**précis Interviews Chappell Lawson on IPL**

Earlier this year, CIS established the MIT International Policy Lab, whose mission is “to enhance the impact of MIT research on public policy.” Professor Chappell Lawson, who serves as the faculty lead, sat down with précis to discuss the program.

The International Policy Lab is awarding up to $10,000 to faculty and research staff with principal investigator status who wish to convey their research to policymakers.

**The Dictator’s Army**

by Caitlin Talmadge

Why do some states successfully convert their national assets into operational- and tactical-level fighting power in war, whereas others fail even when they have the economic, demographic, and technological endowments needed to succeed?

**CIS in American War Gaming**

by Reid Pauly

Where did this methodology of modern war games originate? In large part at MIT, where a host of legendary faculty affiliated with the Center for International Studies were crucial early adopters and innovators of the games. Beginning in the late 1950s, Lincoln “Linc” Bloomfield and others transformed rudimentary war game exercises into immersive experiences for policymakers.

**Global Refugee Crisis**

The millions of Syrian refugees displaced by their country’s four-year civil war constitute a major tragedy...a group of scholars and relief workers said at an MIT Starr Forum.

**New Wilhelm Fellow**

Paul Heer, a recent National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, has been named a Robert E. Wilhelm fellow. Heer arrived to MIT in September 2015 and will be in residence at CIS for the 2015-2016 academic year.

**East Asia Expert Joins CIS**

Eric Heginbotham, one of this country’s foremost political-military analysts of East Asia, has joined CIS as a principal research scientist.
Earlier this year, CIS established the MIT International Policy Lab with a mission “to enhance the impact of MIT research on public policy, in order to best serve the nation and the world in the 21st century.” The Policy Lab is awarding up to $10,000 to faculty and research staff with principal investigator status who wish to convey their research to policymakers. The deadline for submissions to the Lab’s first call for proposals was December 6, 2015.

précis: Why did CIS establish the Policy Lab?

CL: MIT has an enormous amount to contribute to the policymaking process. We’re generating first-rate scholarship and science that has clear policy implications and should inform public policy. But it doesn’t always do so.

So we asked ourselves, what more can we do on our end to make the transmission belt between academia and policy run more smoothly. There’s enormous appetite in policy circles for the product that MIT generates. MIT has an unparalleled brand name. And it is perceived as producing ideologically neutral, technically-based research. That appeals to people on both sides of the aisle in Washington.

MIT is an institution that draws heavily on federal research dollars. I see this as an opportunity for us to give back—not just through the impact of our research on society but also through our research informing policy debates.

I’m in the middle of my third stint in Washington, now as a part-time government employee while still full-time at MIT. I see how important it can be for policy to be informed by cutting edge research. This is an opportunity to enhance the policy debate.

précis: Who should submit proposals?

CL: We are a service to the MIT faculty. Our target is faculty members who have an appetite for engaging with the policy community (broadly defined) and whose work has some implications for policy, but who are not currently intimately involved in policy debates or who are already involved but want to have a greater impact.

précis: How does the Policy Lab help?

CL: Our goal is to do three things. First, we ask: what sort of impact do faculty want to have, given the amount of time they’re willing to invest? Second, we provide modest grants for travel or translational material, such as policy briefs based on their research. And then we choreograph their trips to Washington or elsewhere so that they meet with as many of the right people as possible.

In addition to the modest grants, we also have staff resources to support faculty.

précis: When will applicants be able to move forward with their projects?

CL: They’ll hear back in time to do something over IAP. We want the process to be nimble.

précis: Where does the Policy Lab’s funding come from?

CL: The funding comes from the MIT Office of the Provost, the Dean of the School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Science (SHASS), and the Center for International Studies.

précis: You’ve had several stints in government, most recently under the Obama administration as executive director of the National Security Council. You also have a background in the academy. What can you add to the conversation?

CL: My background is in international relations. I’ve spent a great deal of time thinking about the foreign policy of the United States, and I bring to the table an appreciation for what an incredible country this is and how important it is that we exercise leadership in the world.

As someone who spent time in government, I think about what it means to be in a position to develop policies, and what it means when these policies get adopted, because they’re not just academic exercises. They actually affect people’s lives.

I see it as important to be thinking about what MIT has to offer in this conversation. We can provide a forum for discussion that brings different viewpoints to the table, and that’s what I think we can do best. We can bring different perspectives to policy debates, and that’s what I hope to contribute to.

précis: You have a long history at MIT, both academically and professionally. Can you talk a little bit about your personal connection to MIT?

CL: I have a deep connection to MIT. I was a student here in the early 1980s, and I’ve been affiliated with the Institute ever since. I’ve been on the faculty here, and I’ve been involved in a number of different initiatives at MIT.

I’ve seen MIT change a great deal over the years, but one thing that hasn’t changed is the quality of the students and the faculty. MIT is a place where people come to think about big, important questions, and to do really good work.

I think that’s what attracted me to the Policy Lab. I was interested in the idea of bringing MIT’s expertise to bear on important policy issues, and I think this is an opportunity to do that in a really meaningful way.

