What Kind of Capitalism?
by Ben Ross Schneider

In the many intense debates over development in Latin America in recent decades, the question rarely arose, as it had in previous decades, as to what kind of capitalism existed or whether capitalism in Latin America was somehow different, says Ford International Professor of Political Science Ben Ross Schneider.

Insurgent Organizational Structure & the Control of Collective Violence
by Alec Worsnop

A central moment during the United States surge in Iraq came with the August 2007 stand down of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). As a result, sectarian violence declined drastically as Baghdad became more stable. However, few analysts in academia, the government, or the private sphere expected the ceasefire to hold.

richtext:

Richard Nielsen, assistant professor of political science at MIT, uses statistical text analysis and fieldwork in Cairo mosques to understand the radicalization of jihadi clerics in the Arab world. He sat down with précis to discuss current projects and courses he’s teaching.

Nielsen completed his PhD and AM at Harvard University, and holds a BA from Brigham Young University. His work is published or forthcoming in The American Journal of Political Science and International Studies Quarterly.
**précis**

**INTERVIEW**

Richard Nielsen  
Assistant Professor  
MIT Department of Political Science  

**précis: How did you become interested in International Relations and Middle East politics?**

RN: It really started with September 11. I had just started college. I thought I was going to be a math and science major of some sort (my dad’s a chemist). Then 9/11 happened, in my second week of college, and it really affected my thinking on a lot of things—I spent several weeks just thinking about the events themselves. That was the initial spark and in some way I’ve circled back to that event with my research. It’s been a long circle back—and a lot of steps along the way that didn’t have to do with 9/11—but it got me interested in political science. I took an intro to International Relations (IR) class a couple of years later and that was really my first political science class. It’s one of the reasons I’m passionate about teaching Introduction to IR here because that was the thing that turned me on to what I’m doing now. I also did a research design class shortly thereafter and was a research assistant for the same professor. That set in motion the events that got me headed to grad school and to all the topics I’m interested in.

**précis: This fall, you’re teaching an introductory course on International Relations (IR). What do you think are the most important subjects in IR to introduce to undergraduates at MIT?**

RN: I think the most important thing is strategic thinking. We’ve really spent the first half of the semester on strategic thinking in various contexts, primarily with issues of war and peace. We’ll be turning to international economics more in a couple weeks, and international institutions, but I think strategic thinking is at the core simply because all of the main theories and paradigms of international relations deal with strategic thinking in some way even if it’s to critique a kind of strict logic of strategic thinking. And more importantly, strategic thinking is perhaps the most important thing an undergraduate will take from the course and will affect how they view life, interactions, and undertakings in very different contexts. I often enjoy pointing out places in ordinary life where the same strategic logic that we’re unpacking in, say, a security dilemma or international cooperation on measurement and standards, actually applies to how they interact with their friends and how they deal with the pressures of school.

I also think it’s really important for students to see primary documents. So to mention a couple of things we’ve done: We actually read through several transcripts of documents that have been collected through FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] requests on near nuclear catastrophes or mistakes with nuclear weapons. One involved an unauthorized shipment of nuclear weapons between air force bases and the other the Goldsboro 1961 incident in which there was almost a detonation of a 15-megaton nuclear warhead on North Carolina because of a B–52 breakup. Another exercise we’ll do on terrorism is to read through one of Sayyid Qutb’s pieces.

**précis: This spring, you’ll be teaching a graduate course on Comparative and International Politics of the Middle East. Tell us a little bit about what you have in mind for the course and how you see the material you’ll be discussing as contributing to broader debates in political science.**

RN: Part of the course will try to match student interests, so the syllabus may be flexible. It will include a mix of classics and some cutting edge stuff that gives students a sense of what’s at the edge of the field both methodologically and substantively.
In terms of broader debates in political science, I think the Middle East is valuable for studying democracy, authoritarianism, social movements, and religion and politics—there’s a lot coming out of the Middle East on those topics right now, and a fair amount of theorizing to do. Another debate is about the extent to which Middle East politics is area studies or a subfield of comparative politics. I think the primacy of theory plays into that and that’s a debate we’ll take up. Another part of the debate is the belief that the Middle East has had “bad data” and to study it, you had to do it in particular ways. I’m quite a pluralist in terms of how I think people should study things and I think with Middle East politics the balance has been focused on qualitative and ethnographic approaches because people have felt there wasn’t data to do anything else. So I want to give students ideas about how to do mixed methods research with qualitative sources to supplement the qualitative sources we’ve known about for quite a while.

**précis: Are there other courses you’d like to teach in the future?**

**RN:** I’ll be teaching Scope and Methods with Gina Bateson next fall and I’m very excited about that. One of my goals is to reconcile the growing experimental ethos in political science with the reality of IR where it’s very difficult to think about meeting the conditions of a randomized experiment in any research design. I think it’s worth reminding the randomistas that there are other ways to learn about the world, but I’m also optimistic about the potential for creative and innovative work that takes IR more in this direction.

I’m thinking about a course on “Jihad and International Affairs,” perhaps for undergraduates. I’m also thinking about something called “Hacking for Political Scientists” or “Fun with Big Data.” My research has benefited incredibly from the ability to harness computational resources that are essentially force multipliers. It makes it possible to analyze hundreds of thousands of documents when in a prior era a graduate student could only have carefully analyzed 100 documents. The benefits, especially to graduate students who don’t have access to a research assistant, are just huge.

**précis: In your own work, you’ve adopted a unique approach combining statistical methods, text analysis, foreign language, and fieldwork. What do you see as the unique contributions of these approaches to your work?**

**RN:** So the unique contribution is definitely the combination of approaches and methods. I will freely admit that I am not the best at any of the things I’m cobbling together. There are people better at statistics, language, fieldwork, but there’s really no one pulling these things together, at least in Middle East politics.

