Alchemy Report on World Relief’s Income Generation Programs  
Maratane Refugee Camp, Nampula, Mozambique  
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I. Refugees in Mozambique

A. General Country Situation

In order to better understand the impact of income generation activities for refugees in Mozambique, it is important to situate our findings both in the context of the general situation for refugees in Mozambique and in the broader developmental context of the country. In many circles Mozambique is considered a development miracle, or, at the very least, a success story. Though throwing off the shackles of rapacious Portuguese colonialism as recently as 1975 and plagued by a highly destructive civil war from 1981-1992 during which over one third of Mozambique’s 17 million people were themselves displaced, Mozambique is now a peaceful and relatively stable country. The ruling party FRELIMO (the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) formally abandoned Marxism in 1989, and the first multiparty elections in the country’s history were held in 1990. However, while serious internal conflicts have abated and democratic reforms have taken place, the government is still rife with corruption and poor management, factors which contribute to the underdevelopment of the country.

Mozambique’s macroeconomic growth rate improved dramatically beginning in the second half of the 1990s, and inflation was dramatically reduced. Nonetheless, the country is still one of the world’s poorest and least developed countries, with 70% of the country’s population living below the poverty line and a 21% unemployment rate.

Drought is also a significant problem hindering Mozambique’s development, and is another factor which has caused it to rely heavily on assistance from international donors. More recently, the country has been embarking on some large scale development projects, such as the MOZAL aluminum smelter, the country’s largest foreign investment project to date, which have increased its export earnings. While the majority of the country’s workforce is involved in subsistence agriculture, Mozambique also exports aluminum and agricultural products, and is also involved in some value added production activities.

To a country such as Mozambique, which has both a legacy of war, poverty, dependence, and abuse by outside powers and a deep sense of pride in recent accomplishments and hope for great improvement in the future, hosting refugees could easily be seen as a burden and a drain on precious resources. However, in the case of Mozambique the government seems to see refugees as more of a potential asset than a liability, a point of view which contrasts significantly with that of its neighboring countries which host refugees. In the following sections I will explore more thoroughly the possible reasons for this difference, and examine how it affects Mozambique’s policies toward refugees and the resulting refugee situation in the country.

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B. Refugees in Mozambique

There are currently 5,899 refugees in Mozambique, 4,258 of whom are living in Maratane camp 20 km outside of the town of Nampula, the third largest city in Mozambique, in Nampula province. This number has decreased significantly since last summer, when the number was quoted by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) staff to be 10,136, both because of more accurate reporting due to a massive refugee registration and identification effort on the part of the government, and to the fact that a small number of refugees are beginning to return to their countries of origin due to improving security situations there. Additionally, the number of refugees arriving in Mozambique has dropped significantly in the past year, due to the fact that, because of improving conditions in some of the sending countries, fewer refugees have been making a secondary migration from refugee camps in Tanzania and Zambia, which is how the majority of refugees, none of whom come from countries bordering Mozambique, end up there.

In terms of the composition of the refugee population in Mozambique, the vast majority of the refugees come from the Great Lakes region of central Africa, specifically the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Burundi. In the country in general, there are 3,776 refugees from DRC, 1,088 from Burundi, 893 Rwandans, 71 Somalis, 11 each from Angola, Congo (Brazzaville), Sudan, and Zimbabwe, 9 Liberians, 6 from Sierra Leone, 5 Ugandans, 2 Eritreans, and 1 each from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ivory Cost, Cuba, Ethiopia, and Madagascar (INAR stats). In terms of urban refugees specifically, there are 1,612 in Mozambique, over 900 of whom live in Maputo.

Refugees began arriving in Mozambique in 1992, but until 1995 there was no significant influx. Due to the conflicts in the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi in the mid and late 1990s, refugees started coming in more substantial numbers at that time, and the Mozambican government created the Bobole refugee camp near Maputo in 1996. However, this move caused some tension with the governments of South Africa and Swaziland, because of fears of the migration of refugees to those countries for work. The camp was also reaching its capacity, so the government decided to move the refugees to the northern province of Nampula, where, in addition to the aforementioned benefits, the camp would also be much closer to the refugees’ sending countries.

With the transfer of the camp from Maputo to Nampula in the year 2000, no refugees were legally permitted to stay in the capital, and all international refugee assistance including food rations and other services (e.g. regular access to water, receiving material for construction of own housing, access to school and health service, etc.) have become available to refugees only in Maratane, which opened in 2001. This meant that the 1,500

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4 The term refugee in this report will be used to indicate all people who have crossed an international border fleeing persecution or conflicts in their home countries, whether or not they have obtained official refugee status in their host country.
5 Interview with Damasco G. Mathe, Head of the Department of Operations and Programs for INAR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
7 Interview with Damasco G. Mathe, Head of the Department of Operations and Programs for INAR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
8 Interview with Olivia Shannon, Program Officer for UNHCR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
9 Interview with Damasco G. Mathe, Head of the Department of Operations and Programs for INAR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
or so refugees who chose to stay in Maputo were no longer supported by UNHCR and could no longer receive material assistance although they were still under the protection of UNHCR. Many of these refugees were participating in microcredit programs, and were operating small businesses which they did not wish to abandon\textsuperscript{10}. Today there are 4,258 refugees officially registered as residing in Maratane camp\textsuperscript{11}.

The northwestern city of Lichinga is the official point of entry for asylum seekers in Mozambique. All refugees that enter the country are now sent directly to Nampula after registering with one of the NGOs that provide the service of transporting them to Maratane camp within a few days of arrival into the country. If refugees arrive in Maputo, they are screened at the office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation’s National Institute for Refugees (INAR, the government entity responsible for refugees in Mozambique), and their status is then determined by UNHCR. They can choose to stay in Maputo, but they then opt out of receiving aid, though they are still under UNHCR protection\textsuperscript{12}.

Once an asylum seeker has entered Mozambique, they receive a pre-screening by INAR followed by a waiting period of approximately three months, during which the individual can reside in the camp on a temporary basis but is not officially an asylum seeker\textsuperscript{13}. This waiting period helps officials determine whether an individual is truly seeking asylum in the country or if they are simply passing through on their way to Johannesburg or another destination\textsuperscript{14}. If it is determined that they do qualify as an asylum seeker under the definition set forth in the 1951 Refugee Convention, then they are allowed to stay in the camp in that capacity provisionally. INAR staff in Nampula then send the necessary paperwork to the INAR office in Maputo, where the ultimate designation is made\textsuperscript{15}.

Asylum seekers receive an identification document called the ‘declaracao’, or ‘declaration’. In the rare instances in which an asylum seeker has undergone refugee status determination, they receive a ‘DIRE’, which is the official permission of residence in Mozambique. The declaration is issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation to all those recognized as asylum seekers in Mozambique. After two months in the camp, this document is obtained by almost all of asylum seekers. As opposed to the declaration, which is relatively easily obtained, the DIRE is very hard to get, as it requires the asylum seeker to undergo the full process of status determination, which often takes a long time, usually somewhere between 7 and 10 years. Since the Mozambican government does not apply a prima facie status determination process for refugees, all applications are decided according to individual circumstances. Currently, there are only 1,724 refugees in Mozambique who have official refugee status. The

\textsuperscript{10} Interview with Damasco G. Mathe, Head of the Department of Operations and Programs for INAR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
\textsuperscript{11} Interview with Chida Etsuko, UNHCR Protection Officer, Nampula, June 21, 2005
\textsuperscript{12} Interview with Olivia Shannon, Program Officer for UNHCR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
\textsuperscript{13} Interview with Adereito Matangala, Maratane Camp Administrator, INAR, Nampula, June 23, 2005
\textsuperscript{14} Interview with Ana Palao, UNHCR Field Officer, Nampula, June 22, 2005
\textsuperscript{15} Interview with Adereito Matangala, Maratane Camp Administrator, INAR, Nampula, June 23, 2005
DIRE is issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs after a thorough process of individual examination by the Ministry of Interior and Migration, INAR and UNHCR.16

C. Refugee Rights Guaranteed and Protected
All refugees are entitled to certain rights put forth in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Protection of Refugees, and the states which host them are obligated to respect these rights, just as refugees are required to respect the laws of the host country. At the most basic level, a refugee has the right to safe asylum. According to UNHCR, refugees (those accorded full refugee status) should, based on the 1951 convention, receive at least the same rights and basic help as any other foreigner who is a legal resident, including freedom of thought and movement and freedom from torture and degrading treatment. Refugees should also have access to economic and social rights such as medical care, schooling and the right to work.17

However, most of the people we think of as refugees, especially in developing countries, are actually not officially recognized refugees, but instead are asylum seekers who are not guaranteed all of the same rights. While UNHCR urges governments not to send failed asylum seekers back to dangerous places and advocates for the thorough review all immigrant cases before determining refugee status, the right of “non-refoulement” (the right not to be returned to a place where an individual has a well-founded fear of persecution) is not guaranteed to those who have not been given refugee status.18 However, many would say that this principle has become customary international law, and that governments, regardless of whether or not they have ratified any of the relevant treaties, are bound by this custom not to refoule potential refugees.19 Nonetheless, even in the case of refugees with official status, many host countries, signatories or not, do not respect the basic rights laid out in the 1951 Convention and the regional treaties.

Mozambique does a better job than most developing countries in this regard. In 1983, Mozambique ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, and subsequently ratified the additional 1967 Protocol and the 1969 OAU Convention in 1989.20 As mentioned above, vast numbers of Mozambicans were forced to flee their country during the civil war, 1.7 million of whom became refugees hosted by a number of surrounding countries, most significantly Malawi.21 From Mozambican government officials to ordinary people on the street, I found Mozambicans to be friendly toward refugees both in terms of their official policies and their everyday attitudes, likely because the experience of being a refugee is so fresh and real in the consciousness of all Mozambicans, whether or not they themselves were actually refugees.

16 Interview with Damasco G. Mathe, Head of the Department of Operations and Programs for INAR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
17 UNHCR website, “Protecting Refugees: Questions and Answers”; http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/txr/vtx/basics/opendoc.htm?bI=BASICS&id=3b0280294
18 UNHCR website, “Protecting Refugees: Questions and Answers”; http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/txr/vtx/basics/opendoc.htm?bI=BASICS&id=3b0280294
19 Lecture by Jaqueline Bhabha, Jr. Lecturer on Law and Executive Director of the Harvard University Committee on Human Rights Studies, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, February 28, 2006
Many refugee-hosting countries in the region, especially those that border the sending countries of DRC, Rwanda and Burundi, are both more heavily burdened with refugees and have more restrictive policies and less accepting popular attitudes toward refugees than does Mozambique. Both of these phenomena are due in part to the fact that these countries have had many security problems both in and outside of refugee camps with refugees from these sending countries, as many of the refugees bring their home country conflicts with them and continue to live alongside their home country adversaries in crowded, under-funded camps where they have little access to employment. Additionally, all of the surrounding refugee-hosting countries have many more refugees than does Mozambique, a fact which certainly contributes to this discrepancy. According to UNHCR’s Statistical Yearbook for 2002, by the end of that year Tanzania had 689,548 refugees, Zambia had 247,710, and Kenya had 236,089, in comparison to Mozambique’s approximate 10,000 at that time.22

Considering that Maratane camp in Mozambique is very well supplied with food and non-food items (many refugees earn a small income selling extra rations in town) and quality services (some local Mozambican villagers come to the camp to attend the Portuguese school and use the health clinic), it is not surprising that refugees in some of the overcrowded, highly restricted, less secure camps in countries such as Tanzania would get word of this situation and make the trip to Mozambique. In some important senses, the quality of life in the camp is better than that of the surrounding rural communities.