I’m looking forward to seeing how this initiative develops, and I hope that it will be successful in bringing MIT’s research to bear on policy debates in a meaningful way.
director and senior adviser to the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. What sparked your personal interest in government service?

CL: I grew up in Washington DC and always had an interest in federal policy. As a political scientist, I understand how important policymaking is for a country’s safety and prosperity. For me this is an opportunity to join my long-term interest in politics with my deep commitment to the Institute.

**précis**: Can you tell us about your current research?

CL: When I was last in government, I worked on issues related to our land borders, as well as air borders and seaports. Customs and Border Protection must facilitate legitimate trade and travel in an era of pronounced security concerns. This is a challenge I’m continuing to think about.

Another project I’m working on is targeting. One aspect of border management is to be able to better identify potentially dangerous individuals or shipments bound for the United States within the vast flow of goods and people that pose no danger whatsoever. How can we get better at fusing all the information that the federal government has, including information from state, local, and foreign partners to better make an adjudication about risk without compromising civil liberties and privacy?

There are many borders in the world where international conflict is not a realistic scenario, but where trade flows are vast. How can we manage those flows more efficiently? It’s extremely important for global competitiveness in an era of global supply chains. This is a subject I’ll be returning to when I finish my current tour with the government.

**précis**: Has the Policy Lab seen results so far?

CL: All the projects are sufficiently nascent that we don’t expect them to have dramatic results yet. But it’s clear that the people involved are directly and success-fully engaging with policymakers. This could be regulators interested in synthetic biology. It could be people at the EPA drawing up guidelines and projections for methane emissions. It could be understanding trade regimes for dual-use technologies.

We’re very pleased by the extent to which we’ve been able to help faculty members make the right connections to policymakers and be involved in policy debates that are directly related to their research. I would expect dozens if not hundreds of MIT faculty members to be logical clients for the policy lab. I’m particularly excited about the prospect of collaboration of faculty members involved in large-scale, mission-driven, Institute research projects in areas such as the environment, health care, and energy.

There are a number of faculty members who have served in Washington. But people don’t have to leave their job to have an impact if we can facilitate that connection for them. For some people, this may be a very brief one-time engagement. For others it could lead them to something that they find much more appealing. Either way, we’re there to help.

**précis**: Tell us about the proposals.

CL: For the first year we reached out to individual faculty members. Now the time has come to open it up as a formal call for proposal for all faculty members. At the very least we’d like to help people do more of what they were already planning to do. More ambitiously, we would like to interest a larger number of faculty members in policy debates related to their research. We encourage people to submit more than one grant if appropriate. We have the ability to support a significant number of projects. I’m very excited to be working with my faculty colleagues on the next phase of the IPL. There’s a lot of affiliated faculty. We’re also very happy about the close relationship we have with the MIT Washington Office and the support we’ve had from MIT’s upper administration.
Facing the Global Refugee Crisis
by Peter Dizikes, MIT News Office

The millions of Syrian refugees displaced by their country’s four-year civil war constitute a major tragedy—and could be a harbinger of even worse problems in the future, a group of scholars and relief workers suggested at an MIT forum on October 21, 2015.

To cope with such scenarios, the panelists suggested, governments, international organizations and other concerned groups will likely have to take an unblinking look at both the causes of forced migrations and the system of refugee aid that leaves huge numbers of displaced persons holed up in camps and other facilities for years at a time.

“This might well be the tip of the iceberg,” Jennifer Leaning, a professor and director of the FXB Center for Health and Human Rights at the Harvard School of Public Health, said of the situation in Syria. Leaning is also a member of the Inter-University Committee on International Migration, a research group MIT hosts in its Center for International Studies (CIS).

As Leaning noted, the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, a nonprofit group, estimates that about 60 million people are displaced around the world right now, a figure higher than the estimated 50 million people left displaced at the conclusion of World War II.

Most Syrians are fleeing the war that has shattered their country. But as Leaning noted, in most places, the world’s displaced persons constitute “a great mixture of highly miserable people … coming for a variety of reasons.” That reality is not easily accommodated by our political and legal systems, however, which are geared toward people seeking political asylum, but not necessarily those displaced by war, economic upheaval, and famine.

Leaning also cited Africa, where she has worked in multiple countries, as a place where increasing forced migration may occur for several reasons.

Indeed, in the view of Anna Hardman—a lecturer in economics at Tufts University and an organizer of MIT’s work on migration, who moderated the event—we may be “uncomfortable choosing a single word” to describe displaced persons because we are trying to sort them into groups, such as either “refugees” or “migrants.” Yet in reality those distinctions may be ill-suited to the many circumstances that force people to flee.

On the ground in Syria and beyond
Those circumstances were well documented at the event, thanks to a pair of presentations from relief workers who have been on the ground in Syria, Iraq, and refugee camps in Europe, where many Syrian refugees have fled.

“It’s just the consequence of desperation and hopelessness,” said Nahuel Arenas, director of humanitarian response at Oxfam America, who has been working on the organization’s response to the Syrian crisis. As he noted, 250,000 people have been killed in Syria, 1 million injured, and half the country’s children no longer attend school.
The panelists contended that wealthier countries could be doing more to accommodate the current influx of refugees—and overestimate the extent to which refugees will stay in their borders.

