than pathways in opium poppy, the work of these groups may prove useful in the production of these next-generation analgesics.

Q. Why should it be regulated?

A. The development of yeast-based opiate-production platforms presents significant challenges to public health and safety. Opiates now reach illicit markets through two principal channels: First, legal prescriptions for oxycodone, hydrocodone, and other opiates are commonly diverted to unauthorized use. Second, illicitly cultivated opium poppies in Afghanistan, Myanmar, Laos, Mexico, and other countries are processed into heroin, and distributed by criminal networks.

Yeast-based opiate synthesis could create a third pathway of decentralized, small-scale production. Because yeast is easy to conceal, grow, and transport, law enforcement and criminal syndicates would both have difficulty controlling dissemination of an opiate-producing yeast strain. The essentials of yeast cultivation are well understood by home brewers, and fermentation equipment is inexpensive and widely available.

Access to low-cost opiates would increase opiate use and abuse. The legal sale of tincture of opium in the late 19th and early 20th century led to widespread addiction. Likewise, rates of addiction to prescription opiates surged when new painkillers became more widely available and fell somewhat when additional restrictions were imposed. More generally, increased access to other addictive substances, such as methamphetamine, has been associated with increased use. Yeast-based production of opiates would thus be likely to increase the number of opiate users and addicts.
Q. Which regulatory principles, or policy specifics, are most suited to this case?

A. As they were submitting their articles to journals, the Dueber and Martin labs asked Tania Bubela of Concordia University, Chappell Lawson of MIT, and me to develop recommendations on how to address risks associated with their opiate-synthesis work. Our policy recommendations are designed to allow potentially beneficial research while limiting the likelihood of unintentional release of an opiate-producing yeast strain. We offer four basic recommendations and a fifth observation.

First, we recommend adjustments in the design of yeast strains to limit illicit appeal. These measures included producing end-products with less appeal for illicit use, making yeast strains harder to cultivate, and creating markers to enable easy detection of opiate-producing strains. Second, we recommend basic lab security measures and personnel checks to limit the likelihood of theft or sale of opiate-producing strains from academic labs. Third, we recommend measures to make it harder for criminal organizations to engineer yeast strains … by asking gene-synthesis consortiums and firms to screen orders by adding opiate-producing, nonpathogenic yeast strains to current blacklists of pathogens. Fourth, we recommend changes in domestic regulations, including licensing of opiate-producing yeast strains and activation of international consultation mechanisms in the International Narcotics Control Board and the International Expert Group on Biosecurity and Biosafety Regulation.

Finally, the case of opiate synthesis in yeast should be viewed in light of two broader trends. One is that the field of biological engineering is now moving very quickly. New tools like CRISPR, used for gene editing, are more efficient, and inventories of biological parts suitable for repurposing are now useful in a practical way. Results that were once an abstract possibility are being realized—gene drives, human germline modification, and opiate synthesis are examples.

Another is that technologists developing these powerful applications are now stepping forward early to encourage discussion of benefits and risks before, rather than after, the fact—early enough to conduct research to address areas of uncertainty, early enough to identify gaps in domestic regulations and international conventions, and early enough to have a deliberate and informed discussion of risks. Prominent scientists have stepped forward early in the case of opiate synthesis, gene drives, and human germline modification. Furthermore, the National Science Foundation, the Sloan Foundation, and other funders have provided support for precisely this sort of responsible engagement.

The particulars of the opiate synthesis case are significant. But these two more general trends are the important larger story.

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Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan visited MIT as part of his weeklong trip to the U.S., participating in a roundtable discussion of innovation strategies during his stop at the Institute.

Abe called MIT “a center of innovation in the world” and said he was “very impressed and grateful” for the remarks on innovation at the meeting with MIT faculty in fields ranging from bioscience to management and political science.

Abe added that encouraging a “virtuous circle” of innovation, including academia, was “one of the pillars of my growth strategy,” and emphasized his commitment to seeing women have an equal role in innovation and entrepreneurship. Japan will “double our efforts so that female leaders have a better chance,” Abe said, asserting that he wants to “create a society where women can shine.”

