

NOORA LORI: Good afternoon, everyone. Good morning and good evening, depending on where you're logging in from. My name is Noora Lori. I'm an assistant professor of international relations at the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University, and it is my absolute pleasure to introduce today's speaker. Professor Erin Chung will be joining us, any minute we'll see her video come up. There she is.

So first of all, welcome to the Myron Weiner Seminar Series on International Migration. This is organized by the Inter-University Committee for International Migration, which is a consortium of universities in the Boston area. And one of the beautiful things about the highlights of this new Zoom world we find ourselves in is that we're able to reach such a global audience. So thank you for the attendees, for coming, and please, we encourage you to use the Q&A box to ask any questions.

Before we start, I also just want to point out that we have Dr. Louise Druke who is one of the founding members of this Myron Weiner Seminar Series and Professor Anna Hardman, who is also here, who is another member of the steering committee. So thank you, for the committee members for being here.

And without further ado, it's really my pleasure to introduce Professor Erin Chung today, who has several books and is in-- sorry, there we go, is the Charles D. Miller Associate Professor of East Asian Politics at the Department of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. She previously served as the Director of the East Asian Studies Program, and co-directs the Racism, Immigration, and Citizenship Program at Johns Hopkins. She's going to be talking about her second book. Her first book, *Immigration and Citizenship in Japan*, came out with Cambridge University Press in 2010. It was also translated in Japanese in 2012, and then this book is a culmination of a comparative project across East Asia and immigrant incorporation in East Asian democracies, which also came out with Cambridge University Press in 2020.

On a more personal note, I will say that I am very, very honored to be here today. Professor Chung was really critical in helping me find my own voice as a scholar. She was on my dissertation committee. She's seen so many different iterations of my work over the years, and it's really a pleasure and an honor to be able to be here and lead this discussion. As I said, please ask any questions at any point and

we will make sure to try to get to them in the discussion. So without further ado, please, Professor Chung, welcome and thank you for being here.

**ERIN AERAN
CHUNG:**

Thank you so much Noora. It's such a pleasure to be here. I really want to thank Professor Lori for inviting me and Laura Kerwin for organizing my visit. So before we started this, Professor Lori and I were just talking about my last visit to Boston when I participated in a panel on citizenship and migration in East Asia at Boston University in November 2019, which was actually one of the last in-person talks that I gave before the pandemic. And as Professor Lori mentioned, my book was published last October in the middle of the pandemic, and, obviously, I hadn't quite envisioned that I would be giving virtual book talks upon the publication of my book, but I'm really grateful that I'm able to share my work with you through this platform, and I very much look forward to you returning to the Boston area sometime soon.

So I'm just going to give you first a very brief background to my book, and what I'll do is go ahead and share my screen as I do so. All right. Does it look OK? All right. All right.

NOORA LORI: Yes, perfect.

**ERIN AERAN
CHUNG:**

Thank you. So my book compares three similarly situated liberal democracies in Northeast Asia to shed insights into how past struggles for democracy shape current movements for immigrant rights and recognition. And largely I'm putting immigrant agency at the center of analysis to ask why foreign residents make the political choices they do as they become permanent members of their receiving societies. And the project itself is based on fieldwork and archival research that I conducted over a seven year period in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. That included over 150 interviews with migrants, activists, and government officials as well as original focus groups with over 20 immigrant communities.

And I just want to plug my data first, which is-- so in Japan, these focus groups included residents from China, South Korea Brazil, Peru, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Ethiopia. In Korea, these included immigrants from Vietnam, from China, Taiwan, Philippines, Mongolia, and Burma. And then in Taiwan, these included Vietnamese, Indonesian, Filipino, Thai, mainland Chinese, and Malaysian residents. And I'm showing you the slide because 16 of the Japan and Korea focus groups from

the study have been archived by the Johns Hopkins University data management services and are available to the public for a download. So I'm just showing you this page. So you can actually go to this page by just Googling immigrant incorporation East Asian democracies project, or IIEAD project. And here you can either download all of the transcripts from Japan and South Korea, or you can just click on one of the data sets and then choose individual transcripts. And these include both the original language transcripts as well as the English translations.

And I just want to briefly describe or explain why we don't have any of the Taiwan focus group transcripts in the archive. So unlike Japan and South Korea it was actually very difficult for us to organize focus groups in Taiwan, because most of the migrants either lived very far away in kind of more remote areas that were close to the factories where they worked, or they were domestic workers who had rarely had a day off, and I'll be describing this more. So this included some workers, some domestic workers who had had a day off only in the last three months, some in the last six months, and some had never had a day off.

And so many of the focus groups that we did with them ended up being a little bit more haphazard and were conducted with their employers, so with the elderly man or woman that they were in charge of at public parks, or in the hospital. And so we wanted to, basically, make sure that their identities were completely anonymized because they were worried about their job security and so forth. So that's why we don't have the focus group transcripts for the Taiwan group.

So, basically, I focused my research on immigration politics in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, because they represent three similar cases, right. They're all relatively rich, liberal democracies that have dissent-based citizenship policies, and among the most restrictive immigration policies in the world, especially relative to their levels of development, which is why they're often described as negative cases of immigration, right. So compared to their European counterparts that have experienced heightened immigration since the mid 1960s and 1970s.

The three countries recent encounters came much later with the lion's share arriving from the late 1980s, largely from other parts of Asia. And while the total foreign population has grown almost by two-fold in Japan, over three-fold in Taiwan, and over 12-fold in Korea, immigrants continue to make up a relatively small

percentage of the total population in all three countries at approximately 2% to 5%. Now the dominant comparative scholarship on immigration and citizenship has tended to favor focus on cultural determinants, especially claims of ethno-cultural homogeneity to explain the so-called East Asian Paradox. Now according to this count, this is a very crude and brief way of summarizing, East Asian democracies represent exclusionary or ethnic citizenship and immigration regimes that privilege dissent over liberal norms.

Now I found these accounts largely unsatisfying because they tend to overlook the significant cross-national variations between the three countries as well as the intra-national contradictions. They also tell us very little about the immigrants themselves as political actors in their own right. So by comparing three East Asian democracies with overlapping citizenship and immigration policies I wanted to analyze what the process of immigrant incorporation was like among so-called exclusionary cases.

Now before proceeding I just want to briefly explain what I mean by immigrant political incorporation, which my usage of the term is not equivalent to naturalization. So instead I define immigrant incorporation as the process by which immigrants and their descendants shift their status from sojourners to political participants who make claims as permanent members of their receiving societies. And I'm largely focusing on four areas, the first being immigrant self identification and understandings of their membership. Secondly, immigrant political participation. Third, the policies, programs, and services that target immigrants as well as state institutionalized rights. And finally, policy reforms.

Now given the similarities between their immigration and citizenship policies as well as their overlapping immigrant populations that are largely from neighboring Asian countries, that I mentioned before, and their common dilemmas as liberal democracies that have, since 2005, competed with each other, largely, for the less than desirable distinction of having the world's fastest aging population, lowest birth rate, and most rapidly shrinking workforce. I expected to find a singular, or at least a similar model, of immigrant incorporation among the three Northeast Asian democracies, but instead I found dramatic cross-national variations between three seemingly similar systems, especially from the mid 2000s.

