



# précis

n. a concise summary of essential points, statements, or facts

## précis Interviews Diane Davis

Diane Davis, a member of CIS, is professor of political sociology in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning. Her current research is focused on cities in conflict and, within that area, police corruption and police violence.

Through a USAID grant, Davis and John Tirman (the Center's executive director and a principal research scientist) will explore how cities from Brazil to Pakistan cope with violence, and inform policy-makers of promising practices.



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## Democratic Insecurities: Violence, Trauma, and Intervention in Haiti

by Erica Caple James

Supported by a rich cultural heritage, the Haitian people retain a capacity for hope, faith, and resilience that remains a tremendous resource for any efforts to rehabilitate the nation and its people.



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## Much Ado About Decline

by Joshua Itzkowitz Shiffrin

For at least the third time in the post-war era, the decline of American power is at the forefront of American foreign policy discourse. Underlying the decline debate is a consensus that decline, if and when it occurs, will be disastrous for American interests.



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### OF NOTE

#### Study on Women's Security

A year-long study in six countries has found that the goals of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, enacted 10 years ago, have not been fulfilled and that implementation is generally poor.

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#### Meet the Neuffer Fellow

Rabia Mehmood, a journalist in the Lahore bureau of *Express 24/7 Television* in Pakistan, has received the 2010-11 Elizabeth Neuffer Fellowship.

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#### Miliband Joins CIS

David Miliband, the Foreign Secretary for the United Kingdom from 2007 to 2010, will join the Center as a Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow in residence from April 11 through 15, 2011.

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## Diane Davis

Professor of Political Sociology  
MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning



*Diane Davis, a member of CIS, is professor of political sociology in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning. Her current research is focused on cities in conflict and, within that area, police corruption and police violence.*

*USAID is providing \$385,000 for 8 case studies of urban resilience in situations of chronic violence. Through this grant, Davis and John Tirman (the Center's executive director and a principal research scientist) will explore how cities from Brazil to Pakistan cope with violence, and inform policymakers of promising practices.*

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**précis:** You recently stepped down as the head of the International Development Group (IDG) in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning (DUSP). How would you characterize the work of the IDG and what would you say were its major accomplishments under your leadership?

**DD:** The IDG, which is a program group within DUSP, exists in order to provide a sub-community within DUSP for students and faculty that work on developing countries. We work as a group to ensure that our students are offered the research and internship opportunities that will make them good international development planners. I saw myself as an enabler of these activities, a task consistent with my strong commitment to the interdisciplinary opportunities at CIS. For instance, I try to link our students in DUSP to the international discussion and debate on the developing world that occurs at CIS.

**précis:** CIS is a truly interdisciplinary research institute, as demonstrated in your self-description as a “political sociologist.” What is the research orientation of political sociology as a field, as distinct from either political science or sociology more generally?

**DD:** One general distinction is that sociologists do not work exclusively within the domain of the state, understanding instead that politics can occur in society as well. In my own writings, I look at both the state and society, focusing on the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, or between citizens and states—I have written about social movements and political parties from this perspective. I also am an urbanist, and I look at movements and politics within the context of cities. So when I examine sociological phenomena like state formation and

political party development, I am very interested in the role that the city and urban populations play in both local and national political trajectories. As a sociologist, I am engaged with questions that complement much of the work in political science, to be sure; but I use a slightly different approach. For example, many political scientists take the national state as point of departure, whereas I am interested in how states get formed in the first place, and my focus is as likely to be sub-national and transnational governance structures and processes, and how they may impact national-states.

**précis:** In a prize-winning article published in *Contemporary Security Policy* in 2009, you argue that our traditional categories for understanding non-state armed actors are not sufficient for analyzing emerging forms of violence in the developing world. What kind of non-state behaviors should scholars be paying more attention to and why are they important?

**DD:** Political scientists have studied non-state armed actors for years, although their focus tends to be groups whose main objective is to challenge the state, like guerilla movements and rebel movements. What I have tried to do in my own research is widen our analytical understanding of what constitutes a non-state armed actor. I am particularly interested in those armed forces that are not working in or for the state, and are a threat to the state, but are not necessarily trying to undermine or seize state power. I originally started to study this category of armed actors by examining mafias, drug traffickers, and other organized criminals who are destabilizing politics and society in countries of Latin America. These actors have become increasingly relevant for those of us interested in political systems, because

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their actions can reduce social stability without directly challenging government authority. What also is interesting is how these more “economically motivated” non-state actors work with or join hands with other more politically-motivated non-state actors, such as terrorists, to destabilize, de-legitimize, and undermine state sovereignty.

Organized criminals, mafias, and other non-state armed groups need more attention because they are growing in number and influence, and are increasingly successful at destabilizing political systems and international relations, in no small part because they often operate on a transnational scale. As someone who studies politics and society in Latin America, I can attest to the ubiquity and importance of transnational organized crime in this region, even in the economically successful countries. In Mexico, a country I have studied for several decades, these actors are delegitimizing the government and calling into question the democratic ideals of the nation. Other countries of Central and Latin America also face similar problems with non-state armed actors whose use of violence has become socially and political destabilizing. The rise of violence entrepreneurs and organized criminal actors in countries that not that long ago struggled over democratic transition is one of the most critical problems throughout Latin America, Africa, and other parts of the developing world, and it needs serious scholarly and policy attention.

**précis:** In another recent publication, you extend the state-formation framework of your late colleague Charles Tilly to analyze the behavior of some of the groups you just mentioned. How do such actors compare to conventional states, and how do they challenge the power and legitimacy of the modern nation-state?

**DD:** In the piece you mention, I wanted to build on the work of both Charles Tilly and Benedict Anderson, and their respective writings on state formation and nationalism. Both were concerned with the loyalties and reciprocities that help

link the rulers and the ruled. While Tilly approached this subject by identifying how connections forged by such activities as war-making, taxation, and social policy drove processes of state-formation, Anderson’s approach built on the idea of an “imagined community” of sentiments that tied people together in a common political imaginary. Both scholars were concerned with the shared sentiments that bind citizens to each other and to the nation-state. In my article, I was interested in exploring the extent to which non-state armed actors also cultivated similar forms of loyalty. In particular, I hypothesized that reciprocities among them and within the communities in which they operated helped create an alternative “imagined community” of political reciprocities. I also sought to understand the conditions under which these new imagined communities emerged and strengthened. This led me to examine the extent to which the existent government is not doing a good job of providing public services, employment, or other conditions that contribute to political stability and state legitimacy. In such conditions, citizens are more likely to limit their loyalty to the formal nation state, turning instead to non-state armed actors who have increasing political and economic power. These non-state armed actors often offer what some might identify as a parallel “stateness,” not just because they have developed considerable control over the means of coercion, but also because they sometimes provide welfare and other key services demanded by citizens. Through these and other measures, non-state armed actors challenge the legitimacy and coercive power of the existent nation-state; but rather than fully undermining these states they contribute to what I call a situation of “fragmented sovereignty,” where divergent state and non-state forces compete to insure their own legitimacy and relatively autonomous control over the means of coercion.

To the extent that alternative imagined communities rely on transnational activities and sub-national allegiances to undermine state sovereignty and buttress their own authority, they further reveal the limits of the contemporary nation-state. Neither the United States nor Mex-

ico has been able to put a dent in the flow of drug-trafficking activities that move across their common border, not only because of the fluidity of the border but also because of the limited powers available to nation-states in an increasingly globalized world. The United States has had to be very careful with what it can do for fear of violating Mexican sovereignty, and vice-versa, while the problems necessarily need some coordination. It is hard for a single nation-state to solve problems that are transnational in nature.

**précis:** Some of your current research focuses on “Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence.” What exactly is “urban resilience,” and how do you hope to advance your research on the concept?