Abe also toured three research labs in the MIT Media Lab, and met with MIT President L. Rafael Reif, who in welcoming remarks noted the extensive ties between MIT and Japan.

“Japan is a country MIT has studied and admired for many years,” Reif said, noting that 39 current courses at the Institute focus on Japan. Moreover, Reif observed, over 1,000 undergraduates have worked and studied in Japan as part of the MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI) program, which places students in internships; today, more than 1,600 MIT alumni also live in Japan.

In conjunction with Abe’s visit, the government of Japan announced a new gift to MIT. The gift takes the form of a fund that will initially support research in Japanese politics and diplomacy at MIT’s Center for International Studies (CIS) and, in its second phase, the creation of a new chaired professorship, to be titled the Professor of Modern and Contemporary Japanese Politics and Diplomacy, within MIT’s Department of Political Science.

As the title of the chair suggests, the new position will focus on current-day issues in Japanese politics and international relations, building on MIT’s existing strengths in those areas. The gift will take effect ahead of the start of the 2015-16 academic year.

**Innovation from many perspectives**

Abe began his visit by talking with researchers in the Media Lab, guided by Media Lab Director Joi Ito. Abe listened to research presentations by Neri Oxman, the Sony Corporation Career Development Associate Professor of Media Arts and Sciences and director of the Mediated Matter group, along with Chikara Inamura and John Klein, graduate students in the group; Hugh Herr, associate professor of media arts and sciences and head of the Biomechatronics group; and graduate student Philipp Schoessler, who works with Hiroshi Ishii, the Jerome B. Wiesner Professor and director of the Tangible Media group.

During the roundtable discussion on innovation, held on the sixth floor of the Media Lab, faculty members took turns making presentations before Abe responded to the group.

Political scientist Richard Samuels, the Ford International Professor and director of CIS, noted that MIT and Japan have historical ties dating to the 1870s, soon after
Japan opened to the West; he added that Japan’s “spirit of innovation and improvement has never flagged.” Still, Samuels suggested, while Japan was viewed in the 1980s as the “model for how to do technology right,” today’s innovation landscape is more open-ended and depends on access to capital, a university-based research and spinoff culture, and more.

Other faculty discussed what they regard as especially crucial elements of an innovation ecosystem. Neuroscientist Susumu Tonegawa, the Picower Professor at MIT, recommended alterations in the rules of Japanese universities to allow professors more time pursuing off-campus research. He added that it is “important for the Japanese government to continue to support fundamental research.”

Robert Langer, the David H. Koch Institute Professor at MIT, also emphasized the significance of academic research in innovation. He cited Cambridge’s biotechnology sector as an example, saying growth “will follow [if we] fund universities to do the best research, and train the best students in the world.”

Some of the MIT faculty present study innovation, and offered remarks on that topic. Suzanne Berger, the Raphael Dorman and Helen Starbuck Professor of International Relations at MIT, recommended that Japan pursue growth opportunities in advanced manufacturing and connected fields. “There is such a tight connection between innovation and production,” Berger said.

Fiona Murray, the Bill Porter Professor of Entrepreneurship, associate dean for innovation in the MIT Sloan School of Management, and co-director of the MIT Innovation Initiative, added to Abe’s remarks about gender and entrepreneurship, noting that “male and female graduates are equally interested in taking this path.” She also observed that sound policies spark innovation, saying there are “important ways that governments have brought stakeholders together to effect change.”

Kenneth Oye, an MIT political scientist with expertise in both Japan and in technological regulation, suggested that forward-looking attempts to gauge the risks of new technologies, particularly in biomedical research, were in the “common interest” of the U.S. and Japan. In turn, he said, “realizing the consequences” of evolving technologies would make it easier for widely useful new tools to get adopted.

For his part, Ito suggested that new tools and techniques have made sophisticated, interdisciplinary innovation more plausible at smaller scales, and suggested that it is important for funders to give researchers room to make discoveries—since many of them are tangential to the original aims of a research project.

“Japan really can build the same kind of economy we see here in Massachusetts,” Ito suggested.

**Abe: Japan backs a “similar model”**

In response to these comments from the discussants, Abe said the interdisciplinary nature of the projects on display in the Media Lab created “quite an insightful moment” for him.