Arabic and fieldwork really ground what I do. It would be easy to make a lot of very wrong statements without being able to speak the language, reading a lot of documents, and having spent time on the ground. My fieldwork has been very ethnographic. In Egypt, I spent a lot of time praying with a congregation. I sat in on a lot of classes on hadith. I sat in on Quranic recitation classes. I showed up at 9:00 AM, did whatever people were doing, and left at six. When there wasn’t anything going on, I grabbed a Quran and worked on memorizing the Quran. It wasn’t the most systematic fieldwork, and at times it wasn’t always clear what I was getting out of it, but now when I go and analyze 30,000 documents using text analysis, I can spot when things are going wrong and when things are going right.

I think the statistics are also important for complementing the fieldwork. It’s quite easy to take the ten things you observe in your fieldwork and then to assume that those incidents are representative of all incidents. That’s often not the case. And there’s more ground you can cover when you bring in the ability to analyze 30,000 documents. You can really start to make statements about “here’s how general this set of ideas is.”

**précis: Your work on religious extremism could be described as existing at the nexus of Comparative Politics and International Relations. Do you see yourself as working in one subfield or the other? What do you think about the prospects for more work at this nexus?**

**RN:** I do think I’m working at the intersection of Comparative Politics and IR. I’m trained as an IR scholar and I’m much more comfortable covering broad areas of IR that I’m not working in. My training in Comparative Politics is much more eclectic and it mostly includes the areas I work in. It’s difficult to cover two subfields. There’s a lot of literature to keep up with. But I think some of the best work is happening at the intersection.

**précis: How has your work evolved since arriving at MIT? Has the community here affected your work in any way? What do you see as the unique opportunities for work in international studies at the Institute?**

**RN:** My work has evolved quite a bit in my short four months now sitting at MIT. For one, new environments bring new ideas and new projects. It was partly hitting the end of my dissertation that made for some space where I wanted to start new things, but I’ve just started working on a number of exciting things that I think are promising. Some of those things have been fueled by MIT’s UROP program [Undergraduate Research Opportunities Program] in which MIT funds undergraduates to be research assistants for a semester or longer. It’s been really exciting because my work uses a lot of computation and there are a lot of people at MIT with computational skills. So I have someone putting together a Twitter database for me, and we’re going to try to map jihadist sentiment worldwide with this data. I’m working with a friend from CSAIL [Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory] who has the data and an undergraduate researcher who is helping push things forward. I’ve just found the community to be very stimulating—lots of exciting ideas. Is correlation causation? I don’t know, but I hope so.

**précis: The Washington Post recently reported on the efforts of Egypt’s military...**

*continued on page 10*
How Should We Use Our Intelligence?

Peter Dizikes, MIT News Office

How do we balance national security and privacy in an age when the government can access virtually all of our electronic communications?

That question hit the public sphere with new force in June, when former U.S. intelligence contractor Edward Snowden disclosed, largely via the British newspaper The Guardian, new material about the extent of the surveillance operations undertaken by the National Security Agency (NSA).

Six months later, a public forum held at MIT on Thursday showed that fault lines exist even among highly placed former government officials. Joel Brenner, a former general counsel for the NSA, largely defended an agency whose workers are, he said, “tasked with finding terrorists they don’t yet know about,” and thus in need of copious data.

On the other hand, former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia Chas Freeman sounded a sharply critical note, decrying the “cancerous growth of the government surveillance apparatus,” which he described as “only tangentially related to national security.”

What the principals agreed on, generally, was the need for a more vigorous public discussion of the topic. Brenner asserted that the agency’s efforts have been legal and suggested that the disclosure of its programs years ago would have pre-empted the current controversy.

“We are in the midst of a very unusual, I think unique, intelligence affair,” Brenner said, noting that most previous intelligence scandals have involved failures to warn government officials of incipient military strikes, or abuses of well-known legal standards. Instead, Brenner asserted, “It’s the first time we have an intelligence scandal involving an agency that’s done what it was legally authorized to do.”

The legality of the NSA’s activities, and the secretive process used to establish those legal foundations, has been a major source of controversy. However, Brenner recounted, soon after he joined the NSA in 2002, he learned about the surveillance programs, and suggested to other officials that Congress should add them to its Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), passed in 1978, which bans domestic spying in the U.S. without probable cause that the surveillance target represents a foreign power.

“The unity in the country behind the fundamental authorities of the intelligence business is a strategic goal,” Brenner said. “I mean, intelligence involves secret, powerful institutions in a political culture that is deeply hostile both to power and secrecy. The only way you square that circle is when the public understands what the broad rules are, and has reason to believe they’re being followed.”

Freeman, by contrast, criticized the tight limits the executive branch of government has placed on discussion of its data-gathering activities, even among the members of Congress who are supposed to be overseeing it.
Snowden’s disclosures, Freeman said, were intended to make the point that “we Americans now live under a government that precludes legal or political challenges to its own increasingly deviant behavior.”

Out of the ‘Goldfish Bowl’
The panel discussion, titled, “The ‘Snowden Affair:’ Intelligence and Privacy in a Wired World,” was hosted by MIT’s Center for International Studies (CIS) and held in MIT’s Media Lab before a capacity audience of about 200 people. It was part of CIS’s regular Starr Forum series of panels on pressing topics in the international arena.

The panel was moderated by Adm. William Fallon, a CIS scholar and the former head of CENTCOM, the U.S. military command overseeing the Middle East, Central Asia, and parts of East Africa. Fallon also served previously as head of the U.S. Pacific Command.

“We are in a decidedly different world, in the business of intelligence and national security, than we were just a few years ago when I was on active duty, in that the leapfrogging advances in technology enable so many more things to occur,” said Fallon, who was head of the U.S. Pacific Command from 2005 to 2007, and head of CENTCOM in 2007 and 2008.

Freeman, for his part, said his views had been profoundly shaped by his experiences as a diplomat and defense department official, a period during which his overseas travel was closely monitored by foreign countries.