**DD:** John Tirman and I are connected to a larger group of scholars who have been debating how to define and develop the concept of “resiliency.” Usually people think of resilience as a very positive concept, a very hopeful concept, which is obviously attractive to those scholars and policymakers who are trying to reverse the very terrible conditions of violence facing far too many people around the world. But we have identified this concept as our starting point not just because it is hopeful, but also because it allows us to examine what types of adaptations are actually being undertaken in situations of chronic violence. We fully understand that these adaptations could be both positive and negative, with the former leading out of violence and the latter reproducing or reinforcing violence. As such, our larger research aim is to systematically understand what form adaptations take, and whether by reinforcing or reducing urban violence they also contribute to resilience. In doing so, we hope to build on the considerable work that has been undertaken in the study of violence already. But rather than focusing our efforts on the sources of violence, we are interested in examining how individuals and institutions deal with or adapt to violence. That is what we mean by resilience.

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Resilience in a very general sense is about whether and how people continue to make meaning and keep on with their everyday lives and livelihoods. Resilience is about survival, and about trying to make sense of one's world and one's family, work, and community connections despite the fact that violence has become a part of daily life. The analytical challenge is that resilience can take many forms. If we think about it in terms of Hirschman's notions of "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty" one possible form of resilience might be "exit," although the longer term implications of this might be very negative for the city and the individuals left behind. Another form might be "voice"—a way that citizens actively respond or mobilize against the deteriorating conditions. A third form might be "loyalty," with citizens working with state actors and institutions—or possibly even violence perpetrators themselves—to manage or accommodate to conditions of violence. Which of these responses will reinforce or reduce violence, and in what ways and why, is still not entirely clear. That is what we are trying to find out in this project.

**précis:** What kinds of urban adaptations have been most successful? What adaptations are more negative?

Maybe we can do another interview a year from now after we have undertaken our field work, and I will have more to share about positive and negative adaptations. What I can say now is that as a general matter, it often is very hard to tell which is which. For instance, I have worked extensively on the development of private police, one adaptation to violence that is seen when citizens hire their own private security forces. This kind of adaptation can protect individuals from the ravages of chronic violence, not only from criminals, but also when violence accelerates because the "public" police are corrupt and untrustworthy. But when individuals hire their own armed security personnel, when these armed forces answer to no-one but their private clients, and when neither the security forces nor their private clients are fully accountable to public or democratic authorities, we might also see a vicious cycle where more people become armed and where violence

becomes the currency of daily life. Private security may contribute to the social and physical separation of the rich from the poor, or limit mobility in space, or contribute to unequal access to basic goods and services, all of which can actually drive violence. So we don't yet know the long-term consequences of adaptations, even those which on the surface look like positive responses.

**précis:** How did you become interested in these broad questions of political sociology? What are the intellectual origins of your research agenda?

**DD:** My interest in urban violence began because of my longstanding research on Mexico City, a place I have studied for many years, but which in recent years has suffered from growing rates of violence. I first began studying Mexico City as a doctoral student, when I sought to integrate my interest in the political economy of development with the study of rapid urbanization. Over the years, I have focused on many different themes, ranging from the growth of Mexico City and how it laid the path for national political and economic development, to the emergence of urban social movements and their impact on democratization in Mexico, to the rise of leftist mayoral administrations and their role in revitalizing democracy and civil society. Each of these themes reinforced my deep engagement with and love for the history, culture, and politics of Mexico and its capital city. Starting in 1994, however, I started to see that Mexico City was confronting new problems of violence, and that these problems were threatening to undermine all the positive developments in politics, democracy, and civil society that had unfolded in prior years. Today, Mexico has chronic violence, organized crime, alternative imagined communities, an increasingly unstable political system, and a disenfranchised and distressed citizenry. These developments captured my imagination, driving me to the study of urban resilience in situations of chronic violence while also motivating me to ask "big questions" about state formation, governance, and the rule of law.

**précis:** What would you identify as the major policy prescriptions of

**your recent work? If you could draw policy-making attention to one or two implications of your research, what would they be?**

**DD:** That is really a hard question for me to answer. In the field of planning, policy prescription and implementation are important parts of professional practice. Still, in the field of planning (and maybe also in political science), I also know that there are two types of people: those who focus on identifying the character and context of pressing social problems, and those whose aim is to solve those problems. While both these tasks inform each other in the best of all worlds, and some of the most renowned planning professionals can do both, I definitely see myself as falling in the former category. I am a scholar by nature, and I am interested in studying the historical roots of problems and specifying their complexity. I think it is important to do this before jumping to policy prescriptions, partly because it is all too easy to fall into the trap of promoting a certain policy without knowing well enough whether that policy will address the particular challenge at hand. I like to call this a solution in search of a problem—and there are lots of examples floating around the policy world today, whether in the form of micro-credit, social capital, decentralization, citizen participation, or what have you. These are policy prescriptions that have become so popular that scholars often try to apply them everywhere, whatever the issue is at hand. I spend a lot of time trying to convince my students that they need to understand the origins and dynamics of problems more deeply, and that every place facing such problems will have peculiarities specific to their local situation. My job is to give students the analytical tools to understand the complexity of the problem and the problem-solving environment, so that they can actually intervene effectively. Policy can become a repertoire of mantras oriented toward general actions that work in a large array of situations. My work lies on the other end of the spectrum, where every problem needs deep, context-specific research. Where the two ends of the spectrum come together, lasting and significant policy innovations are made. ■

# Study Finds Promises on Women's Security Unmet

*“The insights these women have brought to the 1325 discourse underscore two related points,” said John Tirman, executive director of CIS. “The first is that the Member States are not fulfilling their obligations, which is a serious failing that should concern everyone who believes in the utility of collective security. The second is this is a resolution that is both realistic and innovative, covering half the population of the world. It is important, and it is being ignored.”*

A year-long study in six countries has found that the goals of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, enacted 10 years ago, have not been fulfilled and that implementation is generally poor. The UN itself, major industrial powers, other international organizations, and conflict states have all failed to include women in peace processes and peacebuilding, two key goals of the resolution.


The study, “What the Women Say: Participation and UNSCR 1325,” was organized by CIS and the International Civil Society Action Network, a NGO based in Washington DC. The 50-page study and recommendations were released on Oct. 28 at the U.S. Mission to the UN.

In the six countries—Aceh (Indonesia), Colombia, Israel and Palestine, Liberia, Sri Lanka, and Uganda—researchers found that the governments had essentially failed to take the necessary steps to raise women's participation. In some of these countries, formal legislation had been enacted but had not been implemented. In others, special advisers or commissions have been created, but the offices are ineffective, politicized, or diverting resources from women NGOs.

The study was based on extensive interviews in each country, government documents, press accounts, and the experience of the study team. The work was supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Irish Aid, Forum for Women and Development, Channel Foundation, among others.

The case studies were conducted by Cerue Garlo, Liberia; Shyamala Gomez, Sri Lanka; Suraiya Kamaruzzaman, Aceh; Turid Smith Polfus, Palestine/Israel; Elena Rey, Colombia; and Lina Zedriga, Uganda. (Biographies are available in the full report.)

“The insights these women have brought to the 1325 discourse underscore two related points,” said John Tirman, executive director of CIS. “The first is that the Member States are not fulfilling their obligations, which is a serious failing that should concern everyone who believes in the utility of collective security. The second is this is a resolution that is both realistic and innovative, covering half the population of the world. It is important, and it is being ignored.” ■



The report is available for download at: <http://web.mit.edu/cis/publications.html>.