So in Korea, the arrival of migrant labor generated centralized rights-based

movements and eventually sweeping policy measures that included the implementation of a guest worker program in 2004, the extension of local voting rights to permanent foreign residents in 2006, making Korea the first and only country to do so in Asia, and the passage of a dual nationality bill in 2010. Now while there were no structural reforms in Japan until 2019, decentralized, grassroots movements and partnerships between local governments and civil society organizations generated an assortment of local services and programs for foreign residents that range from what may be seen as kind of the more typical cultural exchange programs, to the more substantive, like housing and employment assistance, to foreign resident assemblies.

In fact, foreign resident rights and social welfare provisions for those who are already settled within Japan are among the most generous of liberal democracies. Finally, while Taiwan was the first among the three countries to implement a guest worker program, it's been the slowest in addressing immigrant rights and welfare, as well as labor protections for migrant workers, and local support services for foreign residents. Now my argument, in a nutshell, is basically centering on the concept of civic legacies, that I'll be introducing momentarily, and is based on the idea that past struggles for democracy shape current movements for immigrant rights and recognition.

So I'm just going to show you this, an outline of my book chapters, to describe how I go about the argument. So I'm looking, largely, at three levels of variation. First, cross-regional differences between immigration and citizenship regimes in East Asia and those in Western liberal democracies. Secondly, cross-national variations between three countries with dissent-based citizenship policies that are conventionally described as exclusionary in their policies toward immigrants. And finally, intra-national variations between immigration and citizenship policies and practices among different migrant subcategories.

So basically, after I introduce the concept of civic legacies in chapter one, I examine the cross-regional differences between East Asian and Western citizenship regimes in chapter two, and identify distinct civic legacies in East Asian democracies, namely local, grassroots movements in Japan, national rights-based movements in South Korea, and then, finally, ethnicity-based coalitions in Taiwan. Now chapter

three, which is the focus of my presentation today, explains the cross-national variations between the three countries. I then examined the intra-national variations among the migrant subcategories in chapter four through a discussion of my focus group data. Chapter five then zooms in on one specific category of migrants, that is non-citizen, female spouses of native citizens that are often referred to as marriage migrants, who have become one of the most important immigrant populations in East Asia. And then finally chapter six brings us back, full circle, to convergent policies, where I examine the emergence of three distinct frameworks for immigrant incorporation in East Asian democracies that are based on variants of multiculturalism.

Now based on their exclusionary immigration and citizenship policies, we could expect that all three East Asian democracies would have actually followed Taiwan's trajectory. Namely, one that maintained an exclusionary migration regime with weak protections and underdeveloped services for migrants. Certainly global human rights norms had not pushed the three East Asian democracies toward liberal immigration and citizenship policies, which the so-called convergence hypothesis would predict. Nor were domestic, political elites, such as bureaucrats, and left leaning parties, or activist courts the drivers for immigration liberalization and expanded migrant rights, as the research, that is largely based on case studies of North American and Western European countries, have found.

Now if we applied a teleological framework to understanding migration governance that's based on democratic development, then we should expect that Japan, as a mature democracy, would have liberalized its immigration policies well before Korea and Taiwan, which are both relatively young democracies. And democratization itself was not the driver for liberalization since Korea and Taiwan both underwent a democratic transition in the late 1980s and are widely recognized as having consolidated their democracies at least by the early 2000s. And finally, left leaning parties or competitive political party system do not sufficiently explain the cross-national variations in immigrant incorporation patterns among these three similar migration regimes because we could say, for example, that the LDP, the Liberal Democratic Party's almost uninterrupted rule, since 1955, in Japan, may explain the lack of structural reform. But in fact, it was under the watch of the LDP that foreign resident rights expanded to make Japan one of the most generous of

liberal democracies in this area.

And the ascendance of Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party, which championed multiculturalism, and the expansion of women's rights, and made Taiwan the most LGBTQ friendly country in Asia with the legalization of same sex marriage in 2019, was not accompanied by more liberal immigration or immigrant policies, and on the contrary, the rise of Democratic Progressive Party was accompanied by greater immigration restrictions. So in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, immigration reform, immigrant incorporation, and migrant rights became an important part of the equation only when civil society actors forced them onto the agenda, which is an insight that other studies of immigration politics in East Asia have contributed, as well as studies that have emerged in studies of the United States and Europe.

But our three cases highlight that the presence of civil society alone is insufficient for explaining cross national variations in immigrant incorporation patterns. Not all civil society actors sought to advocate for migrant rights, or to even incorporate migrants into their local societies because civil society, after all, can be the source of both pro-migrant advocacy, as well as anti-immigrant mobilization, as we all know. For example labor unions have historically played, and in some cases continue to play, central roles in calling for restrictive immigration policies.

So rather than assume that civil society actors confront the challenges of immigrant incorporation in a uniform way, or that civil society actors necessarily seek to incorporate immigrants in their local societies, I introduced the concept of civic legacies to refer to the ideas, networks, and strategies applied in past struggles for democratic inclusion that differentially shape the direction of immigrant incorporation and the potential for structural reform. Now although civic legacies do not determine immigrant incorporation patterns, they form the opportunities and constraints that demarcate the rules of the game for migrant claim-making. So in other words, the language, symbols, and strategies used in past struggles for democratic inclusion shape how civil society actors, including migrants themselves, give voice to migrant interests, mobilize migrant actors, and shape public debate and policy on immigration.

Civic legacies also influence the prioritization of issues and agendas among civil society actors, That is the distinct civic legacies shape which civil society actors

choose to advocate for which migrants and why, as well as the strategies and ideas that they employ to make claims to the state. Because after all, grassroots movements by immigrants and their supporters do not transpire in a vacuum. On the contrary, the residuals of prior struggles for democratic citizenship shape contemporary citizenship practices. Now of course international norms, and movements, and new state and non-state actors, may provide additional tools, or they may challenge or alter the dominant discourse, or shift agendas in civil society, but I'm arguing that their impact on the ground is mediated by civic legacies.

So we should thus expect to find that civil society mobilization and advocacy for non-citizens mirror those applied to preceding generations of citizen women, workers, minority groups, and others who have historically been denied full citizenship status and/or rights. So the Civic legacies framework thus helps us to understand how similarly restrictive immigration policies in East Asia generated divergent immigrant incorporation patterns. I'm going to now discuss our three cases and I'll start each case with a quote from my focus groups.

So this first one is from the Han Chinese focus group interview in Korea. Quote, "Without the emphasis on human rights in Korean society, undocumented workers like us would not be able to have what we have. I don't think I broke the law because I didn't commit a crime. I didn't murder or rob, I just worked illegally. I got work because the factory was in need of workers, and the Korean bosses like to hire illegal workers. In Korea human rights are meant to protect everyone." Unquote.

So migrant advocacy in South Korea built on the civic legacy of national rights-based movements, specifically the country's recent democratization movement and the strong tradition of labor and civil society activism, to push for structural change. So not only did the mistreatment of migrant workers and police crackdowns of undocumented migrants resonate strikingly with the abusive practices and political repression of Korea's past authoritarian regimes, but the language and tactics that migrant workers used in their protests were almost identical to those of the labor movement in Korea's recent past. So slogans such as we are human not animals, and we are not slaves came to epitomize the migrant workers movements much like, we are not machines, represented the Korean workers movement of the movements of the 1970s and 1980s.