“For 30 years I was a consumer of intelligence, as well as a producer of it,” Freeman said. “I was also a victim of it. Every bedroom I ever stayed in [as a diplomat] had cameras in the walls and microphones as well.” Having experienced that, he added, “I have a strong view that ordinary Americans, or people not associated with government officialdom, should not have to live their lives in the goldfish bowl that I did.”

Panelist Susan Chira, an assistant managing editor at The New York Times who specializes in international coverage, added that the media had a significant responsibility to push for disclosures concerning such government activities.

“Transparency leads to accountability,” said Chira, who questioned the independence of the court tasked with approving the NSA's requests for domestic surveillance.

In response, Brenner said, “It is not a rubber stamp,” adding, “The court is very tough.”

As former government officials, Brenner, Fallon, and Freeman all expressed uneasiness with Snowden’s actions, saying that such disclosures made the work of intelligence agents, diplomats, and the military harder, although Freeman was willing to defend Snowden to a significant extent.

“As someone long in service to our country, I am upset by such defiance of authority,” Freeman said. “But as an American, I am not.”

Reprinted with permission of MIT News.
In the many intense debates over development in Latin America in recent decades, the question rarely arose, as it had in previous decades, as to what kind of capitalism existed or whether capitalism in Latin America was somehow different. If anything, the homogenizing Washington Consensus of the 1990s sidelined such queries with expectations that market reforms would soon make the economies of Latin America resemble liberal economies elsewhere. Market reforms and globalization have transformed many aspects of capitalism in Latin America, but areas of convergence are often, as elsewhere, less interesting and less consequential for development than are the areas of continued divergence. So, it is worthwhile to raise again the question of what sort of capitalism exists in Latin America.

Most attempts to characterize the political economies of Latin America as somehow distinctive can be roughly classified as internationalist or statist. The former was famously staked out in various dependency arguments of the 1960s and 1970s that claimed that international economic ties created a stunted form of capitalism with limited possibilities for autonomous development. The internationalist perspective later surfaced in several guises including global production networks, natural resource curses, and other macro perspectives on debt and international capital flows. Internationalist perspectives are indispensable in some places (such as oil exporters or export zones) or some periods (such as the debt crisis of the 1980s), but these are only partial views because they miss most of the domestic political economies of the rest of the region in more normal times.

By the 1980s, the mainstream focus shifted to the domestic economy and emphasized comparisons across development strategies (import substitution vs. export promotion) and the variable role of the state, often invoking revealing comparisons between Latin America and East Asia. After 1990, research on the political economy of Latin America mostly concentrated on the changing role of the state, especially during market reforms of the 1990s, but then on into the 2000s with attention to social welfare, the new left, and various forms of renewed state intervention. Of course, not all past work in political economy fits the division between internationalist and statist, but little research, save specialized publications, asked whether there was something distinctive about the domestic private sector.

Much of the recent statist bias is fully warranted as shifts in the role of the state in Latin America have been epochal. However, the statist perspective tends to overstate the extent of change and to obscure the pivotal economic agents—firms and workers—that are driving development in the wake of state retrenchment in the 1990s. Key questions—such as: Why is education so low? Why has productivity not increased? Why have good jobs been so scarce? and Why do firms not invest more in research and development?—cannot be answered in a statist framework and require instead an analysis of the types of firms, labor markets, corporate strategies, and skill regimes that constitute the institutional foundations of capitalism in Latin America. Moreover, recent scholarship on change, in policies and development models, has missed significant continuities in patterns of organization and behavior by business and labor.

This book starts with business and labor and develops four main hypotheses: (1) that Latin America has a distinctive, enduring form of hierarchical capitalism characterized by multinational corporations (MNCs), diversified business groups, low skills, and segmented labor markets; (2) that institutional complementarities knit together features of corporate governance and labor markets and thus contributed to the resiliency of hi-
erarchical capitalism; (3) that elements of the broader political system favor incumbents and insiders who pressed governments to sustain core economic institutions; and (4) that hierarchical capitalism has not generated enough good jobs and equitable development nor is it, on its own, likely to.

Developing these arguments requires a new approach to the study of Latin American political economy. Theoretically, drawing on the literature on comparative capitalism and especially varieties of capitalism, the analysis brings three main innovations. First, it uses a “firm’s–eye” focus on the structure of corporate governance and labor markets and on the predominant economic strategies of firms and workers. Second, it examines interactions across realms of the economy. The separate literatures on business groups, MNCs, labor markets, and skills are large, but they rarely overlap or speak to one another. This book tries to link them. Third, I use the economic strategies of firms and workers, and the institutional complementarities that animate them, to reinterpret the sources of policy preferences and political strategies of business and labor. Again, existing research on business and labor politics is extensive, yet it rarely connects political activity back to firm strategies and institutional complementarities.

The best way to answer the question of what kind of capitalism Latin America has is to compare it to other varieties, especially liberal market economies (LMEs) in the United States, Britain, and other Anglo economies; coordinated market economies (CMEs) in Northern Europe and Japan; and to other developing economies. These broad comparisons help pinpoint the distinctive configuration of hierarchical capitalism. Within this comparative framework, my focus is primarily on Latin America, especially the larger countries of the region, but hierarchical capitalism is not just Latin capitalism. The model should also apply, with modifications, to other middle–income countries outside the region, such as Turkey, Thailand, or South Africa.

This book draws on a long tradition of comparative institutional and historical institutional analysis, but with a crucial shift in analytic focus to incorporate firms and organizations. Following Douglass North, many institutional approaches have assumed organizations such as firms and paid them little heed. North insisted on a “crucial distinction” between institutions and organizations: “institutions are rules” of the game and firms and other organizations are merely the “players.” The implication, followed in most institutional analysis in political economy, was to concentrate primarily on the rules and neglect organizations that were assumed to adapt more or less automatically to the rules. My focus instead problematizes firms and makes them core components of an institutional approach to Latin American political economy. Organizations in Latin America—from the Church, to state–owned enterprises, to business groups—have always been hybrid, syncretic, complex, interrelated, and politicized, and understanding them requires the full analytic toolkit from comparative institutional analysis.