“We would like to see further fruition of a similar model,” Abe added, referring to Japanese efforts to build an innovation ecosystem in the city of Okinawa, drawing upon contributions from academia, industry, and government.

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In August 2012, after Japanese authorities detained and deported a group of Hong Kong–based activists attempting to land on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which both Japan and China claim as their own territory, China erupted in anti-Japan protests. These initial waves of protest were quickly followed by more in September when many Chinese cities witnessed anti–Japan protests again, in response to Japan's decision to nationalize the islands. Some protests turned astonishingly violent, with Japanese cars smashed and Chinese car owners badly beaten. The media has attributed these protests to “nationalism gone awry” and, in academia, the study of the anti-Japan protests has also been linked to nationalism. Undoubtedly, nationalism is relevant. But the notion that these protests emerged directly and singularly as a result of Chinese nationalism is a myth. Such a narrow view fails to explain the variations in people's behavior and motives during the protests: why were some people angrily smashing cars while others actively advocating for nonviolence? What motivated Chinese citizens to participate in these protests?

In contrast to the conventional wisdom that treats the Chinese as if they were a unified, equally nationalistic group, my research finds that Chinese citizens participated in anti–Japan protests for drastically different reasons—many of which had little to do with Chinese nationalism. In this article, I review the motivations and behaviors of five types of Chinese protestors, many of whom were not motivated purely (or even primarily) by nationalism. These diverse types of participants include: (1) committed patriots: active through the entire protest wave—from organizing online activism to offline street protests—these individuals are arguably the most nationalistic of all the protestors; (2) ordinary urbanites: the young city-dwellers, some of whom were motivated by local, rather than national, allegiances; (3) anger-venters: those individuals who reacted violently and were stimulated by a combination of legitimate grievances and the emotion of crowd dynamics; (4) clever critics: those who joined the protest opportunistically to voice their criticisms of domestic policies; and (5) business interests: those entrepreneurs who saw the protests as a marketing opportunity to expand their businesses.

By examining the actual motivations and behaviors of each of these groups, my research illustrates that nationalist explanations of the recent anti-Japan protests fall short in significant ways. Instead, the anti–Japan protests included a diverse medley of people—often with opportunistic rather than nationalistic motivations—who used the official “patriotism” frame to justify their actions. In fact, protest participants exhibited different gradations of patriotism: at one extreme were the committed activists who devoted organizational and material resources to the cause of anti-Japan activism for a long period of time; and at the other extreme were opportunists who joined the protests for motivations that had little to do with patriotism.

**Nationalist motivations: “baodiao” activists, Tong Zeng, and the CFDD**

The group that appears to adhere most clearly to the nationalist explanation of the protests is the “baodiao” activists (i.e., defending the Diaoyu islands), who proved deeply motivated and committed to nationalistic, anti–Japanese rhetoric. The “baodiao” protests began on August 15, 2012, when “baodiao” protestors gathered in front of the Japanese embassy in Beijing. This protest was organized by the China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands (CFDD), chaired by the nationalist entrepreneur Tong.
Zeng. This peaceful protest marked the beginning of the high tide in the anti–Japan protest wave, after which street protests erupted across Chinese cities.

Indeed, the CFDD and Tong Zeng have been consistent patriotic activists for a long period of time—according to CFDD’s official website, its history dates back to 1996 and it has been active ever since, both on and offline. During this period the CFDD has devoted organizational and material resources to the “baodiao” movement, making it one of the most influential “baodiao” organizations in China. Moreover, the CFDD has been devoting organizational, leadership, and material resources to “baodiao” activism, even in the face of challenges from the state: the authorities sometimes shut down CFDD’s website and restricted Tong’s activities, but they have continued to support the movement. In this way, Tong Zeng, together with the CFDD, are among the most committed patriots in the anti–Japan protests, and their use of the “patriotism” frame during the most recent wave of nationalist protests appears to be quite genuine.