The aforementioned insecurity is another reason some of these refugees make it to Mozambique even though the journey is long and difficult and requires relocating again. A number of the refugees who end up in Mozambique are those who did not feel secure in the camps in Tanzania or Zambia, either because of belonging to an ethnic group which was a minority or which was persecuted in those camps, such as Tutsi (Rwanda and Burundi) or Banyamulinge (eastern DRC) or because of actions in the home community or camp which engendered the ire of the majority of camp residents, such as protecting individuals from the opposing side of the conflict, voting against the majority in camp elections, or working to promote peace in either context (see attached database for individual stories of insecurity).

However, it is also certainly the case that many refugees cite insecurity as a reason for leaving the country of first asylum although they are motivated more (or simultaneously) by a desire to reside in a camp which is less crowded and has more resources in a country where attitudes toward them are better and policies are more refugee-friendly. Additionally, there are individuals who are motivated by the desire to migrate slowly, taking advantages of the resources and protection available to them in camps along the way, to Johannesburg, South Africa, where there are perceived to be more employment opportunities and more lucrative jobs. This, of course, is not legal, and refugees with these kinds of intentions do not make them known to UNHCR and the host government officials who determine their status and eligibility to remain in the country and the camp.

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In fact, refugees are only entitled to receive aid and protection in the country of first asylum, which is the first country they entered after crossing an international border in flight from persecution in their home country. Therefore, refugees coming to Mozambique after staying in camps in other countries are not officially entitled to this kind of assistance. However, refugee status determinations are made on the basis of the declarations of the refugees themselves, so that, if an individual claims to have fled directly from the country of origin to Mozambique seeking refuge, UNHCR and the host government take this declaration at face value. According to UNHCR and INAR officials in Mozambique, they mostly turn a blind eye to this process, another indicator that the government sees refugees as an asset and actively takes steps to encourage them to come to Mozambique.

**Freedom of Movement**

Mozambique has very liberal refugee and asylum policies, allowing them almost complete freedom of movement and the right to work outside of the camp and live in Nampula. According to UNHCR Protection Officer Chida Etsuko and Field Officer Ana Palao, both based in Nampula and Maratane, only about half of the 4,258 refugees officially living in the camp are actually residing there full time, while the other half are keeping their residences in the camp and also living in Nampula where they have businesses or other employment. Of course, this is not legal, but it has been a challenge to verify this with what has been, until this past year, such lax control of their movement. Also, it is not likely that the refugees themselves will come forth and report that this is their situation, since they would then risk losing access to resources on which they depend. All of this makes it very difficult to get accurate numbers with respect to residency.

Although it was not a move toward granting more refugees official status, in January of this year INAR conducted a large scale registration of refugees and asylum seekers in Mozambique, which included giving them special IDs that will ostensibly make it easier both for the government to keep track of refugees for protection purposes and for the refugees to exercise their rights without harassment by officials who may mistake them for illegal immigrants. This photo ID was issued to all refugees and asylum seekers except for children asylum seekers, and is required for nearly everything refugees do, including the receipt of food rations from UNHCR. While there are a handful of refugees and asylum seekers who did not receive their IDs initially due to errors in processing, all should have them by the end of 2005.

According to Ms. Palao, the new registration and ID program has not restricted the movement of refugees, but is truly an effort on the part of the government to better protect refugees, who still have complete freedom of movement. Although refugees need to request a special permission to leave the camp if they go outside of Nampula province, Palao contends that they are easily given permission to leave by the government officials who monitor their movement, a claim which is corroborated by Mr. Matangala of INAR, to the extent that there is significant lack of control even with the new ID program in

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23 Interview with Damasco G. Mathe, Head of the Department of Operations and Programs for INAR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
24 Interview with Damasco G. Mathe, Head of the Department of Operations and Programs for INAR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
place. According to Mr. Matangala, this permission to leave the province is usually granted within 24 hours of the request and entails a very simple procedure.

Ability to Work
According to Ms. Shannon of UNHCR Maputo, a refugee with skills can get a job in Mozambique without difficulty and, in Nampula, INAR actively helps them find jobs. UNHCR and INAR try specifically to motivate women to work, Ms. Shannon asserts, but this is particularly challenging as many of them are intimidated by their husbands out of seeking employment. Also, there is often a disparity between the types of jobs the refugees are accustomed to doing at home and the nature of the work available to them in Mozambique, especially in Nampula, where most opportunities for work are in farming. The kinds of jobs with which many of the refugees have prior experience, such as teaching, tailoring, and small business operation, tend to require host country-specific language and cultural skills that most refugees lack. In the view of Ms. Shannon, this is a reason for the less-than-perfect results of the income generation projects in the camp, as many of the refugees are just not interested in the kind of work that is available to them. UNHCR, she asserts, can do no more than advise them of what kinds of income generation activities are available to them and hope that they decide to participate.

Access to Education
Refugee children in Mozambique have the same ability to access schooling and pay the same school fees as do Mozambicans, just as they do with health care and all other public services. Along with a Mozambican school with instruction in Portuguese primarily utilized by local children, the camp also has a French language school which the refugees started themselves and which is, as of this past year, now funded by UNHCR.

II. Maratane Refugee Camp

A. Overview
When Maratane camp opened in 2001, it had a population of approximately 1,600, but then grew slowly as more refugees arrived. The camp is located in the hilly green countryside of Nampula province and is bisected by a wide river in which the camp residents bathe, wash clothing, and fetch water to irrigate their gardens. The camp, located about 20km outside of Nampula, has been called “the most picturesque refugee camp in the world”, and is smaller, better funded, and better organized than most camps in Africa.

As mentioned earlier, the majority of refugees in the camp are from the DRC, though there are Burundians, Rwandans, and a sprinkling of others from various African countries. Approximately 40-60 people are still arriving each month, mostly from those three countries, a number which is down significantly from a year ago when about 150

25 Interview with Ana Palao, UNHCR Field Officer, Nampula, June 22, 2005
26 Interview with Olivia Shannon, Program Officer for UNHCR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
27 Interview with Adereito Matangala, Maratane Camp Administrator, INAR, Nampula, June 23, 2005
28 Interview with Adereito Matangala, Maratane Camp Administrator, INAR, Nampula, June 23, 2005
30 Interview with Chida Etsuko, UNHCR Protection Officer, Nampula, June 21, 2005
31 Interview with Chida Etsuko, UNHCR Protection Officer, Nampula, June 21, 2005
came each month\textsuperscript{32}. Each family has a mud and cement house built by UNHCR, and, in addition to the health clinic and schools, there are a couple of churches, a market, a few refugee-owned shops, and the gardens, hen houses, fish ponds, and sewing, carpentry and computer workshops which comprise the income generation activities run by World Relief.

While the number of new arrivals in the camp each month is quite significant, the population of the camp is not growing at this same level. This is due both to the fact that some families and individuals move on to South Africa and that some are integrating locally, mostly by moving into the town of Nampula\textsuperscript{33}. According to Ms. Etsuko, there are 500-1000 refugees who are in town officially, and they receive protection but no material assistance from UNHCR. At the same time, she estimates that there are really only 2000-2500 refugees living full time in the camp, and that the rest are officially living in the camp, and therefore receiving food and other assistance, but have a residence and business in town as well. This is certainly a strategy practiced by some, in which the old and infirm stay in the camp where they can receive care while those who can work stay in town and pursue employment opportunities, usually opening a small store of some kind.

With respect to the daily functioning of the camp, the refugees are actually quite involved in the camp’s governance. Many important decisions are made by the camp coordination committee, which is headed by a president elected by the refugees and meets regularly to discuss camp affairs. In addition to Mozambican police officers ensuring security in the camp, the camp coordination committee also chooses 10 refugee guards (the “Tsungo Tsungo”, as they are known in Swahili) who monitor the security situation in the various neighborhoods of the camp and report back to the police, the committee, and, if necessary, the INAR camp administrator.

\textbf{B. Camp Actors}

The basic structure of the camp is made up of a coordinating entity, comprised of UNHCR and INAR, which oversees the general functioning of the camp and provides protection, and the implementing partners: the NGOs which provide direct services to the camp population. Until recently, there were no implementing partners in Maratane except for World Relief, which provided, as it does now, income generating activities for refugees. Instead, most other services were provided directly by UNHCR and INAR, with some services, such as construction and potable water, being supplied by local business working as contractors\textsuperscript{34}. Within the past 6 months, this situation has changed dramatically, as there are now four NGO implementing partners in the camp. Save the Children coordinates the distribution of food and non-food items, World Vision is in charge of providing health and education services, Oxfam ensures access to water, and World Relief manages all income generation and vocational training activities in the camp. Representatives of these organizations meet weekly to coordinate activities and discuss issues of common interest\textsuperscript{35}.

\textsuperscript{32} Anna Mecagni, “Alchemy Report on World Relief’s Income Generation Animal Husbandry Program”, August 2004
\textsuperscript{33} Interview with Chida Etsuko, UNHCR Protection Officer, Nampula, June 21, 2005
\textsuperscript{34} Interview with Chida Etsuko, UNHCR Protection Officer, Nampula, June 21, 2005
\textsuperscript{35} Interview with Adereito Matangala, Maratane Camp Administrator, INAR, Nampula, June 23, 2005
As the government entity officially responsible for the functioning of the camp, INAR’s main mandate is the protection of the rights guaranteed refugees in Mozambique by the conventions of which Mozambique is a signatory, and they make ultimate determinations of refugee and asylum seeker status.

UNHCR’s primary mandate is protection as well, and this begins with conducting the initial screening on a refugee’s arrival into the country in order to determine their status. If an individual’s story does not hold up under scrutiny or seems questionable, the refugee is sent to Maputo where the government makes the status determination. According to Ms. Etsuko, the government is likely to grant asylum seeker status even if the individual’s story is questionable, because, as was mentioned earlier, the Mozambican government largely sees refugees as more of an asset than a liability.

While it is UNHCR’s general policy to harmonize the living conditions of refugee camps with the standards of the surrounding population, the conditions in Maratane camp are markedly better than those of the surrounding rural communities, a fact which engenders some hostility from the local population. According to Ms. Etsuko, this is also due to the unique perspective and policies of INAR, and stems from their desire to attract refugees to the camp and to Mozambique. More recently, UNHCR has taken steps to scale back some of the goods and services provided at the camp in order to be in keeping with the agency’s policy of harmonization.

This effort included, before the arrival of the NGO implementing partners, UNHCR’s insistence that INAR no longer work as an implementing partner in the camp, due to their unusual generosity, and that their role be confined to providing security and protection and helping to oversee the functioning of the camp. When pressed to specify the motive for this outsource generosity on the part of the government, Ms. Etsuko explained that, if refugees continue to come to Mozambique, INAR staff will continue to have jobs, something that they are not guaranteed to find if they are no longer working for the government. Additionally, if greater numbers of refugees come to Mozambique, then more resources and funding will be allocated to INAR’s budget, a circumstance which would certainly benefit those working for the agency.