Core Institutions of Hierarchical Capitalism

What are the institutions in Latin America that organize investment, labor, technology, and skills into an overall production regime? The comparative capitalism framework for developed countries gives a guide on where to look, but that framework cannot be imported wholesale. On the side of capital and investment, scholars of developed countries start with capital markets—banking systems and stock markets—and the myriad rules and practices that regulate them. However, in Latin America, equity markets and banks were not the sources of long term productive investment (nor were they markets for corporate control). Instead, the private institutions (as organizations) that mobilized capital for investment were business groups and MNCs. In terms of strategic interactions, CEOs in developed countries are usually preoccupied with managing relations with stock markets (quarterly earnings and guidance, institutional investors, etc.) in equity–based financial systems or with bankers in bank–based systems. In contrast, managers in hierarchical capitalism are most keenly attentive to relations with family
owners in business groups or with headquarters in MNC subsidiaries. Most research on corporate governance, narrowly conceived, examines relations between financial principals (shareholders or creditors) and their managerial agents; in hierarchical capitalism, these external financial principals have little leverage over managers.

Similarly, scholars of labor in developed countries focus on overall regulations, collective bargaining, and employment practices. Such a focus in Latin America would underscore the high levels of regulation, but it gets only part way because almost half of jobs are informal and not subject to formal regulation. Moreover, employment practices point less to long-term relations (save for a few) as in Japan and Germany but rather to very short-term employment. For lack of a better term, I use the shorthand of atomized labor relations and segmented labor markets to characterize the result of this complex institutionalized mix of formal regulations and informal practices. On skills, the institutions in Latin America resemble those in developed countries, and the overall skill regime comprises basic education, technical education, universities, public training programs, unemployment insurance, regulations on company spending on training (compulsory in-house training, tax incentives, etc.), and general private practices on training.

Capitalism in Latin America might first be characterized simply by weak or missing formal institutions: undeveloped financial markets, unenforced labor regulations, and shallow and partial coverage by the skills regime. One could then write, as others have, about how and why these institutions are weak and develop a comparison of weakly versus strongly institutionalized varieties of capitalism. My approach is less concerned with standard formal institutions—and how and why they lack force—and focuses instead on the organizational and behavioral responses to weak or absent institutions, namely, diversified business groups, MNCs, segmented labor markets, and a low skill regime. Thus, business groups and MNCs mobilized capital without stock markets or banks. Unlike firms in other varieties of capitalism whose strategies were conditioned by bank-centered or equity-centered financial systems, business groups and MNCs are freer from these constraints, and thus, their internally generated strategies and behaviors are more consequential for development outcomes (hence the importance of organizations or institutions in corporate governance).

In labor markets, the responses to unevenly enforced regulations and limited training and education were segmented labor markets, atomized labor relations, and low skills. These responses are not recognizable organizations such as business groups, but rather are dispersed, though regular, patterns of behavior. However, these patterns of behavior in informality, in school leaving, and in high job rotation are enduring, and shape long-term expectations of workers and managers and, as such, constitute themselves informal institutions that regulate labor markets in the absence of formal rules. By analogy, albeit imperfect, much of the comparative institutional literature looks at the mold (the formal institutions and rules that shape behavior) whereas I focus more on the object that emerges with only a partial mold (behaviors and organizations in the absence of constraining formal institutions). However, the end goal of each approach is the same—to explain the strategic interactions and behaviors of owners, managers, and workers.
Indonesian Journalist
Prodita Sabarini

Prodita Sabarini, a Jakarta-based journalist, has been selected as the 2013–14 Elizabeth Neuffer Fellow. The award is offered through the International Women’s Media Foundation (IWMF) and is sponsored in part by CIS. Beginning in September, Sabarini joined CIS as a research associate. She will also complete internships at The Boston Globe and The New York Times.

Sabarini is the ninth recipient of the annual fellowship, which gives a woman journalist working in print, broadcast or online media the opportunity to build skills while focusing exclusively on human rights journalism and social justice issues.

Sabarini, a staff reporter for the English daily The Jakarta Post, was chosen from a pool of highly qualified applicants from around the world. She plans to research the phenomenon of religious intolerance in Indonesia during her tenure as the Elizabeth Neuffer Fellow and wishes to explore the factors that turn people’s fear into acts of violence.

“The Elizabeth Neuffer Fellowship provides an opportunity to access research materials that are not available in my home country,” Sabarini said. Peter Canellos, Editorial Page editor at The Boston Globe and a member of the Neuffer Fellow selection committee, noted that “the Neuffer fellows are both students and teachers. Each fellow has made her impact felt in Boston and elsewhere in the United States, and then taken her own lessons back to readers in Uganda, Colombia, Pakistan, India, and many other countries where former fellows are living and working.”

“It is an honor to have Prodita among us. My hope is that she finds her time in an academic setting richly rewarding,” said Richard Samuels, director of the Center for International Studies and Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT.

The fellowship is named for Elizabeth Neuffer, a Boston Globe reporter and the winner of a 1998 IWMF Courage in Journalism Award who was killed while on assignment in Iraq in 2003. Neuffer’s life mission was to promote international understanding of human rights and social justice.
RN: I think that independent religious institutions will face challenges. The Muslim Brotherhood looks like it's going to suffer, and my guess is that even if there's a move toward some democratization in the future under the military regime, the Muslim Brotherhood will be outlawed from participation and groups representing salafi candidates will also be outlawed. But on the other hand, I think that will backfire. I think that the more the state represses these groups, the more it fuels extremism. It sets up a dichotomy where clerics are either seen as bought out by the state or true clerics are seen as sticking to their principles and are radicalizing. It doesn't leave any room for a moderate cleric sticking to his principles but who, at the same time, criticizes radicalization.