Non–nationalist motivations: ordinary urbanites, anger venters, clever critics, and business interests

Although the “baodiao” movement clearly coheres with the nationalist explanations of the anti-Japan protests, there remain a number of additional groups, who participated in the protests, but did so for largely non–nationalistic reasons. Thus, the following groups deviate from the conventional nationalism explanations in important ways.

Ordinary urbanites

Among the protestors during the anti–Japan protests were groups of young people working in the cities. Within these younger populations the motives and behaviors differed from other protestors significantly. With regard to motivations, anecdotal evidence from Chinese language sources suggests that some young urbanites emphasized their local allegiances rather than their national ones. For example, in Guangzhou, a Southern metropolitan area, local youth organizations did not harbor anti–Japan sentiments, but instead emphasized their love for Guangzhou, not for China. One of the organizers, Gengshu, wrote in his blog that a small group of colleagues who were concerned about violence printed one thousand posters of “love Guangzhou, nonviolence” and disseminated them on September 18.

In addition, these youngsters adhered strictly to non–violence, prioritizing non–violence as the core feature of their participation. For example, in Guangzhou, the group Genshu tried to keep the protests from becoming violent through public lobbying campaigns. Unlike Tong Zeng, they did not have charisma nor significant material input, but instead called themselves ordinary participants. Thus, both in their limited appeals to anti–Japanese sentiment and their emphasis on nonviolence, the subset of protest participants in this category differed from nationalist groups such as the CFDD.

Anger–venter

Unlike the CFDD patriots or the ordinary urbanites, a third class of protesters, who I refer to as anger–venters, adopted the violent and extreme tactics of –beating, smashing, and looting– (da, za, qiang). But in addition to their choice of violent tactics, the motivations of this subset of protesters differed in important ways from other groups. China’s official explanation of their violent behavior identifies “opposition against social inequality” from those at the bottom of the society as the key factor for violence during the protests. While grievances about social inequality are highly relevant, however, this explanation is incomplete in that it fails to explain why violence took place at particular times and places. At the most basic level, it is true that structural factors sow the seed for anger–venting events—socioeconomic changes during the reform era resulted in

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redistributive inequality, social injustice, corruption, and weakening state ideology—and these factors gave rise to a group of dissatisfied people, including the unemployed, laid off workers, migrant workers, and veterans. However, it is not simply these grievances that lead to violence—this anger was ignited by the non–routine, group dynamics that were observed during the protests. Indeed, through Chinese–language reports and interviews, my preliminary findings suggest that it is not simply social grievance that motivated this sort of violence, but these social grievances compounded by crowd psychology (and delayed responses from the authorities) that induced such angry, violent outcomes.

Clever critics
Also in the mix of the anti–Japan protests were a group of people holding banners that conveyed criticisms about domestic politics through the clever use of allegories and sarcasm. For instance, one slogan, written by an elderly shopkeeper, was placed in front of his small shop by the protest route. It was a perfectly–rhymed poem: “no medical care, no social welfare, but [we] have the Diaoyu islands in the heart; even if the government does not provide pension, [we] still must get the Diaoyu islands back; no property rights, no human rights, on the Diaoyu islands [we] fight for sovereignty rights; even if [we] cannot afford housing or tombs, [we] will not give a single square foot of [Diaoyu] to the Japanese.” This sarcastic but playful poem captured the grave problems faced by the elderly Chinese today: lack of medical care, pension, or even more sadly, the ability to afford a proper burial after one dies. This group was dissatisfied with the government and took the opportunity of the anti–Japan protests to voice their criticisms, but not on nationalistic grounds. The fact that they came prepared with these banners further demonstrates their determination to voice these criticisms on the street. The behavior and repertoires of these sarcastic “patriots” indicate that the official rhetoric both gives venues for dissent and limits its content: these banners conveyed criticisms about the government, but complainers still had to frame these criticisms within the official rhetoric of patriotism, indicating their acknowledgement of state domination. Like the ordinary urbanites and anger–venting groups, the clever complainers constituted another group that embedded itself in the larger anti–Japan protests for reasons not nationalistic.