In terms of UNHCR Nampula’s relationship with the head of the UNHCR mission in Maputo, it has often been strained and plagued by unclear communication. Until recently, the Nampula office was not a field office in its own right, but was instead an extension of the Maputo office staffed only by a UN Volunteer Field Officer. Only in the past 6 months did the office acquire a protection officer, a resettlement consultant, and a health volunteer. Due to this fact, the Maputo office still largely sees Nampula as under its direct jurisdiction, often making decisions over the heads of those on the ground in the camp.

C. Security

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36 Interview with Chida Etsuko, UNHCR Protection Officer, Nampula, June 21, 2005
37 Interview with Chida Etsuko, UNHCR Protection Officer, Nampula, June 21, 2005
38 Interview with Chida Etsuko, UNHCR Protection Officer, Nampula, June 21, 2005
While tensions have decreased a bit in recent months, Maratane camp has a history of insecurity, mostly relating to inter-ethnic group tensions which residents have brought with them from other camps and from their home towns and regions. In the origin countries of the majority of the camp’s population, the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda, the conflicts which caused the refugees to flee were rooted in ethnic differences among the populations. Though far too complicated to do justice to here, the crux of the problem in Eastern DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi was and is fueled by extreme tension between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups (Bembes and Banyamulinges in eastern Congo).

In Maratane camp, as in other camps hosting refugees from these countries, individuals from both groups, even those who were pitted against each other during the war, are living together as neighbors. While the definition of a refugee excludes those who were actively involved in combat, and so no combatants are allowed in the camp, this is a very difficult rule to enforce as it is nearly impossible to determine with accuracy who was a soldier and who a civilian in these conflicts. Moreover, aggressive and threatening behavior is not limited to those who were actively involved in combat in their countries of origin. Nearly all (44 of 48) of the refugees I interviewed claimed to be living in fear of harm coming to them by other camp residents who belonged to a different ethnic group, or by members of their own group who did feel they were too sympathetic to the other group.

The high point of tensions in the camp was about a year ago, when the most recent elections for the camp coordination committee leader took place. For the first time in the history of the camp, the population elected a committee head who was not from the Congolese Bembe ethnic group, to which 80% of the camp residents belong, but instead was a Rwandan Tutsi woman. In response to this, a group of Bembes walked out of the inauguration ceremony and threatened to cause trouble in the camp if UNHCR didn’t invalidate the results and hold another election. When UNHCR refused on the grounds that the election had been clean and fair, some camp residents from other ethnic groups began to receive threatening letters, and one Burundian was threatened with death.

UNHCR and INAR staff members attribute the recent improvement in the security situation at the camp to a couple of factors, including the hiring of a new police commander who is more professional and insists on stricter adherence to camp security policies. They report that this new commander has improved the quality and efficiency of the camp police force by hiring four more police officers (making a total of 14 officers), all of whom are younger and more qualified than bulk of the incumbent officers, many of whom were retired from the local police force and therefore often had problems with vision, strength and health, making them less effective than younger officers would have been. Also, they were often not backed up by UNHCR in taking action on breaches of security, so were unsure of how forceful they could be. Additionally, the local government, both in and outside of the camp, responded to the heightening of tension and insecurity in the camp by monitoring the situation more

39 Interview with Chida Etsuko, UNHCR Protection Officer, Nampula, June 21, 2005
40 Interview with Ana Palao, UNHCR Field Officer, Nampula, June 22, 2005
closely and holding refugees more closely to the local laws and dealing with them accordingly, instead of making an effort to keep them out of the local criminal justice system as UNHCR is often wont to do\textsuperscript{41}.

While the situation has improved markedly since the period right after the elections, there are still flare ups of violence both between refugees and on the part of refugees toward UNHCR, INAR, or NGO staff members working in the camp. For example, a group of refugees recently surrounded a staff member of World Vision and threatened to rape her, claiming they had been sent by Camp Administrator Matangala. UNHCR staff saw this incident as an effort on the part of those involved to pit the various agencies and individuals working in the camp against one another, but it was not successful\textsuperscript{42}.

Contributing somewhat to the level of tension in the camp (and to the impression refugees give of how insecure they are) is the fact that Maratane got its first UNHCR resettlement consultant in December of 2004, and resettled its first group of 200 refugees to the US in September of this year. Not surprisingly, nearly all of the refugees would like to be resettled and think they have a valid set of reasons for meriting it. Because of this, almost everyone has at the ready a detailed story of both why they would not be safe returning home and why they are not safe in the camp. Of course, some version of all these stories is certainly true, but it is nearly impossible to determine exactly how much is true and how much fabrication or embellishment. Due to this incredibly strong desire to be considered for resettlement, some refugees have taken to provoking incidents with other refugees in order both to have proof that they are insecure in the camp when others retaliate in a public way and to give camp officials an incentive to get rid of them, thus recommending them for resettlement in order to get them out of the camp\textsuperscript{43}.

In terms of the refugees’ security in the context of relations with the surrounding community and in the town of Nampula, different actors have varying opinions. INAR officials claim that there are no tensions whatsoever between the local population and the refugees, since Mozambicans, “have a heart to help, because they’ve been refugees themselves too very recently, and they know how difficult it can be.”\textsuperscript{44} Contributing to this amicable relationship is the fact that locals can, and do, come into the camp and utilize services there. While this perspective seems to be largely representative of the reality to which I was exposed in the camp, three of the refugees with whom I spoke provided a different perspective, saying that, at times, locals came into the camp and stole from their gardens or burned their crops out of spite.

In the case of those refugees who have opened businesses in town, Mr. Matangala of maintains that there are absolutely no problems or tensions now between them and locals, though there used to be. In the past, when the camp was newer and the local population wasn’t accustomed to having refugees in their midst, there was often the misperception that refugees were illegal immigrants, a group toward which there is a great deal of

\textsuperscript{41} Interview with Ana Palao, UNHCR Field Officer, Nampula, June 22, 2005
\textsuperscript{42} Interview with Chida Etsuko, UNHCR Protection Officer, Nampula, June 21, 2005
\textsuperscript{43} Interview with Chida Etsuko, UNHCR Protection Officer, Nampula, June 21, 2005
\textsuperscript{44} Interview with Adereito Matangala, Maratane Camp Administrator, INAR, Nampula, June 23, 2005
animosity in Nampula because of the widely held belief that they take jobs and cause crime to increase. However, INAR and the local police have worked hard to educate the public and change this perception, which Mr. Matangala feels has made a significant difference in the attitudes of locals toward refugees. Meanwhile, two of the refugees I interviewed told a different story, claiming that, due to anti-refugee sentiment, their stores in Nampula were attacked.

D. UNHCR’s Durable Solutions in Maratane Camp
UNHCR utilizes and promotes three durable solutions to refugee situations, and different solutions have had varying levels of popularity and use at different times since the beginning of the refugee protection regime. Repatriation, assisting refugees in voluntarily returning home after the area has again become safe, is currently the preferred solution, but UNHCR must be careful not to encourage and aid repatriation if it is likely that hostilities may flare up again, which can sometimes be difficult to determine.

Local integration entails the voluntary settlement of refugees in the communities of the host country, either by becoming self sufficient enough to leave a camp and support themselves and their family, or by choosing this as the best alternative when a camp closes, in this case usually receiving some assistance from UNHCR in this process. A key advantage of this solution is that the refugee is usually relatively close to their country of origin and can thus have the option to return when and if the security situation there improves. However, some would argue that it is harder for UNHCR to provide protection when refugees are scattered throughout a country’s major cities, and that this solution puts the onus of providing for the needs of the refugee population on host governments, the vast majority of which govern poor, developing countries.

Resettlement is a viable option for a very small number of the world’s refugees, and is intended to be reserved for those who are not secure in the country of first asylum (usually in a camp) and who would not be safe to return home even if hostilities there ceased. The US is by far the biggest resettlement destination, with Australia and Canada in 2nd and 3rd place, respectively. This “solution” has the advantage of placing refugees in systems where there are jobs available to them and where there are, to varying degrees, developed networks of social services to help them integrate and to assist in supporting them. However, the culture of the refugee producing countries and the resettlement countries is usually hugely different, sometimes causing difficulties of integration. Also, the possibility of resettlement, no matter how slim, creates tension and false expectations in refugee camps, often making it more difficult for UNHCR and host governments to promote the other solutions and creating an incentive for individuals to stay in camps, and thus remain dependent, instead of becoming economically self sufficient and voluntarily integrating themselves locally or returning home when circumstances permit.

Repatriation
Considering the status of the conflicts in the origin countries of the populations in Maratane camp, repatriation is mostly not currently an option. Repatriation cannot take place until a tripartite agreement has been signed between the origin country government, UNHCR, and the host country government, and so far, of the three major sending
countries, Mozambique only has this kind of agreement with Rwanda. However, the Rwandans in Mozambique, along with much of the international community, doubt the sincerity of the government on their offer of safe return, and are not anxious to return, likely also because they see themselves as good candidates for resettlement, a solution which is just now beginning to be exercised in Mozambique. Repatriation must be voluntary, so it will not happen unless, or until, the Rwandans decide they are ready to go home. Additionally, the government of Mozambique is still waiting for a response from the Rwandan government on a couple of points in the accord, so the accord is not officially in effect for the time being. In the case of Burundi, the Mozambican government is in the process of working out a similar kind of agreement for organized repatriation.

With respect to Congolese and Burundian refugees, a few individuals have been repatriated with the assistance of UNHCR, but only in cases where they are from areas to which peace has returned. For example, if an individual hails from Lumumbashi or Kinshasa, wishes to return, and has someone there that is willing to support them upon arrival, UNHCR could assist the refugee in that process, since these cities are currently considered safe and look to continue to be so in the near future. In the case of the DRC, the government only allows refugees to return directly to the town from which they originally fled. However, there are very few Congolese refugees in Mozambique who hail from either of the aforementioned cities, and it does sometimes happen that refugees will falsely claim that they are from a place that is now safe with the intention of then making the journey to their hometown, which is nearly always in the eastern region of Kivu.

So far a very small number of refugees have been individually repatriated from Mozambique to their countries of origin, but UNHCR hopes to have a mass repatriation of Burundians soon since the security situation in that country has improved markedly in recent months and a seemingly successful peace process is underway. As of August 2005, only 13 Burundians had been repatriated, but, in cases of mass repatriation, the process can take as little as a month if all goes smoothly. Though there is also a peace process ongoing in the DRC, INAR doesn’t formally encourage repatriation to that country, since there is still so much insecurity there, especially in the Kivu region from which most of the refugees originate.

**Local Integration**

Local integration is happening and has happened on a small scale in Mozambique, both case by case from Maratane camp as individuals start small businesses or procure employment in town, and voluntarily in Maputo as many refugees decided to stay in the city instead of moving up to Nampula when the camp first opened in 2001. However, refugees already in the camp face many disincentives to leaving, such as the fact that

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45 Interview with Olivia Shannon, Program Officer for UNHCR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
46 Interview with Damasco G. Mathe, Head of the Department of Operations and Programs for INAR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
47 Interview with Olivia Shannon, Program Officer for UNHCR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
48 Interview with Damasco G. Mathe, Head of the Department of Operations and Programs for INAR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
49 Interview with Olivia Shannon, Program Officer for UNHCR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
50 Interview with Olivia Shannon, Program Officer for UNHCR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
51 Interview with Damasco G. Mathe, Head of the Department of Operations and Programs for INAR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
their basic needs are taken care of there and that they have the possibility of resettlement if they stay. According to INAR, local integration also places the burden of supporting the population on the government and not on UNHCR, who provides protection but not aid to those who leave the camp\(^52\). This fact may dissuade the Mozambican government from promoting and encouraging local integration, as Mozambique is a poor country working hard to pull itself out of economic dependence and stagnation.