I'm skeptical that the Washington Post had the whole story—that al–Azhar is going to be a credible, moderate voice for the regime. Al–Azhar flexed its muscles during the revolution, and while it's true that in my interviews with clerics there they repeatedly said "we are the face of moderate Islam in Egypt," and that "we do not instigate fights between any of the schools or between Muslims and non–Muslims," at the same time they really like their independence and it will be difficult for the state to retain them somehow as both a legitimate institution and an independent institution. They'll either have to rein them in, and then it will lose legitimacy, or they'll have to give them some leeway. My guess is that the Azharis will tepidly support the regime as a matter of survival, but this will make them irrelevant to the Islamist opposition so there won't be any new "Egyptian Islam."

RN: I personally side with scholars and others who think a lower U.S. profile in the region would be beneficial. It takes two to fight. A lot of the bite of jihadi rhetoric is that U.S. actions can be interpreted through a lens jihadis are offering. If the U.S. stopped carrying out those actions, then when jihadis claim that this is the reincarnation of the Crusades, it would start to sound a lot more hollow. They would fire up the youth less. The major concern with pulling back is that we would see an increase in terror attacks attempting to provoke further Western involvement in the region. I worry that Western politicians would take the bait on that one. But I also think standing down in a few of these situations, trying to avoid being provoked by jihadis, would take some of the wind out of jihadis' sails.

RN: I think the allure of foreign fighting is strong. Syria has been declared a jihad by many, many clerics. And not just radical clerics. Yusuf Qaradawi has a weekly television show on al–Jazeera and has dedicated at least three episodes in the last three months on Syria and has been encouraging a Syrian jihad. The Shi'is are also encouraging jihad on the other side. I'm pessimistic that U.S. involvement would win over the opposition or be able to clean the opposition of the extremist elements. The extremists were allied with the opposition before we ever were. And the extremists are more likely to be stalwart allies than the U.S. ever will be. I think moderates see the alliances with jihadist groups as a kind of necessary evil. Competing with jihadis for the future of Syria will be bad, but competing with Bashar al–Asad for the future will be worse. I think that means there's not much the U.S. can really do to try and influence the nature of the opposition. The U.S. is in a tough place choosing between "do we let al–Asad stay in power?" or "do we attempt his ouster and open up a can of worms with the U.S. not able to control the outcome?"

RN: I've been working on a project about drone strikes that does two things. First, I'm attempting to look at the effect of drone strikes using sentiment on Twitter; and second, the effects of strikes on the legacy of jihadist intellectuals who are killed. I have some interesting data on how popular the writings of different jihadis are. I'm also hoping to build on citation data: whether the intellectual influence of jihadis grows after being martyred. So in addition to inciting civilians to further extremism, we may be lionizing the targets in some way.

The other thing I'm really excited about right now is looking at the sources of political attitudes among Shi'i clerics. This is actually where my initial interest in fatwas came from. I was following the 2009 Iranian elections and watching some clerics split from the regime and say that the elections were illegitimate, which for a regime run by clerics was quite surprising. It turned out to be too challenging for a dissertation at the time, but now I have an RA who is an Iraqi Shi'a who brings a lot of cultural knowledge and we're doing it. We're collecting public statements on whether each cleric agrees or disagrees with the Iranian principle of vilayat–e faqib (or "Guardianship of the Jurist"), which establishes a cleric as supreme leader of Iran. There's some substantial variation in agreement with this principle.
There’s also a divide between political and quietist clerics that, as far as we can tell, is not correlated with attitudes on Guardianship of the Jurist, and we think the sources of both those things may be from academic networks, especially on whether the concept of Guardianship of the Jurist is valid or not. In addition to collecting public documents, we’re hoping to contact some of the clerics soon going forward.
A central moment during the United States surge in Iraq came with the August 2007 stand down of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). As a result, sectarian violence declined drastically as Baghdad became more stable. However, few analysts in academia, the government, or the private sphere expected the ceasefire to hold. Pointing to JAM’s internal divisions and geographic overreach as well as Iran’s attempts to divide and rule Iraq’s Shiites, they argued that Sadr did not have sufficient control of the organization to ensure that his fighters would put down their arms. As a professor in Baghdad told the International Crisis Group: “Everybody was surprised by the degree to which militants obeyed Muqtada al-Sadr. At first, I expected about half of the Mahdi Army members to ignore him.” Instead, compliance was substantial and stuck despite intrusive operations by Coalition and Iraqi forces.

My research addresses this puzzle: how did a seemingly fragmented and disjointed organization adhere to a costly ceasefire? Resolving this question requires better specifying when organizations will fragment as well as how and when such fragmentation will limit insurgent organizations’ ability to employ and calibrate the use of violence. Rather than treating the causes and consequences of fragmentation uniformly, I find that the impact of factors such as state tactics, internal disagreements, imbalances in power between and within groups, or geographic stretch is dependent on the institutional context in which organizations operate.

In particular, I seek to identify the organizational characteristics which determine whether the leaders of formal insurgent organizations can control when violence is employed. Such control includes ensuring insurgents fight when ordered and abide by agreements or orders to cease violence. My research indicates that the degree of this control within formal organizations is related to the interaction of two organizational characteristics: (1) leadership embeddedness, or the extent to which leaders are rooted in strong underlying communities and social structures; and (2) resource centralization, or the extent to which leaders directly, and exclusively, distribute both material and social resources. Embedded leaders must provide resources in a manner which leverages control of the community mechanisms needed to motivate and sustain collective violent behavior.

In the remainder of this piece, I will first lay out the basic tenets of this theory and underscore how it clarifies current approaches to fragmentation. Second I will briefly elaborate how this theory can explain JAM’s ability to control when violence was employed from 2003 to 2008.