Half-hearted patriots: business opportunities
The last group in the anti–Japan protest wave consists of business interests. For example, in the anti–Japan march in Hangzhou on August 19, there was a banner that read “the Diaoyu islands are China’s sacred territory and shall not be invaded!” At first glance, it was a most ordinary anti–Japan slogan, yet below this sentence was a blatant advertisement for the “Hangzhou website for vegetables and fruits” (Hangzhou shuguo wang), along with its URL “www.hzshuguo.com.” This business, as its website suggests, was about fruits and vegetables and specialized in “online shopping, delivery, and import.” This online fruit company did not seem to have much conflict of economic interests with Japan—after all, Japan had very little share of vegetable sales in China and this business also imported vegetables and fruits. The banner indicated a marketing strategy instead of an expression of patriotism, or at least the former seemed to be the primary motivation.

Conclusions and implications
Chinese citizens did react to Japan’s nationalization of the Senkaku islands with protests. Utilizing primary materials on the Chinese Internet and journalistic reports, however, this paper finds that the conventional theories of nationalism are inadequate in explaining the emergence and the expansion of the anti–Japan protests. The participants in these protests were not homogeneous. They differed in terms of patriotic commit
ment and people participated in the protests for different motivations, which led to variations in their protest repertoires.

This paper is just a beginning into the study of the most recent anti–Japan protests. There remain many crucial questions, the answers to which are important practically and theoretically and they have policy implications both for Chinese foreign policy and domestic politics. For example, if not all participants of the anti–Japan protests are nationalistic, what does it say about the alleged effects of the Chinese patriotic education campaign? What factors might affect the degree of the Chinese public’s acceptance of the patriotic indoctrination? How can the United States and Japan engage the Chinese population who is less nationalistic? The study of anti–foreign protests in general could also potentially bridge the study of social movements and international relations.

REFERENCES
4 I define the “patriotism” frame as official rhetoric about patriotism, which is mainly the discourse that Chinese citizens should be loyal to the country, and the Communist party, and that they should support territorial integrity of the Chinese nation.
6 Information regarding past CFDD activities comes from its official introduction at http://www.cfdd.org.cn/html/6/n-6.html
8 Gengshu is the internet name in his Sina blog. He claimed to be an NGO worker in the “signature” section. The Chinese character for the quote is “ai Guangzhou, fei baoli.” Emphasis in the translation added by author.
9 Gengshu’s blog at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_490575c01016myv.html. See also his censored weibo article at https://freeweibo.com/weibo/34942669470900242.
11 The underclass includes migrant workers, laid off workers, the unemployed, etc. They are literally at the bottom of the society.
12 See http://tieba.baidu.com/p/1870735068. This elderly was said to be a Chengdu resident. The poem read: Mei yibao, mei shebao, xingzhong yaoyou diaoyudao; jiusuan zhengfu buyanglao, yeyao shoufu diaoyudao; meiwuquan, meirenquan, diaoyudao shang zhengzhuquan; maibuqi fang, xiu buqi fen, cuntu burang ribenren. The rhyme of the poem is lost after my poor translation.
13 See http://www.kpkpw.com/space.php?do=activity&id=29&type=kuaipai&albumid=29297314. Apparently, the website was accessible in April 2013, and is now under construction.
Dolev Receives MIT Excellence Award

David Dolev, assistant director of MISTI and managing director of MIT-Israel, was honored with the Excellence Award for Advancing Inclusion and Global Perspectives in recognition of the programs he has developed that promote greater understanding across the MIT community and beyond. His inventive program MISTI 2.0 is designed to develop MIT students into dynamic leaders with a global perspective. In the MIT-Israel program, he has created opportunities for hundreds of MIT students to work and do research in Israel, a pioneer in fields like energy and the environment. In the MIT-MEET program, Dolev helps recruit and prepare MIT students to promote interaction and camaraderie between Israeli and Palestinian high-school students as they bond around a passion for new technologies.

Wickremesinghe Elected PM of Sri Lanka

The Center is thrilled to announce that Ranil Wickremesinghe was recently elected prime minister of Sri Lanka. Wickremesinghe was a CIS Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow in the spring of 2014. While at MIT, he focused on how to formulate a constitution sans an executive presidency. He also worked with faculty and students interested in Asian regional issues and was the key speaker at a Starr Forum: The Indian Ocean: The Vortex of Destiny. Wickremesinghe was prime minister of Sri Lanka twice before, from May 7, 1993 to August 19, 1994 and from December 9, 2001 to April 6, 2004.