So this slide compares the anti-government protests during the 1980s democratization movement and a migrant worker protest in 2003 that was led by the Korean Federation of Trade Unions, and you can see that there are striking parallels in terms of the confrontational tactics that are used against the riot police. The use of particular symbols and imagery that, perhaps, is not as obvious in these slides, but some of the slogans that are on the clothing, or that are on headscarves, or other signs are strikingly similar, even the colors that are often used, and even the preparation for these demonstrations, like the use of face masks, knowing that tear gas will be widely applied and that this is a good way to sort of protect yourself from tear gas is not necessarily coincidental. This is a learned type of protest strategy.

And even the site of protests has been replicated. So this is a slide comparing the June 1987 and November 2003 protest in front of the Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul, which many have described as the traditional stage and refuge of anti-government protesters in the era of military rule. So just by staging their protest in front of this historical area, where the democratization movement was really found its home, lent the migrant workers movement with a significant amount of symbolic and political capital and potency.

Now what is especially noteworthy about Korea's migrant advocacy organizations is their position within Korea's democratization movement and post 1987 Democratic consolidation. In other words, these groups represent a cross section of Korea's civil society that includes moderate and radical labor groups, women's organizations, religious institutions, and a range of progressive citizen groups, whose leaders had deep roots in Korea's democratization movement. So there is strong tradition of activism, coupled with the reconfiguration of political power from the late 1990s, that is with the inauguration of the first opposition President Kim Dae Jung in 1998, and a former human rights activist and labor lawyer Roh Moo Hyun in 2003, let the struggle for migrant labor rights significant potency and magnitude in Korean society because after all, how could a pro labor government condone exploitative practices toward migrant laborers? That many in the administration, including the president himself, had struggled against for decades.

OK we're going to now move to the Japan case, and this is a quote from a Chinese

focus group interview in Tokyo. Quote, "In most areas of life, Japanese and foreigners share the same benefits such as child allowances, as long as they, foreigners, are registered residents. Permanent residents are treated the same as Japanese in policy except in the area of political rights." Unquote. So in Japan, migrant advocacy built on the Civic legacy of local, grassroots movements for democratic inclusion that set the foundation for decentralized, community based strategies that ultimately posed barriers to restructuring migrant labor policies.

So despite their labor shortages, both Japan and Korea opted for piecemeal solutions to temporarily meet labor demands rather than opening their borders to foreign labor for decades. So these include, as many of you may know, preferential policies for coethnic immigrants, who provided a relatively ample pool of unskilled workers, who were not classified as foreign laborers. So these are largely coethnic immigrants. So ethnic Japanese from Brazil and Peru, in Japan's case, and ethnic Koreans from China, in Korea's case. And the second side door policy was through the industrial trainee programs that similarly created a relatively large pool of cheap labor who were not recognized as workers and thus not entitled to the rights and protections of labor laws.

Now the industrial trainee system, in particular, generated a host of problems for both Japan and Korea. So this included exploitative practices by employers as well as a rapidly growing population of undocumented workers among the industrial trainees. And similar to Korea, hundreds of civil society organizations in Japan played key roles in providing services and advocacy for foreign workers. But the difference is that the industrial trainee system remains intact and Japan's borders remained closed to unskilled immigration until 2019.

Now the 2018 bill that went into effect in 2019, basically opened Japan's borders to up to 345,000 semi-skilled workers in agriculture, construction, shipbuilding, hospitality, and nursing over a five year period. And it is significant because it marks the first time in postwar Japan's history that the country's borders are officially open to unskilled foreign labor. But what is especially noteworthy is that the establishment of an official guest worker program has not been accompanied by legislative moves to abolish the industrial trainee program, suggesting that the former, the industrial trainee program, is meant to complement rather than

replace-- I'm sorry the former, the new guest worker program is meant to complement rather than replace the industrial trainee system, which is in contrast to Korea, where the industrial trainee program was abolished after the establishment of a formal guest worker program.

So instead of structural change, immigrant incorporation in Japan has occurred largely at the local level with decentralized, grassroots organizations taking the lead. Now unlike Korea, Japan had a seemingly natural ally for new migrants, that is the multi-generational, Korean residents that are known as *Zainichi* Koreans in Japanese, who had succeeded in gaining rights and recognition for foreign residents through what I call a non-citizen civil rights movement. So these are largely colonial era migrants who migrated to the Japanese metro pole and did not return to the Korean peninsula.

So by the time that Japan had encountered its most recent wave of immigration from the late 1980s, *Zainichi* Korean activists and their supporters had reached the final stages of their movement. So beginning with the landmark Hitachi Employment Discrimination trial of the early 1970s in which a Korean plaintiff successfully sued the Hitachi company for employment discrimination, Korean residents made dramatic gains in their claims to citizenship rights and access to the labor market through lawsuits and local campaigns, and by 1980 foreign residents were eligible for social welfare benefits and public sector jobs in cities such as Nagoya, Osaka, Kawasaki, Kobe, and Tokyo.

And this culminated in the largest mass mobilization of Korean residents and their supporters in post-war Japan. Here I'm referring to the decade long, anti-fingerprinting movement in the 1980s that succeeded in abolishing the fingerprinting requirement for special permanent residents in 1993 and for all foreign residents in 1999. And the basic argument that Koreans and other foreign residents gave was that by having to submit their fingerprints at the age of 16 and above, foreign residents were being criminalized. They actually had to submit all 10 of their fingerprints, and it was considered to be a really very degrading experience that their neighbors and friends had never had to experience.

Now the fingerprinting requirement was, in fact, reinstated in 2007 for all foreign residents except for *Zainichi* Koreans. And this is the cover image from my first

book, which is an anti-fingerprinting rally in Tokyo in 2007, which was in response to the reinstatement of that requirement. And what's probably quite noticeable is how sparsely attended it is. So there aren't as many, nearly as many demonstrators as there were during the 1980s fingerprinting requirement.

And what is most significant is that the only group of Koreans that attended this rally is right here. So these are actually representatives from the Korean Youth Association, which is the youth organization of the pro South Korean [? Mindan ?] organization, and they were not even planning to attend the rally, but they got a last minute, urgent call from Amnesty International really begging them to show some Korean representation in this rally since Koreans had been central to the original anti-fingerprinting movement. And at the very last minute they decided to attend, and they found that the old anti-fingerprinting balloon that they used in the rally, and blew it up just in time for the rally only to show up and find so few people were there. In fact, in many cases it appeared that there were more members of the media than there were protesters, which really does signify the ways in which the foreign resident movement has really declined, but specifically, the ways in which there's not as much solidarity between the so-called the multi generational Korean residents and the newer immigrants.

So rather than lead the movement for immigration reform and expansion of migrant workers rights, *Zainichi* Korean activists have largely distanced themselves from migrant workers, and instead have absorbed new migrants into existing programs and movements that reflect more the interests of their multi generational community and less those of recent immigrants. Now on the one hand, this means that immigrants with a secure legal status benefited from the civic legacies of earlier movements by *Zainichi* Koreans that made foreign residents eligible for a range of social welfare benefits and legal protections against employment and housing discrimination that were really out of their reach until the late 1970s and early 1980s. But on the other hand, because existing foreign resident services and programs were created for permanently settled, highly assimilated, in many cases, native born non-national residents, most local communities were ill equipped to address some of the specific needs of migrant workers.