A Theory of Organizational Control of Collective Violence
This theory is derived from the need for formal military organizations to actively motivate and gain the allegiance of their fighters. During civil wars, insurgent organizations often try to develop such relationships with their fighters by building on pre-war community structures and social linkages. Indeed, many authors have found that strong community structures are crucial in both starting and sustaining rebellion. Such communities are able to employ status rewards based on solidarity, enforce norms of fairness, ensure monitoring and concomitant sanctioning of undesired behavior, and share information leading up to and during rebellion.
However, my research suggests that organizations embedded in such communities are not able to simply absorb and then employ these communal mechanisms to support the aims of the formal organization. Organizations face the unique challenge of co-opting such community mechanisms for their own use. This challenge is evidenced by the major dissimilarities between insurgent organizations built upon similar communities, for example: Islamic Jihad and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Hezbollah and Amal in Lebanon, the Taliban and Hizb-ı-Islami in Afghanistan, the Badr Organization and Jaysh al-Mahdi in Iraq, or the Viet Minh, the Dai Viet, and the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang in Vietnam. As Selznick observed over a half century ago with respect to Bolshevik insurgents in Russia, “[O]rganizations become infused with value as they come to symbolize the community’s aspirations, its sense of identity.” Only by capturing the social base can formal leaders shift fighters from simple participants to “deployable personnel.”

I find that another organizational characteristic—how leaders distribute social and material resources—determines whether or not leaders who are embedded in strong communities can leverage the bonds within those communities. Leaders will benefit from the provision of pay, food, clothing, or services when they are able to directly and exclusively control how such resources are distributed. In a simplistic sense, if leaders do not directly pay or punish their members, they cannot credibly threaten to withhold pay or to apply punishment if their fighters defect. However, even when insurgent organizations directly distribute resources, the utility they gain is limited when other members of either the organization, the broader rebellion movement, or the state can also supply access to those resources.

Provision of resources by the formal leaders captures underlying communal networks by both increasing the importance of the ties between formal leaders and the community and positioning these formal leaders as key actors within the informal social structure. This status allows leaders to leverage the community mechanisms, such as norms of reciprocity or solidary benefits such as a sense of community and camaraderie, needed to motivate and sustain collective violent behavior. Thus, both the social context in which resources are provided (i.e., the extent to which leaders are embedded in strong communities) and the manner in which those resources are provided (i.e., resource centralization) determine whether organizations are able to ensure that their members use and cease using violence when they are so ordered.

This focus on organizational characteristics helps to clarify the role of many other factors often linked with fragmentation or defection within insurgent groups. For example, while many studies theorize that increases in relative power will make insurgent groups more effective, my research identifies how increases in relative power such as capturing territory or gaining access to new weaponry can reduce the importance of centralized leaders in distributing resources or empower local leaders. Similarly, while external support may provide more relative power to an organization vis-à-vis other conflict actors, if the formal leadership does not control the resources being distributed, this change in relative power would lessen their capacity to control when violence is employed.

Jaysh al–Mahdi

I’ll briefly discuss some empirical findings with respect to JAM from 2003–2008 to illustrate the utility of the theory in explaining their compliance with the 2007 ceasefire in Baghdad. JAM is rooted in the movement of Muqtada al–Sadr’s father, Muhammad Sadiq al–Sadr, and distant uncle, Muhammad Baqir al–Sadr. In stark contrast to the majority of the Shiite clergy in Iraq, they espoused a distinctly non–quietist approach calling for the removal of Saddam Hussein and establishment of an Islamic government in the mold of their Iranian neighbors. In particular, Sadiq sought to formally connect the religious establishment with Iraq’s large and underprivileged Shiite community. His efforts were largely successful as he built a strong persona, deep patronage networks, and

continued on the next page
garnered vast public support. Muqtada al-Sadr was embedded in this strong Shiite community when he assumed a leadership position in Jaysh al-Mahdi following the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq.

However, Sadr’s ability to exclusively provide material and social goods, such as mosque sermons, local charity, payment, weapons, and spiritual guidance, was limited. Beyond competing with many more accomplished religious leaders within the Sadrist trend, Sadr lacked the ability to dispense patronage due to the relative poverty of his followers, his lack of access to outside resources, and competition from other religious figures. Illustratively, during the 2004 spring and summer conflicts, JAM members were not paid and were forced to buy their own weapons and provide their own transportation. As such, given that JAM was not resource centralized, the theory correctly predicts that during this time period, JAM was unable to maintain a number of ceasefires. As a result, JAM suffered severe military setbacks and was unable to fully take up arms again until early 2006.

By 2006, Sadr was able to capitalize on being embedded by centralizing control of resources. He became a main provider of the religious and social resources of order, guidance, and Islamic governance. Sadr created the Mahdist Institute to teach basic principles of faith and established a code of conduct enforced by a Judgment Committee which disciplined those violating the rules. More importantly, by joining the government, Sadr took control of a number of ministries and was able to provide rents to Shiites, particularly in Sadr city where his support was seen as strongest. Members of JAM became cabinet ministers in health, human services, transportation, etc., allowing for the capture and provision of government resources. These services were directly distributed by Sadrist neighborhood offices (Maktab al-Sayyid al-Shahi) where citizens had to go to get access to the services.

Thus, while there were many factions within JAM by 2007, the theory predicts that the organization had the necessary characteristics to ensure compliance with ceasefires. Obeying the ceasefire was not an easy choice for these foot soldiers. Foot soldiers and mid-level commanders lost significant territory and prestige. Beyond simply losing explicit control, many JAM members were forced to flee Baghdad fearing retribution from other Shiites and Sunni militants. Nonetheless, there were numerous reports in the Arabic and U.S. news media of continued allegiance to Sadr. Indeed, the International Crisis Group interviewed a number of followers abiding by the ceasefire who expressed impatience, but commitment to Sadr. One follower told them that we “are impatiently waiting for Muqtada al-Sadr to announce a resumption of the Mahdi Army’s activities. You’ll see what we’ll do with those...The only reason we are not reacting now to Badr’s attacks is that we respect Muqtada al-Sadr’s decision.”