Most fleeing Syrians have gone to Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq, but those countries have not been able to cope with a migration now numbering millions of people; Iraq is suffering “a humanitarian crisis of its own,” as Arenas noted.

Ali Aljundi, a Syrian who is now a project officer for Oxfam in Syria, noted that the country’s humanitarian crisis “didn’t happen in one night,” and that drought, agricultural struggles, and an economic downturn had exacerbated the country’s problems even before the civil war started in 2011. Still, as he noted, “the regional conflict has played a particular role in this.” Some of his own relatives have fled, he noted, and some remain displaced.

“The house we want to live in”

The public discussion was part of CIS’s Starr Forum series of events, in which experts discuss pressing issues in international politics and society.

The panelists contended that wealthier countries could be doing more to accommodate the current influx of refugees—and overestimate the extent to which refugees will stay in their borders.

Arenas emphasized that in his experience, refugees almost always want to return home. While presenting a series of photographs from his fieldwork, Arenas showed the audience a picture of two young Syrian refugees in a Serbian camp, constructing a small makeshift object out of sticks.

“We are building the house we want to live in when we go home,” the boys told Arenas, when he asked what they were making.

However, that return might be a long time coming. Serena Parekh, an associate professor of philosophy at Northeastern University who has researched and written about refugees and human rights, noted that once people are displaced, it is common for them to spend 20 years in camps, with no alternative easily available.

“Most displaced people are going to live their lives as displaced people,” Parekh said. “And we ought to treat them well.”

The panelists did express some optimism that wealthier countries may change their attitudes toward refugees in the long run, and Aljundi emphasized that rebuilding Syria would be an important part of easing the refugee burden other countries are experiencing.

“As Syrians, please give us some hope that we will go back to rebuilding our country,” Aljundi said.

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If the basic activities that produce success on the modern battlefield are well known, why don't all states perform them? Why do some states successfully convert their national assets into operational- and tactical-level fighting power in war, whereas others fail even when they have the economic, demographic, and technological endowments needed to succeed?

This book proposes and tests an answer to these questions, one that focuses on the organizational practices that militaries adopt. These practices, related to promotion patterns, training regimens, command arrangements, and information management in the military, serve as the critical link between state resources and battlefield power. Where states get these practices right, battlefield effectiveness is usually the result, even if states lack many of the other inputs traditionally associated with the generation of military power. But where states get these practices wrong, national traits often associated with battlefield advantage are virtually useless.

The distribution of these military organizational practices is not random. Practices reflect the dominant, proximate threat to the ruling regime in a given state. Traditionally, international relations scholarship has highlighted the importance of external threats in shaping security decisions, but the type and magnitude of internal threats matter too, often decisively. The sort of military built to fight against other states in conventional wars is not necessarily well suited to the internal tasks of most concern to many governments: state-building, quashing mass protests, or fighting domestic insurgencies. Most important, such a military is an active liability for regimes vulnerable to military coups. As a result, regimes facing significant coup threats are unlikely to adopt military organizational practices optimized for conventional combat, even when doing so might help them prevail in conflicts against other states (or even to combat other types of internal threats, such as conventional civil wars or insurgencies). We can most accurately assess where coup risk is likely to be high by examining two indicators: the strength of a given regime’s political institutions, and key features of the state’s civil-military history. Where political institutions are weak and civil-military relations deeply conflictual, coup fears are likely to dominate regimes’ threat calculations at the expense of battlefield effectiveness. Where coup threats are muted, however, states have little need for the organizational practices designed to guard against military overthrow. As a result, they are free to generate maximum combat power from their material resources.

The adoption of practices optimized for conventional war is not then guaranteed, of course. Such practices require costly investments that states cocooned in benign external threat environments would have little reason to make. But the absence of coup threats does make such practices possible. Where well-institutionalized regimes with relatively peaceful civil-military relations face significant external threats or have foreign policy goals that require territorial revision, they are much more likely to adopt the organizational practices that enable conventional military success.

Understanding these connections between differing threat configurations and military organizational behavior helps resolve a number of puzzles plaguing the study of military effectiveness. Above all, it can explain why military performance seems to vary much more than existing theories predict. Most of the variables that other studies emphasize—such as national culture, the level of economic development, societal cohesion, and the presence or absence of democracy—are relatively static over long periods of time in individual states.
Such factors no doubt condition overall military performance and are relevant to explaining some cross-national variation in military effectiveness, such as the Israeli military’s consistent outperformance of its Arab neighbors in the series of conflicts between 1948 and 1973. But these factors are not as well suited to explaining within-country variation in effectiveness. Such variation can occur over time, as seen, for example, in the Chinese army’s excellent performances against the United States in 1950 and India in 1962, followed by a rather poor showing versus Vietnam in 1979. It also can occur across different units of the same military, as seen in the 1991 Gulf War when some Iraqi units stood and fought the coalition while others surrendered on first contact.

The framework presented here shows that all three types of variation—cross-national, over-time, and cross-unit—stem from a common underlying cause operating through a common causal mechanism: the threat environment and its effect on the structure and behavior of military organizations.