So one example would be when I interviewed some of the more recently arrived

foreign residents in Kawasaki City, quite a few of them would talk about the incongruity between the pressure that they were getting from foreign residents who were in the foreign resident assembly and others who are basically saying you need to fight for your local voting rights. So foreign residents need to fight for their local voting rights to get their voice heard, and they would say to me I can barely speak Japanese. I don't even know where to send my children to school, or where my local hospital is, or what I'm even eligible for, in terms of health care, and here everyone is telling me I need to fight for my local voting rights when I can't even take care of my own basic rights. So because the *Zainichi* Korean movement from the 1960s made claims to citizenship rights on the basis of their permanent settlement as taxpaying, law abiding residents, the ideational frame of what is called the foreign resident citizen widened the gap between legally registered, long term foreign residents, and unauthorized migrant workers.

OK. Sorry. We're going to now go to the final case, which is the Taiwan case, and this is a quote from the Vietnamese focus group interview in Taipei. Quote, "A lot of people don't care whether you have a Taiwanese ID, but look at your accent, and think you're a foreigner or a Taiwanese citizen. Some TASAT-- and this is the Trans Asia Sisters Association in Taiwan in which the participant was engaged-- some TASAT sisters get judged because of their skin color and their appearance." Unquote. And I just want to note that the Taiwanese ID card is basically equivalent to Taiwanese nationality.

So the civic legacies of Taiwan's recent democratization movement, especially its ethnicity-based coalitions, largely hampered migrant advocacy as the latter proved to be a poor fit for indigenization campaigns, and became ensnared in cross straight politics. So despite its recent history of ethnic accommodation, Taiwan stands out among the three East Asian cases for its weak labor protections and underdeveloped support services for migrant workers at both the National and local levels. So in contrast to the improvements in the status and treatment of foreign residents resulting from civil society movements in Korea and Japan, neither local governments nor civil society organizations in Taiwan have succeeded in bringing about major immigration reforms, or even the expansion of migrant rights.

Instead immigrant incorporation in Taiwan has largely followed a pattern of one

step forward, two steps back. That is, the expansion of rights for one specific category of migrants, largely spouses of Taiwanese nationals, has been accompanied by the restriction of rights for others. Now although various NGOs have provided services and advocacy for migrant workers and marriage migrants their numbers pale compared to those in Japan and Korea, and more significantly, their voices are often drowned out by the anti-immigrant rhetoric of other civil society actors. Now as was the case in Korea, foreign workers in contemporary Taiwan have faced many of the same problems that Taiwanese workers confronted only a few decades ago. But rather than focus on areas of solidarity, as we see in Korea's case, Taiwanese labor union leaders, especially those that represent workers in the construction and manufacturing industries, which have historically had significant concentrations of indigenous or Aborigine workers, have been among the most vocal critics of foreign workers who they claim have stolen jobs from Taiwanese citizens and depressed wages.

Now the conflicting interests among civil society groups within Taiwan are exacerbated by the peculiar configuration of migrant labor in contemporary Taiwan. Specifically about a third of all foreign workers in Taiwan are engaged in domestic labor and most ostensibly as caregivers for the elderly, and because they work and live in the private homes of their employers, they're often excluded from labor rights protections as they're not considered to be workers by the state, and this can result in really serious problems and abuse. Some of the workers that I interviewed said that they had to take care of the elderly person for, basically, 24/7. And some of them had to sleep in the same rooms. Some of them had to sleep in the same beds because it did require this 24 hour care. Others said that they had to, basically, sleep in a hospital mattress in the hospital room that was shared by two other patients because the person that they were caring for was seriously ill.

So obviously this system is really ripe for abuse. Now one of the central problems as I mentioned before, is that so few domestic workers actually get a day off because they're not considered to be workers. And so this slide shows pictures from the annual where is my day off rally. So the bigger one is from 2011, and then the smaller ones are from 2018, and in case you can't see the signs very well, they say, every weekday off, domestic work as work, and no harassment, violence and overwork. And you can see again that they are over represented by women as well,

most of them from Southeast Asia.

Now the other point that I wanted to make is that the situation is compounded by the growth of local NGOs that represent the caregivers employers, that is the elderly, the disabled, and working women, whose interests often conflict with those of the caregivers and their supporters. For example, women's groups, as well as social welfare NGOs, and NGOs representing the elderly and the disabled, have lobbied actively against a proposal to adopt the Household Services Act, which would regulate domestic work and provide labor protections.

So clear this is really about the conflict of interest, and also the Democratic Progressive Party which, as I mentioned earlier, has championed the rights of Taiwan's ethnic groups, the working class, women, and LGBTQ communities, has largely been indifferent and in some cases hostile to pro immigrant advocacy. Some DPP supporters have expressed concern that advocacy for so-called foreigners detracts from the indigenization, or localization campaign, whereby democratic reforms have addressed the widespread demands for ethnic Taiwanese representation in Taiwan's political, cultural, and economic spheres. For example a leading DPP supporter, known for her progressive advocacy for women, challenged a pro-migrant activist at a rally stating, how can you protect foreigners, we must protect our own.

So in some, a splintered labor movement and civil society organizations viewed the arrival of new immigrants with suspicion, and rather than pushing for more liberal reforms to immigration policies, pressured the state to further restrict existing immigration and citizenship policies to guard against the displacement of native, historically marginalized workers. The result has been a profound depoliticization of the migrant worker problem with commercial brokers holding primary responsibility for importing, distributing, administering, and even deporting migrant workers.

So to conclude, instead of a single East Asian model of immigrant incorporation, what we find in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are divergent approaches that have emerged out of similarly restrictive immigration and citizenship policies. So when the question of immigrant incorporation is embedded in a larger national struggle for democratization, migrant advocacy will likely gain powerful allies that can lend the struggle for migrant rights significant potency and magnitude disproportionate

to actual migrant numbers.

So in Korea, a decentralized rights-based approach to immigrant incorporation resulted in major structural reforms. Networks of civil society activists who had played integral roles in Korea's struggle for democratization, including the vanguard groups of labor and women, as well as religious organizations, human rights lawyers, and various middle class citizen organizations, applied the established language, symbols, and ideas of previous claims that were based on human rights, justice, and Korea's democratic development to demand policy reform using the tried and true strategies of mass demonstrations, candlelight vigils, petitions, public awareness campaigns, litigation, and lobbying.

Now when immigrant incorporation is embedded in ongoing grassroots movements for democratic inclusion however, the priorities of migrant advocacy may be directed by the vanguard group whose interests may not necessarily align with those of recent immigrants. So in Japan, a decentralized residents-based approach to immigrant incorporation resulted in the proliferation of local incorporation programs and services, but no structural reforms. So grassroots activists in local communities with growing populations of foreign residents tapped into networks of local civil society activists who had been active in earlier movements to incorporate *Zainichi* Korean residents, applying the familiar language, symbols, and ideas of local citizenship as they collaborated with the local governments to provide services, raise public awareness, solve local level problems, and cultivate foreign resident community leaders.