Myron Weiner Seminar Series on International Migration

The Center hosted three seminars including: “Migration, National Security, and New Forms of Policing: Dubai and Abu Dhabi,” with Noora A. Lori, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University; “Dreaming Europe in the Wake of the Arab Revolts: Causes and Consequences of Migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe,” with Philippe Fargues, Professor and Director of the Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute; and “Theorizing International Migration: Towards a Unified Field of Study,” with Professor James F. Hollifield, Director of the Tower Center for Political Studies, Southern Methodist University.

Sferza Receives Infinite Mile Award

TSerenella Sferza, co-director of the MIT-Italy Program, received a SHASS Infinite Mile award this year in the “Great Ideas” category. This award recognizes Serenella’s creation and development of MISTI Global Teaching Labs, a program that now sends some 150 students abroad over IAP to teach STEM subjects in foreign high schools. Thanks to Serenella’s contagious enthusiasm for GTL, this highly competitive program has now been replicated in a handful of MISTI countries, creating new ways for hundreds of MIT students to gain a unique hands-on learning experience abroad.
Hrant Dink Memorial Lecture

The Center launched a lecture series honoring the late human-rights activist Hrant Dink. The series welcomes distinguished speakers to MIT to address issues of human rights. Hrant Dink was a well-known activist on behalf of human rights in Turkey, his native land, and was widely lauded for promoting Turkish-Armenian reconciliation, human rights, and minority rights in Turkey. He was often critical of Turkey's denial of the Armenian Genocide and of the Armenian diaspora's enmity toward Turks. He was the founding editor of Agos, an Armenian-language newspaper in Istanbul. In January 2007, he was assassinated by a Turkish nationalist. More than 200,000 people attended his funeral. The inaugural lecture was given by Jennifer Leaning, the Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Professor of the Practice of Health and Human Rights Director, FXB Center for Health and Human Rights, at the Harvard School of Public Health. The Center's Hrant Dink Memorial Lecture is made possible by the generous support of the Gubnenkian Foundation and Harry Parsekian.

Christia Receives Andrew Carnegie Fellowship

The Carnegie Corporation of New York has announced the inaugural class of Andrew Carnegie Fellows, among them MIT’s Fotini Christia, associate professor of political science. Each fellow will receive up to $200,000 to support his or her research in the social sciences and humanities. Christia’s research—which has involved extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iran, the Palestinian Territories, Saudi Arabia, and most recently, Syria and Yemen—considers issues of conflict and cooperation in the Muslim world.

SSP Wed Seminars

The Security Studies Program’s lunchtime lectures included: Steven Simon, Middle East Institute, on “The U.S. and the Middle East;” Steven Wilkinson, Yale University, on “Army and Nation: coup-proofing the military in South Asia;” Wendy Pearlman, Northwestern University, on “Protest Cascades in Syria;” and Sally Paine, Naval War College, on “China between Continental and Maritime World Orders.”

Starr Forums

The Center hosted multiple Starr Forums this spring including: a conversation on security dynamics in Asia with the following speakers: Ambassador Shivshankar Menon, India’s former national security advisor and foreign secretary, and a recent Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow at CIS; Taylor Fravel, associate professor of political science at MIT and member of the Security Studies Program, and Vipin Narang, associate professor of political science at MIT and also a member of the Security Studies Program. Another event was on demystifying ISIS with speakers Juan Cole, Richard P. Mitchell Collegiate Professor of History at the University of Michigan and Richard Nielsen, assistant professor of political science at MIT. Science and innovation diplomacy was the topic of another event and included the following speakers: Fiona Murray, William Porter (1967) Distinguished Professor of Entrepreneurship and faculty director at both the Martin Trust Center for MIT Entrepreneurship and the Legatum Center; Phil Budden, senior lecturer at MIT Sloan, affiliated with the Martin Trust Center for MIT Entrepreneurship and the TIES Group; Nina Fedoroff, Evan Pugh professor at Pennsylvania State University and former Science and Technology Advisor to the US Secretary of State; and Kenneth Oye, who holds a joint appointment at MIT in Political Science and Engineering Systems. Moderating the discussion was Calestous Juma, Dr Martin Luther King, Jr Visiting Professor at MIT and Professor of the Practice of International Development at Harvard.
PhD Candidate **Noel Anderson** was awarded a National Fellowship from the Miller Center and a Jennings Randolph Peace Scholarship from the United States Institute of Peace for the 2015-2016 academic year. He presented “Explaining Changing Trends in the Incidence of Civil War: Competitive Intervention and its Consequences for Intrastate Conflict” at the University of Chicago’s Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security in April. He also presented “Competitive Intervention and the Angolan Civil War, 1975-1991” at the Tobin Project Forum on National Security in Cambridge in January, at the International Studies Association’s Annual Convention in New Orleans in February, and at the Midwest Political Science Association’s Annual Conference in Chicago in April.