Conclusion
My research underscores the importance of studying how processes of fragmentation are influenced by organizational characteristics. In particular, the extent to which formal leaders are embedded in strong communities and can directly distribute resources determines their capacity to control when violence is collectively employed. Nonetheless, different organizational characteristics should be associated with different causal processes. Indeed, organizations that are able to control when violence is employed may still be quite weak militarily and easily destroyed. My dissertation builds on this logic by researching how additional organizational factors such as formal hierarchy, centralized training, and command and control procedures are needed to explain insurgent military effectiveness.
REFERENCES
3 International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Civil War, the Sadrists and the Surge, Middle East Report, February 7, 2008, 17.
8 International Crisis Group, Iraq's Civil War, the Sadrists and the Surge, 14.
Starr Forums

The Center hosted multiple Starr Forums, including: “Syria: A Just War?,” featuring Barry Posen (Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of MIT’s Security Studies Program), Jeanne Guillemin (senior advisor at the MIT Security Studies Program), and Augustus Richard Norton (professor of international relations and anthropology at Boston University), and moderated by John Tirman (executive director and principal research scientist at CIS); “The Passion of Chelsea Manning: The Story behind the Wikileaks,” with Chase Madar (author and civil rights attorney) and Noam Chomsky (MIT); “Japan’s Continuing Nuclear Nightmare,” featuring Ken Buesseler (senior scientist, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution), Patrick Stackpole, (former chief of staff of U.S. Forces Japan during Operation Tomodachi), and Richard Samuels (Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of CIS), and moderated by Ken Oye (associate professor of political science and engineering systems); and “The ‘Snowden Affair’: Intelligence and Privacy in a Wired World,” Susan Chira (assistant managing editor, New York Times), Chas Freeman (retired career diplomat, ambassador, and assistant secretary of defense), Joel Brenner (former senior counsel at the National Security Agency), and moderated by Admiral William Fallon (former head of CENTCOM).

MISTI’s Global Teaching Labs

As part of its Global Teaching Labs, MISTI will be sending more than 80 students to Israel, Mexico, Korea, Spain, Italy, and Germany. Originally launched as the pilot program Highlights for High Schools, this experiential teaching program attracts top students looking to share MIT’s unique approach to science and engineering education. Select students are matched with foreign high school hosts throughout the country for three weeks in January. At each location students prepare tailored courses on science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) subjects that complement the school’s curriculum and highlight MIT’s hands-on approach to education.

SSP Wednesday Seminars

CIS Artist in Residence

In October, the Center hosted Jonathan Alpeyrie as an artist in residence. Mr. Alpeyrie’s career as a conflict photographer stretches over a decade and has brought him to more than 25 countries and 9 conflict zones, mostly in East Africa, the South Caucasus, the Middle East and central Asia. In the spring of 2013, while in Syria, he was taken hostage for 81 days by Syrian rebels. His one week residency concluded with a public talk “Syria: The Mainstream Media and Its Role in the War,” and a photo exhibit from his work while in Syria.

Myron Weiner Seminar Series on International Migration

This semester, the Center hosted a seminar on “Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement,” by Alexander Betts, University Lecturer in Refugee Studies and Forced Migration at the University of Oxford. The Myron Weiner Seminar Series explores factors affecting global population movements and their impact upon sending and receiving countries and relations among them. It was named in honor of Myron Weiner, the late founder of the Inter–University Committee on International Migration and former director of CIS.

CIS Audits Syria’s Civil War

In September, Brian Haggerty wrote an Audit on “Debating U.S. Interests in Syria’s War.” He concludes with four distinct questions in an effort to reframe the discussion. In this ongoing series of essays, the Center tours the horizon of conventional wisdoms that inform U.S. foreign policy, and puts them to the test of data and history. Full text of the Audit is available on the Center’s web site under “Publications.”

MISTI Receives NAFSA Award

MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI) was recently presented with the 2013 Senator Paul Simon Spotlight Award during International Education Week in Washington, D.C. The award is granted by NAFSA: Association of International Educators to innovative university programs that make a significant contribution to campus internationalization. An article in a NAFSA publication noted that, “MISTI has spawned entrepreneurs, academics, and venture capitalists who work on the global stage with language skills on top of advanced technological prowess.”

Assistant Professor of Political Science Regina Bateson was awarded the Heinz Eulau award for the best article published in the American Political Science Review during the previous calendar year for her article “Crime Victimization and Political Participation” (August 2012).

In December, PhD Candidate Mark Bell presented “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy” at the Tobin Project National Security Graduate Student Forum in Cambridge.

Suzanne Berger, the Raphael Dorman–Helen Starbuck Professor of Political Science, was interviewed in the Boston Globe in September on the Production in the Innovation Economy (PIE) project, which she co-chairs. In September, the PIE conference marked the release of Berger’s Making in America: From Innovation to Market and Production in the Innovation Economy (MIT Press 2013). She also discussed the PIE project in MIT News in September.

Associate Professor of Political Science Fotini Christia’s book Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (Cambridge UP 2012) won the Luebbert Award for Best Book in Comparative Politics and the Lepgold Prize for Best Book in International Relations. In October, she served as discussant for the “Roundtable” panel at the University of Denver Sié Chéou–Kang Center for International Security and Diplomacy’s Conference on the Role of Non-Violent Strategies in Violent Contexts.

PhD Candidate Christopher Clary started a Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellowship at the RAND Corporation in Washington, DC. He presented on “India’s Capacity to Be a Defense Partner” at the Meridien International Center in September and spoke at the release event for the annual Strategic Asia volume at the George Washington University in October, both in Washington.