For reasons elaborated in chapter 1, I use this framework to examine the battlefield effectiveness of authoritarian militaries. Compared to their democratic brethren, such militaries have been understudied. Yet the wide variation in authoritarian regimes’ threat environments, organizational practices, and battlefield effectiveness suggests an area ripe for exploration. The cases studied here show that, contrary to common assumption, not all authoritarian regimes face coup threats, so not all engage in the sort of “coup-proofing” behavior that damages external battlefield effectiveness.

Indeed, past studies of coup-proofing have shed important light on the Arab regimes that gave rise to the term, but the framework presented here grounds the phenomenon in a broader argument about the requirements for generating tactical and operational fighting power. It helps identify ex ante the states most likely to engage in coup prevention measures, by developing systematic indicators of the threat environments facing different regimes. It shows that these differing threat environments consistently result in military organizations that adopt different practices with respect to promotions, training, command, and information management—the core activities relevant to success or failure on the modern battlefield. Parsing out this variation within the broad category of “nondemocracies” enables us to explain why authoritarianism sometimes produces military juggernauts à la North Vietnam or the Soviet Union during the Cold War, while it at other times results in militaries that collapse on the battlefield even when they have the resources needed to continue fighting, as happened with South Vietnam in 1975 and with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003.

Understanding these differences among authoritarian regimes is of immense practical import as well. If one believes that democracies generally do not go to war against one another, then we can expect that virtually all future conflicts will involve at least one nondemocratic participant. Many wars may consist exclusively of such states, or their proxies: China, Iran, Russia, or North Korea, to name just a few. Simply knowing that such states are nondemocratic will offer little help in predicting their likely battlefield effectiveness. This book’s framework enables us to identify the key aspects of such states’ threat environments and organizational behavior that will shape their militaries’ performance in war.

The framework also provides a tool for better gauging the likely battlefield effectiveness of nondemocratic allies or coalition members—an increasingly urgent proposition as the United States conducts more of its foreign policy by “building partner capacity” among nondemocratic or weakly democratic states rather than by putting U.S. boots on the ground. Why do some recipients of U.S. military advising and weapons seem to bring healthy returns on the investment (Taiwan, South Korea), while others display continuing deficits even after years of training and support (Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan)? These differences remain baffling from the perspective of studies focused on external threats alone, but they are little mystery when viewed from the framework of this book. Before delving into that framework further, however, we must be specific about what battlefield effectiveness is and is not.
The Pioneering Role of CIS in American War Gaming

by Reid Pauly

It is April 1972, and tensions between the superpowers run higher than ever. The United States is mired in a disastrous war in Indochina, the Soviet nuclear arsenal is growing rapidly, and both countries are investing heavily in anti-ballistic missile systems. As nuclear weapons technology proliferates, West Germany inches closer to the bomb. One morning, Moscow warns Washington that it will soon commence conventional bombing of West German nuclear research facilities. American officials debate whether the move is a bluff, but as the minutes tick by, Soviet planes take to the sky. What is the United States to do?

Thankfully, this scenario never played out in the real world. It was part of a war game called BETA II conducted by the Joint War Games Agency in 1967. One of dozens of war games held during the Cold War, the exercise pitted a Blue Team against a Red Team in a series of strategic decision-making rounds, facilitated by a Control Team interlocutor. The purpose was multi-fold—to study strategic interactions, to educate participants, and to refine American strategy.

Where did this methodology of modern war games originate? In large part at MIT, where a host of legendary faculty affiliated with the Center for International Studies were crucial early adopters and innovators of the games. Beginning in the late 1950s, Lincoln “Linc” Bloomfield and others transformed rudimentary war game exercises into immersive experiences for policymakers. The games, many of them held at the Institute’s Endicott House in Dedham, Massachusetts, set a standard that the U.S. Department of Defense and others would consciously imitate.

War gaming comes to CIS

Preparation for war has long involved simulation in some capacity. Military training exercises are in a sense preparing combatants for the reality of war at the tactical level. For the purposes of developing strategy, however, simulation took on a new prominence in the nuclear age. Unable to hone the tactical skills or the strategic logics of nuclear warfare through practice and experience, leaders would rely on theory and simulation to train and prepare. As Herman Khan astutely put it, “how many thermonuclear wars have you fought recently?” This emphasis on simulation began with systems analysis in the early Cold War and evolved into role-playing politico-military games. Later, as computing power increased, the emphasis shifted to man-machine games and computer simulations. Today, war games remain a tool of strategic analysis and training.