Finally, when immigrant incorporation does not fit into existing civic legacies, or threatens the status quo within civil society, migrant advocacy will likely be stalled, highly contentious, and/or uneven. So in Taiwan, the arrival of new immigrants threatened institutions that were founded on the ideational frame of indigenization, which had been really central to Taiwan's democratization movement. A handful of citizen organizations and activist groups from labor, women's organizations, and human rights networks, did, in fact, apply the language, symbols, and ideas, of multiculturalism, human rights, and democratic inclusion, also using the kind of established strategies of public performances, petitions, and rallies to make claims for migrant rights. So the chapter five where I'm focusing on the so-called marriage

migrants, I describe the ways in which they were actually quite successful in pushing for rights and recognition for migrant spouses of Taiwanese nationals, most of whom they were successful in doing for were Southeast Asian migrant women rather than mainland Chinese women.

At the same time, their voices were often drowned out by those of other civil society actors that had rallied against migrant workers and mainland Chinese migrants based on, largely, a zero-sum contention that the expansion of migrant rights came at the expense of native Taiwanese gains. So instead of providing a receptive environment for immigrant incorporation, Taiwan civic legacies left migrant workers with few allies among civil society actors who saw no place for them in Taiwan's democratic project.

So in short, whereas national immigration policies establish the parameters for legal entry, employment, and length of stay, it is the civic legacies of past struggles for democracy that shape the opportunities and hurdles for immigrant incorporation and claims making. We thus need to further examine the ideas, networks, and strategies of previous struggles for democratic inclusion to explain how some migrant claims lead to structural reforms, which migrants get included and excluded, and why civil society actors differentially impact immigrant incorporation. OK thank you. I will now stop sharing my screen.

NOORA LORI: Wonderful. Thank you. That was such a rich presentation, and having already read the book, I feel like I still learned more things through this presentation. So I want to thank you for that. I have a bunch of questions, but there are a couple of questions in both the chat and then in the Q&A box. I will say, I think what is important and innovative and the takeaway for people who are working cross-nationally on these questions is the way that you bring up the importance of this meso-level of these actors that are non-state actors, and so we don't really think about them. We often think about public opinion, individuals, and then state actors.

And one thing that you just said about the Taiwanese case that made me also think about this is how civil society actors also structure notions of competition and group competition and whether the inclusion of other migrants should be understood as a zero-sum game. So that's really something I didn't even think about, in addition to economic crisis, the way that, actually, these civic legacies also shape notions of

deservingness and zero-sum games or competition.

So I have a couple of questions that I'm going to table for a minute, and we'll take a couple from the chat. So first from Dr. Louise Druke had a great question which was, so if a French National married with a Japanese and living in Japan already some 10 years with self-employed activities, can they obtain Japanese nationality at some point soon. And maybe I would just add is there a gender dynamic to this where it's more likely for a foreign wife versus a foreign husband or something like that. So that's the first question.

**ERIN AERAN
CHUNG:**

So thank you for that question. So that's one of the big questions that was, kind of, central to my focus group interviews, and that was one of the major categories of questions that I asked to my focus group. So first I should note that all three countries do not prohibit the naturalization of particular migrant groups, except for migrant workers, so unskilled migrant workers. And so in Japan and South Korea's case, unskilled migrant workers are not necessarily prohibited in law, but rather their visa status does not allow them to reside in the country long enough, continuously, to be eligible for naturalization. And then in Taiwan, migrant workers are just downright prohibited from naturalization. So that's the only case.

But what's interesting about the naturalization question is that in Japan's case, as you're pointing out, the naturalization requirement for foreign residents is actually not that much different from what you see elsewhere, like in the US or so forth. It basically requires five years of continuous residency and it does require giving up your existing nationality because Japan does not recognize dual nationality, and then there are other more subjective criteria, in terms of not having trying to overthrow the Constitution, or also not trying to challenge forms of social stability, and this is kind of described in much more neutral language.

So in the past that fungible requirement was enforced in a very discretionary way by local bureaucrats who would basically say, you're not eligible for naturalization unless you prove that you can assimilate into Japanese society. So this was really a major problem for the largest population of foreigners who were trying to naturalize. Those were the multi generational Korean residents known as *Zainichi* Koreans. And while most of them are, in fact, culturally assimilated, they mostly speak Japanese, only speak Japanese, most of them can't speak Korean. So over

80% don't speak Korean fluently, and that intermarriage rate itself is quite high. So there are signs that they are highly assimilated. Many of them, still, maintained a Korean name, which not surprising.

So in the US we would have like my name, Erin Chung. My first name is an anglicized name, but the last name is Chung still, even though it's Romanized. In Japan's case most Koreans in Japan have a full Japanese alias in addition to their Korean name. So you might find somebody whose last name is not Kim, that's a Korean name, but rather Kimura, and so their entire name is Japanese. And so one of the suggested, or heavily encouraged requirements for naturalization had been, in the past until the 1980s, to adopt a Japanese name entirely. And because most of the Koreans had already been quite assimilated, to them, symbolically, that meant giving up one's Korean identity entirely because after you give up your name and your Korean passport, there's nothing left. There was no more connection to having a Korean identity.

So that was considered to be one of the major barriers to naturalization, but since then that requirement, or that encouragement has gone away, and Japanese bureaucrats, actually, have tried to encourage naturalization, especially for the *Zainichi* Koreans. One of the top bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice, in regards to immigration policy, In fact, said if we encourage Koreans who are already highly assimilated to become Japanese nationals they'll disappear. So there won't be a minority anymore, they'll just disappear.

So it's not so much that there are these structural barriers, but more, what I find interesting, is that there are these lasting civic legacies in regards to the naturalization question. So it's not too surprising that Koreans would be reluctant to naturalize because of that lasting link to Korea, but mostly because there are the colonial legacies. So there was a forced assimilation policy during the Japanese colonial period that really have almost a direct link to the idea of naturalization in Japan. So it wasn't surprising that Koreans wouldn't resist this.

But what I found fascinating is that even the more recent immigrants, like ethnic Japanese immigrants from Brazil, were very much reluctant to naturalize, and what I found was that it's not because the requirements were necessarily so difficult. In fact, there's a five year continuous residency requirement for naturalization, but a

10 year continuous residency requirement for permanent residency. But far more applicants for permanent residency in Japan than there are for naturalization. There are only 1%, less than 1% of the total foreign population naturalizes annually in Japan. And so people would actually go for the higher, harder requirements than the easier one, largely because there is still a stigma attached to naturalization, and both government officials, as well as, the street level bureaucrats, as well as civil society organizations, do not try to encourage foreign residents to naturalize.

So one focus group participant said that when he applied for permanent residency, he was from China and he lived in Japan for like 15 years, and the local officials said, you're free now. You can do whatever you want in Japan because you have permanent residency. There was nothing, there was no mention about, OK this is how you might apply for naturalization in the future. Rather it was basically, permanent residency was seen as the final step of incorporation. And of course, a lot of this also has to do with the rights that are associated with permanent residency. You actually have almost the same rights as a Japanese citizen, except voting rights. So that's a long answer to to Drew's question that yes, you would be eligible whether or not you were a spouse, but if you had maintained continuous residency for five years.

NOORA LORI: Absolutely. But I really like the response because it also reminds us, I think we have an automatic assumption that people want to naturalize, and that naturalization means greater voice. And I think what you're showing is that there's actually a contradiction here where you might be able to more collectivize and keep your identity as permanent residents then as a naturalized individual. OK great. So we have another question here, anonymous question, is it possible-- so it's a question about case selection actually. So is it possible to generalize these three all through the lens of liberal democracy given their own unique circumstances? So that is, Japan is essentially a one party state, and Taiwan has an unchangeable foreign Constitution that governs citizenship and faces threat of foreign invasion for any change to citizenship laws, so is it possible to link these three coherently or do we, instead, view them as entirely separate [INAUDIBLE]?