# Democratic Insecurities: Violence, Trauma, and Intervention in Haiti

Erica Caple James

On January 12, 2010, as this book entered the final stages of production, Haiti was struck with a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions, the latest in a long series of catastrophes that have afflicted the nation and its people. The epicenter of the 7.0 magnitude earthquake was mere kilometers southwest of the nation's capital, Port-au-Prince, where the ethnographic research discussed in this book was conducted. Between 1995 and 2000 I worked with survivors of human rights abuses from the 1991-94 coup years and studied the interveners that attempted to rehabilitate them as part of my project analyzing the role of humanitarian and development assistance in postconflict reconstruction. Current estimates are that 80 percent of the capital has been destroyed. As of this writing I have had little word of the fate of the people with whom I worked. A few in positions of power, wealth, and security have survived. Others have died. Many are missing. The fate of most of the poor pro-democracy activists who shared with me their lives of suffering and resilience remains unknown.



Erica Caple James is associate professor of anthropology at MIT and member of CIS.

The scale and nature of the recent devastation are unprecedented. Nonetheless, the physical and psychosocial aftershocks have created eerie parallels to events analyzed in this book—from accusations that Haitian culture and religious practices are responsible for this tragedy and hamper efforts to remedy it to the outpouring of concern for Haitian victims and the influx of aid to the nation. Other parallels that raise the uncanny specter of *déjà vu* are the lack of donor coordination, widespread frustration with the distribution of humanitarian resources, and the escalation of violence among the internally displaced.

Since the ouster of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986, the Government of Haiti has had only limited capacity to protect its citizens and has struggled to establish security apparatuses that operate transparently and are accountable to Haitian citizens. While the abbreviated tenure of Haiti's first democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, initially raised hopes of peace and security in the nation, his ouster by military coup in 1991 and three subsequent years of repression thwarted those aspirations. Since the political upheaval of 2004 following Aristide's second ouster from the presidency, thousands of UN military peacekeepers, international police, and international and local staffers have worked to arrest crime and promote security, much as was the case in the period following the restoration of democracy in 1994. Many of these individuals were killed during the earthquake, and others are still missing.


Although additional UN and U.S. military forces are currently attempting to restore order and provide humanitarian relief, security remains of paramount concern. The earthquake damaged the national penitentiary. Thousands of former prisoners are currently at large. Some of these escapees undoubtedly orchestrated the destabilization of democracy and security in Haiti in the 1990s and in 2004. Armed gang members who had been imprisoned have reportedly returned to slums they once ruled to reassert their sovereign power.

The struggles of the Government of Haiti to protect its citizens and assert its sovereignty are no better demonstrated than by the actions of an American missionary

group recently charged with child trafficking. The group claims it was rescuing children from the chaos of postquake conditions and was taking them to an orphanage in the Dominican Republic where they would be adopted. The group felt a divine call to intervene without authorization by the Haitian state in order to save the children, some of whom still have living parents. As the case has progressed, questions have arisen about the true intentions of this group, the corruption of the Haitian judiciary, and whether justice is for sale or will be meted out according to the rule of law. But the case is also an indicator of the extent to which international actors feel entitled to intervene in order to fulfill their mandates.

There are other parallels to the circumstances documented in this book. As during the 1991-1994 period, hundreds of thousands of Haitians have fled to provincial cities, towns, and villages seeking asylum in areas that once depended on their labor in the capital for subsistence. Many Haitians have crossed into the Dominican Republic seeking medical care and new lives. It remains unclear whether the population shift to rural Haiti will result in permanent resettlement and future development of the nation's periphery, as was intended by many of the international development plans that proposed the nation's decentralization in prior years. The United States has also begun to prepare its naval site in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to receive a potential influx of refugees should conditions worsen and desperation increase. The detention of Haitian "boat people" in this camp is not new. Long before it was used to house suspected terrorists, Camp Delta held tens of thousands of Haitians for reasons of humanitarian and security concerns during the 1991-94 coup years. The majority of these "inmates" were subsequently returned to Haiti, despite its ongoing political and economic crisis.

Also reminiscent of the conditions described here are reports that have begun to circulate regarding the rape of women and young girls. Haitian women of all classes have traditionally been the pillars of society. They bear greater responsibility for maintaining the household and family than do men, and many do so while also pursuing independent livelihoods to meet their families' needs. Such expectations must be fulfilled regardless of shifts in political, economic, or environmental conditions. Because of these disproportionate obligations, Haitian women have typically been less mobile and more strongly rooted in their communities. For precisely these same reasons, they have also been more susceptible to attacks: it is difficult to flee from persecution when one's livelihood, family, and home are tied to a particular neighborhood, market, or place of work. If current reports are accurate, the makeshift tent cities that currently provide refuge to the internally displaced are sites of further victimization of women rather than sites of asylum, which raises additional questions regarding how security will be established in Haiti. Such conditions also highlight how gender is an integral component of the experience of insecurity and trauma.



The excerpt from *Democratic Insecurities* was reprinted with permission from University of California Press.

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## Democratic Insecurities

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*“Regardless of the material or infrastructural disparities in power between Haiti and other members of the international community, Haitians must be imbued with equal (if not greater) power than international, national, and local interveners in deciding the course of reconstruction efforts in their country.”*

Other similarities between the current crisis and the conflict and postconflict period in the 1990s concern the politics of aid. A few recent reports suggest that criminal actors have begun to capitalize on the chaos in order to expand their traffic in persons, drugs, and illicit goods. This book characterizes black market transactions like these as components of occult economies, some of which incorporate hidden exchanges between material and unseen (or immaterial) worlds. Furthermore, scandalous stories have circulated about how humanitarian aid has been diverted from its intended recipients into the black market. Well-intentioned charities have been questioned about the authenticity and legitimacy of their work in Haiti. There have been signs of contention between and among grassroots and international nongovernmental organizations regarding how and to which institutions the hundreds of millions of dollars in charitable gifts that have been donated to aid Haiti will be distributed. These ethical debates involving the just distribution of resources to victims and to the organizations that assist them are described here as components of a political economy of trauma.

As these events continue to unfold, there will come a point at which the numerous agencies and agents now working to provide relief will shift from a framework of emergency to one of reconstruction and rehabilitation. This book analyzes how such transitions occur. It is a cautionary tale documenting how conditions of insecurity have evolved over time. The phenomenon of insecurity incorporates political and criminal violence, economic instability, environmental vulnerability, and long histories of corruption and predation on the part of Haitians and foreign interveners. This text also chronicles how the transition from a crisis mode of intervention to one aimed at sustainable development of Haitian institutions—the police, the judiciary, and civil society organizations that promote democracy, human rights, and rehabilitation and reparations for victims—provoked competition and strife within the governmental and nongovernmental aid apparatus in the context of insecurity. To some extent the influx of aid had the unintended consequence of exacerbating the conditions that gave rise to military and humanitarian interventions in Haiti in the first place.

Some people have characterized the earthquake tragedy as an opportunity for Haiti’s transformation, as long as Haitians remain partners in deciding how plans for their country’s redevelopment and reconstruction are to take place. Calls for partnership and greater economic employment opportunities for Haitians are important and necessary. What remains crucial is that Haitians from all social classes and geographic locations participate in such plans. Regardless of the material or infrastructural disparities in power between Haiti and other members of the international community, Haitians must be imbued with equal (if not greater) power than international, national, and local interveners in deciding the course of reconstruction efforts in their country.

As this book demonstrates, it is perilous to consider Haiti and its citizens solely as clients, recipients of welfare or charity, or as victims. This lesson is even more urgent given that there are several populations affected by the earthquake whose status is similar to that of Haiti’s victims of human rights abuses following the 1994 restoration of democracy. As was the case then, the Government of Haiti possesses little capacity to provide security, civil services, and medical care for its citizens. Women are increasingly vulnerable to insecurity. The number of orphans has increased exponentially. Thousands of new amputees of all ages require multiple forms of rehabilitation to help them rebuild their lives. If these populations are singled out for greater psychological, physical, economic, and other social supports because they are considered “at risk,” but similar opportunities are not made available for all Haitians to flourish as productive citizens, it is possible that these groups may become subject to further stigma and resentment in their communities, as were victims of human rights abuses from the coup and postcoup years.