PhD Candidate **Mark Bell** presented “What Do Nuclear Weapons Offer States? A Theory of State Foreign Policy Response to Nuclear Acquisition” at the Harvard Belfer Center International Security Project Seminar in March, and “Beyond Emboldenment: The Effects of Nuclear Weapons on State Foreign Policy” at the International Studies Association Annual Meeting in February. He has accepted a Managing the Atom/International Security Project predoctoral fellowship at the Harvard Belfer Center for the 2015-2016 academic year.

Associate Professor of Political Science **Fotini Christia** has been named an Andrew Carnegie Fellow in the inaugural year of the Andrew Carnegie Fellowship program, which will provide support for scholars in the social sciences and humanities.

Frank Stanton Chair in Nuclear Security Policy Studies and Professor of Political Science **Frank Gavin** served as Director of the Nuclear Studies Research Initiative (NSRI) and convened the 2015 NSRI conference in Airlie, VA. He, along with collaborators at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, also received a major grant to develop the “Carnegie International Policy Scholars Consortium and Network,” a program aimed at providing advanced graduate students in international affairs with the skills, substantive knowledge, and mentorship needed to successfully pursue careers both in the academy and the world of practice.

Senior Advisor **Jeanne Guillemin** was an invited delegate to the 2015 Paris Assembly, a conference on open-source learning and scientific research organized by the Centre de Recherche Interdisciplinaire (CRI) in Paris and Sage Bionetworks, Seattle, Washington, with support from the Institut Pasteur and the City of Paris. The sessions were filmed and are available, along with the agenda and list of participants, on the Assembly website. She also presented a paper, “The 1925 Geneva Protocol and Reactions to the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons in War,” at the international conference “100 Years of Chemical Warfare: Research, Deployment, Consequences,” which marked the first use of chemical weapons in World War I in April 22, 1915 at Ypres (Belgium), and was sponsored by the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science and the Fritz Haber Institute of the Max Planck Society.

CIS Research Fellow **Jerome Klassen**’s new book, *Joining Empire: The Political Economy of the New Canadian Foreign Policy* (University of Toronto Press, 2014), received the 2015 book prize awarded by the Society for Socialist Studies at the Congress of Humanities and Social Sciences in Ottawa, Canada.

PhD candidates **Marika Landau-Wells** and **Steve Wittels** have both been awarded Tobin Project Graduate Student Fellowships for the 2015-16 academic year. The Tobin Project aims to support aspiring scholars interested in collaborative work and focusing their research on real-world problems. The fellows are primarily from the fields of security studies and from disciplines focused on the relationship between democracy and
markets. The fellowship includes $2,000 in research funding and also involves participation in a year-long forum.

Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow Julia Macdonald received a Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center Predoctoral Fellowship for the 2015-16 academic year. She presented “Leadership Beliefs and State Threat Assessment: Saddam Hussein and the Iraq War 2003” and “Understanding the Way Societies Choose Their Means of War: U.S. Public Perceptions of Manned versus Unmanned Weaponry” at the ISA Annual Meeting in New Orleans in February. She also presented “Believing the Threat? Assessing the Effectiveness of Nuclear Coercion in International Crises” at the NSRI Meeting in Airlie, VA, in May.