ERIN AERAN CHUNG: That's a really great question. So yes, I did choose the three countries first, based on their citizenship and immigration policies. So as I mentioned they were largely

overlapping, and in fact South Korea's immigration policies were almost exact carbon copies of Japan's. And so the policies themselves were not only overlapping, but in some cases identical. So that was kind of the basis for choosing them, but also I chose to just focus on the three countries that would be considered democracies rather than include, for example, China, which is obviously the elephant in the room. Any study of East Asia should include China, but I decided that if I included China then the explanation would hinge too much on regime type, that basically China is different from the rest of the cases, and it would be too easy just to rely on the regime type question.

Now I do see your point, though, about whether or not the three countries could really be called liberal democracies, and that is definitely a point of debate, of in the literature about whether or not Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are truly liberal democracies as opposed to some other kind of democracies with adjectives. But at the same time, they all three have to, basically, adhere to a certain level of democratic accountability. So even though we might say there are specific limits to democracy in all three countries, and so as you were saying, almost uninterrupted one party rule in Japan, and then Taiwan's very contingent type of democracy, that's contingent on cross-strait relations, and also just the fact that Taiwan is not, necessarily, recognized as a nation state by all countries. And then, also, Korea's national security context has also allowed for a certain level of contingencies that are relative to the constant threat of invasion from North Korea.

So yes, there are definitely these kinds of problems, but still, the political leaders are nevertheless held accountable, for maintaining democratic institutions, and they also have to answer to the votes of their electorate. So I do think that there are, generally speaking, very similar challenges and demands that political leaders do have to face because at least they operate as democracies of sorts.

NOORA LORI: Absolutely. Thank you. So here we have another question. I have a question about Taiwan. I didn't know that. So the previous question was actually very helpful for me to understand. I didn't realize that Taiwan has this kind of constitutional limit on citizenship laws. I will say, and I don't want to detract from the conversation, but one thing that has been-- as someone who doesn't work on East Asia-- fascinating, is looking at passport rankings. Taiwan's passport has been really growing in power

very rapidly, and I was just curious about that. Is it because it's a small state, and there's lots of control over who can get these passports? Is there some kind of mobility diplomacy going on where they're opening up these [INAUDIBLE]? So that's a side question.

We have a question from the audience. Do you think that amending the nationality law in Japan to allow dual citizenship would encourage more *Zainichi* Koreans to naturalize, basically allowing them to maintain Korean identity and citizenship while obtaining voting rights in Japan. And would this potentially encourage more [? Naki ?] Peruvians and other more recent immigrants to naturalize and vote as well.

**ERIN AERAN
CHUNG:**

Yes. So absolutely, yes. And this is something that has always come up in my interviews with more recent immigrants but also with *Zainichi* Koreans, when I was interviewing them for my first book in particular, so the question of the possibility of dual nationality for them is basically, really, the main inducement. The idea that you don't have to give up in order to become a Japanese national because, basically, in my focus group interviews there were two sets of reasons that were given for why they would not naturalize as Japanese.

One was the idea that even if they naturalized they would not be recognized as Japanese. And this came up in the quote that I used for my chapter four, which is, I can't be Tanaka. So this was an Ethiopian resident who said, he married a Japanese woman and when he was applying for permanent residency, the local bureaucrat said, OK are you going to naturalize, and the Ethiopian resident said, no, no I don't apply, and so the bureaucrat asked why, why would you not naturalize? And he said, because I can't be Tanaka. Basically, even if I naturalize no one's going to recognize me as being Japanese. And some of the Bangladeshi residents that I interviewed said that getting Japanese nationality cause more problems, in some cases, because they would be stopped on the street. And so foreign residents in Japan have to carry around their alien registration card with them at all times, but obviously Japanese citizens do not have to carry around their passports. And so he was saying that when he gets stopped, if he doesn't have an alien registration card, but instead says, no I'm Japanese, nobody's going to believe him.

So he said that actually makes him more susceptible to police harassment than actually not having Japanese nationality. But then the other set of reasons that were

given about why they didn't want to naturalize was because this idea that if you naturalized as a Japanese, you're giving up. They basically said they have a problem with the term naturalization in Japanese, which is *kikka*, which traditionally, which in the colonial era, meant submit oneself to the emperor. So it still has these really strong colonial overtones. And still very much symbolically implies that you're giving something up and obtaining some kind of privilege, but not necessarily acquiring active citizenship and the rights and duties that come with it.

And so they said that because there's this very deep, symbolic significance that's associated with giving something up they would not choose to naturalize for that reason, but if dual nationality were instated, that would really change the meaning of Japanese citizenship. It would really remove the idea that there is something very ethno-culturally pure or singular to Japanese nationality, where you can actually equate Japanese nationality with Japanese ethno-cultural identity.

So yes, that was definitely an answer, and just as a side note, I should note that one of the reasons South Korea enacted dual nationality in 2010 was precisely to encourage so-called marriage migrants to naturalize because they realized that there were still relatively low rates of naturalization, and they really wanted the spouses of Korean nationals to become Korean citizens, largely for the family. The idea that they wanted to protect the family as a whole, the family union unit. So basically the idea was they would institute dual nationality to basically make it easier for foreign spouses to naturalize.

NOORA LORI: I think your response really makes me think of one thing that I really love about this book, is the way that you actually deal with race and racial hierarchies, and how those intersect with the immigrant experiences. I wonder if you could say a little bit more about that. We have a question from Jeff that I'm actually going to pose to you, but I know that you're hesitant to push this to non-democratic states because the fight for democratic inclusion is a big part of the story, but I can see resonances with this idea of, there are brokers who are non-state actors who help you navigate racial hierarchies and gain access to rights and I'm thinking, we often try to make these comparisons across regions, but in the Middle East the role of certain families or tribes and being able to have a patron who is brokering with the state can lead to inclusion.

But, also, you have this powerful quote that says, residuals of prior struggles for citizenship, structure, later struggle so you really reminding us the importance of how racial minorities, women, other vulnerable groups get citizenship, or get rights at previous periods in time, how that then influences the ability for migrants to be part of that. And again, I think a civic legacies combines historical institutions, which can be quite structural and path dependent with contentious politics and social movements, so it's a really, really thoughtful framework that I think is really effective for thinking about race and comparative perspective, especially at this moment when there's a lot of interest in how do we think about race. And I think that what you do is you show us how to do it without it being just residual from the US model, or thinking in these kind of black white terms. So I wonder if you could just something about that, and then I'll also pose at this moment Jeff's question.

So Jeff said-- this is Jeffrey Pugh, who is a professor at UMass Boston that, of course, Erin you know too, one of the alums from Johns Hopkins-- you mentioned the resistance of labor activism for immigrants in Taiwan because of suspicion backlash against perceived threats to citizens' interests. Did you see differences in the experiences of those migrant groups with closer proximity to cultural identities or expressions of the dominant group compared to those seen as more different from the whole society, or whose culture was viewed more as oppositional to dominant cultural norms? And in other words, was tolerance for immigrant political activism mediated by any characteristics related to their identity, and were some immigrants more able to engage in activism than others? A really thoughtful question. It kind of relates to this idea of racial hierarchies and ethnic boundaries.