These issues of population management, the regulation and distribution of resources,



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identity, and accountability are important considerations for Haitians in Haiti and its diaspora and for those who would aid in rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. However, such concerns should not overshadow attention to the physical, psychosocial, and spiritual effects of trauma that are the primary focus of this book. Trauma can result from ruptures in the routines of daily life, whether caused by natural, industrial, or human authors. Those who survive such ruptures may experience acute trauma; providers of care to victims may experience secondary trauma during and after a crisis. Trauma and emotional distress are phenomena that are culturally mediated and experienced in bodily ways. Whereas some view the devastation caused by the earthquake as an opportunity to create a blank slate in Haiti, the stories recounted in this book suggest that without effective strategies to address these traumas the power of memory and the embodied legacies of acute victimization will render attempts to mitigate suffering and to promote reconstruction and development ineffective.

Other questions addressed in this book must now be considered anew. How long will the “emergency” funds flow? How and to whom are private donations accounted for? Will the rehabilitation of trauma (whether physical, psychological, infrastructural, or spiritual) be rationed, regulated, and curtailed prematurely, so as to have only limited effect? What identities will emerge for these new “victims” after Haiti’s dependence on charity, emergency relief, and other forms of humanitarian and development aid reemerges as a large component of its current economy? If new paths toward sustainable development cannot be created to empower all Haitians and to restore those who wish to rebuild their broken communities, aid interventions risk exacerbating the cycles of insecurity that have ebbed and flowed over the past twenty-five years.

Supported by a rich cultural heritage, the Haitian people retain a capacity for hope, faith, and resilience that remains a tremendous resource for any efforts to rehabilitate the nation and its people. Even when a powerful minority—whether Haitian or foreign—has posed obstacles to democracy, human rights, justice, and economic possibilities for all, the majority has endured. They must participate as equal partners in the reconstruction of their nation. ■

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# Joint Research on Regulatory Science

CIS, along with The European Medicines Agency (EMA) and MIT's Center for Biomedical Innovation (CBI), is launching a collaborative research project with a focus on enhancing regulatory science in pharmaceuticals.


Specific questions addressed by this project include how to adapt current regulatory requirements to best support the efficient development of safe and effective drugs; how to incorporate patient valuation of health outcomes and benefit-risk preferences into regulatory decisionmaking; how to implement what have been termed staggered and progressive approaches to drug approval; and how to improve fulfillment of post-marketing regulatory requirements.

The data and recommendations from this project are expected to link to implementation of the "EMA roadmap to 2015" and the overall CBI's New Drug Development Paradigms (NEWDIGS) Research Program. It will explore the feasibility, priorities, and practical considerations of implementing demonstration project(s) on some of the issues addressed during the course of the research.

The project, scheduled to be completed by December 2011, will be conducted within the framework of CBI's NEWDIGS research program in cooperation with CIS and EMA.

## CIS "Audits" Kryrgyzstan, Artificial Life

The Center's series *Audit of the Conventional Wisdom* continued with a look at the security implications of the crisis in Kryrgyzstan. On June 15, 2010, Carol Saivetz, a visiting scholar at CIS and a researcher in the Center's Security Studies Program interviewed Bakyt Beshimov, a visiting scholar at CIS, who is a former Kryrgyzstan Opposition Leader, former member of Kryrgyzstan Parliament, and former Kryrgyzstan ambassador to India. And, on May 28, 2010, the Center looked at the recent discovery out of the Craig Venter laboratory: artificial life. Ken Oye, director of the Center's Program on Emerging Technologies and associate professor of political science and engineering systems, discussed the implications of this discovery from his MIT office.



Ken Oye discusses the implications of the latest discovery out of the Venter laboratory.

Both videos are available here: <http://techtv.mit.edu/collections/mit-cis>.

# Much Ado About Decline

by Joshua Itzkowitz Shiffrin



*Joshua Shiffrin is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at MIT and an affiliate of the Center's Security Studies Program. His research focuses on grand strategy, power transitions, and the use of force.*

For at least the third time in the post-war era, the decline of American power is at the forefront of American foreign policy discourse. In perhaps the clearest manifestation of the decline hypothesis to date, President Obama argued in his 2010 State of the Union address:

“China is not waiting to revamp its economy. Germany is not waiting. India is not waiting. These nations—they’re not standing still. These nations aren’t playing for second place [ . . . ] *Well, I do not accept second place for the United States of America* [emphasis added].”<sup>1</sup>

Underlying the decline debate is a consensus that decline, if and when it occurs, will be disastrous for American interests. Analysts depict interrelated problems. Some warn decline will undermine the credibility of American commitments. Others argue alliances will form to counterbalance the U.S. In extremis, some contend, a declining U.S. will be forced to go to war against revisionist rising powers eager to remake the U.S.-dominated international system. In short, decline is seen to portend a widening period of danger for the United States as other states adjust their policies to take advantage of impending U.S. weakness.<sup>2</sup>

But this picture of disaster is incomplete. Historically, Britain’s relative loss of power before World War I encouraged rivals such as the United States, France, and Japan to settle outstanding political differences with Britain. Likewise, the perceived decline of the United States in the 1970s saw NATO allies increase their military contributions to European security. In short, history suggests striking variation in the consequences of decline as some relatively rising states challenge the interests of declining actors, whereas other rising states support them.

Under what conditions should we expect supportive policies rather than exploitative ones? Scholars and policymakers presently lack an answer as most existing studies on decline focus on the tendency of decline to lead to war between rising and declining states. Though historically insightful, this literature is less than helpful in an era where war between great powers is unlikely due to the presence of nuclear weapons, extensive economic interdependence, and large geographic barriers between rising and declining states.

## Conceptualizing Decline’s Consequences

Analysts typically look to three factors—the economic, military, and diplomatic policies of other states—when describing the potential challenges of decline. These factors comprise what I term a state’s balancing response towards a declining state. Balancing responses matter because they can 1) force a declining state to expend greater resources to sustain its interests or accept their loss, or 2) help reduce the declining state’s costs. In this sense, balancing responses fall on a scale ranging from “extremely exploitative” to “extremely supportive.” Unsurprisingly, the more a state tries to force a declining state to surrender or pay a higher price for its interests, the more exploitative the response. On the other hand, the more a great power reduces armaments, avoids interfering in a declining great power’s sphere of influence, or offers the declining state economic assistance, the greater the degree of support.

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# Much Ado About Decline

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## **Military Threat and Balancing Responses**

The key to international balancing responses is the credibility of a declining state's military threat. Threat credibility results from the size, composition, and posture of the armed forces of the declining state relative to its opponents. Exploitation occurs when a state believes the declining adversary's military stands a reasonable chance of imposing unacceptable costs on a state's own interests. The logic is simple: efforts to further degrade a declining state's capabilities provide an opportunity to remove the threat entirely. A similar logic applies to support: at some point a declining adversary's military cannot be expected to pose a substantial risk. Under these conditions, a state will grow concerned that continued exploitation will generate significant "blowback": third parties may view exploitation as aggression, while the declining adversary may be incentivized to drive itself hard, put its house in order, and renew its challenge. Supportive responses forestall this possibility.