The first organized political-military war game likely took place in Germany in 1929; the crisis in question: a Polish invasion of East Prussia. In the United States, the RAND Corporation pioneered the first war games as early as 1948. At RAND, the Mathematics Division established the Blue-on-Red simulation method, focusing initially on developing a computer model of a Cold War crisis, based on their developing interest in the field of systems analysis. By 1954, the Social Science Division at RAND developed the first rounds of “political gaming,” involving both human and machine-played roles. The first full political-military games were held at RAND in 1954 and 1955. One of the express purposes of these games was to explore “novel strategies,” both from the perspective of the United States and the Soviet Union. To this end, the new games eliminated rules about what had constituted victory in the mathematicians’ simulations, continuing play until either the umpire called the end or time ran out. Still, RAND’s contribution was limited by its focus on the Air Force, its chief client.
By the end of the decade, RAND war gaming had attracted the interest of academics. The center of the academic study and development of war games became CIS at MIT. The idea of war gaming seems to have been introduced to MIT by W. Phillips Davison, a visiting professor from the RAND Corporation. Davison conducted the first simplified war game at MIT in a graduate seminar during the 1957-58 academic year. MIT professors Lucian Pye, Norman Padelford, and Warner Schilling later conducted similar war games in their courses.

The most invested MIT professor, however, was Bloomfield. Recently graduated with a doctorate from Harvard, Bloomfield studied international law and the process of UN-facilitated territorial transitions. He turned to the subject of war gaming when CIS director Max Millikan introduced him to the ongoing RAND exercises. Bloomfield was hooked and soon began to work on designing a more professional war game methodology.

Between 1958 and 1971, Professor Bloomfield directed twelve “senior-level” war games at MIT. Dubbed the “POLEX” war games, Bloomfield and Paul Kecskemeti of RAND led POLEX I in September 1958. The crisis at the heart of the three-day game was a nationalist uprising in Poland. CIS hosted POLEX II in 1960, a game that posited a crisis in the Middle East. Thomas Schelling, who at the time taught at Harvard, joined Bloomfield in designing these war games.

Schelling and Bloomfield were instrumental in innovating a new style of politico-military war gaming at CIS. Rather than have participants role-playing characters and asking themselves “what would I do if I were in this official’s shoes?” Schelling and Bloomfield wanted the teams to be of “homogenous responsibility” so that the players were “deeply engaged in the decision-making process, in which they were taking full responsibility for their decisions.” Moreover, Schelling felt that in previous war games at RAND “the limits were always decided in advance,” leaving no room for an analysis of the “process of escalation, no process of feeling around for what the other side might accept or reject.” They sought to rectify these shortcomings in the game design.

Two primary innovations formed the backbone of the new CIS method of politico-military gaming. First, participants were no longer “role-playing” in a strict sense of being assigned a character to play; rather they were part of a team, a committee of decision-makers debating strategic interactions. Second, the decisions were simplified to only include military moves. The teams would make military decisions and then focus on the political and diplomatic effects of those military decisions. This boiled the simulation down to strategic interactions, not faked diplomacy.

Former RAND analyst Henry Rowen recommended that the Pentagon adopt Schelling and Bloomfield’s MIT war gaming method. In 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Joint War Games Agency (JWGA). It hosted five or six games per year, conducted in the manner of Bloomfield and Schelling’s politico-military games—Red versus Blue (in separate rooms) moderated by Control. Games required rigorous preparation, between two to three months. Each team generally consisted of five to ten players. The teams plotted moves for several hours a day, in three to six rounds of moves, over three or four days. A typical game would work as follows: (1) Red and Blue Teams assemble and receive the “scenario problem paper”; (2) Each team deliberates and decides on discontinuous “moves,” which are written down and given to Control; (3) Control assesses the moves (it may reject them if they are unrealistic), determines the likely outcome of both moves and updates the scenario; (4) Game clock advances and the Red and Blue Teams make another move; (5) Play continues until time is up or Control ends the game; (6) All games end with a debrief and critique.

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War games and policy
Did war games influence policy? Participants in MIT exercises tended to think they did. In an MIT survey between 1958 and 1964, a large majority of war game participants believed prior participation in war games would broaden the perspectives of decision makers in crises, by increasing the “number” and “quality” of “policy alternatives perceived.” And more than half of participants who self-identified as being “engaged in policy planning, formulation, or implementation” could recall an instance in which their war game experience had been of practical value in their job.20

The experience itself tended to leave an impression. After the 1958-1964 MIT games, nearly two-thirds of participants reported an “extreme” or “intense” degree of emotional involvement in the roles they played.21 “Because the experience is highly demanding in terms of attention and concentration, as well as being of real interest,” a report from participants concluded, “these insights do not soon pass out of one’s mind.”22

Schelling further recalls that participants in the 1961 Berlin Crisis simulation “virtually lived the game.”23 Participants in these games, conducted at Camp David, included McGeorge Bundy, Carl Kaysen, and John McNaughton.24 During the Cuban Missile Crisis, somebody in the office of John McNaughton reportedly said, “this crisis sure demonstrates how realistic Schelling’s [war] games are,” to which someone responded, “No, Schelling’s games demonstrate how unrealistic this Cuban crisis is.”25

An untapped resource
Unclassified war games, including those conducted at CIS, can provide reams of data for scholars. Yet so far the exercises have gone mostly unexamined. In another paper, I use some of this evidence to argue that U.S. elites who participated in war games showed a remarkable reluctance to employ nuclear weapons in exercises, and that their reticence provides additional evidence of a normative prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons.

By all accounts, the players took war games very seriously, including the fictional 1972 crisis. Scholars would be remiss not to do the same.