**ERIN AERAN
CHUNG:**

So I'm going to start with Jeff's question, if that's OK, just because I want to make sure I remember, because I have a lot to say about your question. So basically, what's really interesting in Taiwan's case is that first of all, Taiwan really stood out to me among the three cases because it was the only one that did not claim to be ethno-culturally homogeneous, in terms of it's ideology, and, in fact, really embraced this idea of multi-ethnic society by really giving voice to native Taiwanese groups. So that was kind of interesting. so I actually expected Taiwan to be the most progressive among the three cases because it claims to be multicultural, and it's also the only country that has used the language of being a country of immigration. This is, of course, a very strategic use of this term because it was used largely by

the mainland Chinese minority to justify their own long martial law and a minority rule over Taiwan during Taiwan's authoritarian period, and also as a way for them to include themselves. So when the Democratic Progressive Party came into power and really institutionalized these multicultural slash multi-ethnic policies, mainland Chinese political elite started saying we're immigrants too so basically we're part of this multicultural story.

But what's been really interesting to see, in terms of whether or not activism for groups that may be closer to one or another group to the existing Taiwanese ethnic groups have been more effective. Actually it's been the opposite. So the major country sources of immigration are Southeast Asian countries and then mainland China. And mainland Chinese migrants can only enter China as migrant spouses. So they're actually is not a route open for migrant workers to come in from mainland China, and they're also not considered to be foreigners, or they're not counted in the statistics for foreign nationals in Taiwan.

But if you look, especially, at the policies for mainland Chinese migrant spouses, especially compared to Southeast Asian migrant spouses, mainland Chinese migrant spouses actually have greater hurdles to gain Taiwanese nationality and, especially, citizenship rights. So their residency requirement is longer than that for Southeast Asian migrant spouses, and once they have actually gotten Taiwanese nationality, they actually have to undergo a waiting period before they are eligible for full citizenship rights in Taiwan. And based on the interviews I did, and much of that the reasoning was one, the idea that mainland Chinese are too similar. They're too similar to Taiwanese and therefore they could easily just pass as being Taiwanese when, actually, they're not really Taiwanese. So there's this idea that mainland Chinese who are not familiar with democracy could potentially stay in Taiwan's democracy by exercising the full rights of Taiwanese citizenship. So they need a longer waiting time to learn what democracy is like before becoming eligible for full rights of citizenship as Taiwanese nationals.

And then there was this idea that mainland Chinese were also, in fact, a threat to Taiwan's democracy. That they could actually be seen as a security threat. So it's kind of similar to the first one. But the first one was really more about treating them like as children, in a sense. They don't know democracy, therefore they need to

learn. And then the other viewpoint is basically treating them as potential spies, and kind of infiltrating Taiwanese society. So it's actually the opposite of what we might expect, in terms of co-ethnic affinity and so forth.

Now your question, Noora, about the racial hierarchies and how that plays out in the three countries. So what I argue, and especially I find really interesting, is that when I talk about the multiculturalism that is the frameworks that are developing in the three countries, it's a type of management of racial hierarchy in some ways, in the three countries. And in South Korea's case, I think, is probably the most poignant in the sense that the visas that are given to a particular subcategories of migrants are often actually based on a script of criteria rather than on the demands of the labor market. So you have these marriage migrant visas, you also have an overseas Korean visa for co-ethnic immigrants, largely from China, but also the United States and Japan and the former Soviet Union, and then you have a variety of migrant worker visas, and a couple of them are specifically for ethnic Koreans as well.

And so these visas are basically then based not just on the skills that you have or even necessarily your country of origin. It's also based on your ethnicity, and as well as your gender, for the case of marriage migrants. And in the case of the co-ethnic visa, what was really fascinating, was that when the co-ethnic visa, the overseas Korean visa was first instituted, co-ethnic immigrants, so ethnic Koreans from China as well as from the former Soviet Union, were largely excluded. They were not eligible for that visa because the definition of overseas Korean was initially set as those who had previously had South Korean nationality and their descendants. The vast majority of Koreans in China and the former Soviet Union are colonial era migrants. So they migrated before the formation of the Republic of Korea in 1948.

And so, by extension, they were excluded. And they did ended up filing a lawsuit, and they actually won that lawsuit so that they became eligible in the end. But what was really fascinating was that this overseas Korean visa, which very clearly targeted professionals, Korean-American professionals in particular, but professionals, Korean diasporic professionals from the United States and Japan, basically was a very generous visa that had de-facto dual nationality rights and had unlimited employment rights, and it could be renewed in an unlimited amount of time, but the only restriction on that visa was that initially those with that visa could

not engage in manual labor, which really demonstrates the class-based assumptions behind that visa.

And the fact that the vast, largest population of co-ethnic immigrants in Korea, those from China, were excluded said a lot because they were largely migrant workers, unskilled migrant workers as well. So that's one way that we can think about the ways in which these pre-existing ideas and assumptions that are based on ascriptive criteria get institutionalized, and therefore hardened through visa categories in the case of these three countries. And the visa categories themselves end up really perpetuating these hierarchies among migrants that have very asymmetric access to citizenship rights, and employment rights, and so forth, and even eligibility to nationality.

NOORA LORI: Very powerful. So it reminds us how these basic categories are racialized, gendered, classed, as you put it, and how they get reproduced, but I think, also, your comment really points to the importance of timing, when people arrive and then how their time is counted by the state, what rights you have for each visa category, when you can get it, how long you have to be in it, and so how time is really used as part of this enforcement mechanism.

We don't have any audience questions so I would love to encourage the audience members, please feel free to pose questions. And in the meantime, I also just wanted to say we posted the data verse. And I hope that our attendees, who are either working on research or advising students, I would really encourage them to look at this. I think that we're constantly getting questions of, how do we do our research under COVID and this is a perfect example of how, from your desk, you could get access to this primary material, and it's so much richer than what can fit into one book, And so really thinking about this as being encouraging people to really check this out, and share with them, and think about all the possibilities of how you can get, actually, ethnographic and qualitative research even from far away. So thank you for making that available to us. And let's see-- Yeah go ahead.

ERIN AERAN CHUNG: I was just going to say that when I archived the transcripts and translations that was obviously before the pandemic so I wasn't thinking that far ahead, obviously, but a lot of it, too, is just about, one, it was really hard to organize the focus groups, and as far as I know, this is the only study that engages or that employs original focus

group transcripts of as as 20 immigrant communities. And so one is that they were very difficult to organize because of language barriers, I actually had a whole army of research assistants who could speak the native languages of the foreign residents, but also it was really hard on the migrant participants time.

It was really hard to find a time where everybody could actually get together, and that's why it was especially difficult in the Taiwan case where really, they just could not commit to a set time. In that initial slide that I showed you, I forgot to mention of Taiwan, was one set of focus groups I did in the Taipei main station where, largely Indonesian residents, get together every Sunday, and they all sit, picnic style, in the middle of the Taipei main station, and some of the factory workers would tell me, I can't commit to a focus group but just come there. Just go to the Taipei main, just meet us there at Taipei Main Station. And that was the way that we were able to achieve it. So it was it required a lot more planning and resources, than I think that most researchers can afford, both in terms of time, and money, and support.