## **The Collapse of the Soviet Order and the Consequences of Decline**

The U.S. response to the collapse of the Soviet Union offers preliminary support for this argument. It is also a critical test for a more general assessment of decline's consequences: as long-standing adversaries, one intuitively expects the U.S. to do everything in its reach to exploit Soviet decline and ensure its demise as a great power. Indeed, the Reagan Administration's policy after 1982 was specifically designed to isolate the Soviet Union politically, exacerbate its economic problems at home, blunt its perceived military edge, and ultimately "encourage the dissolution of the Soviet Empire."<sup>3</sup>

By the close of 1988, this strategy yielded results—Soviet decline was increasingly apparent. The Soviet economy was in trouble as economic growth stagnated.<sup>4</sup> The Soviet military, facing stagnant budgets since the late 1970s and budget cuts after 1988, confronted stark resource tradeoffs driven by qualitative improvements to Western military forces.<sup>5</sup> Soviet politics were also increasingly in turmoil as Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party, faced strong opposition from conservatives within the Party over his policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring).<sup>6</sup> American policymakers, who recognized mounting Soviet economic problems as early as 1981, began to discuss the possibility of a major change in the distribution of power.<sup>7</sup>

U.S. policy, however, reacted slowly to these changes. Through the middle of 1989, the Bush Administration resisted pressure to reduce the U.S. military presence in Europe, only moving to study the issue.<sup>8</sup> It backed away from arms control negotiations begun by the preceding Reagan Administration, and promised economic assistance to Soviet client states in Eastern Europe if they reformed their economic and political systems—that is, if they removed themselves from the Soviet orbit.<sup>9</sup> Overall, U.S. policy through the first half of 1989 was moderately exploitative: if not imposing new costs on the Soviet Union, then also doing nothing to lessen the costs of Cold War competition.

Soviet power then experienced a precipitous drop in the second half of 1989 as Soviet client regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed.<sup>10</sup> Unilateral Soviet force withdrawals, announced in December 1988, also began to shift the military balance away from the USSR.<sup>11</sup> By the start of 1990, the Soviet position in Central Europe was crumbling as newly established democratic regimes looked to evict Soviet forces from their territory while seeking economic aid from the West.<sup>12</sup> Counter-intuitively, however, this was precisely when U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union began to change. Force reductions were codified as U.S. policy, and Bush proposed deeper force reductions in his 1990 State of the Union address than previously considered possible.<sup>13</sup> Even more dramatically, the United States—elaborating on a West German proposal—offered Gorbachev a comprehensive set of guarantees regarding Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe. These included pledges that would limit NATO's presence in the former Communist countries; limits on the size and composition of the German military; pledges to reform NATO and transform it into a more "political" alliance; and hints of economic assis-

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*“...the United States need not be so pessimistic about the consequences of decline: as the Soviet case demonstrates, there is a limit on how far other states will go to exploit a declining adversary.”*

tance.<sup>14</sup> There is also significant evidence that U.S. officials promised NATO would not expand eastward to encompass the former Communist regimes. While U.S. policy should not be overstated—for instance, the U.S. refused to provide the Soviet Union with economic assistance despite repeated calls for aid through this period—U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union nevertheless took on a different form following the collapse of East European communism.

The collapse of the Soviet position became a rout over the second half of 1990 and 1991. Soviet forces began to withdraw from Eastern Europe, while the Soviet economy experienced sharp contractions. Meanwhile, domestic turmoil increasingly undermined the Soviet political system itself: not only did the conflicts between Soviet reformers and conservatives sharpen as the Soviets retrenched from Eastern Europe, but a resurgence of nationalism undermined Moscow’s control over individual Soviet republics.<sup>15</sup>

Again, however, U.S. policy continued its moderate course. Several supportive measures—notably the signing of the START and CFE treaties—were pursued during this period.<sup>16</sup> Reversing earlier policy, the U.S. announced a limited aid package for the USSR and, after repeated Soviet efforts, encouraged USSR membership in international economic organizations.<sup>17</sup> Most interestingly, President Bush resisted strong domestic and international pressure to recognize the independence of individual Soviet republics—an act that would effectively undermine the political legitimacy of the Soviet Union itself—through the actual dissolution of the USSR in December 1991.<sup>18</sup> At the nadir of Soviet power and capabilities, the United States selected policies that effectively reduced pressure on their former adversary.

The central puzzle to explain in this case is the sudden shift in U.S. policy from exploitation to support in late-1989, and the acceleration of U.S. support as Soviet decline became a collapse. How does my theory fare in explaining these developments? The evidence is incomplete, but offers preliminary support for the core prediction that only when the Soviet military threat faded would the United States begin to support the Soviet Union. Indeed, this prediction tracks with the timing of the case: as described above, the major shift in U.S. policy did not occur until after the Soviet military threat to Western Europe receded during the second half of 1990.<sup>19</sup> Despite encroaching economic weakness throughout the 1980s and shifts in the political order in the second half of 1989, it was only when the Soviet military position became untenable that U.S. policy changed.

Another telling piece of evidence comes from the concerns voiced by U.S. policymakers about the future of the Soviet threat to Europe and the role this played in American policy. Bush Administration officials remained fundamentally worried throughout 1989-1991 that Soviet decline would prove ephemeral. Even as the Communist regimes in the Warsaw Pact collapsed and the Soviet military began withdrawing from the region, U.S. leaders grew concerned that the Soviet Union would eventually re-emerge as a military threat to Europe.<sup>20</sup> Prior to mid-1990, these concerns were used to justify efforts to accelerate Soviet withdrawal from Europe. By 1991, however, the concern was that only if the U.S. failed to support the USSR would this situation come to pass. The new concern was that continued U.S. exploitation would lead to a conservative coup in the USSR and Gorbachev’s replacement with a hardliner seeking to undo the events of 1989-1990.<sup>21</sup> As one might expect if states care about the potential harm posed by declining powers, having eliminated the Soviet threat to Europe, policymakers were now eager to adopt policies that would help the USSR reconcile itself to a diminished place in Europe and limit the possibility of a renewed challenge.

### **Conclusion**

More research is needed to flesh out the nascent theory described above. If accurate, however, then it holds important implications for the U.S. decline debate. Most significant

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cantly, it suggests that the United States need not be so pessimistic about the consequences of decline: as the Soviet case demonstrates, there is a limit on how far other states will go to exploit a declining adversary. This is not altruism, but a sincere concern that overly exploiting a declining adversary will generate more problems than it solves. Even declining states hold significant resources that can be used to make international politics unpleasant.

Equally important, the theory and case suggest that the U.S. may have a significant degree of agency in determining whether it is supported or exploited as decline progresses. Just as U.S. policy towards the declining USSR shifted as the USSR came to pose less of a threat to U.S. interests, by implication, the U.S. may be able to encourage other actors to support U.S. interests by reducing the size and presence of its military overseas. Ironically, avoiding exploitative outcomes as the U.S. declines will depend on an American willingness to adopt a more relaxed view towards its own decline. ■