There is also a concern on the part of INAR that some of the refugees may not be willing to work if they were to enter society, since most of the Congolese were engaged in kinds of work they are not likely to find in Mozambique, especially Nampula. According to Mr. Mathe of INAR in Maputo, the Burundians and Rwandans in the camp have garden plots and sell their produce in the camp market and in town, as many of them were engaged in agricultural pursuits before fleeing their home countries. The Congolese refugees, on the other hand, were mostly engaged in other kinds of work before leaving home, so, in Mr. Mathe’s view, may find doing agricultural or animal husbandry work to be beneath them or outside of their knowledge and experience. Because of this, some INAR officials fear that integrating this population locally could place an undue burden not only on the government but also on the local community in terms of an increase in crime or an oversupply of labor and small businesses\(^53\).

According to UNHCR officials, Maratane camp might close soon, due both to the peace processes underway in Burundi and the DRC and to the current resettlement efforts, which primarily involve Rwandans\(^54\). If that happens, then a large scale repatriation effort would take place along with an INAR-managed local integration program for the “residual caseload” of those who decide to stay and become integrated into the local community\(^55\). Central to this kind of local integration effort, according to all involved, are income generation programs.

**Resettlement**

For the first time in Maratane’s history, a group resettlement is going to take place in the near future. In September, 240 refugees are slated to be resettled to the United States and Canada [in fact, 200 were resettled\(^56\)]. Since the receiving country determines the resettlement eligibility criteria and ultimately decides which refugees they will take, the role of UNHCR in this case is to generate an initial pool of eligible refugee that they then recommend for resettlement to the regional processing centers run by the receiving country in question\(^57\). The individual responsible for this initial screening is, in the case of Maratane, Ms. Lene Frendrup, a UNHCR resettlement consultant who began this work in December of 2004.

\(^{52}\) Interview with Damasco G. Mathe, Head of the Department of Operations and Programs for INAR, Maputo, August 19, 2005

\(^{53}\) Interview with Damasco G. Mathe, Head of the Department of Operations and Programs for INAR, Maputo, August 19, 2005

\(^{54}\) Interview with Olivia Shannon, Program Officer for UNHCR, Maputo, August 19, 2005

\(^{55}\) Interview with Olivia Shannon, Program Officer for UNHCR, Maputo, August 19, 2005

\(^{56}\) Interview with Olivia Shannon, Program Officer for UNHCR, Maputo, August 19, 2005

\(^{57}\) Interview with Olivia Shannon, Program Officer for UNHCR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
In Maratane, the resettlement consultant is the sole determinant of which refugees are passed along as potential resettlement candidates to the head regional UNHCR office\textsuperscript{58}, which then passes the bulk of that list along to the receiving country’s regional resettlement processing center\textsuperscript{59}. Of course, the big question to the residents of Maratane camp, indeed, to the residents of any camp from which refugees are potentially resettled, is how to get onto that initial list of possible candidates. According to Ms. Shannon, the way to be considered for resettlement is to request an interview, and all of those who request interviews get them. In Maratane camp, however, everyone is effectively requesting a resettlement interview whether or not they ask for one by virtue of the fact that they desperately desire it and consider themselves appropriate candidates. At the same time, very few camp residents know that they have the right to request an interview, since their perception of the process is very different from this official version.

During the time I spent in Maratane camp, I learned that most refugees and aid workers believe the process to be in fact much more haphazard and ad hoc than UNHCR policies state that it should be. Instead, they observe this process to be based primarily on the referrals of one NGO employee, who is quite familiar with the individual stories of many refugees in the camp due to the nature of her work, to the resettlement consultant. In response to this, other UNHCR staff have attempted to institute a more comprehensive and consistent procedure for the review of individual cases for potential resettlement, such as having the block leaders recommend a list of cases each week or month, but not much has actually happened with this.

In the view of INAR in Maputo, the resettlement process currently underway in Maratane camp is not being conducted with the necessary degree of transparency. While they are not opposed to the promotion of this “durable solution” for refugees in Mozambique, the agency feels strongly that it should be based on a thorough and open process, and believes that, as things currently stand, the criteria for both initial consideration and ultimate resettlement are not clear. This creates tension and conflict in the camp, and serves to cull the most educated and best prepared members of the camp community, leaving those with less education and less capacity for self sufficiency to potentially integrate locally in Mozambique\textsuperscript{60}.

According to Ms. Frendrup, however, the process is fairly straightforward. A case is initially referred to her by an NGO, government, or UNHCR staff member, or directly by the refugee if they write her a letter describing their situation. Next, she conducts interviews, attempting to determine whether there is an asylum motive, whether the refugee in question has been a respectful and peaceful camp resident, whether they have committed crimes in the home country, and whether or not they are telling the truth. If they pass the interview and she decides to recommend them, she passes the case along to UNHCR’s central resettlement office in Nairobi, where they give the final okay on the cases (of which they approve the vast majority) and then decide to which countries they be referred. At this point, there is a “very high likelihood” that the receiving country will

\textsuperscript{58} Interview with Olivia Shannon, Program Officer for UNHCR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
\textsuperscript{59} Interview with Lene Frendrup, UNHCR Resettlement Consultant, Nampula, August 2, 2005
\textsuperscript{60} Interview with Damasco G. Mathe, Head of the Department of Operations and Programs for INAR, Maputo, August 19, 2005
accept the referral, but the decision is ultimately up to that country, which is usually the US\textsuperscript{61}.

While this entire process can take up to two years, it can usually be expedited in cases where there is deemed to be an urgent safety risk. The number of those considered and referred for resettlement depends entirely on the quotas sent by individual countries, which in turn determine the target numbers of referrals which can come from each camp. In addition, the assignment by UNHCR of resettlement consultants to various camps depends on the perceived appropriateness of the refugees in each camp for resettlement and on the individual country quotas. For example, a camp where there is a strong possibility that most of the refugees will be able to return home soon will likely not receive a full-time resettlement consultant at all, and instead will receive a consultant visit once or twice a year in order to review individually urgent or appropriate cases. In contrast, a camp with a population that is not likely to be able to safely return home any time in the near future, such as Somali Bantus, will likely have a number of consultants. In the case of Maratane, Ms. Frendrup claims that she can send all the appropriate cases she finds to the Nairobi office and expect all of them to be resettled, since this population has a lot of appropriate candidates for resettlement and there is only one resettlement consultant in the camp\textsuperscript{62}.

III. World Relief’s Income Generation Activities in Maratane Camp

All of the income generation activities in Maratane camp are managed and implemented by the US based NGO World Relief. These programs fall under World Relief (WR)’s Refugee Integration Program (RIP), which aims to assist refugees and asylum seekers living in Mozambique in becoming self-sufficient and gaining increased economic independence. By participating in this program, clients have the opportunity to improve their livelihoods and integrate themselves into the local community through participation in the following RIP income generation activities: animal husbandry, agricultural cultivation, environmental improvement, microcredit lending, and vocational training.

A. Animal Husbandry Program

Overview
Refugees living in the camp have few options for generating income, as they are outside of a city center and have limited transportation. This causes them to be dependent upon assistance for their basic needs, including food. As with the Agricultural Program, World Relief started the Animal Husbandry Program in 2002 in the camp near Maputo and then moved with the camp to Nampula in 2003\textsuperscript{63}. Not only do refugees in the camp need ways to supplement their diets and generate income, but they also need avenues for developing skills which will enable them to become self sufficient in their host country. WR’s agricultural husbandry program helps to do this, training participants to raise chickens and fish and to start and manage a small business. Until last year, this program consisted only of the raising of chickens for sale as meat, but, in 2005, two more

\textsuperscript{61} Interview with Lene Frendrup, UNHCR Resettlement Consultant, Nampula, August 2, 2005
\textsuperscript{62} Interview with Lene Frendrup, UNHCR Resettlement Consultant, Nampula, August 2, 2005
\textsuperscript{63} Anna Mecagni, “Alchemy Report on World Relief’s Income Generation Animal Husbandry Program”, August 2004
elements were added: the raising of chickens for egg sales, and the raising of fish to supplement refugees’ diets.


Implementation

The central idea of the original Chicken Project (CP) is for a group of refugees to raise 1,500 chickens together which WR will then help them sell, giving them all of the profits minus the cost of the inputs and a 5% fee with which WR buys the next batch of chickens. Each interested participant must first attend an introductory workshop, where they learn about the overall process and the challenges of raising chickens for sale. They then organize themselves into groups of 5 to 7 members and apply collectively, as they will work together to raise the chickens over the course of 45 days. A contract, which lays out the rules for the program, is then signed between the group and WR, of which each party retains a signed copy. World Relief provides technical assistance and a credit to the group in the form of one day old chicks, food, medicine, and the transportation (refugees do not have to pay back for transport) and sale of the chickens for their meat, usually to stores and restaurants, once they are grown.

The groups then divide the profits amongst themselves, sometimes collectively investing them in a new business, but are ultimately able to decide what they do with their portion of the profits. Most often, the profits are used to take care of basic family needs. WR’s new microcredit program aims to increase the number of participants in both animal husbandry and agriculture who use their profits to start a business instead of spending it for consumption purposes by giving small loans to individuals or groups that were successful in those programs who can then combine their own profits with the loan amount in order to start a small business (see section below on microcredit program for more detail). After all the chickens are sold, a final report is produced by WR, which accounts for chickens that died or got sick, the amounts spent on various inputs, and the profits from sales.

Participation

Just one group at a time participates by raising their flock of 1,500 chickens, so, in this way, the program is limited in the number of refugees it can serve at a given time. Each group is actually participating in the project for a total of 60 days, a period which includes training, selling, and cleaning the hen houses after the chickens are sold (they have to be vacant for 10 days to ensure they are free of disease). As of August 2005, 10 families had been served since the initiation of the project (approximately 50 people).

As to the selection process for participants, there are many more refugees who wish to participate than the program has room for so it is still a bit haphazard, something upon which World Relief staff are trying to improve. It is a requirement that no one on the current waiting list be in the same family as someone who has already participated, but control on this is effectively quite lax, and I found during my interviews that there were a number of cases in which the same family participated more than once. Additionally, many refugees with whom I spoke who had not participated in the chicken project complained that they didn’t know how to get on the waiting list and that only members of a certain group (namely Congolese Bembes) got to participate. In evident response to
this feedback on WR’s part, the last group of chicken project participants I observed was comprised mostly of Burundian and Rwandan refugees.

Challenges & Progress
World Relief currently flies the day old chicks up from Maputo, but are in the process of transitioning to a local layer to supply the chicks, which will save the program a good deal of money. While the program is self-sustaining since the refugees pay all the costs, the program does not subsidize the staff time, and many refugees claim that the profits are too low to enable them to start a business. While there is quite a variety in the amount of profits various groups have earned, the majority of the participants I interviewed did not start a business and cited the low level of earnings as the key reason for this. According to CP Coordinator Fausto Saide, the average profit earned by a group through June 2005 was $371.67, which then gets divided among 5-7 families, which amounts to approximately $62 per family. However, interviewing former CP participants I found that there was a dramatic range in the amount they reported earning individually from the project ($0 to $148.67), with many reporting amounts around $37 or less. Many program participants reported to have used this money for basic necessities, such as food, clothing, and shoes for their families.