REFERENCES
2 For a good discussion of how war gaming in the nuclear age affected civil-military relations, see Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, “Simulating the Unthinkable: Gaming Future War in the 1950s and 1960s,” Social Studies of Science 30 (2000), 164-222.
5 Giffin, The Crisis Game, 64.
2015-2016 Neuffer Fellow
Meera Srinivasan

Meera Srinivasan, formerly a senior assistant editor with The Hindu, has been selected as the 2015/16 IWMF Elizabeth Neuffer Fellow. The fellowship is offered through the International Women’s Media Foundation (IWMF) and is sponsored in part by CIS. The award provides a unique academic and professional opportunity for women journalists focusing on human rights and social justice reporting.

The fellowship was created in memory of Elizabeth Neuffer, The Boston Globe correspondent and 1998 IWMF Courage in Journalism Award winner. Neuffer died while reporting in Iraq on May 9, 2003. In collaboration with Neuffer’s family and friends, the IWMF started this program to honor her legacy while advancing her work in the fields of human rights and social justice.

“We are thrilled to welcome Meera Srinivasan to MIT as a Elizabeth Neuffer Fellow,” said Richard Samuels, director of the MIT Center for International Studies and Ford International Professor of Political Science. “Meera is a courageous journalist who, in the spirit of Elizabeth, works tirelessly to reveal social injustices that would otherwise be ignored. It is an honor to have her among us.”

Recent National Intelligence Officer for East Asia Joins CIS

Paul Heer, a recent National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, has been named a Robert E. Wilhelm fellow. Heer arrived to MIT in September 2015 and will be in residence at CIS for the 2015-2016 academic year.

Heer served as the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia—the senior analyst of East Asian affairs in the US Intelligence Community—in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from 2007 to 2015. A career officer of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence, he began that career in 1983 as a political and foreign policy analyst on Southeast Asia before specializing on China as an analyst and analytic manager. He served on the staff of the President’s Daily Brief, and as a member of the CIA’s Senior Analytic Service and the Senior Intelligence Service. Heer was the Visiting Intelligence Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations during 1999-2000 and was subsequently elected a Life Member of the Council.

Heer will spend his time at MIT researching and writing on US relations with East Asia, both contemporary and historical, and Chinese political and foreign policy developments. He will also meet with faculty and students to discuss issues related to East Asia.

A generous gift from Robert E. Wilhelm supports the Center’s Wilhelm fellowship. The fellowship is awarded to individuals who have held senior positions in public life.
International Policy Lab Requests Proposals

MIT announced the first call for proposals from the International Policy Lab (IPL), a new program working to enhance the impact of MIT-sponsored research on public policy. The Center launched IPL last year in recognition of the growing need for science and engineering to inform public policy, with seed funding from the Office of the Provost; Dean of the School of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences; and its own budget. The IPL works with MIT faculty members and researchers to translate their scholarly work into policy-relevant materials and to connect them directly with policymakers.

MIT Generation Global

CIS has nurtured an innovative outreach program open to MIT undergraduate and graduate students who are passionate about solving global problems and want to share that passion with local high school students. Called Generation Global, it recruits MIT students to lead a two-week problem-solving session with students from public high schools in the Boston area. Successfully piloted in 2015 with a Somerville, Mass., charter school, the Center now seeks to expand this model to several underserved schools in the metropolitan area. The program engages the high school students in a way they have not been challenged before, aids the high-school teachers involved in the program, and benefits the MIT students by immersing them in using their knowledge to hone skills of engagement, communication, and leadership. And Generation Global provides a unique opportunity for MIT to serve the Boston community.

SSP Receives Support From Carnegie

The MIT Security Studies Program extends its appreciation to The Carnegie Corporation of New York, which has awarded SSP a 36 month, $1 million, grant to support its research on the global “Diffusion of Power.” This will allow the program to sustain and expand its work on Asian Security, Nuclear Arms Control and Strategy, Domestic Political Instability and Violence in the Greater Middle East, and U.S. Grand Strategy.

Guide to Using Japanese Government Archives

Mayumi Fukushima, a PhD student in the MIT Department of Political Science’s Security Studies Program, has published a very useful guide to using Japanese government archives on the widely used H-Diplo. “As a former Japanese Foreign Service officer, I did not imagine how hard it would be for outside researchers to identify and find archival documents relevant to their research questions. It was not until I searched the Japanese diplomatic archives myself as an academic that I learned the challenges foreign researchers faced in accessing governmental documents,” says Fukushima.
SSP Wednesday Seminars


Starr Forums


Bustani Middle East Seminar

The Emile Bustani Middle East Seminar hosted two talks: Malika Zeghal, Harvard University, on “Is Tunisia a secular state? Islam in the 2014 Tunisian Constitution;” and Melani Cammett, Harvard University, on “Sectarianism and the quality of social welfare in Lebanon.”