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- 3 Comment by NSC staffer Thomas Reed to the National Security Council, April 16, 1982. Reed directed the Reagan Administration's review of U.S. national security policy and was presenting the completed study—entitled "NSSD 1-82"—for the first time. Transcript available in Jason Saltoun-Ebin, *The Reagan Files* (Self Published: 2010), p. 138.
- 4 Central Intelligence Agency, "Annual Bulletin on Soviet Economic Growth: January–December 1988," SOV SEG 89-001, May 1989; Central Intelligence Agency, "Gorbachev's Economic Programs: The Challenges Ahead," NIE 11-23-88, December 1988.
- 5 Noel E. Firth and James H. Noren, *Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimates, 1950–1990* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M UP, 1998), pp. 75–82; William Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1998).
- 6 See the discussion of growing domestic opposition in Garthoff, *Transition*, pp. 347–368.
- 7 James Baker, U.S. Secretary of State from 1989–1992, notes that his first briefing on U.S.–Soviet relations accurately observed, "The Soviet Union is a Great Power in decline...As Secretary of State, your central task in East–West relations will be to manage the international effects of this decline productively and peacefully;" James Baker with Thomas M. DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy* (New York: Putnam, 1995), p. 41.
- 8 In fact, the Administration only agreed to study military reductions after Gorbachev's arms control initiatives in 1988–1989 were perceived to threaten U.S. leadership within NATO; George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Knopf, 1998), pp. 71–74.
- 9 Bush and Scowcroft, *World Transformed*, pp. 48–54.
- 10 The Polish government fell in June; Hungary's in October; East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia in November; and Romania in December.
- 11 See the CIA reports collected in Benjamin B. Fischer, *At Cold War's End* (Pittsburgh: Government Printing Office, 1999), pp. 293–295, 305–323.10 The Polish government fell in June; Hungary's in October; East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia in November; and Romania in December.
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- 13 Lorna S. Jaffe, "The Development of the Base Force, 1989–1992," Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1993, pp. 19–25; Sarotte, 1989, p. 110.
- 14 Sarotte, 1989, p. 164; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1995), pp. 262–264.
- 15 Bush and Scowcroft, *World Transformed*, p. 215; see also the CIA reports collected in Benjamin B. Fischer, *At Cold War's End* (Pittsburgh: Government Printing Office, 1999), pp. 49–150.
- 16 Baker, *Politics*, pp. 473, 658.
- 17 See Curt Tarnoff, "U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet Union, 1991–2001: A History of Administration and Congressional Action," CRS Report RL 30148, January 15, 2008, pp. 1–7.
- 18 Bush and Scowcroft, *World Transformed*, pp. 515, 524–525, 541–558.
- 19 The collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe meant both that Soviet forces could not count on allied assistance in wartime and, equally important, Soviet supply lines were threatened. While large Soviet forces remained in these countries, the absence of secure supply lines made them a rapidly wasting asset. See, for instance, the assessment in Fischer, *End*, p. 301.
- 20 See, for example, the various positions voiced by Bush, Scowcroft, Baker, and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney in Bush and Scowcroft, *World Transformed*, pp. 13–15; Baker, *Politics*, p. 69; Jaffe, "Base Force," p. 18, among others.
- 21 Bush put the point baldly in his memoirs: "Whatever the course, however long the process took, and whatever its outcome, I wanted to see stable, and above all peaceful, change. I believed the key to this would be a politically strong Gorbachev;" Bush and Scowcroft, *World Transformed*, p. 502.

# Journalist from Pakistan Receives Neuffer Fellowship

**R**abia Mehmood, a journalist in the Lahore bureau of *Express 24/7 Television* in Pakistan, has received the 2010-11 Elizabeth Neuffer Fellowship. Mehmood is the sixth recipient of the annual fellowship, which gives a woman journalist working in print, broadcast or online media the opportunity to focus exclusively on human rights journalism and social justice issues. The award is offered through the International Women's Media Foundation and is sponsored in part by CIS.

As a reporter for *Express 24/7 Television*, Mehmood creates news features and special reports on courts, crime, human rights, politics, socio-economic issues, health, environment and culture.

Based on what she observes in her coverage, Mehmood believes that the core issues behind the lack of social justice in her country include incompetence, nepotism, police negligence and corruption.

Throughout her career, Mehmood has reported on topics such as women's rights, freedom of speech and political unrest. She has covered the survivors and victims of terrorist attacks, suicide bombings and hostage sieges carried out by militants in Lahore. Mehmood has also reported on internally displaced people who left Northwest Pakistan as a result of insurgency by terrorists and military offensives.

From December 2008 to April 2009, Mehmood covered the detention, court case and release of Hafiz Saeed, the leader of Jamat-ud-Dawa, the charitable wing of Lashkar-e-Toiba, a militant organization. Jamat-ud-Dawa was banned by the United Nations' Security Council due to its links with terrorist attacks in India. After the organization



was banned, the Pakistani government put Saeed and three other officials under house arrest and subsequently tried them in court.

While at CIS, Mehmood hopes to explore topics such as the failure of the Pakistani government to support human rights protection and the use of religion by extremist groups seeking power and political control. For example, in Pakistan's Northwestern province Khayber-Pakhtunkhwa, conservative extremist groups have blown up schools, halted polio vaccination campaigns and banned cultural activities, Mehmood says. These groups are adamant that women's roles should be restricted. Mehmood hopes to investigate the groups' use of violence and advocacy of rigid boundaries and their impact on the political system of Pakistan.

Mehmood holds a master's degree in mass communication and media studies from Kinnaird College for Women in Lahore and a bachelor's degree in mass communication and English literature from Lahore College for Women University.

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### Seminar XXI Celebrates 25th Anniversary

Seminar XXI is the Center's educational program for senior military officers, government and NGO officials, and executives in the national security policy community. The program's objective is to provide future leaders of that community with enhanced analytic skills for understanding foreign countries and the relations among them. Seminar XXI began in 1986 as an experimental program adapted from several graduate-level courses taught at MIT. Over the years it has provided an opportunity for frank and challenging exchanges of ideas between policymakers and university scholars, as well as among the fellows, who themselves represent a wide range of institutions and organizations in the policy-making community. Seminar XXI is now in its twenty-fifth year and has more than 1,600 graduates.

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### Report Card on President Obama

MIT experts Barry Posen, Henry Jacoby, and Simon Johnson assessed President Obama's work on Afghanistan, climate, and the economy. The Starr Forum event took place on November 9, one week after the mid-term elections. Posen is Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and director of the Center's Security Studies Program. Jacoby is the William F. Pounds Professor of Management Emeritus at the MIT Sloan School of Management and co-director of the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change. Simon Johnson is Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He served as economic counselor and director of the research department at the IMF from March 2007 to August 2008 and is the co-author of *13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover* and *The Next Financial Meltdown*. Richard Samuels, Ford International Professor of Political and director of CIS, moderated the discussion.

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### PEGS Initiates New Fellows Program

The Center's Program on Environmental Governance and Sustainability (PEGS) is initiating a new fellows program for graduate students at MIT. The award period runs from November 2010 through November 2011. This year's theme is "Environmental Change and Conflict" and the faculty directors for the 2010-2011 fellows are Diane Davis and PEGS director JoAnn Carmin, both from the Department of Urban Studies and Planning. The students will be working across the globe on issues related to environmental change and conflict. More details on the fellows and their projects can be found at <http://web.mit.edu/cis/pegs.html>.

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### SSP Wednesday Seminars

The Security Studies Program's lunchtime lectures included: Samuel Wells, from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, on "Korea and the Escalation of the Cold War,"; Graham Allison, from Harvard University, on "Nuclear Terrorism: Iran, Pakistan, North Korea and the Fragility of the Global Nuclear Order,"; Nuno Monteiro, from Yale University, on "Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself? Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War,"; and Lawrence Wilkerson, from The



College of William and Mary, on “A No-Strategy Nation: Muddling Through Will No Longer Do.”

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### **“Cultures of War” Book Talk by John Dower**

John Dower spoke about his new book *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, and Iraq*. Dower is professor emeritus of history at MIT and founder/co-director of the online Visualizing Cultures project, established at MIT in 2002 and dedicated to the presentation of image-driven scholarship on East Asia in the modern world. The talk was co-sponsored by the MIT-Japan Program.

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### **Bustani Middle East Seminar**

The Bustani Seminar invites scholars, journalists, consultants, and other experts from the Middle East, Europe, and the United States to MIT to present recent research findings on contemporary politics, society and culture, and economic and technological development in the Middle East. This fall the seminar featured two talks: “Lebanon: Consensus in Times of Enmity” with Augustus Richard Norton, Boston University; and “What Happened to the End of Ideology and the Triumph of Liberalism in the Arab World?” with Michaelle Browsers, Wake Forest University.