One way WR has attempted to improve the profit margin for their clients is by reducing the price of the inputs they purchase. The most expensive inputs are feed, charcoal (for heating the henhouse until the chicks are 2-3 weeks old), petrol for lighting the henhouse, and medicines for diseases, in that order. With respect to feed for the chickens, WR has begun processing some of it in the camp, creating another income generation activity in the process. Three women were lent a mill by WR, and are charging a small amount to camp residents in exchange for milling their grains. While earning an income from this activity, they are also paying off the loan to WR with the eventual goal of buying the mill outright. This has brought the cost of chicken feed down significantly, but also may have inadvertently introduced some health problems related to lower quality feed (see section below on layer chickens for more information).

In 2004, World Relief had identified the purchase of a power generator to be a high priority, as it would greatly reduce costs in charcoal and petrol. However, further research into this indicated that the generator would actually cost more than purchasing charcoal and petrol, so the idea was dropped.

According to WR staff, conflicts between the refugees who work together to raise the chickens and share the profit are nonexistent, as WR explains at the outset what the potential problems are and the ways in which participants need to work with their group and choose its members wisely. However, some of the refugees I interviewed told of serious conflicts, one group experiencing a member who disappeared with the profits.

64 Interview with Fausto Saide, CP Coordinator, WR Nampula, June 24, 2005
65 Interview with Moisés Dias, Regional Director, WR Nampula, June 16, 2005
66 Interview with Fausto Saide, CP Coordinator, WR Nampula, June 24, 2005
67 Interview with Moisés Dias, Regional Director, WR Nampula, June 16, 2005
Impact & Monitoring
As to the impact of the program on participant self sufficiency, WR staff report that it is very difficult to know exactly how many people have left the camp to open stores in Nampula with the money they have earned from the Chicken Project since, as mentioned earlier, the refugees have no incentive for reporting this. In terms of keeping track of how many start businesses, however, the information should be relatively easy to obtain and organize, but it has largely not been done since Alchemy’s 2004 summer intern, Anna Mecagni, first implemented the impact monitoring system. Any contact with previous program clients occurs in an ad hoc, informal way, and no data is kept on their progress after program completion. WR Regional Director Moisés Dias has stated that improving this process is an important goal to him and his staff.

Program participants are encouraged to start businesses, and are often referred to WR Microcredit Program staff, but it is up to each individual to decide what they will do with their profits. WR staff estimate that 50% of Chicken Project participants have started business, such as barbershops, shops/stands selling basic necessities, and seed selling businesses. My data, on the other hand, indicate that the numbers are slightly lower than that, as 15 of the 39 refugees who did participate in the CP reported starting a business with the profits (including those who buy chickens to raise at home or grow produce at home and sell it in the camp market). Thirteen of those businesses were still operating at the time of interview, and three of those who did participate but did not start businesses instead used the money earned to grow their existing businesses, all of which are still operating.

2. Layer Chickens – The “Egg Project”

Implementation
In 2004, the Alchemy Program grant funded the construction of a new egg hatchery in Maratane Camp. As of August 2005, the first group of 4 refugees was learning to work with the egg laying chickens so that they, along with World Relief staff and their in-camp program assistant, camp resident and refugee Awar Abahayana W'Amury, will be able to care for the chickens and help train others as the program progresses.

The functioning of this project will be quite similar to that of the broiler chicken project, in that there will be 6 people to a group, each group will take the chickens through one cycle, WR will then help them sell the eggs to a few main customers (mostly restaurants and stores in Nampula), the refugees then receive all the profits minus the cost of the inputs and the 5%, and they can then decide, after splitting the profits, whether they want to keep their share of the profits or pool them together to start a small business. The chickens continue to lay for about a year, at which time they will be killed and sold for meat.

Challenges

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69 Interview with Fausto Saide, CP Coordinator, WR Nampula, June 24, 2005
70 Interview with Moisés Dias, Regional Director, WR Nampula, June 16, 2005
71 Interview with Fausto Saide, CP Coordinator, WR Nampula, June 24, 2005
While sickness is often a problem with any kind of chicken raised in large numbers in close quarters, the chickens WR has begun raising for eggs have a rather serious problem which is causing them to die in higher numbers than was predicted. When the hens first lay they often tear, causing them to bleed, which then prompts other hens to peck at the wound, resulting in serious injury or even death if the wounded hens are not taken out and put in a separate pen in time. WR staff members think that the cause of this problem might be the quality of the pre-made food they are purchasing in Nampula, which they are currently getting tested by a scientist. If not the food, then they think it could be due to the breed of the chickens, which they imported from Malawi, so they are planning to get the hens from a different source next year, perhaps from Maputo. However, as the hens lay for the second and third time, this problem lessens or disappears completely.

In the future, the layer chickens will receive feed made in the camp with the new mill using components which are purchased raw in bulk. This is considerably less expensive than buying pre-made chicken feed, but there is also the concern that, if not made just right, the feed can cause illness. This is why WR has not yet started the egg-laying chickens on camp-made feed, as they are already having serious problems with disease in that population. Because of this, they will spend six months working on perfecting and testing the mixture before giving it to all of the egg-laying chickens.

Impact
According to WR staff, this project has the potential to be much more lucrative and beneficial to refugees that the layer chicken project since there is more demand for the eggs, which are cheaper than the Nampula market price, than there is for the chickens, which are expensive for the market. Additionally, the cycles of participation are shorter, so more refugees can participate in a shorter time, and the layers are easier to care for than the layers. According to Mr. Saide, “in a month of selling eggs at our current capacity we can make $1500 gross with the refugees keeping a profit of $750”. Since this work can eventually be done by a group of 3 people, this can work out to quite a profit if the program is expanded to have multiple groups raising egg laying chickens at the same time.

Mr. Saide also asserts that the egg project will have a positive impact on the entire camp community since there will more money circulating in the camp and more goods available in the form of eggs. In both of these ways, Mr. Saide sees layer chickens as being more beneficial to the community as a whole than the broilers, as more money will remain in the hands of refugees and the product of their labours will be a good that is needed in the camp and is affordable enough for refugees and locals to purchase.

3. The Fish Project
This project has just recently begun, and is thus in its pilot phase. Its objective is to supplement the diet of the refugees with protein, hopefully someday expanding to the point that refugees can sell excess fish in the camp market or in Nampula. The pilot

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72 Interview with Fausto Saide, CP Coordinator, WR Nampula, June 24, 2005
73 Interview with Fausto Saide, CP Coordinator, WR Nampula, June 24, 2005
74 Interview with Fausto Saide, CP Coordinator, WR Nampula, June 24, 2005
The project is progressing satisfactorily thus far, although the water levels sometimes drop below the level of the input and output channels, making it so that there is not enough oxygen for the fish to survive. This project will be tested further before being developed into a full fledged income generation activity for refugees in Maratane.

2005 Animal Husbandry Program Goals
- Start working toward the production of fish in the refugee camp
- Reach 50 participating families in the meat producing chicken project
- Raise and sell 7,200 chickens
- Begin the production of eggs in the refugee camp
- Increase and improve the production of chicken feed in the camp

June 1st Progress Update
- Initiated the egg project
- Assisted 6 families with the chicken project and 4 with the egg project totalling 10 families served (approximately 50 refugees, all Congolese)
- Raised and sold 2,719 chickens
- Currently monitoring the raising of the 684 hens for egg laying
- Transported and sold over 15,000 eggs
- Monitored the production of more than 50% of chicken feed in the camp
- Built two large fish tanks and started the fish project

B. Agriculture Program
Overview
WR’s Agriculture Program (AP) enables refugees to learn valuable cultivation skills which they can use in the camp to create home gardens and which they can also take with them when they leave the camp. Additionally, this helps them supplement their diets with fresh produce and earn income by selling excess produce in the markets in nearby Nampula. This program started at the end of 2002 in Maputo, and then moved along with the camp to Nampula when WR opened a branch office there. The AP is open to any refugee in the camp, though preference is given to those who have not yet participated. WR provides training seminars, technical assistance, tools, seeds, fertilizers, insecticides and transportation to take produce to the market in town for sale.

Implementation
The first step for interested refugees is to approach World Relief staff with a proposal which includes a plan to cultivate their land and grow specific crops, and explains what they need to make it happen. Once their proposal has been accepted and they have become participants in the program, they are trained in the specifics of agriculture in Nampula, including crop selection and garden planning. Each participant makes their own garden plan, and then begins, with WR technical assistance, to start their own garden. Every three months WR staff members give specialized trainings on topics such as fighting crop diseases, planting methods, and pest control which are open to anyone in the camp who wishes to attend. Along with the individual plots that families cultivate outside of their homes or in other available spots in the camp, WR also maintains training.
plots which are intended for teaching refugees cultivation techniques and testing out new crops and varieties. World Relief then gives participants in-kind donations of seeds, tools, pest control supplies, buckets and fertilizer, along with access to water aided by the dam they built last year. With this assistance, the refugees grow crops such as tomatoes, green beans, sweet potatoes, cabbage, eggplants, onions, peppers, manioc, and legumes. During the first year of participation, WR continues to give supplies and technical assistance, but after a year has passed the refugees are expected to continue without additional receipt of supplies. This is a new policy which has been implemented in the past year in order to allow the program to continue to assist new families, as there is continually more demand for participation in the program than WR is able to meet. From the second year of participation on, refugees continue to receive technical assistance, but they have to pay half the costs of the inputs for their gardens. Currently, there are about 50 people who are in this continuing group.

Objectives
According to WR Agriculture Program Coordinator Pierre Harushimana, many of the participants have never before worked in agriculture, so the learning process takes some time for them. For the most part, these refugees aim to take the money they earn from their agricultural sales and use it to open a small business, which is something most of them are more comfortable doing based on past work experience and from which they expect to earn more money in the long term. So, while a goal of the project is to assist them to be self-reliant in their new environment in the camp and in Mozambique in general should they choose to self settle outside of the camp, it is also to enable individuals to earn enough money selling their produce in Nampula and in the camp market to jump start their larger personal income generation plan. Additionally, the AP aims to supplement the ration-based diets of the refugees with fresh vegetables, thus improving their nutrition, and provide them with a daily occupation, which can help reduce camp tensions by keeping people busy.

Participation
Participation in the agricultural program in 2005 is down somewhat from last year, when 542 families were participating as of August 2004. This decrease in participation is also due the spring 2005 drought and to the decrease in assistance given to those who’ve been participating for more than one year. The current participant number of 413 families as of June 2005, however, is up considerably from the 218 participating in the summer of 2003. While the high numbers of 2004 were putting a bit of strain on the monetary and personnel resources of WR, the subsequent drop in the number of participants has helped to ease that pressure. However, the creation of the two group system (those who are in their first year of participation and receive full assistance and those who are in year 2 or more and have limited assistance) has enabled WR to keep the

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75 Interview with Pierre Harushimana, WR AP Coordinator, Nampula, June 22, 2005
76 Interview with Pierre Harushimana, WR AP Coordinator, Nampula, June 22, 2005
78 Interview with Pierre Harushimana, AP Coordinator, WR Nampula, June 22, 2005
program open to all those who are interested and present a realistic and credible proposal for a garden plot.

While the program is technically open to anyone who wants to participate, WR has encountered the problem of those who have been through the program but have not been successful for any of a variety of reasons and who then come back and want to start over in the program. While they do not wish to make the program a one-time only opportunity, since there are many valid reasons a first-time garden might fail, WR staff also do not want to waste valuable resources on those who are not really trying to have a successful garden plot. Because of this, they have created a waiting list for folks who have already been through the program once and have been unsuccessful before they can begin the process again.

It is also important to note that any camp resident, whether or not a participant in WR’s Agricultural Program, has access to land and can cultivate it. However, the fact that only the land relatively close to the river is good for cultivation and that a far-reaching irrigation system does not exist means that there is only a certain amount of cultivable land available at the camp. So far this has caused only a few conflicts between refugees, as there is still enough land to go around. The average plot size for a family is 25x25 to 100x100 meters, but the size of the plot is ultimately up to each family.80

Challenges & Progress
The single biggest challenge to the program is irrigation. In order to address this, World Relief has recently constructed a water tank in the area where most of the cultivation takes place to aid the irrigation of crops. WR also reconstructed a dam in the river last year, and are now pumping some water from the river through pipes to these tanks or directly to the field, which helps somewhat. However, these efforts are only a small step in the direction WR wants to go, which is to have an entire irrigation system in place for the garden plots. At this time, however, construction of an irrigation system would be prohibitively expensive for WR.81

The highest program costs come from purchasing fertilizers, medicines, insecticides, and seeds, in that order. In an attempt to bring down one of these costs, WR instituted a seed saving program, in which the participants are only given seeds the first time around, and are then expected to save the seeds from each crop for next year’s planting. According to WR staff, this effort is having some effect on cutting costs, as they are buying fewer seeds than before they began it.

Impact & Monitoring
As with the Animal Husbandry Program, it is very difficult for World Relief staff to determine with any accuracy how many Agriculture Program participants have become self sufficient and left the camp. However, Mr. Harushimana estimates that 55-60 participants in the agricultural program have used the money earned from the program to open businesses or seek employment in Nampula or other locations.

80 Interview with Pierre Harushimana, AP Coordinator, WR Nampula, June 22, 2005
81 Interview with Moisés Dias, Regional Director, WR Nampula, July 7, 2005
While WR staff are making an increased attempt to track these numbers by visiting those who’ve moved to Nampula and keeping a running list of them and, thus, evaluate the impact of the program on refugees, they still find it difficult to do so for the reasons mentioned above and have not made it a part of their regular working process. Additionally, there is pressure on WR from UNHCR to report these names and numbers so that rations can be scaled back or eliminated, and WR staff feel both that they don’t want to be complicit in the reduction of aid to refugees who may still need it and that this process gives refugees a disincentive for participating in their income generation activities.

2005 Program Goals
- Reach a total of 600 participants
- Develop and implement an irrigation system
- Produce seeds and start saving project

June 1<sup>st</sup> Progress Update
- Reached 413 participants
- Purchased 4 irrigation pumps
- Built 1 irrigation tank
- Started seed saving project
- Preparing tomato, green beans, paprika seeds, and sweet potato cuttings for production

The breakdown of participant gender and nationality in the Agriculture Program as of June 2005 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congo</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M F</td>
<td>M F</td>
<td>M F</td>
<td>M F</td>
<td>(M) 218 (F) 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164 155</td>
<td>24 20</td>
<td>25 20</td>
<td>5 0</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>319</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. Environmental Program
Overview
Refugees living in the camp and locals living in surrounding communities cut down trees for building, cooking and agricultural purposes. As the resulting deforested areas are rarely replanted, a lack of trees for shade and fruit has resulted. The camp community has also engaged in unsustainable or harmful agricultural practices, which has caused some pollution and environmental degradation.

When the camp first moved to Maratane, WR trained the refugees about how best to adapt to and maintain their new environment, emphasizing especially the negative ramifications of cutting down trees. In 2004, WR started to grow the seedlings outside of their office in Nampula and then transport them to and plant them in the camp. In that first year, 1070 trees were planted, and, as of the end of 2005, there were 3000 trees.

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82 Interview with Moisés Dias, Regional Director, WR Nampula, August 5, 2005
planted in the camp. Refugees are encouraged to plant them near their homes, with the
goal being that each home have 4 trees. After that point, WR plans to plant trees in the
common areas of the camp for the entire community to enjoy83.

Implementation
Together with other organizations, WR organizes and conducts seminars for refugees and
locals which focus on sustainable and healthy agricultural and household practices. WR
grows seedling trees and distributes the transplants to the refugees, teaching them how to
plant and take care of the trees and helping them provide their households with additional
green space, shade, and fruit. WR also trains participants in agricultural practices which
do not use chemical fertilisers or pesticides.

2005 Program Goals
• Conduct 2 environmental trainings in the camp and surrounding community
• Distribute and facilitate the planting of approximately 2,000 trees
• Supervise the care of the planted trees
• Train all farmers in the camp about the use of land, fertilizers and insecticides

June 1st Progress Update
• Produced 3400 seedlings of both shade (2,640) and fruit (860) trees
• Distributed and facilitated the planting of 2,725 trees in the camp
• Held 1 training on environment and agriculture in the camp
• Approximately 97 newly planted trees died

D. Microcredit Program
Overview
Although many refugees in Maratane camp have interest and experience in small
business development, there has been very little access to credit in the camp until
recently. WR has changed that by starting a microcredit lending program, which
disburses loans and gives technical assistance to refugees who already have a functioning
business they wish to expand or who have a viable plan for starting one. This program
began in March of 2005 and is currently serving 61 refugees.

Background
In late 2002, Fundo de Credito Communitario (FCC), then the microfinance branch of
World Relief, implemented a microcredit program for refugees in Maratane and
Nampula. In the year that it was operational (late 2002 through November 2003), the
program provided loans to 271 refugee clients. Although it was first touted as a success,
the program quickly fell apart as clients were unable or unwilling to repay their loans.
On average, the repayment rate was around 25%84. The program was canceled in
November of 2003 and no source of credit was available to refugees in Maratane until
WR began its own microcredit program this past March.

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83 Interview with Pierre Harushimana, AP Coordinator, WR Nampula, June 22, 2005
Implementation
Each interested refugee must present a proposal and give an individual monetary or, in the case of small loans to groups of first time business clients, verbal guarantee as a group. WR then provides training on business and financial management, and gives loans for up to 4 months with a 5% monthly interest rate after approving the project proposal. Each beneficiary receives weekly or bi-weekly follow-up visits to monitor their progress and assist with business development[85].

If a client does not repay the loan on time, official protocol states that the individual or group pay a penalty, but, in reality, these fees are not charged, as WR tries to work with clients they think will be able to pay eventually. If someone were to abscond with the loan, which has not yet happened, WR’s response would be to report the matter to UNHCR, INAR, and WR’s financial department in Maputo so that the necessary legal and punitive steps would be taken[86].

Participation
While WR’s microcredit program is serving successful former FCC clients and former chicken program participants, they are also serving many individuals who have not participated in either of these programs. In order to serve clients with different financial profiles without taking an inordinately high risk, WR has created two levels of microcredit participation, depending on the level of wealth and former business experience of the clients. One level consists of individual borrowers who must have a 95% percent monetary guarantee and a business already functioning at the time of qualification in order to qualify for a loan of $1870. Additionally, they must repay monthly, and the entire first loan is only for 4 months. The second loan is for up to 6 months, depending upon successful repayment of the first. Some common examples of businesses often opened by individuals receiving these kinds of loans include barbershops, mills, store selling basic necessities, restaurants, and bars.

The second type of loan goes to those with fewer resources in order to make credit available to the poorest of the poor in a way that does not put WR at too much financial risk. In groups of 5, refugees receive $185 each, but they officially borrow the amount together and guarantee it as a group since they do not have enough wealth to guarantee the loan themselves. On repayment day, they must present themselves as a group to each repay their portion of the original loan. Due to this, they have to be very careful about choosing, and trusting, their group members, since this is their only way to guarantee the loan as there is no collateral or down payment.

Most of these participants already have a functioning business of some kind (preference is given to clients who do), perhaps working in the market selling produce or selling goods in the street in Nampula. Some of them are already working with the other members of their loan group, perhaps sharing a stall at the market, and may continue to

[85] Interview with Madeira Armando, Microcredit Program Coordinator, WR Nampula, June 23, 2005
[86] Interview with Moisés Dias, Regional Director, WR Nampula, August 5, 2005
work together once the loan has been disbursed. Individuals in this category are required to deposit 30% of their profits directly into savings. Though the program was serving 68 refugees as of August 2005, demand is much higher than can currently be met. WR Regional Director Moisés Dias hopes to hire another staff person as soon as possible to handle a bigger case load and so that there is one staff member who disburses the loan and another who supervises and coordinates the program and monitors its impact.

As of the end of May 2005, 38 clients were active, having already received their loans, with 30 additional clients to become active in July 2005. With the first 38 clients there was an 85% repayment rate, with only one of the clients having such difficulty remaining financially solvent that he will liquidate next month. Of the 30 new clients added in July, exactly half of them are based in Nampula and half in Maratane.

**Impact & Monitoring**

According to Mr. Dias, the organization sees monitoring the impact of this program as beneficial, but thinks that the process needs to be better incorporated into the day to day functioning of the program, as there should be one staff member disbursing the loans while another oversees the program and monitors its impact. Although it is early in this program’s history, making it hard to accurately assess the long term impact of this program, Mr. Dias thinks that this program is now helping and will continue to help refugees to leave the camp but stay in Mozambique and integrate themselves into the community.

As to client complaints, the dominant criticism is that they would like larger loans and longer repayment times, both of which would make it more likely that their small business efforts were successful. However, these current practices are constrained by limits on the program’s current funding level, which WR is hoping to increase once the program can be shown to be successful.

**2005 Program Goals**

- Reach 100 clients with loans, with a focus on outreach to women and widows
- Help refugees develop proposal writing, business planning, and financial management skills

**June 1st Program Update**

- Trained 55 new beneficiaries, including individuals and groups
- Disbursed loans to 8 individual beneficiaries, 8 groups (of 5 people each, 40 people total)
- Purchased, housed, and lent a mill for the grinding of chicken feed and in-camp food needs - has become an income generating project serving 3 female refugees as well as supplying the camp with the milling service
- Repayment rate of 85%

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87 Interview with Madeira Armindo, Microcredit Program Coordinator, WR Nampula, June 23, 2005
88 Interview with Madeira Armindo, Microcredit Program Coordinator, WR Nampula, June 23, 2005
The breakdown of participant gender and nationality in the Microcredit Program as of June 2005 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>M 29</td>
<td>F 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>M 10</td>
<td>F 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>M 1</td>
<td>F 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>M 0</td>
<td>F 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>M 40</td>
<td>F 21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E. Vocational Training Program

Overview
Although many refugees come to the camp with professional skills, they are often lacking in skills that they can use at the camp or in the local economy. World Relief’s new vocational training program helps refugees gain skills which can help them to integrate locally or that they can take with them when they resettle or repatriate. Specifically, WR trains refugees in carpentry, computer skills, and sewing. In the future, WR plans to have a training center in the community which will serve locals and refugees, and they plan to start a metal smith training group.

Implementation
Interested individuals must submit a long-term work plan stating how they will use the skills acquired through vocational training. Qualified participants then receive trainings of various lengths, depending on the skill they are developing. In the future, WR plans to facilitate internships with local companies in the hope that refugees further their learning and that some will gain full time employment.

2005 Program Goals
RIP took this program, which UNHCR started in January of 2005, over this past May. The goals for the remainder of the year are as follows:

- Train instructors in 3 skill areas
- Create a curriculum for all 4 skill areas
- Purchase 10 computers and metal smithing equipment, and fix sewing machines
- Train 200 people
- Build a training center in the community

June 1st Progress Update

- Trained 7 instructors
- Trained 66 refugees in computers, 8 in carpentry, and 22 in sewing (97 total)
- Bought 5 computers, fixed 3 computers already in camp, fixed sewing machines
- Began work on curriculum

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89 Interview with Mário Amisse, Vocational Training Program Coordinator, WR Nampula, June 23, 2005
The breakdown of participant gender and nationality for the Vocational Training Program as of June 2005 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Congo</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Totals</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>(79)</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>15 (15%)</td>
<td>(2) 2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0) 0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>(0) 0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F. Future Plans and Projects

According to Mr. Dias, there are many new plans and projects on the horizon for World Relief in Maratane camp. In addition to continuing to develop and expand the old and new projects described above, WR hopes to involve the local community in the agriculture and environment programs, raise chickens for locals with hatcheries and then sell the grown chickens back to them, and improve the infrastructure of both chicken projects to increase program participation, especially diversifying the tasks done by refugees, such as raising, buying, and selling.

With respect to the agriculture program, WR hopes to be able to purchase a professional irrigation system, but is dependent upon a significant funding increase to do this. One day, Mr. Dias would like to see the refugees become completely self-sufficient as farmers, buying their supplies directly from the companies that produce them, and he believes this is an attainable goal. With respect to microfinance, the current goal is to increase the total number of participants somewhat but, more importantly, to increase the size of the loans that are disbursed to those who have successfully managed and utilized their original small loan.

In developing the vocational training program, WR will get a significant boost from a $20,000 grant they are to receive later this year from the US embassy in order to build a training center with a generator, and with the additional $20,000 UNHCR will contribute to buy equipment for the center. The women who are currently receiving training in sewing will get business training and those eligible will receive a loan through the microcredit program to start their own sewing business. In closing, Mr. Dias told me, “What you see here now is only 50% of what the person who comes next summer will see”.

IV. Evaluation Income Generation Activities’ Impact

A. Summary of 2004 Findings

According to Anna Mecagni, the Alchemy intern who began monitoring the impact of World Relief’s income generation activities in the summer of 2004, there was not much difference in income and economic well-being for past program participants and those who had never participated. While she found that the participants were somewhat better able to provide for their families in the short term, she concluded that participation did not often lead toward significant improvement in the economic situations of refugees.
over the longer term. Ms. Mecagni also did not find that participation in these income
generation activities led to repatriation or onward migration, though it did seem to have
allowed some participants to leave the camp and start a life in Nampula. Nonetheless,
her evaluation concluded that participation in the program did have some lasting effects,
such as skill development and reduction of tensions in the camp.\footnote{Anna Mecagni, “Alchemy Report on World Relief’s Income Generation Animal Husbandry Program”, August 2004}

B. 2005 Findings

In order to assess the impact of World Relief’s income generation activities on the
refugees themselves and on the wider community, I interviewed 48 refugees, 39 of whom
were male, 9 female, and only one of whom had left the camp and was living full time in
Nampula. For most of the interviews I used a translator, as most Congolese refugees in
the camp speak Kiswahili, and the Rwandans and Burundians speak Kinyarwanda and
Kirundi, respectively. Many from all countries also speak French, though women and
those with less formal education often do not. I conducted a few of the interviews in
Portuguese unaided by a translator since a few of the interviewees had learned enough
Portuguese during their time in Mozambique to become conversant.

I employed two translators for my interviews, a Congolese male refugee fluent in
Kiswahili, French, Portuguese and English to interpret for interviews with men, and a
female Rwandan refugee fluent in Kinyarwanda, Kirundi, Kiswahili, French, and English
to interpret during interviews with women. These translators were selected based on a
survey of the various government, UNHCR, and NGO staff who had used translators in
the past and who indicated to me which ones had been the most professional and
respectful of confidentiality. They were compensated at a slightly higher rate than that
paid by UNHCR, through a combination of funding from WR and myself. Though
impossible to fully avoid, I believe this careful selection of translators helped minimize
the extent to which the participants felt uncomfortable talking about these subjects, and
thus helped ensure the most accurate data possible.

Sample composition

Forty-one of the interviewees were from the DRC, while 5 were Burundian and 2
Rwandan. Their ages ranged from 17 to 45, with an average age of 34 (median 33). In
terms of educational background, the refugees interviewed ranged from no schooling (1
person) to 3 years of university (2 people), with the majority having completed secondary
school (27 people). Reflecting the religious diversity of the camp and of the refugees’
origin countries, 11 different religions were represented among those I interviewed,
including Protestant (16), Catholic (7), Jehovah’s Witness (5), Non-denominational
Christian (4), Methodist (3), New Apostolic (2), Pentecostal (2), Assembly of God (1),
Nazarene (1), Anglican (1), and Muslim (1). One person professed to have no religion,
and 4 declined to specify their religion.

Before leaving their countries of origin, the refugees I interviewed came from a variety
of professional backgrounds. The highest concentration of any one stated profession among
the individuals I interviewed was that of teaching (15). Some of the former teachers had
worked in secondary and some in primary schools, and 2 of them had been school
administrators. Six of those fifteen are currently working as teachers in the French language school in the camp. Other individuals interviewed listed their origin country profession as small business owner (11), student (7), carpentry/construction (3), agriculture (3), hospital staff (2), NGO worker (2), factory worker (1), barber (1), electrician (1), and driver (1). One person had been jobless in their home country due to a chronic illness.

Most of the refugees in Maratane camp have fled ongoing crises that have made it unsafe for them to return to their country or region of origin for some time. The stories of those I interviewed reflected that, with the number of years since leaving the origin country ranging from 33 to less than one, with 1998 the average departure year and the median departure year being 2000. The average household size before leaving the origin country was just over 6, with a median of 5 and a range of 1-15 persons. Since coming to Maratane, the average household size among those I interviewed was 7.3, with a mean of 8 and a range of 2-22 people.

The Chicken Project
Thirty-nine of the 48 refugees I interviewed were current or former participants in World Relief’s Chicken Project (CP), while 9 were not (though some were on the waiting list and hoped to participate). Of the 39 CP participants, this was the second interview for 16 of them who had originally been interviewed by Ms. Mecagni last year (in addition, three participants I interviewed claimed to have been interviewed last year, but there was no record of this in Ms. Mecagni’s data). In terms of participation in other WR projects, 26 of the 39 CP participants were also current or former participants in WR’s Agriculture Program (AP), while 12 of them were current or former participants in a WR-related microcredit program, either as a current recipient of a microcredit loan form WR, or as a former member of FCC’s loan program (all but one of these 12 were individuals who also participated in the AP). Seven of the 9 non-participants had participated in the AP and 3 of them had participated in FCC’s microcredit program.

Economic well-being
Accurately measuring livelihood activity and household income (and changes to it over time) in this kind of context is challenging. Because of this, the Alchemy Project questionnaire included many different types of questions designed to elicit different pieces of information that, when taken together, provide a more complete picture of a refugee family’s economic well-being.

In terms of gainful employment, 22 of the 48 total respondents were jobless before starting the Chicken Project with 5 not responding to the question, and the remaining 21 reporting being gainfully employed (even if self-employed, i.e. selling charcoal or produce in the camp market) at that time. Of the former and current CP participants who were working before they started the program, 18 were working beforehand and 33 were working at the time of interview, showing a dramatic increase in the employment level of the participant population after participation. In the sample of 48 refugees as a whole, however, employment went up as well, as only one member of the control group reported being currently unemployed, whereas 3 were jobless (with one not reporting) before the
participant group began their respective terms of participation in the CP. This could point to other factors in the camp or local environment having contributed to the overall rise in employment, not just participation in the CP.

Before participation in the CP, the average maximum monthly income for all respondents (with 20 people not answering the question) was $33, with a median of $7.40 and a range of $0 to $554. The average minimum monthly income for the whole sample before CP participation was $13.80, with a median of $1.85 and a range of $0 to $185. For CP participants, average maximum monthly income before participating in the CP was $13.50, with a median of $7.40, and a range of $0 to $103.50, and average minimum monthly income at that time was $7.25, with a median of $0.92 and a range of $0 to $85. For non-participants, only 3 of the 9 respondents answered this question, as they either did not remember this information or misunderstood the question since it was worded to be specific to those who had participated in the CP.

After participation, the average maximum monthly income of the entire sample was $18.55, with a median of $7.40 and a range of $0 to $92.40. The average minimum monthly income for the entire group was $11.75, with a median of $1.58 and a range of $0 to $92.40. In the participant group, the average maximum monthly income was $17.79, with a median of $10.16 and a range of $0 to $92.40, and the average minimum monthly income was $11.27, with a median of $1.66 and a range of $0 to $92.40. For the non-participant group, the average maximum monthly income was $21.76 with a median of $7.40, and a range of $0 to $92.40. The average minimum monthly income for that group was $14.16, with a median of $3.70 and a range of $0 to $73.90. So, if we take reported changes in income to be an accurate measure of economic well being, the non-participants are and were better off than the participants, and the entire sample was better off before the participants were involved in the CP. However, the unusually high income from one successful non-participant who now earns less money that he used to (and was a participant in WR’s Agriculture Program and used the profits from that program to open the first of his many businesses) significantly skews this data, a common problem with so small a data set.

Currently, 16 of the 48 respondents report that they do have savings, and four of those were individuals who have not participated in the CP (9 people total). The average amount of savings reported among the entire group was $123.63 (median: $73.90; range: $3.70 to $400), while it was $154 (median: $99.05; range: $3.70 to $400) for the participant group and $32.71 (median: $28.46; range: $7.40 to $49.52) for the non-participants.

Regardless of efforts to standardize responses to the income question, there was surely much uncertainty among respondents as to how to calculate monthly income, as most earn a living from sales or other sources which do not issue regularly monthly paychecks. Additionally, all refugees in the camp receive food and non-food items from UNHCR,
and a few (5) receive money from relatives elsewhere. The income question refers to the respondent’s own income, and 11 said that, in addition to their reported income, someone else in their household brought in income or other resources. Since some of the refugees I interviewed were women, and their own income is likely not the primary source of income in the household, it is certain that a good deal of many household’s wealth is not being captured numerically by these questions. Considering the fact that the reported income figures are less than perfect measures of a family’s overall economic well-being, the Alchemy questionnaire also asks about which goods the respondent is able to purchase for his or her family as a way to measure this.

When asked how many times in the last week they bought a list of food products for their family, the refugees I interviewed answered thusly: fresh meat: 4 said once, 1 said 3 times, and 43 said not once; chicken: 3 said once; soap: 23 said once, 5 said twice, and 1 said 4 times; bread: 8 said once, 1 said twice, 1 said 3 times, 1 said 4 times, 1 said 6 times, and 1 said 7 times; drinks: none.

Since chicken and bread are both items which individuals in this context desire to provide for their families but of which they have varying degrees of likelihood of being able to purchase (chicken is much more expensive and is thus a luxury item among this population), it is helpful to take a look at the average number of times a given group was able to purchase these goods in the week preceding the interview. On average, the non-participant group reported being slightly better able to provide both of these goods for their families (bread: 1.44 times; chicken: 0.11 times) than the participant group (bread: 0.43 times; chicken: 0.05 times). However, it is hard to draw much of a conclusion from this since the size of the non-participant group was so small (9 respondents), and includes the aforementioned anomaly.

**Entrepreneurial activity**

Of the 39 refugees who did participate in the chicken project, 15 started a business with the profits (ranging from buying chickens to raise at home or growing produce and selling it in the camp market to opening a carpentry business in Nampula), 13 of which were still operating at the time of interview. Three of those who did not start businesses instead used the money earned to grow their existing businesses, all of which are still operating.

When answering the question, “What did you do with the money you earned from the Chicken Project?”, many individuals had more than one answer, as they did multiple things with the amount earned. Therefore, I will refer here to either the answer given first by the respondent if they listed more than one use for the money, or to the cause to which the largest portion of the earnings was dedicated. Additionally, the amount earned per individual varied quite a bit due to myriad factors that influence the cost of inputs and the amount earned during sale of the chickens. One group, for example, did not earn anything, as one of the members ran off with the profits. While I didn’t ask the question of how much was earned by each interviewee (which would be a helpful question to include in future Alchemy questionnaires), some did mention the amounts they earned, with the response amounts ranging from $22.45 to $149.67 per individual.
As to what they did with the CP earnings, the primary response of 13 refugees was that they spent the money on basic necessities for their family, sometimes pointing to an unusual circumstance, like a mother’s visit, a wife’s pregnancy, or a child’s illness. Many of these 13 also said that the amount earned was so small ($18.71 – $48.64) that they were not able to do anything more substantial and lasting with the profits than help with their family’s basic needs. Twelve interviewees said that they started a business with the profits, though the majority of these “businesses” were buying more chickens and raising and selling them. A couple of people started more substantial businesses, like a salon, a convenience store, and a carpentry business. Six of the refugees I interviewed claimed to have started a business with the profits, but then met some unfortunate fate which caused their business to fail, such as theft or violence from camp residents or Nampula locals, or predators or inclement weather which damaged their livestock or crops. One respondent used the profits to grow his existing business, three reported no earnings at all, and 13 were either non-participants or current participants, and so had not yet received any earnings from the sale of the chickens they were raising.

Most of the refugees I interviewed, regardless of whether or not they’d participated in the CP, said that if they had more money, they would start a business or expand the one they already have. Many of them had specific and creative ideas for the kinds of businesses they would open, including filling gaps in the camp economy by offering services such as butchery and refrigeration, importing items like clothing to sell in Nampula, and opening businesses such as salons and restaurants. There is even a group of young Congolese musicians who, at the time of interview, was applying for a microcredit loan from WR in order to attempt to generate income by playing concerts in Nampula, a project with which they’d already had some success. At the same time, there were 6 interviewees (2 of whom were non-participants) who stated that they wouldn’t want to have more money because they feel it would make them less safe in the camp, as they feared they’d be targeted by others who either resented them or wanted to steal from them or both. However, as with any claims of insecurity, it is hard to know if this is really the view of the respondent or if it is an attempt to demonstrate insecurity in hope of resettlement.

With respect to the training provided by WR before beginning the Chicken Project, 35 of the 39 participants found it to be helpful, with most of those saying they now felt they could go on to raise chickens on their own and perhaps even start their own business. Only one respondent said the training was not sufficient in preparing him for the task of raising chickens, and three did not answer the question. When asked for suggestions as to how to improve the programs, many ideas were offered. Some of the most commonly mentioned were: increase preventive efforts to control the diseases which are causing so many deaths among the chickens and make medicines more readily available, cut costs so that refugees are making enough money to be able to use the profits to start a business, and make or purchase higher quality food to increase the health of the chickens. Other suggestions included making in-kind donations to trained individuals so they can raise the chickens at home (4 respondents); increasing transparency and involvement of refugees in the process of purchasing inputs (4); guaranteeing some minimum level of profit to participating individuals (3); increasing fairness with respect to group selection, as some
families have gotten to participate more than once while others wait for a first time (2); issuing a certificate of completion that refugees can take with them when they leave the camp for future employment purposes (2); and providing more trainings (1).

If offered the opportunity for additional training in any area (not mutually exclusive responses), 13 respondents said they would like (additional) training in animal husbandry and agriculture, especially learning to administer medicines and treat the diseases from which the chickens suffer. Twelve said they would like training in computers, many emphasizing that the current facility operated by World Relief in the camp is inadequate in terms of the number of computers and their capabilities. Other hoped-for trainings include medicine & HIV/disease prevention (5), construction (4), electrical work (2), mechanics (2), tailoring (2), rural & economic development (2), and budgeting and accounting (2). One respondent each expressed interested in attending training in music, theology, human rights, and women’s rights.

Conclusions
Based on these findings, I believe that the Chicken Project has made a small impact on the level of economic well-being of participating refugees during the period of evaluation thus far. While some individuals did see a short term spike in their earnings, and many started small businesses, most of those same respondents saw their income revert to more or less what it had been before participation, as earnings were spent on basic necessities and businesses failed. At the same time, it seems that the non-participants were also able to generate income to support themselves and start businesses in other ways, such as from the Agriculture Project or the sale of food rations. When starting a business, it is usually necessary to have enough money to keep the business going even if there are short term setbacks (such as the thefts, bad weather, or illnesses described by many of the interviewees) to truly have business success in the medium to long term, and the CP does not enable refugees to do this.

For this reason, World Relief is beginning the microcredit program so that those who have been successful in the Chicken Project (or in starting their own businesses independently) will have the opportunity to get the necessary support to get a business off the ground and thus be able to generate income from the endeavor over a longer period of time. I believe that this program, if it is better funded and staffed in the future, will provide the essential bridge between the training and borrower evaluation provided by the Chicken Project and the serious improvement to livelihoods that can result from owning and operating a small business. The Chicken Project by itself, however, is not enough to make a significant difference in the livelihoods of most of the refugees who participate.

However, the CP does seem to provide beneficial training, both in animal husbandry and in small business management, and provides a sense of occupation and purpose which should not be underestimated. As mentioned above, many of the refugees stated that, after CP participation, they felt they had the skills to care for chickens at home and/or start their own business, and these are skills they can use if they integrate locally in Mozambique or if they return home. Nonetheless, the economic impact of this program is not significant enough to motivate either voluntary repatriation or local integration,
especially considering the incentives for staying in the camp. That is, refugees are mostly not leaving the camp because of this program. It must be said, though, that those who are opening businesses in Nampula, and perhaps even living there, are also maintaining their residences in the camp, so it is nearly impossible to know exactly who is effectively living in town.

At the same time, the few refugees whose businesses seem to really have taken off are among those who have received the highest amount of profits from the CP, or have already opened a business before participating. Only two of the 48 refugees I interviewed were operating businesses outside the camp in Nampula, and one additional individual had operated a business in the past which had subsequently failed. Ngena Salumu made $112.25 from the CP in November of 2004, and then opened a salon in Nampula which is still in operation. Bulaya Ma’ano earned $116 from the CP in 2004 and used it to expand the salon he had already opened. However, his salon was burned to the ground (he thinks it was intentional arson by local Mozambicans) and he is now employed by a private contractor that does construction work in the camp. Wisongata Ababele earned $37.42 with the CP in November of 2004, and used it to make a garden, from which he earned enough money selling produce in the camp to start his own furniture making business in Nampula. All three men have applied for the microcredit program and are waiting to hear if they will receive a loan.

These personal stories underline my conclusion that the Chicken Project provides valuable training and occupation for participants, along with a real opportunity at livelihood improvement for the few who are exceptionally resourceful or lucky and/or who earn enough of a profit. However, it costs a considerable amount of time and resources, both on the part of World Relief and of the refugees who participate, to provide a long term benefit to so few. For this reason, I would recommend continuing the program only if a certain minimum amount of profits per participant (perhaps $50) can be regularly guaranteed once the project is no longer in a pilot stage, and if the microcredit program can be expanded, better resourced, and tied more directly to the Chicken Project.

Agriculture Program
Of the 48 refugees I interviewed, 33 had, at one time, participated in World Relief’s Agriculture Program (AP). Of those 33, 26 had also participated in the Chicken Project at some point, while 7 of them had not. When asked about ideas to improve the AP, many interviewees suggested (not surprisingly) providing more supplies, especially fertilizer and pesticides. Other common suggestions were to improve the soil and increase irrigation capacity. A few individuals mentioned feelings of insecurity associated with participation in the AP, one man stating that his daughter was raped while watering a plot far from home and from the inhabited part of camp, and a few others claiming that either locals or other camp residents stole the crops from their gardens.

The AP seems to provide an important, if limited, extra source of income for those who work hard and are fortunate. While evaluating the livelihood impact of this program was not the focus of my work with World Relief, I did encounter stories of refugees who, over
time, had made enough money selling crops from the gardens the AP helped them start to open their own businesses in camp and in Nampula, one of whom were even able to leave the camp and move to Nampula. Bushiri Jomali Rara, for example, left the camp and moved his entire family to Nampula a year prior to the interview. Using profits he made from his agricultural work in the camp, he was able to open a business there. With the profits from that business, he was then able to open a business in Nampula, and today he owns and runs a number of small businesses there, including a bar, a restaurant, a salon, and a small store. I’m sure his success was made more likely by the fact that he had prior business ownership and management experience in his country of origin. Two additional interviewees reported using profits from agriculture to start businesses which were successful at the time of interview. However, this question was not directly asked of them, so there may have been more similar stories amongst the respondents that were not aired during the interviews.

In general, it seems that the AP is a very important project that allows most everyone who participates in it to supplement their diets and their incomes, even if it is only by a small margin. While it takes a more sustained effort and a much longer period of time than the Chicken Project, participation in the AP is also less subject to such extreme variation in the amount of profit garnered per individual, as there is more control on the part of refugees over the amount of money they earn from their endeavors. While the CP often creates a short term spike in a refugees economic well being which is then followed by a return to pre-participation levels, those who participate in the AP seem to have a less dramatic but longer-term benefit from participation.

**Microcredit Program**

Twelve of the 48 refugees with whom I spoke were current or former participants in a World Relief-related microcredit program, either as a current recipient of a microcredit loan from WR, or as a former member of FCC’s loan program (all but one of these 12 had also participated in the AP). Nearly all of the current microcredit clients stressed that the loans were too small and the repayment times too short for them to really be able to get a business off the ground, but this is something that WR is actively working on improving through increased funding as it develops this new project. Six of the 48 individuals interviewed have applied for the new microcredit program but have not yet heard whether or not they’ll receive a loan, while 4 are current members of the program. Of these 10 people, 9 had stated plans for what they would do with the loan money, including those who wanted to expand existing businesses (4), and those who would start brand new ones (6).