Associate Professor of Political Science M. Taylor Fravel delivered a talk in November on “China’s Maritime Disputes” at Princeton University. He also delivered talks in November on “East Asian Territorial Disputes and Great Power Relations” at Peking University and on “Conflict Avoidance in Close Quarters” at the Workshop on the Development of the Global Commons and Order at Sea, both in Beijing, China. In October, Fravel spoke on “China and the US ‘Pivot’ to Asia” at Harvard University.

Senior Advisor to the Security Studies Program Jeanne Guillemin was a panelist on October 16 for “The Humanitarian Crisis in Syria” at The Forum at Harvard School of Public Health in collaboration with Public Radio International’s The World and WGBH.

In December, PhD Candidate Brian Haggerty presented “A Theory of Strategic State Sponsorship” at the Tobin Project National Security Graduate Student Forum in Cambridge.
PhD Candidate David Jae presented his paper in August, “Not Whether but When: Reconsidering Alliances as a Cause of War” (co-authored with Kai Quek) at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Chicago.


Assistant Professor of Political Science Vipin Narang was named one of three recipients of the Smith Richardson Foundation’s International Security Junior Faculty grants. He intends to put the award funds toward research on his second book manuscript, Windows of Volatility.

Associate Professor of Political Science and Engineering Systems Kenneth Oye was featured on NPR’s Science Friday discussing “Biosecurity for the Age of Redesigned Life” in November.

Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the MIT Security Studies Program Barry Posen was a panelist for “Where Are We Now? Understanding the Current Landscape in the Study of Security and International Affairs” at the Syracuse University Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Workshop “Towards a New Approach to the Advanced Study of Security and International Affairs,” on November 15 in Cazenovia, N.Y.

Ford International Professor of Political Science Richard Samuels lectured on the topic of Japan’s nuclear weapons option at the Freie Universität Berlin in October. He also lectured on the topic of his most recent book, 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan (Cornell UP 2013), at the Asia Society of Houston and the University of California, Berkeley in September; the Università degli studi di Napoli “L’Orientale” and the Japanisch–Deutsches Zentrum, Berlin in October; and Portland State University, the University of Virginia, and Roger Williams College in November.

Ford International Professor of Political Science Ben Ross Schneider gave talks on his new book, Hierarchical Capitalism in Latin America: Business, Labor, and the Challenges of Equitable Development (Cambridge UP 2013), at the Research Workshop on Institutions and Organizations and at the National Confederation of Industry, both in Brazil, as well as the London School of Economics and Gothenburg University. In November, he was featured in MIT News.
Ford International Professor of Political Science Stephen Van Evera served as discussant for “Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy Under Jefferson, Polk, Truman and Reagan,” at CIS on November 22 and as a panelist for “Where Are We Now? Understanding the Current Landscape in the Study of Security and International Affairs,” at the Syracuse University Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs Workshop “Towards a New Approach to the Advanced Study of Security and International Affairs,” on November 15 in Cazenovia, N.Y. On October 30, he was a panelist for “The Case for Climate Engineering” at MIT.

Security Studies Program Research Associate Jim Walsh was interviewed on WBUR’s Here and Now program “Details of the Interim Nuclear Deal With Iran,” which aired November 25. He also gave a talk, “Small Risk, Catastrophic Consequence: The Challenge of Nuclear Terrorism,” on November 20 at The Technology and Culture Forum at MIT, co-sponsored with MIT Global Zero.

Security Studies Program Research Affiliate Cindy Williams was a guest for the “Veteran's Day” program on National Public Radio’s On Point.

PhD Candidate Alec Worsnop presented “Not All Fragmentation is Equal: Insurgent Organizational Structure and Control of Collective Violence” in August at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Chicago and in November at the Tobin Project National Security Graduate Student Forum in Cambridge.

Published

Mark Bell, PhD candidate & Nicholas Miller, PhD candidate

“Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution online (September 2013).

Suzanne Berger, Raphael Dorman–Helen Starbuck Professor of Political Science


Fotini Christia, Assistant Professor of Political Science

“Empowering Women through Development Aid: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan” (with Andrew Beath and Ruben Enikolopov), American Political Science Review 107, no. 3 (August 2013), 540-557.

Christopher Clary, PhD candidate


“Modernization and Austerity,” with Vipin Narang, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Indian Express, September 16, 2013.

**Brian Haggerty**, PhD Candidate


**Philip Martin**, PhD Student


**Alessandro Orsini**, Research Affiliate

“Interview with a Terrorist by Vocation,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36, no. 8 (August 2013), 672–684.

**Mansour Salsabili**, Research Fellow


**Richard Samuels**, Ford International Professor of Political Science


**Harvey M. Sapolsky**, Political Science Professor Emeritus


“Health or Defense,” *e–ir.info*, December 5, 2013.


continued on the next page
Published
continued from previous page

Ben Ross Schneider, Ford International Professor of Political Science


Eugene Skolnikoff, Professor of Political Science Emeritus


Jim Walsh, SSP Research Associate


Cindy Williams, SSP Research Affiliate


Zachary Zwald, Stanton Nuclear Fellow

NSF Grant to Develop Synthetic Biology Research Agenda

The Center and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars are collaborating on a $233,000 grant from the National Science Foundation (NSF) to help realize potential benefits and to address potential ecological effects of synthetic biology.

The grant is supported jointly by three units within NSF, the Division of Cellular and Molecular Biology, the Division of Environmental Biology, and the Engineering Directorate. The grant will fund development of an interdisciplinary research agenda to improve understanding of potential ecological effects of commercial uses of synthetic biology. The research agenda will be developed through consultations among synthetic biologists, evolutionary biologists, ecologists, and environmental scientists. It will be based on workshops that focus on near— and medium—term applications of synthetic biology, with scenarios based on the intentional and unintentional release of engineered organisms.

This project will be conducted jointly by the Center's Program on Emerging Technologies (led by Professor Kenneth Oye) and the Synthetic Biology Project at the Wilson Center.