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### **“Enemies of the People” Film Screening**

Winner at Sundance Festival 2010, the film represents the first time the story of Democratic Kampuchea has been told from the inside. The film was co-directed by a remarkable Cambodian journalist, Thet Sambath, who lost his family during the time but nevertheless spent 10 years gaining the confidence of Khmer Rouge officials from Nuon Chea, Pol Pot’s deputy, down. The film has been widely praised for putting a human face on the Khmer Rouge, yet it goes further than any account before into the horror of what happened. This apparent contradiction combined with its strong avoidance of anti-communism has meant the film has spoken powerfully to many audiences all over the world. It’s currently on theatrical release in the U.S. and will show in slightly shorter form next year on PBS television. The featured speaker at the Starr Forum event was Rob Lemkin, co-director of the film.

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### **Joint Seminar on South Asian Politics**

The South Asian Politics seminar, co-sponsored by Brown, Harvard, and MIT, and chaired by the Center’s Ashutosh Varshney (who also is professor of political science at Brown) continued with five talks in the fall. Concluding the fall semester series was a talk by Fotini Christia, assistant professor in political science at MIT and a member of the Center’s Security Studies Program, on “Peace through Development: Local Institution Building in Rural Afghanistan.” A list of seminars can be found here: <http://southasianpolitics.net/>.

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### **IAP Courses**

The Center is hosting a range of IAP courses for January 2011 including: Beginning Kyudo, Contemporary Military Topics, Ikebana: The Art of Japanese Flower Arranging, Introduction to Chinese Calligraphy, and U.S. Defense Process (from Policy to Planning to Programming and Budgets).

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## People

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Barton L. Weller Professor of Development Economics **Alice Amsden** gave the keynote speech at McKinsey-Seoul Broadcasting Company seminar on Korea and the Financial Crisis, a prologue to the G20 meeting in Seoul in November.

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**Baktybek (Bakyt) Beshimov**, a visiting researcher at CIS, was the keynote speaker at the Social Science Research Council dissertation development workshop at Harvard University on October 6. His talk was “Case Study—Kyrgyzstan: Violent Regime Changes and the Role of External Parties.”

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**Nazli Choucri**, Professor of Political Science, led The Minerva Project—Explorations on Cyber International Relations—in its first annual conference at MIT last month. As a collaborative project of MIT and Harvard, the agenda and discussion focused on diverse threats to cyber security and potentials for threat reduction, as well as prospects and possibilities for enhancing cyber cooperation.

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Ph.D. candidate **Keren Fraiman** presented her paper “Not in Your Backyard: Coercion and Violent Non-state Actors” at the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago and at the ISSS/ISAC conference in Providence, RI, in Spring and Fall 2010, respectively.

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**M. Taylor Fravel**, Cecil and Ida Green Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science, was named a Research Associate for the National Asia Research Program, which is sponsored by the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Woodrow Wilson International Center. He presented a talk on “Economic Growth, Regime Security, and Military Strategy in China” at several locations: the University of California, Berkeley, September 2010; the China Foundation for International Strategic Studies, Beijing, China, July 2010; the Draper Laboratory, Cambridge, MA, June 2010; and Lincoln Laboratory, Lincoln, MA, May 2010. Additional presentations include “Chinese Military Capabilities and Doctrine,” National Asia Policy Assembly, Washington, DC, June 2010; and “Major Change in Military Strategy: The PLA’s Adoption of the 1956 Strategic Guidelines,” National Security Studies Program, Harvard University, April 2010.

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**Jeanne Guillemin**, CIS affiliate with the Security Studies Program, as a member of the World Economic Forum’s Council on Weapons of Mass Destruction, attended the “WEF Summit on the Global Agenda” in Dubai.

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Ph.D. candidate **Peter Krause** was selected to present at the Triangle Institute for Security Studies “New Faces Conference” at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill in October, 2010. He also chaired a panel “Advances in Terrorism and Insurgency Theory” on which he presented a paper, “Understanding Violence: Integrating Analysis of Terrorism and Insurgency,” (with Paul Staniland) at the ISSS/ISAC Conference in Providence, RI, in October 2010.

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Ph.D. candidate **Jon Lindsay** was appointed postdoctoral fellow at the University of California, San Diego, at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Program for the Study of Innovation and Technology in China.

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**Gautum Mukunda** was appointed a National Science Foundation Synthetic Biology ERC Postdoctoral Fellow at CIS. He also spoke at the World Health Summit in Berlin in October on “The Security Implications of Synthetic Biology.”

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Ph.D. candidate **Tara Maller** presented her dissertation research on U.S. economic and diplomatic sanctions at the International Security Program Brown Bag Seminar at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government on December 2, 2010.

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Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science **Melissa Nobles** delivered a lecture, “Transitional Justice in the American South: Preliminary Thoughts” at the University of Virginia Miller Center of Public Affairs, April 23, 2010. She also was a presenter at a forum for state legislators from the U.S. South on “the U.S. Department of Justice’s Cold Case Initiative on Civil Rights-era Murders,” sponsored by Northeastern University’s Civil Rights and Restorative Justice Project and hosted by the University of Arkansas Clinton School of Public Service, November 10, 2010.

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Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science **Roger Petersen** presented a talk on “Ethnic Status Hierarchy in Macedonia: A Comparative Perspective,” at Columbia University for the Harriman Institute Conference “Macedonia Matters: Conflict, Coexistence, and Euro-Atlantic Integration in the South Balkans,” October 15, 2010. He also spoke on “Understanding Western Intervention,” at the London School of Economics’ Conflict Studies Lecture Series, October 26, 2010.

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Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of the Center’s Security Studies Program **Barry Posen** was the keynote speaker at the ISSS/ISAC Conference in Providence, RI, in October 2010.

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Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Studies **Richard Samuels** presented a conference paper (with Narushige Michishita) “Hugging and Hedging: Japanese Grand Strategy in the 21st Century,” for a conference on “Worldviews of Major and Aspiring Powers: Exploring Foreign Policy Debates Abroad” at the Sigur Center, The George Washington University. He also made presentations based on the paper in Beijing (May 2010) and Moscow (November 2010). Other recent presentations include: “Kidnapping Politics” at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel, July 2010 and New York University November 2010; “Japanese Foreign and Security Policy” for an FPRI conference on “Regional Security in East Asia: Sustaining Stability, Coping with Conflict, Building Cooperation?”

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**Erin Schenck**, the MIT-Germany Program Coordinator, negotiated a grant from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research in order to establish an MIT-Germany Seed Fund. The new fund will offer research initiation grants to MIT faculty and their counterparts in Germany, and will encourage students to be actively involved in the collaborations. Priority will be given to proposals that address complex global issues, including health, the environment, energy and technological innovation. Support for the MIT-Germany Seed Fund—in the amount of 500,000 Euro—will be spread over five years beginning in 2011.

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Ford International Professor of Political Science **Ben Ross Schneider** spoke on “Beyond the Institutional Consensus,” at a roundtable presentation during the meetings of the Latin American Studies Association, Toronto, October 2010. He also gave a talk on “State Capitalism in Brazil?” at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, September 2010.

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CIS Research Affiliate, Senior Research Scholar **Sharon Stanton Russell**, continues working on International Migration, and is an Associate Editor of the journal *International Migration Review*. She attended the Oxford University’s Global Migration Futures Project’s Stakeholders’ Workshop in The Hague at the end of June 2010.

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**Bish Sanyal** and **Larry Vale**, both Ford International Professors of Urban Development and Planning, are leading an Institute-wide effort to create the graduate curriculum for a new University—the Indian Institute of Human Settlement in Bangalore, India. This project is being supported by the Rockefeller Foundation. Sanyal is also advising the Indian Planning Commission on national housing policy issues, particularly regarding the housing of low income urban residents. Sanyal has a third project with the Lincoln Land Institute in Cambridge, Mass, on land readjustment strategies for cities in developing countries. He also continues to head the program for mid-career planners from developing countries at MIT.