PhD student Philip Martin presented “Want and Able: Strategies of Rebellion in Post-Colonial Africa” at the 2015 MIT-Harvard-Yale Political Violence Conference, hosted at MIT in April. Martin was also nominated as a finalist for the 2015 Trudeau Doctoral Scholarship, administered by the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation.

Security Assistant Professor Rich Nielsen received a Junior Scholar Fellowship at Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies during the 2015-16 academic year.

Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and MIT Political Science Department Head Melissa Nobles was just named Dean of the School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences.

Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the MIT Brazil program Ben Ross Schneider presented “Democracy, Big Business, and the Challenges of Industrial Policy in Brazil,” at the World Bank in April 2015. He presented “The Middle Income Trap: More Politics than Economics,” at the University of Frankfurt in April 2015, and at Sabanci University and Bilkent University in May 2015.

PhD candidate Amanda Rothschild accepted a predoctoral fellowship in the International Security Program with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. She presented “Genocide Proofing: The Effects of Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Homogeneity in Militaries on Mass Atrocity,” at the 2015 International Studies Association Annual Convention in February. She also gave presentations on April 3rd for the Tobin Project, on March 19th for the Boston College Political Science Honors Program and International Studies Program, and on April 22nd for the Boston College Arts and Sciences Honors Program Student Board’s Alumni Panel.


Ford International Professor of Urban Development and Planning and Director of the Special Program in Urban and Regional Studies (SPURS) Bish Sanyal traveled to Israel in February as guest speaker at Ben-Gurion University to deliver the keynote speech at the Israeli Planning Association's Annual Conference. Bish gave a presentation on ‘Planning Sensibilities: Old and New.’ Also in February, Bish spoke at the Harvard Kennedy School’s ‘India Matters’ discussion series. Bish spoke on: “Slum Redevelopment in Mumbai: Lessons Learned.” In March, Bish moderated a panel on “India’s Urban Urgency: The 100 Smart Cities Call” at Harvard’s India Conference. He continues to serve on the advisory committee for the newly formed Indian Institute for Human Settlements, and the committee held its first annual virtual meeting in March which Bish attended. In May, Bish participated in a small workshop at the Ford Foundation in NY to explore the importance of rural-urban connections, and drivers of inequality that operate along those connections in the Asia region.

Co-Director of MISTI Italy Serenella Sferza received the School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences “Infinite Mile: Great Ideas Award.”


Senior Ford Professor of Political Science Kathleen Thelen has been elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, one of the nation's most prestigious honorary societies and a leading center for independent policy research.

PhD candidate Alec Worsnop received a Predoctoral Research Fellowship at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He also presented “Insurgent Military Effectiveness During the First Indochina War” at the 2015 ISA Annual Conference in February.

Published

Sana Aiyar, Assistant Professor of History


M. Taylor Fravel, Associate Professor of Political Science


**Julia Macdonald**, Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow


**Rich Nielsen**, Assistant Professor of Political Science

“Computer Assisted Text Analysis for Comparative Politics,” *Political Analysis* (Spring 2015) (one of several co-authors).

**Alessandro Orsini**, CIS Research Affiliate


**Ben Ross Schneider**, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the MIT Brazil Program


**Amanda Rothschild**, PhD Candidate


**Mansour Salsabili**, CIS Research Fellow

“How Iran Became the Middle East’s Moderate Force,” *The National Interest* (March 20, 2015.)


**David Singer**, Associate Professor of Political Science

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visits MIT

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Abe also praised Samuels, noting that the political scientist’s scholarship had been “very effective” in “deepening relations between Japan and United States.”

Abe’s trip to the U.S. coincides with the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, in which Japan and the U.S. were adversaries. Abe will meet at the White House with President Barack Obama, and on Wednesday will deliver the first address by a Japanese leader to a joint session of Congress.

The Japanese prime minister will also discuss global economic and diplomatic issues while in Washington, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a potential trade agreement that has drawn some domestic opposition in both the U.S. and Japan. Abe will make stops in Los Angeles and San Francisco later in the week before returning to Japan.

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