But also I also felt like, in some ways, as researchers of immigrants, and particular migrants, we sometimes replicate each other. We go to the same people, we ask the same questions, and start from the basic set of questions, and I think that can be really challenging for the migrants themselves who feel like, why isn't there already a conversation going on among you researchers who are always coming to us asking for the same interviews, but then you don't make any progress. You're just asking us the same questions and we just repeat ourselves. And so I also wanted to find a way to give voice to the migrants themselves and also really give value to their time in that way.

NOORA LORI: Yeah. I think that that's something we see, definitely, that kind of research fatigue with refugee populations in the Middle East who are just like, you're asking us the same questions over and over and clearly not communicating. So I appreciate that. OK we have three questions that just came in. I'm going to pose them all at once and then I'll let you decide how to take the order. So is the more restrictive development of the immigration regulations in Taiwan observed amongst all immigrant categories or only amongst the relatively low or unskilled workers? The policy implications should this restrictive development be overall, considering, also, the high rate of brain drain in Taiwan, and so thinking about that kind of tension.

Then the next question is from Raquel Obregon, I hope I'm pronouncing your name properly, can you expand on the situation of Peruvian Japanese populations? And then the last question from John [? Trumpdoor, ?] could you say more about anti-immigrant ideologues, politicians, and movements in this society? So I recall your earlier book on Japan had an opening quotation from a governor in Japan who openly referred to the foreigners in Japan as sneaky thieves and other Trumpy language. So yeah, thank you. That's a great question. So do you want me to reread them or do you have--

ERIN AERAN Could you just reread the second one? I don't think I got that one.

CHUNG:

NOORA LORI: The situation of Peruvian Japanese immigrants.

ERIN AERAN Like what is their situation?

CHUNG:

NOORA LORI: Yeah could you expand on their situation?

ERIN AERAN OK. OK. So thank you. I'll try to go through them quickly. One is all of the populations that I focused on were largely-- well in terms of, especially, policy-- were largely unskilled workers. Because I think that we can say, pretty generally, that professionals, immigrants who are in the professional category, often don't face quite as nearly as many barriers, in terms of entry, as well as, their rights that are extended, in any country. And I think that goes across regime type, and sometimes as you know, Noora, in your research, professionals from certain countries, like European countries and US, often get even more privileges than the natives themselves. So that's one of the reasons why I focused, largely, on unskilled workers.

And no, there isn't a consistency in terms of the policy for skilled and professional workers versus unskilled. Basically, all three countries are competing with each other, as well as with countries like Singapore to actually attract more professional immigrants, and to attract much more well-educated immigrants into their midst. So that's a totally different kind of matter in some ways, and I know that there are a number of really great studies that look at professional immigrants and how they're treated, but I feel like that would, in many ways, really devalue the story about the

unskilled workers in the case of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan because it is a totally different type of standard that's applied to them.

And then about Peruvian Japanese, so the ethnic Japanese from Peru as well as from Brazil were brought in with the revision of the immigration policies in Japan, especially from the late 1980s, but mostly from the 1990s, and they were among the fastest growing group of immigrants to Japan because of their co-ethnicity. Although they were not acknowledged as workers, they were basically given a special long term resident visa, which only they, the coethnics were eligible for, that gave them, again, unlimited employment rights as well as long term residency rights and access to the many benefits that I mentioned before, social welfare benefits, that settled foreign residents are eligible for in Japan.

But their numbers started to go down in the 2000s, especially following the major economic recessions in Japan because, basically, following the economic recession, the major economic recessions in the 2000s, most of the contract migrant workers or industrial trainees, basically, were deported, right, or they were returned because they were no longer on contract. But those who had the coethnic immigrants from Brazil and Peru had these long term residency visas that, basically, meant that they could stay in Japan and stay unemployed and even have access to unemployment assistance, to employment assistance. And so Japanese officials saw them more as a drain to the system, and it sort of was a backfiring of their initial attempt to bring in coethnic immigrants through these side doors as migrant workers, but instead they ended up staying and really draining the economy, as some of the officials put it.

So instead they actually used a system that was modeled after Spain, which was a pay to go system, where they paid those who had this long term residency visa, again, the vast majority of them being coethnic immigrants from Peru and Brazil, to go back to their countries, and they would not be eligible to return using the long term residency visa for a sustained period of time. So it was basically a way to retract that particular system. So in some ways I think their situation was really fascinating because the assumption was that coethnic immigrants would pose the most minimal threat to social stability because they're assumed that because they look the same or they're Japanese by ethnicity they would be able to assimilate, but

in fact, it's the very coethnic immigrants who actually have the lowest rates of Japanese language fluency and also had high rates of truancy among their children, and were, in many ways, the most unassimilated in local communities, and so it was kind of this backfiring of these assumptions about coethnicity.

And then finally the anti-immigrant ideologies that-- so obviously I can't talk too much about it because we are short on time but just to, the main pattern that we might observe is that there has been not the same level of anti-immigrant violence that we see in the US and in Europe, but there has been quite a bit of anti-immigrant backlash in all three countries. But what's really interesting is that they are not necessarily responding to new immigration. So any type of anti-immigrant backlash or anti-foreigner backlash that we've seen in Japan, and South Korea, and to a lesser extent Taiwan, have actually been, not so much to liberalized immigration policies, but rather to the so-called special privileges of specific categories of migrants.

So in Japan it's largely been an anti-Korean backlash and not recently arrived Koreans, but rather mostly that *Zainichi*, the colonial era migrants who have the special permanent residence visa that gives them more citizenship rights, so that basically even the movement, [INAUDIBLE], which is the anti-Korean group, is short for, basically, anti-Korean, anti-special privileges of the Korean group, so it's really targeting them. And then in Korea much of the backlash has been toward the marriage migrants who have been eligible for, again, certain subsidies as well as what might be called affirmative action type of policies for their children, to the point where the term multicultural is used in reference to their families, like multicultural family, and some of the fieldwork of these families, or research on this family has shown that now, the term multicultural is used as a slur among kids to bully the kids. So it's like hey, multicultural, because they're often singled out for these special privileges.

And then finally in the case of Taiwan much of the anti-immigrant backlash was toward the marriage migrants as well and that was, basically, based on this idea that these poorly educated women from Southeast Asia were marrying poorly educated men in Taiwan, and therefore contributing to lessening the so-called population quality within Taiwan. So, in fact, you actually had lower rates of so-

called marriage migrants coming in Taiwan than in Korea.

NOORA LORI: So much there, and again, I think that your response to one of these questions, and Jeff's, really challenges our assumptions about what it means to be coethnic and being coethnic is being privileged, and that also, just to keep bringing up the comparative perspective, really makes me think about Arab migrants in the Gulf, and how the fact that they spoke the same language and could pose this Arab nationalist threat, meant that they were seen as more threatening, politically, than the non-coethnics.

So we are out of time, but I want to really thank Professor Chung for this fantastic presentation and discussion, and really thank you to the attendees for all your questions and for sticking around. There were a couple of questions about whether you would be able to watch this. I think that Laura just put the YouTube video, it'll be available tomorrow. I want to make a quick plug for next week at the same time. We'll be having professor Kristin Surak discuss her recent research on millionaire mobility and the sale of citizenship. So thank you professor Chung and have a great day everyone. Thank you for being here.

ERIN AERAN Thank you so much. It was a pleasure.

CHUNG: