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One often hears Japanese refer to their country as a unique small island trading nation, precariously dependent on imported raw materials and adrift in a hostile world. Apart from the fact that all nations claim to be unique, that Japan is not small economically or demographically, and that its dependence on imports is no greater than that of many other countries, there is some truth in this mantra.
Japan’s neighborhood, and the world in which its businesses and citizens operate, have always been filled with threats. This has never been truer than it is today, when shifts in Tokyo’s relations with its colossal Chinese and nuclear-armed North Korean neighbors portend modification of relations with its powerful US ally. Japan’s intelligence officers have to judge the speed, trajectory, and certainty of transformations in the balance of power, and policy makers need to decide what measures to take to protect those businesses and citizens. In the decades of study of Japan’s evolving security community, virtually no sustained attention has been paid to its once expansive—and then atrophied—intelligence community. This community is atrophied no longer; a close look at its past, present, and future is overdue.

Japan was in ruins and its intelligence community was at its feeblest at the end of the Asia-Pacific War, a time of momentous institutional enhancement of the US intelligence community. In January 1946, when the triumphant President Harry S Truman created a National Intelligence Authority and the post of director of central intelligence to coordinate government-wide intelligence activities, he seized the chance to have some fun. The president gave his senior deputies black cloaks, mustaches, and wooden daggers. The fortified US intelligence apparatus—and those of its allies—were not always playgrounds for practitioners, but thanks more to novelists, screenwriters, cartoonists, and comedians than to scholars, “licensed skulduggery”—and the secret agents who practice it—became Cold War stereotypes and satirical fodder. Who did not appreciate James Bond, George Smiley, or Jason Bourne? And who was not amused by Boris Badenov, Natasha Fatale, Maxwell Smart, or Austin Powers?

Of course, real spies have always been among us, many associated with the wisdom of our greatest leaders. According to Numbers 13, Moses sent spies into Canaan under God’s direct order to report on the land conditions. In Kings 2, the Assyrians drew on an extensive intelligence network during their invasion of the kingdom of Judah in 701 BC. Julius Caesar noted that the Gauls regularly interrogated travelers and merchants for information about distant lands to gain strategic advantage, which they thereupon squandered for lack of analytic skills. George Washington relied on spies during the Revolutionary War, and upon becoming president in 1790, he persuaded Congress to establish a “Contingent Fund of Foreign Intercourse,” a secret intelligence kitty that grew to 12 percent of the entire federal budget within three years. In 1861, President Abraham Lincoln personally recruited a southern businessman to provide intelligence to Washington. And as recently as the eve of America’s entry into World War II, President Franklin D Roosevelt was dispatching personal friends to gather information on war-torn Europe.

By then—actually by the end of World War I—intelligence had already become as much a matter for professional bureaucrats as for spies and their derring-do. Indeed, our embrace of the exploits of secret agents belies both how difficult the intelligence business is and the deadly serious role it plays in national security affairs. Members of an intelligence community—shorthand for the network of collectors of adversaries’ secrets and analysts of threat—are in the business of helping decision makers manage uncertainty. They must separate potential and distant challenges from real and near ones in an environment in which their enemies’ intentions are often the most closely guarded of all secrets. They must separate what matters from what only seems to matter, to distinguish what is known from what is unknown, and to know what they do not know. Then, as if this were not difficult enough, they have to transmit their evaluations to decision makers who have multiple reasons to discount or misuse them. As one unnamed senior State Department intelligence official described his unit’s role, “A good day is when we prevent a bad policy decision from

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In “Special Duty,” he dissects the fascinating history of the intelligence community in Japan.

Featured here is an excerpt from the preface of his book.

Photos Pablo Castagnola Fotograf & Einstein Stiftung, Berlin Reuter (above); Laura Kerwin (left); and cover page US Army Signal Corps courtesy Harry S Truman Library.
“Special Duty,” an engrossing history of Japanese intelligence, was selected by Foreign Affairs editors and book reviewers as "The Best of Books for 2019."

being made." Walter Laqueur offers a fitting metaphor: intelligence is “the Cinderella of contemporary politics: long hours, unpleasant work, humiliation, lack of recognition, and no Prince Charming in sight.” Once we acknowledge that all this takes place in the context of existential threat, intelligence ceases to appear all fun and games, and getting its organization right becomes imperative.

Our perceptions of the intelligence community have been shaped predominantly by American, British, Soviet, and Israeli espionage—by Ludlum’s CIA, le Carré’s MI6, The Americans’ KGB, or Reicher Atir’s Mossad—and we may have been led to believe that spies are less suave and resourceful elsewhere. This may be why few Japanese spies have been popularly associated with either wisdom or heroism in Western accounts, though some were both wise and heroic. Nor have many been the benign objects of satire. More often, their malign caricature abroad was formed out of a supposed orientalist capacity for treachery, such as this from the British historian Peter Elphick, who insisted that “the Japanese national psyche” explains why expatriate Japanese who were “required to serve as part of a subversive network [were] deeply honored they were serving their emperor” as spies. Then there is the purported native incapacity of Japanese to act independently, as in this from the US Strategic Services Unit immediately after the Asia-Pacific War: “Jap mentality is completely unsuited to listening post work. They are slow, cautious thinkers, and can never make a quick decision or take prompt action before thinking up a suitable reason or excuse [that is] sufficiently watertight to [protect] against loss of face.” Even the Chinese have waved the essentialist culture card at the Japanese. Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Nationalist leader who once served in the Imperial Japanese Army, reportedly declared that “everyone Japanese, both male and female, is a born spy.” The popular allure of ninjas notwithstanding, clearly there is some confusion abroad regarding whether the Japanese are or are not inherently adept at espionage. As we shall see, there was no inherent intelligence deficit preventing the Japanese intelligence community from expanding or from having its share of success during the first half of the twentieth century.

Meanwhile, the joke at home in Japan has been about the bureaucracies, not the secret agents. In the standard Japanese narrative, during the Cold War Japan had no CIA but did have a “KGB”: Keisatsu (National Police Agency), Gaimushō (Foreign Ministry), and Bōeichō (Defense Agency). This speaks to a fundamental truth that will inform much of the analysis in this book: these separate government agencies—like those elsewhere within Japan and in intelligence communities abroad—seem to have forever been engaged in intense (sometimes petty) jurisdictional competition, captive in silos inhibiting coordination. The Japanese intelligence community, like the US and British ones, took a sharp bureaucratic turn—perhaps even earlier and more sharply than in Washington or London. In the Japanese narrative, more of the country’s heroes—many of whose photos are in this volume—were celebrated as military and government officials than as gallant national champions. They were patriots, of course, but in the first instance they were cashiered soldiers in the former Imperial Japanese Army who were joined by diplomats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), crime fighters in the National Police Agency (NPA), economists in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Finance
(MOF), and lawyers in the Justice Ministry’s Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA). They belonged as much to their competing units as to the Japanese state. And many, of course, were politicians vying for power. Japan’s intelligence units were small, non-comprehensive, uncoordinated, underfunded, and, as a result of lingering political sensitivities (especially regarding the use of spies), unnecessarily baroque. They all operated in an environment of mutual distrust with limited central authority and even more limited public support. Kotani Ken, a leading historian of Japanese intelligence, tells us that the government “never succeeded in managing the central intelligence system effectively,” and even today, many observers simply throw up their hands and declare, “Japan has no intelligence community.”

So this term will be used with caution in these pages. And indeed, we can recognize that not all the problems encountered (or created) by the Japanese intelligence bureaucracies should be connected to the domestic structure of strategic policy making. Subordination to Washington also muted interest in developing Japan’s postwar intelligence community. During the Occupation—and even well after Japan regained sovereignty—its intelligence function was derivative, underdeveloped, and narrowly aimed at domestic enemies and foreign firms. The larger strategic horizon was monitored by its ally the United States. Resentment of Japan’s subservience to its US partner—what one intelligence journalist has called a persistent “master-servant relationship” (shujū kankei)—never independently forced the shape and pace of Japanese intelligence reform, but it did become a more persistent problem than is normally acknowledged. Most Cold War Japanese intelligence and security professionals accepted that they had little choice but to accommodate to US power. As a result—and notwithstanding that there remain gaps in sharing and trust—there has been increasing integration of the two intelligence communities.

While accommodation to the preferences and practices of the US intelligence community was a defining feature of the first decades after the war, the Japanese intelligence community—like the military overall—was also stifled by clear and insistent public opposition to any practice redolent of wartime governance. Above all this meant that engaging in (or even debating the merits of) intelligence—especially counterintelligence, but also counterterrorism—was problematic. Every plan, each discussion of the topic, raised hackles among those who feared (not without cause) that the Japanese could slide down a slippery slope back to unrestrained practices like domestic surveillance and foreign aggression that destroyed millions of lives and their nation.

After the Cold War, thoughtful Japanese national security strategists—in both the bureaucracy and the political class—took up intelligence reform with new energy. They began to tinker, reconceive, and, finally, to restructure Japan’s national security apparatus—and with it Japan’s intelligence community. These, then, are the transitions that are identified and followed in this volume: the expanding, accommodating, tinkering, reimagining, and reengineering of the intelligence community of one of the world’s great powers. It will be a story that shifts from a focus on individuals and their exploits to organizations and their competitions. We will discover how Japan was propelled on this century-long course, why reform was so constant and difficult, and what consequences this had for Japan’s national security.
Like most policy change, in Japan or anywhere else, intelligence reform cannot be reduced to a single cause—at least not without sacrificing accuracy. Chapter 1 identifies three generic drivers that affect the shape, pace, and direction of intelligence reform. None is surprising. The first consists of shifts in the strategic environment. After all, threats and balances of power change. Consider, for example, how and why the OSS became the CIA as the Cold War set in after World War II and the United States found itself having to adjust to being one of two superpowers in a suddenly bipolar world. For their part, Japanese strategic thinkers have always been sensitive to Japan’s geostrategic circumstances, and often have responded with intelligence reform at moments of strategic uncertainty. The Foreign Ministry built intelligence capabilities to undermine tsarist Russia at the turn of the twentieth century, the imperial military began to rely heavily on private intelligence sources in China in the 1920s, the police strengthened counterintelligence and counterterrorism capabilities in the 1920s at the moment when mass parties were mobilizing (in some cases with foreign support), and every agency beefed up its collection and analysis capabilities in the 1930s when war with the United States seemed imminent.

After losing that war, the Japanese intelligence community endured an extended period of subordination to the United States from which it only recently has begun the delicate process of freeing itself by enhancing indigenous capabilities without denying itself the benefits of US intelligence support. As I have already briefly noted—and as I examine in detail in chapters 3 and 4 of this book—Washington’s domination of Japan’s intelligence community throughout the Cold War generated considerable resentment in the Japanese security community. The US Department of Defense reportedly blocked Japanese acquisition of surveillance satellites for a long time, and Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force intelligence units were run under code names that were kept secret from their US partners. Remnants of this resentment persisted after the Cold War, affecting some more than others, but the depth of this resentment varied and never rivaled geostrategy as an independent driver of intelligence reform. US frustration with Japanese intelligence leaks generated pressure from Washington that was as problematic for the Japanese intelligence community as the leaks themselves.

Strategists are fully aware that the global balance of power has shifted several times since the end of the Cold War, and many are quite naturally concerned that continued dependence for security and intelligence on a United States in relative decline renders Japan vulnerable in new ways. As we shall see, this was evident to many well before Donald Trump’s campaign and election in 2016 elevated their concerns. Nearly a decade earlier—even before China’s military threat became palpable and North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons openly challenged the US position—a former chief of MOFA’s Intelligence and Analysis Service argued that Japan could not effectively reform its intelligence community until it realized that Washington would not necessarily provide for Japan’s security and came to grips with the need to formulate a truly independent diplomatic strategy. Just as Prime Minister Abe Shinzō was preparing to reengineer Japan’s foreign policy and intelligence system in 2013 by creating a National Security Council (NSC), three Diet representatives from different parties—one of whom would become Abe’s foreign minister in 2017—issued a vigorous call for an
American’s relative power is declining and China’s military rise, as well as its expanding claims in the ocean, are striking. . . . Is Japan responding effectively to the historic shift in world order? . . . Even if an NSC is established, there is still a missing piece—a foreign intelligence [unit].

The second driver of intelligence reform has been technological change. The most prominent intelligence-related technologies have had to do with the way intelligence is collected: human intelligence (HUMINT), radio and other signals intelligence (SIGINT), and image intelligence (IMINT) are the most widely known and are all widely practiced. Cyber-based intelligence harvesting is just the latest tool to which intelligence communities have to adjust. The Japanese intelligence community has been an active, indeed voracious, technology follower for well more than a century. The imperial military first experimented with aerial reconnaissance balloons in 1877, during the Satsuma Rebellion, and their first operational use came in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War. It was during that conflict when the Imperial Japanese Navy stood up its first SIGINT unit and broke Russian codes. By that time, and for decades after, Japanese agents—some official, many not—were engaged in extensive espionage activities across Eurasia using advanced tools, including encrypted communication devices. Even so, Japanese messaging proved vulnerable to interception. Washington was privy to Japan’s negotiating positions during the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-22 and used its SIGINT advantages to intercept much of Japan’s military and diplomatic communications during World War II.

Even if its counterintelligence capabilities sometimes trailed its collection technologies, Japan was never too slow off the technological mark. Despite self-imposed constraints on the military use of space, Japan deployed transponders on the satellites of civilian agencies that transmitted images for the use of military intelligence starting at least as far back as the 1980s. Today, Japanese analysts use many of the most advanced space-based image processing technologies—reportedly being able to differentiate among five pilots and a lone protocol officer standing in line on the deck of China’s aircraft carrier.

And, like those of most other advanced nations, Japan’s intelligence community is struggling to militarize cyber capabilities to deter, if not to protect against, unwelcome intrusion.

Failure is the third, and often the most proximate, driver of intelligence reform. Clausewitz famously acknowledged intelligence failure in On War: “Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain.” Indeed, although their successes are often well hidden, intelligence communities have failed famously; Hitler’s surprise of Stalin with the treacherous Operation Barbarossa and US complacency before Japan’s attack at Pearl Harbor are just two prominent examples from World War II. Another involved Major General Charles Willoughby, who played a singularly prominent role in the postwar history of the Japanese intelligence community and who engineered “one of the most glaring failures in US military intel-
ligence history” in Korea—both on behalf of General Douglas MacArthur. The failure to coordinate intelligence on the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Washington’s willful ignorance of Saddam Hussein’s abandonment of weapons of mass destruction, and the counter-intelligence failures that abetted Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election are more recent American examples.

But intelligence failure has nowhere been more plentiful or storied than in Japan. The nineteenth-century shogunate was shaken to its knees once the capabilities of Commodore Perry’s “black ships” became known; imperial militarists and pan-Asianists were unprepared for US resolve in the Asia-Pacific War; and the most famous tactical intelligence failure of the Asia-Pacific War occurred after a US signals unit located Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku near the Solomon Islands in April 1943, allowing Admiral Chester Nimitz’s pilots to ambush his plane. In the 1970s, Richard Nixon pulled the rug out from under Japan not once but twice in “shocks” that upended the global financial community and brought China in from the cold. Subsequent unannounced and unanticipated visits by a Soviet MiG-25 in 1976 and by a North Korean missile in 1998 justified immediate changes in the way Japan practiced intelligence.

These three drivers—strategic change, technological development, and failure—forced the pace of intelligence reform in Japan in much the same way that they compelled reform elsewhere. But this is not merely a story of Japan as a normal nation. We can more easily detect what is distinctive about the history and practice of intelligence in Japan when we observe how the drivers converge with the specific activities in which national intelligence communities are engaged—the “elements” of intelligence. This volume identifies and examines six such elements over time: collection, analysis, communication, protection, covert action, and oversight.


5. This perspective is often associated with former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, but it has long been part of intelligence lore. See Thomas, Stafford T 1988, 217. “Assessing Current Intelligence Studies.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 2, no. 2: 217–44.


sions/1705143/JAPANESE%20INTELLIGENCE%20ORGANIZATIONS%20IN%20CHINA%20%20%28WWII%29_0001.pdf.


15. The National Defense Program Guidelines issued in December 2018 emphasized both offensive and defense cyber capabilities.


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It’s been a banner year for Nigerian journalist Shola Lawal. The young reporter, who focuses on human rights and social justice issues, was selected as the 2019 International Women’s Media Foundation’s Elizabeth Neuffer Fellow. The fellowship brought her to MIT this fall as a research associate at the Center for International Studies and provides further journalistic training at the Boston Globe and the New York Times. Last month, she got news from back home that she received The Future Awards Africa Prize for Journalism for making significant contributions toward that continent’s future. Finally, and just before year’s end, she is set to release her first long-form documentary. The film, “Where Powers Live,” chronicles the lives of marginalized indigenous religious worshippers in Nigeria and will be screened on campus next month.

Lawal began her career as a freelance correspondent upon graduating from the University of Lagos. She has covered such topics as women’s rights movements in Nigeria, migrants in Libya, forest reserves in Ghana, and political upheaval in Togo. During this fellowship, she is focusing on issues of injustice that sit at the intersection of certain US policies.

She sat down to discuss what it is like to work as a journalist in Nigeria, her reportage last spring on Boko Haram, and her recent trip to Mexico to investigate the migrant crisis.

The Nigerian government is notorious for putting limits on press freedom, including detaining journalists and activists. How does this impact your work?

Compared to dictatorships on the continent, Nigeria has been fairly navigable for me as a journalist. There have always been stumbling blocks with institutional corruption, secrecy and insecurity but journalists have been able to pull through. This is not to say journalists are not killed or targeted. We’ve always been. However, it has been a particularly hard time for us under President Muhammadu Buhari. He was a former military dictator who got recently re-elected. Fears that dictatorial tendencies would emerge even as a democratically elected official are being realized now. This year alone there have been raids on newsrooms by the military and persistent persecution of journalists. Critics of the government have disappeared without a trace and as we speak, a media entrepreneur is in detention indefinitely for protesting against the government.

Worse, parliament was recently pushing a social media bill that will criminalize insulting government officials with a jail term. The presidency seemed ready to sign off on it with First Lady Aisha Buhari publicly citing China as an example of a country that ‘successfully controls’ social media. Public outrage forced parliament to drop it but it is still disheartening to know that it was being seriously discussed in the first place. Policies like these negatively impact journalists and citizens in an age where digital and social media have become crucial tools for bearing witness and exposing injustice.

There is a grand strategy of fear at play here, and to be frank, it is, for the most part, effective. It’s hard not to self-censor when you know you can be kidnapped or de-
tained and that you’ll only become another statistic. It’s hard not to be scared when you see educated parliamentarians pushing such a regressive policy. I’m scared of what this means for myself and my colleagues, truly. But I’m undaunted. I continue to work even with that stomach-churning fear and so do my colleagues. That gives me hope.

The founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, died in police detention ten years ago this past October. His death led to the radicalization of the sect and it becoming a jihadist terrorist organization. You reported from the heart of the crisis just last spring. Is there any end in sight?

The end is not nearly in sight, I’m afraid. While things have been quiet on the international front regarding Boko Haram coverage, the reality on the ground is that the group continues to control pockets of territory, in northeast Nigeria. A different faction, backed by ISIS, has emerged and calls itself the Islamic State’s West Africa Province, ISWAP. Although ISIS was defeated in Syria and Iraq, it seems to have settled in Africa. The group supports networks of militia groups now operating in West Africa.

Across the region, we’ve seen an uptick in insurgency movements. They have similar strategies of guerrilla attacks and suicide bombings and they kidnap people for funds. These groups operate in the West African Sahel region, a zone that is vulnerable to climatic changes, causing even more pressure on communities there. Several countries including Nigeria, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali have been especially affected.

In Nigeria, Boko Haram’s influence has shrunk, but we will reckon with the consequences of the group’s terror for generations. Millions are displaced, languishing in camps where resources are inadequate. Many are missing. In Borno, where the insurgency started, I spoke to mothers who have not seen their sons in 10 years. The military has rounded up hundreds of young men that are suspected of terrorism without trial. Their families don’t know if they are alive or dead. Trust has been destroyed: Trust in government but even trust within communities. For a society that is big on social connections, that says a lot. For example, teenagers rescued from Boko Haram enclaves are finding it difficult to re-integrate in their communities because community members see them as insurgents too. I know we will heal as a nation, but it will take a long time.

You wrote an opinion piece for The Boston Globe on the Trump administration’s asylum ban. You described it as targeting Central American migration and that it will have a devastating impact on people who are fleeing conflict in African countries. You recently returned from a reporting trip to Mexico’s southern border. What did you learn?

It’s very easy to focus on the US-Mexico border with the administration’s emphasis on ‘the wall’, but a lot is happening on Mexico’s southern border. I was surprised
“While things have been quiet on the international front regarding Boko Haram coverage, the reality on the ground is that the group continues to control pockets of territory, in north-east Nigeria.”
“According to the Center for Responsive Politics, in 2018 Saudi Arabia spent $34 million lobbying in the United States alone.”

Politics and sports don’t mix well. Just ask Colin Kaepernick. But sometimes politics intrudes on athletic competition in a way that can’t be ignored. Thoroughbred racing, already grappling with a terrible track record of horse deaths, is enveloped in yet another political and moral catastrophe that few in the business acknowledge.

For more than two decades, horse racing has been influenced heavily by the Arab dynasties of the Persian Gulf, notably Dubai, a city-state in the United Arab Emirates. Through their rich races in March, including the $10-million Dubai World Cup, and their enormous investment in purchasing horses in the United States and Europe, the Emiratis have a vivid presence in the sport. This extraordinary immersion is led by Sheik Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum, the ruler of Dubai.

Now the Saudis are entering this glittering arena with the $20-million Saudi Cup in February. Top trainers such as Hall of Famer Bob Baffert are reportedly heading to Riyadh. According to news reports, the kingdom is not only putting up a record purse, but it will also foot the bill for getting the horses to King Abdulaziz Racetrack in Riyadh. The largesse is hard to resist.

It should be resisted, however. Both the Emirates and Saudi Arabia are repressive states that have fomented and supported large-scale violence against civilians in Yemen, among other hot spots in the region. The Saudis have paid for terrorist militias...
in Syria and jihadi-oriented schools all over the world. The Saudi war against Yemen, until recently braced by the Emiratis (and still aided by the US), is considered one of the world’s worst humanitarian disasters, with tens of thousands killed and millions on the brink of starvation.

Internal repression is equally disturbing. Saudi Arabia is in effect a totalitarian state. Its Shiite minority is marginalized and silenced. It imports workers from Pakistan (as does Dubai) who are treated like indentured servants. Women’s rights are almost nonexistent. According to the CIA, the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, ordered the murder of a US-based journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, last year.

And yet, the kingdom has gotten a nearly free pass in US political culture because of its aggressive public relations efforts. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, in 2018 Saudi Arabia spent $34 million lobbying in the United States alone. After Khashoggi’s killing, Riyadh stopped promoting the crown prince as a dynamic, young reformer and turned sharply toward “soft power” efforts—including what’s known as sportswashing.

The Saudi Cup is one of the splashiest of those efforts, and the American (and European) horse racing industry implicitly endorses the Saudis’ charm offensive with their uncritical participation in the race. One can imagine the kingdom rehabilitating the prince on the world stage as he awards the trophy to the winning trainer and owner of the Saudi Cup, to wide applause and excellent publicity. As Dubai’s World Cup has shown, chumminess with European and American elites, built around a tony horse operation, goes some distance toward elevating even a government known for its dreadful human rights record.

At some point, the leading lights of the racing industry will have to take moral responsibility for lending legitimacy to thuggish regimes like the Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

What does Mohammed bin Salman have to do to earn their opprobrium? Genocide, terrorism, oppression and murder are already afoot, so apparently the answer is that no crime will earn the racing industry’s disfavor. If it’s all about money, the Saudis’ oil economy can keep pumping out plenty of that.

We don’t expect horse trainers, jockeys and owners to be statesmen. We have a reasonable expectation, however, that they shouldn’t be collaborators, either.
“When Mohammed bin Salman decided it was important to deliver on the economy by allowing certain women’s rights, this did not include all women’s rights.”
précis: Can you describe the progress that women in Saudi Arabia have made in the last couple of years?

HA: The most important driver of recent advancements in women’s rights in Saudi Arabia is the economic crisis. Saudi Arabia’s economy has been facing a crisis since the 2014 systematic reduction in oil revenue. With the government refusing to cut public spending and subsidies, they had to find new ways to revive the private sector so that it can provide more revenue to the state. One of the main problems was that 85% of the youth, the most unemployed demographic, were women. At the same time, those women outnumbered men in terms of graduating from institutions of higher education. Foreign consultants who came to the country around 2016 and 2017 to look into how to reform the economy pointed to the restricted mobility of women, which is something that activists have been fighting against since 1990. Women are restricted by the guardianship system from being able to access their own documentation or travel for business and are banned from driving for their commute.

When Mohammed bin Salman decided it was important to deliver on the economy by allowing certain women’s rights, this did not include all women’s rights. Only those rights that encourage women to take part in the workforce were to be allowed. Issues like protection from violence and reforms to the family law were not addressed. Men can still control women in the family by reporting them as “disobedient” or “absent from home”—two offenses punishable by lashing and prison sentences.

So while more women may be consumers of public spaces, events, and recreation, and are able to engage in the workforce and in public, they are not to be emancipated completely to the point where men lose their control over women.

précis: Do you think this progress will continue?

HA: Unemployment numbers are still sky high, and there are still many women who are more educated than men but unemployed. The private sector is still dependent on state spending. I expect women’s rights to continue improving in terms of how effectively they can participate in the economy for the state’s economic growth, and also because women’s rights will continue to be important for Mohammed bin Salman to refurbish his image as a “reformer” and get the approval of his Western allies. He looks to achieve this by appointing more women, allowing more foreign women to invest in the country, allowing more foreign women tourists to enjoy the country in ways that Saudi women will not be able to, like wearing bikinis and going on tourism adventures. All of these things will help refurbish his image as a modernizer. But I would not say that Saudi Arabia is improving organically because local women’s voices will continue to be targeted and silenced. Women who have been engaging in civil society by reporting grievances and trying to influence the government’s agenda-setting will not be tolerated under Mohammed bin Salman’s rule. They are likely to become even more oppressed so that his image and his program of “reform” can go unchallenged.
précis: How has Mohammed bin Salman’s rise to power affected the ease with which activists can mobilize or press their claims?

HA: Saudi Arabia’s civil society is facing a crisis. Civil society traditionally had been given greater leniency by the state as long as they acted like charity organizations providing services to the needy while any kind of engagement in politics or making demands or trying to change the norms or cultural perceptions of people, towards migrants or women, for instance, was not allowed. Those kinds of activities were never tolerated. It was always very difficult for civil agents to mobilize and advocate for reforms, whether they were on their own or in associations, because of the nature of the regime.

This is an absolute monarchy with the ruling family has been positioning itself since the beginning of the state as the central source of power. The monarchy could not tolerate civil society agents, whether they were informing policies or documenting gaps in services and resources, because that would expose the ruling family or allow for more credible and authentic sharing of power. But even though the monarchical family was never tolerant of civil society as political actors, there used to be a margin of space, especially the online space, where people could protect themselves by seeking safety in numbers. The call for reform, such as lifting the ban on women driving, was advocated by so many people under the cloak of online features like hashtags that it was hard for the regime to pinpoint the blame on individual women.

But this has changed. Mohammed bin Salman has positioned himself to be the owner of “reforms.” For him to get that credit, whether it’s domestically or globally, there can only be his voice and only his narrative. Today you won’t find any independent journalists inside Saudi Arabia. Most are imprisoned, silenced, or exiled—or assassinated like Jamal Khashoggi. The only reporting or coverage in Saudi Arabia is along the official government line.

Mohammed bin Salman, in restructuring the political landscape, wanted anybody who might pose a challenge to him to be silenced, whether by locking them up or targeting them with the death penalty or extra-judicial killing. Civil society is now basically developing in exile. Many activists, after the several waves of arrest that happened, have chosen to either remain silent or leave Saudi Arabia and continue their advocacy from outside.

précis: How long do you think Mohammed bin Salman can sustain his image as a “reformer” in the Western media and publics?

HA: It is important to sustain and foster the voices of local journalists. For instance, Jamal Khashoggi’s one-year reporting on the inner politics of Saudi Arabia was more informative than all the American journalists’ coverage, which praised Mohammed bin Salman as a “reformer” or as someone who is breaking from the radical heritage of Islam. You get more realistic reporting when you have the experiences and nuances about reality from people who are from the region as part of the story. When you read journalists based in the region who are actually engaging with the people, they have a completely different story to tell than those who are only listening to the powerful elites and reproducing reports that are not well-informed.
For people who are coming to cover the region, please listen to the local people and build real relationships that are not based on just one story. Delve deep into the lived experiences of the people, which I understand is very difficult due to the restrictions on media and press freedom in general and on women and civil society in particular. Many of the journalists covering the Middle East will find it more and more difficult to find independent voices to comment on their stories or find people willing to be a part of their story because they can no longer do so safely. Even if they do find a local person who can comment for a one-off story, they will likely just repeat the official narrative in order to protect themselves and their identity, which again highlights the need for more investigative research and foreign journalists who are willing to participate fully in the lived experience of the local people.

“Today you won’t find any independent journalists inside Saudi Arabia. Most are imprisoned, silenced, or exiled—or assassinated like Jamal Khashoggi. The only reporting or coverage in Saudi Arabia is along the official government line.”
Pursuing big questions is a part of the MIT ethos, says Fiona Cunningham PhD ’19.

“Walking through the Infinite Corridor, you can see what people are doing in this space. There is such dedication across the Institute to solving big problems. There is dedication to doing the best work, without hubris, and often without a break. I find this so exciting, and it’s a huge part of what makes me so proud to be an alumna. This dedication will stay with me forever.”

Cunningham completed her PhD at the Department of Political Science, where she was also a member of the Security Studies Program. Her work explores how technology affects warfare in the post-Cold War era. She studies how nations—China specifically—plan to use technology in conflict to achieve their aims.

“I want to understand the changing nature of warfare and how new technologies have become both opportunities and restraints for countries in international politics. These questions are the kinds of questions that global leaders are thinking about when they are grappling with the rise of China, how technology factors into the current US-China trade war, and how technology does or doesn’t fit within national boundaries.”

She received the Lucian Pye Award for outstanding PhD thesis. The award was established by the political science department in 2005 and recipients are determined by the graduate studies committee. Pye was a leading China scholar who taught political science at MIT for 35 years.

“Fiona’s thesis was exemplary. She asked an important question that bears on the future of peace and stability among nations, and conducted an impressive amount of original research about a topic that is especially challenging to study. In this way, she combined academic rigor with policy relevance,” says Taylor Fravel, the Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and director of the Security Studies Program.
The road to China

Cunningham was born and raised in Australia, where the influences of neighboring East Asia are strong. This is what led to her initial curiosity about the region. After high school, she took a gap year and spent part of it in China, where she was drawn into the culture and politics—and the challenge of learning Chinese.

She returned to Australia for her undergraduate studies and recalls two pivotal experiences that guided her academic path: a visiting semester at Harvard University, where she got a taste for the US approach to studying international relations, and working as a research associate at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, an Australian think tank. There she worked with Rory Medcalf, whose early attention to the international security challenges created by the rise of China really helped shape her research questions, says Cunningham.

After those experiences, she knew what she wanted to study and she knew she wanted to study at MIT.

“I chose MIT because no other political science graduate program had such strengths in both East Asia and security studies. And, as someone who has always been interested in science and technology and its impact on international politics, the idea that I would be at an Institute where so much brain power is dedicated to advancing the scientific and technological aspects of how our societies, businesses, and militaries operate was amazing!”

A model community

The Department of Political Science and the Security Studies Program provided a thriving community for Cunningham.

The faculty and scholars she worked with—Taylor Fravel, Vipin Narang, Barry Posen, Owen Coté, Frank Gavin—are models of how to do rigorous scholarship about the things that really matter for the way our world works, she says: “They somehow contribute fully to the discipline and the public debate, which is both super-human and very inspiring.”

Fravel served as her dissertation chair. “Taylor was my mentor, my professor, and, in addition to that, my co-author. I was so fortunate to be able to learn how to think, research, write, and teach from him in all of those roles.”

Fravel and Cunningham co-authored a paper in 2015 on China’s nuclear strategy. They have a forthcoming paper delving further into that topic that examines China’s views of nuclear escalation.

Three women—Lena Andrews ’18, Marika Landau-Wells ’18, and Ketian Zhang ’19—went through the program with Cunningham. “We really helped each other and we will always have a special bond.”
The support she found in these relationships, plus her family, has been a source of inspiration. "My parents have always encouraged me to do something I was passionate about, do it really well, and to do something that will make a difference," she says.

**Breaking new ground**

Cunningham joined George Washington University as assistant professor of political science and international affairs this fall after completing a postdoctoral fellowship at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.

She chose an academic track because she wants the freedom to continue to pursue the international relations questions she finds most important.

It is also her strong ambition to continue doing fieldwork, especially within China.

"I want to see the problems I research through the eyes of people on the front lines. In addition to my fieldwork in China, the Security Studies Program provided me with these kinds of experiences through field trips to US military bases during graduate school. You can't get that from a book."

She also looks forward to teaching. "For me, teaching is about teaching students how to think critically about future problems, and how to write and communicate their analysis and their thinking."

Cunningham had the opportunity to serve as a teaching assistant in undergraduate courses while at MIT. "The students at MIT are so capable. They would bring their STEM background to topics like cybersecurity and the causes of war. I would walk away amazed! If these students are our future, then our world will be good hands."

As a professor, she aims to help her students consider the consequences, both intended and unintended, of employing technology. She wants them to think about the political questions that come into play both now and into the future.

MIT really gets you attuned to this crossover of technology and its social and political implications, she explains.

The San Francisco (California) Bay Area, where she has spent the last year, provided fertile ground for her to dig deeper.

"Silicon Valley is the innovation engine of the US economy, and arguably the world economy. I've been looking around there to see what are the next political science questions. What is the next big question that sits at the intersection of technology and conflict? And what role does great power competition play in the day-to-day life of tech companies? What is the role of individuals and the companies they are running in making decisions that have big political implications?"

Pursuing big questions is a part of Cunningham's ethos. This dedication will stay with her forever.
On May 3, 1946, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) officially opened, with film cameras whirring and flashbulbs popping. The spectacle was planned to attract the world’s attention, which it did, although not as a well-orchestrated triumph for justice. The courthouse was located inside the large former War Ministry building, in the Ichigaya District of Tokyo. The War Ministry was positioned high on a hill and protected by a fence and armed Allied guards. Starting at 7 AM that morning, two lines formed, one at the side entrance for the Japanese, the other at the main door for the Allies and their guests. The defendants, on public view for the first time since Japan’s defeat, were driven over in a bus from Sugamo Prison. Two hours later, the nine judges arrived in limousines.

At a cost of a million dollars, the ministry’s gymnasium and assembly area for cadets had been transformed into a replica of the Nuremberg court, high-ceilinged, with oversized windows, in grand European style. By 10 AM all the gallery seats were filled and the press box on the ground floor was jammed with a mix of Western and Japanese reporters.

At 10:30, the Klieg lights hanging from the ceiling were switched on and the filming began. Spectators and news reporters leaned forward expectantly as 26 well-guarded defendants (two were still in transit) filed into the courtroom, on public view for the first time since the war’s end. After a forty minute delay Court President Sir William Webb led the judges into the hushed, packed courtroom and up the stairs to the bench. The order of the judges’ seating had been determined by Webb, in consultation with General MacArthur. Webb was at the center, with the only microphone on the bench reserved for him. On his immediate left was China’s Judge Mei, who had argued successfully to be seated in a place of privilege. Next to Mei was Judge Zarayanov from the USSR, followed by France’s Bernard, and New Zealand’s Northcroft. On Webb’s right was US Judge Higgins and next to him Britain’s Lord Patrick (whom Mei had displaced), followed by Judge McDougall of Canada, and the Netherlands Judge Röling. The two end seats were reserved for the most junior members, the Philippine’s Judge Jaranilla and India’s Judge Pal, still to arrive.

President Webb made a brief opening statement, which was then translated into Japanese. He spoke of the bench’s commitment to administer justice fairly. “To our great task,” he said, “we bring open minds on both the facts and the law. The onus will be on the prosecution to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” To finish, he waxed even more grandiloquent: “There has been no more important criminal trial in all history.”

Following a brief preamble by Chief of Counsel Joseph Keenan, the prosecution began by reading Count 1, from which the other 54 counts, more or less coherently expressed, had been derived. From January 1, 1928 until September 2, 1945, the charge went, the defendants together and with others participated in a common plan, whose object was “that Japan should secure the military, naval, political and economic domination of East Asia and of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and of all countries and islands therein and bordering thereon and for that purpose should alone or in combination with other countries having similar objects, or who could be induced or coerced to join therein, wage declared or undeclared war or wars of aggression, and war or wars in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances, against any country or countries which might oppose that purpose.”

And so, the charge continued, to the detriment of the Japanese people, the defendants engaged in a conspiracy with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy to “secure the

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Firms and the state in Chinese overseas investments
John Minnich, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science

“Do Chinese multinational enterprises, like their counterparts in the West or Japan and South Korea, base their investment decisions primarily on commercial interests, or do they invest abroad in order to advance Beijing’s political and strategic agenda?”
Long the world’s leading destination for foreign direct investment (FDI), China in the past decade has emerged as a key supplier of investment capital to the international system, as well. Indeed, Chinese outbound FDI flows grew from virtually nothing before 2005 to nearly $200 billion in 2016, making it the second largest overseas investor in terms of both annual flows and FDI stocks after the United States. Weaker economic growth at home and a trade war with the US caused Chinese outbound FDI to slow after 2017. Nonetheless, China will almost certainly remain one of the world’s top overseas investors for the foreseeable future.

In line with its astonishing growth, Chinese FDI has become increasingly contentious in many countries. Governments in wealthy industrial democracies now frequently investigate and sometimes outright block FDI from China into sectors like telecommunications and energy. Meanwhile, public perceptions that Chinese firms engage in unfair labor and lending practices or that Chinese investment exacerbates corruption and environmental degradation have provoked political backlash against China in some low- and middle-income countries. In particular, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a potentially multi-trillion dollar effort to link China to the rest of Eurasia and beyond via basic infrastructure, has become something of a political lightning rod. In 2019, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo lambasted the BRI as a form of “bribe-fueled debt-trap diplomacy” in service of China’s “imperial ambitions.” His views have been widely echoed in the mainstream media and policy community in the US and beyond.

Two questions underpin the debate over the consequences of Chinese FDI. First, what are the Chinese government’s intentions for the international system and for its own place within it? Second, to what extent does FDI from China reflect or serve these intentions? Put another way, do Chinese multinational enterprises, like their counterparts in the West or Japan and South Korea, base their investment decisions primarily on commercial interests, or do they invest abroad in order to advance Beijing’s political and strategic agenda, its “imperial ambitions”?

Firms and the State

It is beyond the scope of this essay to answer the question of China’s intentions. To begin to suggest that states have intentions requires that we make sometimes strong assumptions about the degree of state unity and coherence. In reality, even in countries like China where the foreign policy decision-making process is relatively centralized it is not always clear that the state is a unitary actor. And if, for argument’s sake, we assume that China’s government is a unitary actor, we must still confront the fact that intentions are, if not perfectly inscrutable, then complex and prone to change with shifts in the balance of power and other factors.

Against this backdrop, scholars of Chinese FDI have tended to bracket the larger question of China’s intentions and instead focus on unbundling the relationship between Chinese multinationals and China’s state. Views of this relationship generally fall into one of two broad camps.
In one camp, analysts point to the fact that most Chinese multinationals are centrally-administered state-owned enterprises, and that even private firms like Alibaba and Huawei are believed to have close ties to the country’s central leadership, as clear evidence that state-level political and strategic goals inform or even determine where Chinese businesses invest abroad. To bolster this inference, they point to evidence that Chinese firms’ overseas investment behavior differs systematically from that of Western multinationals, most of which are private and whose FDI decisions are generally seen as commercially, not politically, motivated. For example, whereas “traditional” overseas investors tend to prefer to invest in countries with strong political institutions and low levels of political risk, all else equal, Chinese multinationals appear to prefer the opposite: countries with weaker institutions and higher levels of political risk. If Chinese firms were primarily profit-driven commercial actors, the argument goes, then we should expect them to invest in much the same way as multinationals from other countries. That they do not is seen as indicative of the non-commercial—that is, political or strategic—motives behind Chinese FDI.

In the other camp, some scholars argue that state control over firm-level investment behavior is often tenuous even for the most closely-held state-owned enterprises. In this view, divergent preference schedules, information asymmetries, and other challenges to monitoring and enforcement render the principal-agent relationship between China’s government and Chinese firms much more problematic than first meets the eye. This is not to deny that the state can sometimes shape broad incentive structures for Chinese multinationals. Indeed, the Belt and Road Initiative, like Beijing’s earlier “Going Out” program of the mid-2000s, exemplifies how China’s state uses policy initiatives to channel outbound investment towards certain parts of the world and certain industries, for example energy and basic infrastructure. Nonetheless, scholars in this camp emphasize that the conditions under which China’s government directly and strongly influences firm-level behavior are fairly restrictive. According to this view, apart from a small number of government-directed “prestige projects,” when it comes to overseas investment Chinese firms are “at best imperfect agents” of the state.

The stakes of the debate

Understanding the relationship between Chinese firms and China’s government matters for both theory and policy. On the theory front, if Chinese firms do act as agents of the state in their overseas investment behavior, then scholars of international political economy must reconsider the scope conditions of dominant theories of the political determinants of FDI, virtually all of which proceed from the assumption that firms are independent of their host governments. After all, if state control leads Chinese firms to invest in ways that differ from “traditional” multinationals, and if Chinese FDI (not to mention FDI from other non-Western non-democracies) is likely to grow in the future, then it follows that aggregate patterns of FDI flows may shift in the years ahead, with important distributional consequences for recipient countries.

By the same token, if Chinese firms do not generally act as agents of the Chinese state, then we need new explanations for why their investment behavior nonetheless
diverges from past precedent and expectations derived from existing theories. For example, it may be that commercial interests largely explain why Chinese multinationals invest where they do, but that Chinese firms face risks and uncertainties in countries with strong political institutions (including many democracies) that their Western or Japanese or South Korean counterparts do not. These risks, which may be a function of differences in institutional environments or even a response to fears of mounting political backlash against China in certain kinds of countries, may explain observed differences in Chinese versus non-Chinese FDI behavior.

On the policy front, how decisionmakers in the US and beyond perceive the relationship between firms and the state in China will likely powerfully influence how they respond to Chinese FDI. The more Chinese multinationals are seen as agents of the state, the more prone host governments will be to view Chinese investment as a potential threat to national security. At the extreme, this “securitization” of Chinese FDI could lead recipient countries like the United States not only to more closely scrutinize incoming investments from China, but to actively work to contain Chinese firms’ activities in third party countries. At the very least, the belief that Beijing’s strategic ambitions drive Chinese firms’ behavior overseas exacerbates fears that China harbors broadly revisionist aspirations and is thus a threat to the US-dominated liberal world order.

To begin to suggest that states have intentions requires that we make sometimes strong assumptions about the degree of state unity and coherence. In reality, even in countries like China where the foreign policy decision-making process is relatively centralized it is not always clear that the state is a unitary actor.


Jonathan Gruber joined the MIT Policy Lab at the Center for International Studies as a core faculty member in 2017. Gruber discusses the importance of faculty members engaging in public policy, as well as some successes of the Policy Lab.

What is the MIT Policy Lab and why did you decide to join the program?

The MIT Policy Lab is a vital initiative begun out of the Center for International Studies, which provided seed funding that was then supplemented by the dean of the School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences (SHASS) and the provost. The idea of this initiative is to build a series of connections between MIT faculty and policymakers.

While there is a whole host of policy-relevant research being carried out at MIT, there are two important barriers to that work influencing policy decisions: the translation of sometimes quite complicated research findings into policy relevant lessons, and making the connections between MIT faculty and relevant government policymakers.

So far, this initiative has been very successful in overcoming both of these barriers. Our excellent managing director, Daniel Pomeroy, has wide-ranging experience in a variety of scientific fields, as well as experience in science policy in Washington, DC, making him a perfect person to help faculty members translate their work into policy-relevant discussions. Our generous funding from SHASS and the provost has allowed us to provide financial support to faculty who want to dedicate time to this activity and/or hire students to help. And the connections of all of our leadership in government, as well as partnership with the MIT Washington Office, has allowed us to make valuable connections between researchers and policymakers.
Jonathan Gruber is the Ford Professor of Economics at MIT and director of the Health Care Program at the National Bureau of Economic Research. An associate editor of both the Journal of Public Economics and the Journal of Health Economics, he has been heavily involved in crafting public health policy.

I learned about the Policy Lab through discussions with MIT leadership about my frustrations with the lack of translation of MIT’s research to the policy landscape. When I found out about the Policy Lab I was very excited to realize that an institution already existed to facilitate this translation.

Why is it important for faculty to engage with public policymakers?

In my view, one of the central fights in the US today is over the role of expertise and the scientific method more generally. Traditionally, when policymakers wanted to make decisions over technically complicated issues, they and their staff turned to subject-matter experts to help. This process was supported by the public’s respect for such experts; after all, Time magazine once named “US Scientists” as Man of the Year!

Both the public support for scientific expertise and policymakers’ willingness to rely on evidence have diminished over time. Partly this reflects a set of political developments which have led to general lack of respect for expertise or the use of the scientific method over personal intuition and biases. But the problem is exasperated by an increasingly specialized and distant base of academics who are interested solely in impressing each other, and not providing translation of their insights to the general public.

For both of these reasons, it is a critical time for academics to focus some of their energy on engaging with policymakers and the public. The Policy Lab is an excellent resource for facilitating those interactions.

What are the most successful aspects of the program?

Two different aspects of the Policy Lab have been very pleasant surprises to me. The first is faculty excitement and willingness to engage with the program. I thought that the Policy Lab would have to work hard to get any faculty to participate. But I was, fortunately, very wrong: From the beginning there have been an abundance of faculty who are very excited about this initiative and eager to participate. Indeed, we have been unable to support all of the requests that we have received! The fact that there is this pre-existing demand for an initiative of this type is very exciting.

The second is the ability of the Policy Lab to leverage relatively the limited time of our staff and small grants to make real and valuable connections in the policy world. A variety of projects have already yielded significant impacts, on topics as diverse as using fluid dynamics to predict the transmission of disease and using predictive modeling to help assess the environmental implications of deep-sea mining. These are vital policy issues that cannot be effectively addressed without the kind of scholarly work that MIT brings to bear—and we are seeing that expertise being used to make a real difference.

The model that the MIT Policy Lab has created over the last five years has proven to be an effective and efficient way to connect MIT research to public policy. I hope that we can continue to build on these successes to provide a platform for broadly sharing the enormous policy-relevant knowledge base at MIT with the world.
“We’ve been here before,” Suzanne Berger said. “The first globalization...ended on one day,” she added, referring to Aug 4, 1914, when Britain declared war on Germany.
We are living in an age of populism, according to a wide array of pundits and politicians. But what does that mean, exactly? Some high-profile scholars examined that issue at an MIT public forum on Thursday, discussing the key hallmarks of populism, as well as its relationship to global economics.

While populist politicians have growing prominence and power in Europe and around the world, arriving at a working definition of the subject is not easy, noted MIT political scientist Richard Samuels, in introductory remarks.

Populism is “a very complex phenomenon,” said Samuels, the Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of the MIT Center for International Studies (CIS), adding that there is significant “diversity that’s hidden…within the simple label of populism.”

Moreover, Samuels said, the promises of populists during campaigns do not always match the reasons they seek power, making it all the more important to look under the surface of the movement.

“They run for the people, [and] they run against the establishment,” Samuels said. However, he added, “They run for themselves, above all.”

Thursday’s event, “The Rise of Global Populism,” was held in MIT’s Bartos Theater, with an audience of about 200 people. The panel was part of the Starr Forum series.

The event featured two other scholars: Jan-Werner Mueller, a professor of politics at Princeton University and author of the recent book “What Is Populism?” and Suzanne Berger, a professor of political science and MIT’s inaugural John M Deutch Institute Professor. Berger has extensively studied both popular politics, especially in rural Europe, and the dynamics of globalization and industrial production.

As Mueller noted in his remarks, all kinds of politicians have been granted the populist label in recent years—even French president Emmanuel Macron, an unapologetic technocrat, has been called a “populist of the extreme center.”

Nonetheless, Mueller suggested, a useable definition of populism should be focused on a commonality of populist politicians: They always claim “a monopoly for representing the people” in politics.

“Populists are going to say that all other contenders for power are fundamentally illegitimate,” Mueller said, noting that this has “dangerous consequences” for democracies.
In a related vein, Mueller noted, populists consistently claim their own supporters are the “real” citizens of a given country. For instance, he explained, when the Brexit referendum won at the polls in June 2016, the pro-Brexit politician Nigel Farage declared the outcome a “victory for real people” in Britain, despite the narrow 52-48 margin.

“The populist decides who ‘truly’ belongs to the people, and who doesn’t,” said Mueller. “What is distinctive and dangerous about populism is, for shorthand, antipluralism, the tendency always to exclude.”

Mueller also devoted a significant portion of his remarks to his contention that populists, perhaps contrary to common perception, do not just win elections, but can also govern well enough to meet their political goals.

“Not only can populists govern, they can govern as, fundamentally, populists,” Mueller. Populist leaders might preside over deeply divided electorates, but they practice “mass clientalism,” with policies targeted to reward their own supporters.

While Mueller’s remarks focused more on building a robust definition of populism, Berger discussed the relationship between populism and globalization—which is often regarded as a driver of populist sentiment and unrest, by hollowing out wages and jobs in industrialized countries.

As Berger noted, an expanding group of scholars and writers has called for a halt or a slowing to globalization. Indeed, Berger—who is also working on a new book about globalization—noted that it is by no means an inevitable phenomenon. The world experienced what she called its first modern-scale globalization in the late 1800s and early 1900s, only for World War I to bring the process to a sudden halt.

“We’ve been here before,” Berger said. “The first globalization…ended on one day,” she added, referring to Aug 4, 1914, when Britain declared war on Germany.

“Border walls went up all around the world, and they didn’t come down again until the 1980s,” Berger said. “Capital markets were more integrated in the 1880s than they were in the 1970s.”

Using history as a guide, then, Berger noted, “globalization could end,” especially if economic barriers become a common part of populist policymaking. And in Berger’s view, that could lead to increased economic distress.

“The possibility that protectionism will lead to a recession is a very real one,” Berger said.

However, as Berger said in her remarks, while “slowing the pace” of globalization may help democratic politics, she does not regard a rolling back of global economic connections to be desirable. The larger problem, Berger suggested, is not globalization in itself, but a globalizing economy that has not been accompanied by inclusive politics.
The “first globalization,” Berger said, “was actually a period when democracy expanded and consolidated,” noting that it took place in an era of wider voting rights and other reforms in industrialized nations. “Most of these reforms were won in hard-fought battles [led by] unions, from strikes, and [from] large-scale mobilizations.” In those cases, she added, “elites acted out of necessity and out of concern for social peace... and in order to build coalitions that would support opening the borders.”

To sustain globalization without producing a further backlash from populist leaders and their followers, then, Berger suggested it was necessary to “build organizations that can bring the voices of those most affected by globalization into policy.”

To be sure, she added, “building such a coalition is going to be very difficult. But it’s what we need to make good on our old promises to make globalization a lever to help everyone. ...We need a politics capable of massive initiatives in state and society.”

For his part, Mueller also suggested that mass democracy and greater political participation would not necessarily feed the current populist movement, and indeed might limit the trend.

“It’s not the people who destroy democracies,” Mueller said. “It’s the elites. You might say, ‘Well, sounds like a populist.’ But I remind you: Not all critics of elites are populists.”
briefings

Jeanne Guillemin, biological warfare expert, dies at 76
Michelle English, CIS

Shortly before her death, she established an endowed fund at CIS to provide financial support to female PhD candidates studying international affairs.

Jeanne Guillemin, a medical anthropologist and biological warfare expert, died on Nov. 15, 2019, at her home in Cambridge, Massachusetts. She was 76.

Guillemin received her bachelor’s degree in social psychology from Harvard University in 1968 and her doctorate in sociology and anthropology from Brandeis University in 1973. She was a professor of international relations and anthropology at Boston College, where she taught for 33 years.

From 2006 until her death, she served as a senior advisor to the MIT Security Studies Program (SSP).

"Jeanne was a great scholar, with a ferocious appetite for getting to the bottom of whatever history she chose to study. Beyond her scholarship, she enlivened the Security Studies Program with both her wit and her charm, while also serving as a role model for our community, especially women scholars. She will be missed," says Taylor Fravel, Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and director of SSP.

Guillemin was instrumental in launching a women’s international speakers series at the MIT Center for International Studies (CIS), which has been effective in reaching women graduate students, fellows, and faculty in the greater Boston, Massachusetts area.

Shortly before her death, she established an endowed fund at CIS to provide financial support to female PhD candidates studying international affairs. She described her gift as a resource to graduate students to help energize their sense of inquiry and search for knowledge. The first disbursements of this fund will be made in the spring for the next academic year.
Jeanne Guillemin was described by The New York Times as a “scientific sleuth” and the Washington Post as a “pioneering researcher” in obituaries that lauded her groundbreaking work in biological warfare—a field where men had long outnumbered their female colleagues.

Jeanne Guillemin was a model of interdisciplinary excellence to all—and especially women. Her endowment was such a gracious and thoughtful gesture on her part. We will always remember Jeanne and the contributions she made to our community and beyond,” says Richard Samuels, the Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of CIS.

The New York Times described her as a “scientific sleuth” and The Washington Post as a “pioneering researcher” in obituaries that lauded her groundbreaking work in biological warfare—a field where men had long outnumbered their female colleagues.

Indeed, she was a sought-after analyst on the use of biological weapons and published four books on the topic.


With a MacArthur Foundation writing award, she next wrote “Biological Weapons: The History of State-sponsored Programs and Contemporary Bioterrorism” (Columbia University Press, 2005), a valued course text.


In addition to consulting and lecturing, she was a member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on WMD (2009-13), served on the board of Transaction Books, and was an associate of the Harvard-Sussex Program on chemical and biological weapons disarmament.

Her family has requested that gifts in her memory be made to the Jeanne E Guillemin fund at MIT.
Expanding education: From Africa to Cambridge and back again

Laura Carter, School of Science

For Mgcini “Keith” Phuthi ’19, spending a summer in Africa was more than a trip back to his home continent after graduation. It was an opportunity to directly impact national policy regarding education in the country of Sierra Leone.

Originally from Zimbabwe, Phuthi, who majored in physics and minored in mechanical engineering, was looking for a particular combination of purposes in his third experience with the MIT International Science and Technology Initiatives (MISTI): a return to Africa and a chance to explore his passion for education. “I initially thought I would have to choose one or the other, but when I talked to the [MISTI-Africa] program manager about what I could do in Africa, he mentioned the Sierra Leone opportunity.”

Around the world and back again

Ari Jacobovits, the managing director of the MISTI-Africa program, was equally thrilled to match up a student with his ideal project. “What I try to do with every interested student is sit down with them, see what interests them, and build from there. When I met Keith, he obviously had a lot of experience in Africa, being from Zimbabwe, but he also had a particular passion for education,” says Jacobovits. “It’s exciting to facilitate interactions such as Keith’s between the southern region and the western region, thousands of miles apart.”

This was an ideal chance to get hands-on for Phuthi, who often asks himself how to drive higher qualities into educational systems, particularly in regions where science interest and exposure is low. “I felt they could serve as a model for other countries,” he says of Sierra Leone, “and I wanted to be a part of that.”

The mission of the MIT-Africa initiative, an Institute-wide effort, the principles of which help guide MISTI-Africa, is to seek mutually beneficial research, education, and innovation, contributing to economic and intellectual trajectories of African countries, while advancing MIT scholarship and research. “We are always looking to build engagement and collaboration with leading partners and institutions around questions of global import because the solutions to many of the world’s most pressing challenges are found, and will continue to be found, in Africa,” Jacobovits says.

Homeward bound

After a visit to MIT by a delegation from Sierra Leone this past March, Phuthi was excited. “A big draw was the incredible ambition and enthusiasm the delegation had,” he says. The delegation included President Julius Maada Bio and an MIT Media Lab alumnus, David Moinina Sengeh SM ’12, PhD ’16, who grew up in Sierra Leone and is now the chief innovation officer for the newly created Directorate of Science, Technology and Innovation (DSTI), uniquely located within the Office of the President in Sierra Leone.
“What I try to do with every interested student is sit down with them, see what interests them, and build from there,” said Ari Jacobovits, the managing director of the MIT-Africa program at MISTI.

Recently, Sierra Leone’s government has directed significant attention and funding toward science, technology, and innovation. This includes 21 percent of the country’s budget, invested in improving education and lowering the country’s high illiteracy rate — at present, 60 percent of adults in Sierra Leone are unable to read or write. DSTI and the University of Sierra Leone’s Institute of Public Administration and Management went so far as to sign a five-year memorandum of understanding to support this goal.

Educational systems are always evolving to better fit the information being taught, but they also need to accommodate the needs of the society they serve. Before any amelioration efforts can be made, the government needs to have a firm understanding of the present, including cataloging education levels, identifying the areas that need attention, and determining the best methods for addressing issues observed.

**Education built on education**

One project Phuthi helped develop was the national education dashboard for K-12 schooling, one of the first of its kind, he says. The dashboard required cataloging information about the status of education across Sierra Leone. The task called on his experience with data processing and validation pipelines during his physics research in the Laboratory for Nuclear Science under Department of Physics Professor Joseph Formaggio. “This drew a lot on my scientific background in developing metrics, quantifying uncertainties, and building models.”

“But having accurate data wasn’t enough,” Phuthi says. “We needed to use data science and data visualization to develop narratives and models that answer the questions decision-makers might have.” These included complex logistical details such as the route a new government-purchased school bus should take and the optimal locations for the government to build new schools.

To answer these questions, Phuthi also considered other experiences he gained at MIT, such as teaching assistantships and courses in the Education Studies Program, and even conversations he’s had with people from all over the world, including students. It has become a huge benefit to have stepped outside his fields of science and engineering and attend School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences classes in the Teaching Systems Lab. “My hope was to draw on these experiences to help design solutions to improving education in sub-Saharan Africa, and I think I managed to do so,” Phuthi reflects. The progress of DSTI’s current projects can be seen as bar graphs on their website, depicting most as over half complete. The Education Data Hub, the focus of Phuthi’s work, is far enough along to deploy an interactive website for testing.

At the end of the summer, he joined Michel Reda, an electrical engineering and computer science major in her third year, and Hazel Sive, biology professor faculty director of the MIT-Africa program, for a three-day short course. There, he, Reda, and Sive spoke to faculty at Sierra Leone’s Njala University about the best practices for higher education. “It felt like we really got people thinking in the room,” Phuthi says about the forum that generated a report for future policy changes regarding higher education.
Starr Forums
The Center hosted a series of public forums including: “The Global Rise of Populism” with Suzanne Berger (MIT), and Jan-Werner Mueller (Princeton); “America’s Immigration Dilemma” with Cristina Rodriguez (Yale) and Justin Steil (MIT); “Digital Feminism in the Arab Gulf States” with Mona Eltahawy (American-Egyptian journalist) and Hala Aldosari (Saudi scholar, activist and Robert E Wilhelm Fellow at CIS); and “Iran Reframed” with Narges Bajoghli (Johns Hopkins University) and Mahsa Rouhi (International Institute for Strategic Studies).

CIS hosts consuls general meeting
The Center hosted Boston-area consuls general for a foreign policy briefing by our faculty and scholars. Seventeen consuls and officials, along with several Boston-based journalists, attended the September 26 event at the Samberg conference center. The talks, followed by a question-and-answer session, covered a range of topics: Trump’s grand strategy (Barry Posen), Russian politics (Elizabeth Wood, Carol Saivetz), cybersecurity’s new challenges (Joel Brenner), the new nuclear age (Vipin Narang), China’s military strategy (Taylor Fravel), Japan’s grand strategy (Richard Samuels), Asian strategic dynamics (Eric Heginbotham), human rights in Saudi Arabia (Hala Aldosari), winning a war of ideas against ISIS (Richard Nielsen), and the US-Iran confrontation (Jim Walsh).

New Human Rights & Technology Fellows
In its second year, the Human Rights & Technology Program has awarded seven research fellowships to MIT students, with a total of ten fellows, six undergraduate and four graduate students. The fellowship is co-directed by John Tirman (executive director and principal research scientist at CIS) and Anat Biletzki (CIS affiliate and professor of philosophy at Quinnipiac) and is intended to produce new knowledge about the relationship between human rights and technology.

Fravel named director of the MIT Security Studies Program
M Taylor Fravel, Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science, became director of the MIT Security Studies Program on July 1. Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of SSP since 2006, announced the leadership transition. Posen will continue his research and teaching responsibilities at MIT. At SSP, he will continue leading the Grand Strategy, Security and Statecraft Initiative.
Pat Gercik, visionary of the MIT Japan Program, dies

Pat Gercik, the visionary manager of the MIT-Japan Program and of MISTI in its early years, passed away after a long illness at her home in Cambridge. She was raised in post-war Japan (her family having immigrated to the country in 1918), joined the MIT-Japan Program in 1987 and was with MISTI and MIT-Japan for 26 years. She authored “On Track,” a Japanese case-study book about building trust across cultures; and “The Outsider,” set in the chaos of post-war Japan, a vivid exploration of the political turmoil between the Japanese right and left and the impact of the American occupation through the eyes of a child.

Over 1,000 students, researchers to India in two decades

A recent event organized by the Indian Embassy highlighted the activities of MISTI’s MIT-India Program and discussed a path forward to achieve greater collaboration with MIT to meet future science and technology goals in India. Professor Pawan Sinha, who leads the MIT-India Program, discussed various activities to engage MIT with institutions in India. For example, MISTI’s Global Startup Labs cultivate and empower young tech entrepreneurs in India and includes a six to eight-week entrepreneurship boot-camp taught by MIT students. The courses focus on mobile and internet technologies, and are designed to awaken participants to the commercial possibilities of these technologies.

SSP Wednesday Seminars

The Security Studies Program’s lunchtime series included: Bear Braumoeller, Ohio State University, on “International Order and the Persistence of War”; Jacquelyn Schneider, Stanford University, on “Wargaming “War Games”: How Likely is Thermoneutral Cyber War?”; Mary Sarotte, Johns Hopkins University, on “How to Enlarge NATO: The Debate Inside the Clinton Administration, 25 Years On”; Mary Ellen O’Connell, University of Notre Dame, on “Killer Robots Killing the Rule of Law?”; and Cynthia Roberts, Hunter College, CUNY, on “Blowback and Escalation Risks from the US Weaponization of Finance”; and Rosemary Kelanic, University of Notre Dame, on “Oil and Great Power Strategy”.

Focus on Russia

Each semester the MIT Security Studies Program, together with the MISTI MIT-Russia Program, and the MIT Center for International Studies, presents a speaker series entitled “Focus on Russia,” which considers a number of current issues in Russian domestic and foreign policies. The fall semester’s events included: “The Lands in Between: Russia vs The West and the New Politics of Hybrid War” (Mitchell A Orenstein, University of Pennsylvania) and “The Kremlin’s Global Outreach: From Cyber to Russians Abroad” (Andre Soldatov, a Russian investigative journalist and Russian security services and Irina Borogan, a Russian investigative journalist).
CIS Robert E Wilhelm Fellow Hala Aldosari gave talks at the Fall 2019 Biannual McMillan-Stewart Lecture on Women in the Developing World, Panel on Freedom of Expression at the 67th Elijah Parish Lovejoy Award, New Yorker Annual Festival, the Arab Center Annual Conference, and the Starr Forum discussion on digital feminism in the Arab Gulf states with Mona Eltahawy. Aldosari was awarded the 2019 Leaders for Democracy Award from the Project on Democracy and Human Rights in the Middle East, and became Saudi Arabia’s ambassador for the Human Rights Measurement Initiative.

PhD Candidate Nasir Almasri testified at the Massachusetts Legislature’s Joint Committee on State Administration and Regulatory Oversight Hearing on House Bills 1877, 2719, and 2722. He also testified in support of H1877 to change the state flag and seal and in opposition to H2719 and H2722, which attempt to make it illegal for individuals with state contracts to boycott other countries (primarily Israel).

Suzanne Berger was named Institute Professor, as the inaugural holder of the John M Deutsch Institute Professorship.

CIS Senior Research Fellow Joel Brenner was appointed a member of the Intelligence Community Studies Board, under the aegis of the National Academy of Sciences.

Professor of Political Science Nazli Choucri presented at a meeting of the Science of Security and Privacy Program (US Department of Defense/National Security Agency Research Directorate) on the results of Year 1 of the MIT project on Analytics of Cybersecurity for Cyber-Physical Systems.

Professor of Political Science Fotini Christia (with Erik Demaine and Costis Daskalakis of MIT CSAIL) received a renewed grant award from the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency for a project on “Decision Making via Hierarchy of Network Games: Algorithms, Game Theory, Artificial Intelligence, and Learning.”


PhD Students Suzanne Freeman and Benjamin Harris, with faculty advisor Eric Heginbotham, started the Wargaming Working Group at MIT.

CIS Principal Research Scientist Eric Heginbotham presented “Wargaming and Simulation: Strategic and Academic Applications” at Tufts University’s inaugural Applied IR Speaker Series.

CIS Elizabeth Neuffer Fellow Shola Lawal received the Future Awards Prize for Journalism.

Total Professor of Political Science and Contemporary Africa Evan Lieberman presented “Towards a Political-Economy of Dignity” (joint work with MIT PhD Candidates Paige Bollen and Blair Read) at the Meetings of the American Political Science Association in August, “Why Study the Politics of Development in Africa” to Total Executives at MIT in November, and “Validated Participation Promotes Self-Efficacy and Citizen Engagement in Development” (joint work with Yang-Yang Zhou) at the Meetings of the African Studies Association in November. Lieberman was also appointed as non-resident fellow to the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation with the Harvard Kennedy School, a Fellow of Boundaries and Belonging international working group at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, and is the recipient of the MIT Digital Humanities Fellowship.

PhD Candidate Andrew Miller received a research grant from the Templeton Foundation to conduct a study on the promotion of non-violence norms in Baltimore, Maryland.


Associate Professor of Political Science Vipin Narang received the “Emerging Scholar” award from the International Studies Association’s International Security Section.

PhD Candidate Rachel Esplin Odell has accepted a position as a Research Fellow in the East Asia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. She is on leave from the Quincy Institute until August 2020, while she completes her PhD dissertation and predoctoral fellowship in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School. Odell presented “The Contest for the ‘Free Sea’: Variation and Evolution in the Global Maritime Order” at Harvard Kennedy School on December 12 as part of the International Security Brown Bag Seminar Series, and “How Strategic Norm-Shaping Undergirds America’s Command of the Commons” at the American Political Science Association Annual Conference in Washington, DC, on August 31. She also gave a lecture entitled, “Whose Free Sea? International Variation in Approaches to Maritime Jurisdiction,” at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies in Hainan, China, on July 18, while visiting the institute to conduct dissertation field research.
Managing Director and Senior Policy Advisor of MIT’s CIS Policy Lab Dan Pomeroy became an N Square Innovators Network Fellow.

SSP Senior Advisor Carol Saivetz presented “Putin’s Foreign Policy” at a CIS sponsored consuls briefing in September, “The ‘Drivers’ of Russian Foreign Policy” at a Texas A&M University’s conference on the future of US-Russia relations in October, “The Trump-Putin Bromance” at a benefit dinner for the Second Step (a private non-profit organization that serves victims of domestic violence) in November, and “Russia, Europe, and Energy” at Boston University’s Behind the Headlines series in November.

Ford International Professor of Political Science and CIS Director Richard Samuels launched Special Duty in Berlin at the Freie Universität in October, in New York at the Japan Society in November, and in London at the Henry Jackson Society in December. Samuels also presented the book at Portland State University and Harvard University.

Ford International Professor of Political Science Ben Ross Schneider presented “Contention, Coalitions, and Consultation in the Politics of Education Reform in Latin America” at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI) and at Harvard University in June. Schneider also presented “Business Concentration and Inequality in Latin America” at the LACEA Annual Conference in Puebla, Mexico in November.

PhD Candidate Meicen Sun presented on China and the Transatlantic Alliance in November and on China’s digital rise and a US-EU response in December, both at the Harvard Kennedy School.

Ford International Professor of Political Science Kathleen Thelen was awarded the Aaron Wildavsky Enduring Contribution Award at the 2019 APSA meeting (organized section on Public Policy). Thelen was also awarded the Michael Endres Research Prize of the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.
SSP Senior Research Associate James Walsh received grants from the MacArthur Foundation and Carnegie Corporation of New York to explore what public communication about nuclear weapons in the digital and social media space might look like.

PUBLISHED


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