Myron Weiner Seminar Series on International Migration

The Inter-University Committee on International Migration hosted several seminars: Loren Landau, University of the Witwatersrand, on “Cash, Corn, and Coffins: Mobility, Remittances and Social Protection in Zimbabwe;” Riva Kastoryano, Sciences Po, on “Muslims in Europe: Transnational Integration Politics;” and Susan Akram, Boston University, “Still Waiting for Tomorrow: The Law and Politics of Unresolved Refugee Crises’ with particular emphasis on the refugees in the Middle East.”
People

PhD Candidate Mark Bell’s article, “Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy,” was a joint winner of the International Studies Association’s Patricia Weitsman award for best graduate student paper in security studies. He also presented research at the British International Studies Association Global Nuclear Order Working Group in September, and at the Triangle Institute for Security Studies New Faces Conference in October.

PhD Candidate Fiona Cunningham was awarded a Joint PhD Research Fellowship by the China Confucius Studies Program to spend the 2015-6 academic year researching her dissertation at the Renmin University of China, Beijing. She presented “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability” (co-authored with Associate Professor of Political Science M. Taylor Fravel) at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting in San Francisco, and at a public event on U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy Toward China, hosted by the Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University, both in September. In October, she was a participant in the China-U.S. Young Scholars Dialogue, hosted by the China Institute of International Studies in Qingdao, China.


This summer MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI) welcomed two new faculty directors to the MIT-France and MIT-Mexico programs: Patrick Jaillet, the Dugald C. Jackson Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, and Paulo Lozano, Associate Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics. MISTI faculty directors provide academic oversight and strategic direction to MISTI programs.

MISTI, which sent over 780 students to more than 19 countries last year, welcomes three new staff members to the program. Ekaterina Zabrovskaya, the Editor-in-Chief of Russia Direct, joined MISTI in late November as the new MIT-Russia Program Manager. Zabrovskaya graduated from Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russia, with a B.A. in journalism and earned her Master’s degree in political science from Miami University, U.S.A. as a Fulbright scholar. Sarra Shubart and Katie O’Connell joined MISTI earlier this year as program assistants. MISTI also promoted three program managers to Managing Directors: Matt Burt, MIT-Korea Program; Mala Ghosh, MIT-India Program; and Julia Reynolds-Cuellar, MIT-Africa Initiatives. MISTI currently offers teaching, internship and research opportunities in 22 countries, and this IAP over 180 students will travel to 20 countries to teach STEM courses.

PhD Candidate Marika Landau-Wells won the Atlantic Council’s After the War short story contest for her story, “Remote Operations.” The competition is part of the Council’s Art of Future Warfare project to advance thinking and planning about the future of warfare.

In October, Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow Rohan Mukherjee presented “Nuclear Ambiguity and International Status: India in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 1962-69” at the Annual Conference on South Asia, University of Wisconsin-Madison.

EndNotes
Associate Professor of Political Science Vipin Narang is the 2016 recipient of the Best Book Award of the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association (ISA). He won for his recent book, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era*.

PhD Candidate Cullen Nutt was selected as a semifinalist for the Bobby R. Inman Award for Student Scholarship on Intelligence. The University of Texas at Austin Strauss Center publicly recognized his paper, “Chronicle of a Correction Foretold: The Push and Pull of Nuclear Intelligence Detection,” and provided a monetary prize.

PhD Candidate Reid Pauly won the Doreen & Jim McElvany “Nonproliferation Challenge”—a competition to find and publish “the most outstanding new thinking in the nonproliferation field” run by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. His winning paper, “Bedeviled by a Paradox: Nitze, Bundy, and an Incipient Nuclear Norm,” will be published in an upcoming issue of *The Nonproliferation Review*, and the award is accompanied by a monetary prize.

In September, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the MIT Security Studies Program Barry Posen discussed his book, *Restraint*, at the Institute for World Politics. In November, he appeared on NPR's “On Point” to discuss ISIS.

PhD Candidate Amanda Rothschild was a joint winner of the Patricia Weitsman Award from the International Studies Association. The award recognizes the best graduate student paper on any aspect of security studies. In October, she presented “Dissent in the Ranks: Humanitarianism and US Foreign Policy” at the joint APSA International Security and Arms Control Section and ISA International Security Studies Section Conference. In September, she presented “The Truth is All I Want for History: Standards for Evaluating Historical Research” at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting.

In October, SSP held a special seminar on Capitol Hill entitled “Political Struggles in the Middle East.” Professor Roger Petersen, Assistant Professor Rich Nielsen, and Assistant Professor Peter Krause (SSP Research Affiliate, Boston College) shared their views on the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, with Professor Barry Posen moderating.

Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Studies Richard Samuels presented in July “Hedging and Hugging: Japan’s National Security Strategy” at the University of Duisburg, the Japan Foundation Summer Retreat in Kyoto, and then in September at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto. Also in July, he served as a panel discussant at the Conference on Global History and the Meiji Restoration at the University of Heidelberg. In August, he briefed General Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on East Asian security issues, alongside Associate Professor of Political Science Taylor Fravel and CIS Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow Paul Heer. Also in August, Samuels delivered a memo, “Cooperation with Hedging among NE Asian Allies and Partners,” to the National Intelligence Council’s workshop on “Prospects for Boosting Cooperation Among Northeast Asian Allies and Partners.” In September, he served as a panel discussant on NHK Television’s hour-long broadcast, “Global Agenda.” In October, he presented “Japan: Grand Strategy and the Future of Northeast Asia” at the U.S. Naval War College. Also in October he served as a panelist at Harvard University Law School for a discussion on Mark Ramseyer’s *Second Best Justice: The Virtues of Japanese Private Law*, and gave a briefing on U.S.-Japan relations to the Kansai Keizai Doyukai at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. He presented in July “Disaster and Change in Japan” at the Japan Foundation Summer Retreat in Kyoto and to the University of Pennsylvania Law School in November. Also in November,

Ford International Professor of Urban Development and Planning and Director of the Special Program in Urban and Regional Studies (SPURS) Bish Sanyal gave the keynote address, “Cultivating Doubts,” at the 50th anniversary celebration of the National Conference of Israeli Planners, held in Beer Sheba. He represented MIT’s Hubert Humphrey Fellowship Program at the annual conference of Humphrey scholars and practitioners. In October, he chaired a plenary session on urban responses to international migration at the Annual Conference of Association of American Planning Schools. With support from CIS, he ran a multi-disciplinary faculty colloquium this fall with Professor Sugata Bose from Harvard on the theme of “Kolkata And the Hinterlands.” Nobel Laureate Professor Amartya Sen from Harvard delivered the inaugural lecture.

Associate Professor of Political Science David Singer was appointed to the Board of Directors of the International Political Economy Society (IPES).

SSP alumnus Paul Staniland won the 2015 Peter Katzenstein Book Prize for his book Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Cornell, 2014). The Prize is awarded annually to an outstanding first book in International Relations, Comparative Politics, or Political Economy.

Meicen Sun spoke at the United Nations Academic Impact Fifth Anniversary conference in New York in November on global citizenship and her experience in transnational small arms control.

SSP alumna Caitlin Talmadge received a Minerva Initiative Grant, U.S. Department of Defense, with colleagues at George Washington University Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, for their project on “Spheres of Influence, Regional Orders, and China’s Rise,” for 2015-17.


Professor of History Elizabeth A. Wood gave a talk at the U.S. Naval Academy in October entitled “The Russian Marlboro Man: Vladimir Putin and the Crisis in Ukraine and Crimea.”

PhD candidate Alec Worsnop was awarded a Dissertation Fellowship from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation. In addition, he presented “Who Can Keep the Peace” at the Triangle Institute for Security Studies’ New Faces Conference in October in Chapel Hill, NC. He also presented “Insurgent Military Effectiveness During the First Indochina War” at the American Political Science Association’s Annual Meeting in September in San Francisco, CA.
Published

Mark Bell, PhD Candidate


Fiona S. Cunningham, PhD Candidate and M. Taylor Fravel, Associate Professor of Political Science


M. Taylor Fravel, Associate Professor of Political Science


Mayumi Fukushi, PhD Candidate


Kelly M. Greenhill, SSP Research Affiliate


Rohan Mukherjee, Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow


“Meet India’s New Nationalists,” *The Indian Express*, October 19, 2015.

Rohan Mukherjee, Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow and Vipin Narang, Associate Professor of Political Science

Roger D. Petersen, Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science


Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the MIT Security Studies Program


Amanda Rothschild, PhD candidate


Kathleen Thelen, Ford Professor of Political Science

(ed.), Advances in Comparative Historical Analysis (co-edited with James Mahoney) (Cambridge University Press, 2015).

Elizabeth A. Wood, Professor of History

(co-authored with William E. Pomeranz, E. Wayne Merry, and Maxim Trudolyubov), Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine (Woodrow Wilson Center Press / Columbia University Press, 2015).
REFERENCES


CIS in American War Gaming

REFERENCES (cont.)

8 Giffin, 66.

9 Van Creveld, 181.


14 Ghamari-Tabrizi, “Simulating the Unthinkable,” 178.


18 JWGA was superseded by the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency (SAGA).


23 Remarks by Thomas Schelling and Alan Ferguson at the Harvard Kennedy School, November 22, 1988, p. 3.


25 Quoted in Ghamari-Tabrizi, “Simulating the Unthinkable,” 213, footnote 55. And Schelling says a version of this in Remarks by Thomas Schelling and Alan Ferguson at the Harvard Kennedy School, November 22, 1988, p. 10.
East Asia Expert Joins CIS

The Center is pleased to announce the appointment of Eric Heginbotham, one of this country’s foremost political-military analysts of East Asia, to the post of principal research scientist.

Heginbotham comes to MIT from the RAND Corporation, where he was a senior political scientist for ten years. He earned his PhD at MIT in 2002, winning the Lucian Pye Award for the best doctoral dissertation in the Department of Political Science that year, and has authored or co-authored numerous influential studies, including the U.S.-China Military Scorecard, just released by the RAND Corporation, and Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm, published by Cambridge University Press in 2012. He has also been a leading analyst of Japanese grand strategy. His appointment is supported by a generous gift to endowment received earlier this year from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Richard J. Samuels, Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of CIS welcomes the appointment, declaring, “I have no doubt that Eric Heginbotham will continue to raise the bar for the study of Japanese foreign policy and for the understanding international security in the Asia-Pacific region, areas in which CIS and its Security Studies Program are already world leaders.”