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Ph.D. candidate **Caitlin Talmadge** has accepted a tenure-track position as Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University. Her appointment begins in July 2011. She traveled to Iraqi Kurdistan as part of a delegation from the Center for a New American Security during March and April 2010. She presented a conference paper, “War Unending: Political-Military Relations and Battlefield Effectiveness in Iran and Iraq, 1980-1988,” at the London School of Economics, September 23, 2010. She appeared on al-Jazeera’s program “Empire” to discuss the U.S. defense budget in October 2010.

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A year-long project involving case studies in Liberia, Aceh, Uganda, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Israel/Palestine to evaluate the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which promotes the inclusion of women in peace processes, was completed and presented at a series of public events. **John Tirman**, CIS executive director, and **Sanam Anderlini**, CIS research affiliate, co-directed the project, which was funded by the Norwegian and Irish governments and other donors. The study team presented to an overflow audience at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and to a conference cosponsored by the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington. The group also briefed staff at the National Security Council; Tirman and Anderlini presented at a conference at Harvard Law School; and Anderlini addressed a gender and conflict conference in Bogota. The project report, “What the Women Say: Participation and UNSCR 1325,” is available on the CIS Web site.

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Security Studies Program Research Associate **Jim Walsh** organized a working group on the regime transition in North Korea. He gave a paper at the ISSS/ISAC Conference in Providence, RI in October 2010, on the topic of Iran. He made numerous media appearances on such topics as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, North Korea, and Iran, on Fox, CNN, and NPR.

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Ph.D. Candidate **David Weinberg** presented a paper on “Hypotheses on Leadership Selection Intervention: How Great Powers Pick Sides Abroad” at the ISSS/ISAC Conference in Providence, RI, in October 2010.

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Principal Research Scientists **Cindy Williams** and **Owen Cote, Jr.**, ran the simulation “Complex Crisis in Southeast Asia,” for the Senior Executives Course of the Department of Defense National Security Studies Program at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC, August 18-19, 2010 and September 24-25, 2010. Williams also presented a conference paper entitled “Who Will Serve: Personnel Needs for Future U.S. Forces,” at an international conference on all volunteer forces organized by the Centre for International Studies and Research of Sciences (CERI) and sponsored by the French Ministry of Defense, Paris, France, June 25, 2010. She spoke on a panel entitled “Reassessing Our National Security Goals and Budget,” at Conference, “The Nation’s Fiscal Choices,” sponsored by Demos, the Economic Policy Institute, and the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, in Washington, DC, October 5, 2010.

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**Alice Amsden**, Barton L. Weller Professor of Political Economy

“Property Rights and Elites,” WIDER (United Nations University) working paper #109.

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**Robert Art**, Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations, Brandeis University

“The United States and China: Implications for the Long Haul,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Fall 2010.

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**Baktybek Beshimov**, a visiting researcher at CIS

“Kyrgyzstan’s Hopes, and Fears,” *The Wall Street Journal*, October 4, 2010 (with Sam Patten).

“Kyrgyz Democracy’s Narrowing Window of Opportunity,” *Transitions Online*, October 8, 2010.

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**Nathan Black**, Ph.D. Candidate

“Change We Can Fight Over: The Relationship between Arable Land Supply and Substate Conflict,” *Strategic Insights*, Vol. IX, No. 1 (2010): 30-64.

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**M. Taylor Fravel**, Cecil and Ida Green Career Development Associate Professor of Political Science

“China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: Explaining the Evolution of China’s Nuclear Strategy,” *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010) (with Evan S. Medeiros).

“The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (May 2010), pp. 307-341.

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**Benjamin Friedman**, Ph.D. Candidate

ed., *Terrorizing Ourselves: Why U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Is Failing and How to Fix It* (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute Press) (with Christopher Preble and Jim Harper).

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“Budgetary Savings from Military *Restraint*,” Cato Policy Analysis no. 667, September 21, 2010. (with Christopher Preble).

“Drop Pretension to Supremacy.” *Politico.com*, Spet. 21, 2010. (with Christopher Preble).

“Frank Deserves Credit for Push to Cut Defense Spending,” *SouthCoastToday.com*, July 1, 2010.

“Defense Cuts: Start Overseas,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 14, 2010. (with Christopher Preble).

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**Jeanne Guillemin**, CIS affiliate with the Security Studies Program

“German Flooding of the Pontine Marshes: Bioterrorism or Environmental Crime?,” cover story for *Politics and the Life Sciences*, Fall 2010. (with Erhard Geissler).

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**Jon Lindsay**, Ph.D. Candidate

“War Upon the Map: User Innovation in American Military Software,” *Technology and Culture*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (2010): 619-651.

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**Tara Maller**, Ph.D. Candidate

“Diplomacy Derailed: The Consequences of Diplomatic Sanctions,” *Washington Quarterly*, Volume 33, No. 3.

“Diplomatic Sanctions as a U.S. Foreign Policy Tool: Helpful or Harmful?,” *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Volume 43, No. 4.

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**Melissa Nobles**, Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science

The Prosecution of Human Rights Violations,” in the *Annual Review of Political Science*, Volume 13, 2010.

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**Richard Samuels**, Ford International Professor of Political Science

“Kidnapping Politics in East Asia,” *Journal of East Asian Studies*, Volume 10, No. 3 (November 2010).

“Japan, LLP,” *The National Interest*, No. 107, May/June 2010 (with Robert Madsen.)

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**Ben Ross Schneider**, Ford International Professor of Political Science

“Complementarities and Continuities in the Political Economy of Labor Markets in Latin America,” *Socio-Economic Review*, 8, no. 4 (October 2010), pp. 623-51 (with Sebastian Karcher).

Business Politics in Latin America: Patterns of Fragmentation and Centralization,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Business and Government*, David Coen, Wyn Grant, and Graham Wilson, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

“Business Groups and the State: The Politics of Expansion, Restructuring, and Collapse,” in

*The Oxford Handbook of Business Groups*, Asli Colpan, Takashi Hikino, and James Lincoln, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

“Crises and Institutional Origins: Business Associations in Latin America,” in *Explaining Institutional Innovation*, Richard Doner, ed. (New York: SSRC, 2010).

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**David Andrew Singer**, Associate Professor of Political Science

“Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 104, No. 2 (May 2010): 307-323.

“Exchange Rate Proclamations and Inflation-Fighting Credibility,” *International Organization*, Vol. 64 (Spring 2010): 313-337 (with Alexandra Guisinger).

“International Institutions and Domestic Compensation: The IMF and the Politics of Capital Account Liberalization,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 54 (Jan. 2010) (with Bumba Mukherjee).

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**Caitlin Talmadge**, Ph.D. Candidate

“Under the Radar Rapprochement: Turkey and Iraqi Kurds,” *Foreignpolicy.com*, June 24, 2010 (with Mara Karlin.)

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**Jim Walsh**, Security Studies Program Research Associate

“Pyongyang Policy Options: Instruments and Principles for Dealing with North Korea,” Paper for *The Tobin Project*, pp. 1-28.

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## David Miliband Joins CIS

David Miliband, the Foreign Secretary for the United Kingdom from 2007 to 2010, will join the Center as a Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow in residence from April 11 through 15, 2011. An alumnus of the Department of Political Science Department at MIT, Miliband delivered the MIT Compton Lecture in spring 2010. While in residence at CIS, he will give one major public talk on the war in Afghanistan, which is the topic he addressed for the Compton Lecture. He also will meet with faculty and students across the institute who share his interest in international affairs and global environmental issues. In addition, he will visit undergraduate classes in political science, participate in workshops with doctoral students, and meet individually with post-graduate students to learn more about their work. “This is a wonderful opportunity to have a distinguished practitioner here to visit with students and faculty at MIT. It’s an honor for the Center to host his visit and we look forward to his time with us,” said Richard Samuels, director of CIS and Ford International Professor of Political Science. *Photo courtesy Creative Commons.*



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